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WAR  DEPARTMENT 
THE  ADJUTANT  GENERAL'S  OFFICE 


MUSKETRY 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1917 


Wak  Department. 

Document  No.  (531. 

Office  of  The  Adjutant  General. 


UD 


335 


\> 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

Wasiiinoton,  ■/»///  /.S.   inn. 
Till'  followinj;  nianunl  on  "  .Musketry  "  is  approvtHl  and  puli- 
lislicd  for  use  in  tlie  instruction  and  training  of  tlie  Armies  of 
Uie  United  States. 

[0(52.001,  A.  G.  O.] 

Ry  order  of  the  Secuetauy  ok  War  : 

TASKER  H.  BLISS, 

Major  (li'Hcral,  Art i in/  Chief  of  Staff. 
Official: 

H.  1'.  McCain. 

The  Adjutant  General. 

3 


r- 


938C 


PREFACE. 


An  organization's  ultimate  cfliciency  in  battle-fiold  liriti;,'  !>; 
dependent  upon  the  thoroughness  of  its  training  in  ImUviiiual 
marksmanship,  leadership,  and  teamwork. 

Maxinuim  results  can  not  be  obtained  by  (1)  a  poor  slKuitiiig 
company  under  the  best  of  leadership,  (2)  a  good  shooting  com- 
pany under  poor  leadership. 

There  can  be  no  serious  discussion  among  military  men  as 
to  the  relative  value  of  individual  and  collective  training  in 
sliooting,  as  one  is  dependent  upon  the  other. 

The  course  as  given  in  the  Small  Arms  Firing  Manual  for  the 
development  of  the  individual  marksnuin  should  be  carefully 
followed  and  every  effort  made  to  bring  each  man  to  as  near  a 
state  of  perfection  as  possible. 

It  nuist  be  rememi)ered,  however,  that  the  S(^ldier  is  being 
ti-ained  to  work  as  one  of  a  team,  hence  hand  in  hand  with  the 
training  of  the  man  to  shoot  should  go  the  instruction  and 
training  to  tit  him  to  intelligently  play  his  part  in  that  team, 
be  that  part  a  leader  or  follower. 

Musketry  is  nothing  more  than  teamwork  in  the  conduct  of 
fire.  Instruction  must  be  systematic  if  the  best  results  are  to 
be  obtaintHl.  The  principles  involved  are  first  explained  and 
then  by  practical  demonstration,  or  actually  doing  it  himself, 
the  soldier  has  impressed  upon  him  the  U'ssoii  it  is  desired  to 
teach,  or,  in  other  words,  he  is  first  taught  the  WHY,  and  then 
by  actually  seeing  the  thing  done  or  by  doing  it  him.sclf  he 
learns  the  HOW.  This  HOW  is  the  important  consideration,  as 
Hohenloe  in  his  letters  on  infantry  says : 

"  The  officer  connnanding  a  company  very  rarely  finds  himself 
in  war  in  a  position  to  make  great  tactical,  and  still  less  to 
make  strategical,  evolutions. 

"  His  o!)jective.  whether  in  the  offensive  or  the  defensive,  is,  as 
a  rule,  very  clearly  marked  out  for  him.  Hut  the  struggle,  so 
far  as  he  can  influence  it,  is  decided  by  HOW  he  carries  out 

5 


6  PREFACE, 

liis  work,  by  HOW  his  iiioii  take  advantage  of  the  ground,  HOW 
they  tiiul  cover,  HOW  tliey  shoot,  and  WHETHER  they  hit,  and 
HOW  they  obey  signals  witli  regard  to  advancing,  lying  down, 
aiming,  and  tlie  nature  of  fire." 

Tlie  object  of  the  book  is  to  present  to  the  company  officer  a 
text  on  tlie  WHY  and  HOW  of  MUSKETRY. 

The  subject  matter  of  this  volume  is  based  on  the  courses  of 
instruction  at  the  School  of  Musketry  at  Fort  Sill,  Okla. 

It  is  a  compilation  by  Capt.  O.  P.  Robinson,  Nineteenth  In- 
fantry, director  of  the  experimental  department  of  this  school. 
It  covers  as  completely  as  possible  in  a  volume  of  this  size  the 
subject,  and  is,  for  the  most  part,  based  upon  the  course  of 
MUSKETRY  as  taught  at  this  school,  and  upon  Maj.  H.  E. 
Eames'  well-known  book,  "  The  Ritle  in  War." 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Paragraph. 

Chapter  I. — The  Conduct  of  Fiuk 1-19 

The  private,  position  and  duties 2-3 

The  corporal,  position  and  duties 4-.T 

Tlie  platoon  sruides,  position  and  duties 6-7 

The  platoon  leaser,  position  and  duties 8 

The  first  sergeant 9 

The  raiijie   estimators 10 

The  hufilers,  position  and  duties 11 

The  captain,  position  and  duties 12-1.3 

The  battalion  staff,  position  and  duties 14-15 

The  major,  position  and  duties lG-17 

The  colonel,  position  and  duties 18-19 

Chapteu   II.— Mimtaky  Tkrms 20-21 

Chapter  III. — The  Theory  of  Fire 22-50 

Definitions 23 

The  trajectory 24-3r» 

The  propelling  forces 25 

Gravity  26 

Resistance  of  the  air 27 

Other  factors  affecting  angle  of  departure, 
sighting  of  rifles,  jump,  drift,  fixing  the 
bayonet,  rests,  oily  barrel,  rigidity  of  tra- 
jectory    28-35 

The  sheaf 36-39 

The  danger  space 40-43 

Effect  of  .slopes  and  sites 44-49 

Ricochets 50 

Influence  of  the  point  of  aim 51 

Combined  sights 52-54 

The  battle  sight 55-56 

7 


8  TABLE  OP  CONTENTS. 

Paragraph. 

Chapter  IV. — Instruments 57-87 

Field  glasses 58-72 

The  Galilean  glass 59-60 

The  Porro  prism  glass 61-62 

To  determine  interpupilary  distance 63 

To  focus  the  eyepiece 64 

Characteristics  of  a  good  field  glass,   power, 

light,  field , 65 

Suggestions  for  the  use  of  glasses  in  the  field 70 

Care  and  preservation 71 

Exercises  in  the  use  of  field  glasses 72 

The  mil  as  an  angular  unit  of  measure 73 

The  rear  sight  leaf 75 

The  finger 76 

The  mil  rule 77 

The  musketry  rule 78-81 

The  mil  rule  as  a  range  finder  and  telemeter 81 

Switching  fire 86 

Use  of  musketry  rule  in  connection  with  combined 

sights 87 

Chapter  V. — Designation  and  Recognition  of  Service 

Targets 88-97 

Target  designation 90-97 

Methods  of  designation   (horizontal  and  verti- 
cal clock  systems,  use  of  auxiliary  aiming 

target,  reference  point) 92-96 

Suggested   exercises 97 

Chapter   VI. — Visual  Training 2. 98-100 

Suggested  exercises 99-100 

Chapter  VII. — The  Determination  of  IIanges 101-130 

Estimating  distances 107-111 

Collective  estimating 112 

Range  estimators 114 

Taking  the  range  from  a  map 117 

Obtaining  the  range  from  troops  already  engaged 118 

Measuring  the  range  directly  on  the  ground 119 

Estimating  distance  by  sound 120 

Range  finders 121 

Range  cards  and  range  marks 123-125 

Simple  range  cards  for  attack  and  defense 124-125 

Ranging 126-130 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  9 

rarat'rnpli. 
ChAPTEK  VIII. — FlUE  DiSTRIBtJTION 131-140 

Switch   inethod VM 

In   (lefeuse 138 

Exercises  in  tarjret  (listrii)ution 139-141 

Aiming  tripod 140 

Chai>tek  IX. — Auxiliary   Aimi.ng  Targets 142-14G 

The  ranfie  scale  for  u.so  witii  auxiliary  targets 142-143 

U.se  of  imisketry  rule  to  obtain  sight  .setting 144 

Choice  of  an  aiming  target :_  145 

Chaptek  X. — Battle-Field  Com mtn ration 147-1." 

Me.ssengers 141) 

Verbal  messages 150 

Duties  of  messengers 151 

Exercises  to  teach  conmiunication  and  the  use  of 

signals 152-ir)7 

Chapter  XI. — The  Use  of  Cover 15S-1(;3 

Firing  from  cover 162 

Cover  from  shell  fire 1G3 

Chapter  XII. — Battt.e-Fiei.d  Reconnaissance  and  the 

Selection  of  Firing  Positions 164-178 

Battle   reconnaissance 167 

Personnel  and  training 169 

Equipment 170 

Area  covered 171 

Routes 172 

Firing  positions 173-175 

Reconnaissance  at  night 176-178 

Chapter  XIII.— Fire  Tactics 179-221 

Troop  leading 181-1S9 

The  choice  of  target 1!)() 

The  density  of  the  firing  line 192-107 

Kinds  of  fire  (indirect,  unalmed  of  position  or 
covering,  enfilade,  concentrated,  distributed,  con- 
verging, nuitual  supporting  or  covering) 19S-206 

Rate  and  volume  of  fire 207-216 

Distance  between  echelons 217-219 

Observation  of  fire , 220-221 

Chapter  XIV. — Vulnerarility  of  Formations 222-227 

CHAPTm  XV.— Night  Firing 228-231 

Chapter  X^'I. — Ammtnition  Supply 232-237 

Chaptfij  XVII. — Musketry  in  Trench  Warfare 238-240 


10  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 

Paragraph. 

Chapter  XYIII. — The  Solution  of  Fire  Problems 241-269 

The  solution 242-254 

The  tire  estiniiite  (tjl)servtition  of  tarjiets,  de- 
termination of  ranges,  relative  importance  of 
targets,  strength  of  firing  lines,  location  of 
firing  positions,  classes  of  fire,  rate  of  fire, 
time  of  opening  fire,  formations  in  advancing 

under  fire,  ammunition  supply) 214-254 

The  fire  order  (announcement  of  the  sight  set- 
ting, designation  of  targets,  directions  as  to 
occupation  of  fire  positions,  rate  of  fire,  class 
of  fire,  time  of  opening  fire,  position  of  leader 

during  fire) 255-261 

Example  of  a  problem  with  solution 262-269 

Chapter  XIX.— The  Umpire 270-283 

The  critique 271-274 

The  umpire's  assistant 275 

The  umpire's  records 276 

Form  for  umpire's  record 278-2S3 

Chapteij  XX. — Preliminary  Exercises    (without  ball 

ammunition) 284 

Chapter  XXI. — The  Construction  of  Fire  Problems-  297-300 

Preparation 298 

Form - 299 

Mission 300 

Chapter  XXII. — Situations  for  Fire  Problems 318-328 

Chapter  XXIII. — An  Example  of  the  Constructio.n, 
Solution,  and  Critique  of  a  Fire  Problem    (Ball 

Ammunition)     301-317 

Statement  of  the  problem  (troops,  situation,  object, 
time,  target,  ammunition,  critique,  situation  for 

leader,   requirement) 302-306 

A  solution 307-309 

The  critique  (leadership  and  conduct — personnel, 
fire  effect,  general  comment,  was  the  mission  ac- 
complished, explanation  of  comparison) 310-317 

Chapter  XXIV. — Problems  Suitable  for  a  Class  "A" 

Range    329-332 

For  the  squad 329 

For  the  platoon 330 

For  the  company  (offensive) , 331 

For  the  company  (defensive) 332 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  11 

I'uraKra])!). 

Chapter  XXV. — Thk  Statistical  okmcicu 3S:{-:i02 

Statistical    records 33.'{-:W5 

The  form 334-333 

Sources  of  information  (l).v  observation,  from  tlie 
umpire,  from  tlie  ranf^e  ollicer,  from  the  com- 
mander of  the  lirinj;  unit.  l).v  computation) 3:W 

Entries  in  the  record  (hits,  true  range,  visibility, 
estimated  ranf,'e,  tiring  data  used,  figures  in  tar- 
get, center  of   impact) -  337-344 

Result     conipai-ed     with     standard      (liits,     figures 

struciv.  rale.  time,  shots,  men,  ricochets  included)   34r)-,3."»2 

liesults  (hits  and  figures  si  ruck,  rate,  time,  shots, 

men,  ricochets  included) 3.")."i-3r)(} 

<'(»mi»aris()ns  (comparative  strengths,  comparative 
time,  hits  expected  for  shots  fired,  distribution 
expected  from  hits  made) 357-359 

Statistical  otticer's  tables 3<n-3(52 

Chapter  XXVI. — The  IiJipiue's  Uekerence  Tahi.e 3G4-372 

Distribution    factor 364-365 

Tables    3G6-367 

Use  of  tables  in  judging  results  of  fire  (general  iise 
in  Judging  results.  descrii)tifiu.  normal  conditions, 
variable  cuudilions,  time  and  men  comparison)-  3(58-373 


EXERCISES  AND  PROBLEMS. 


Paragraph. 

Teaching  military  terms 20 

To  teach  the  use  of  held  glasses 72 

To  teach  how  to  locate  an  object  with  the  field  glass  and  to 

pick  it  up  with  the  naked  eye 72 

Estimation  of  the  range,  using  musketry  rule 81 

Estimation  of  fronts,  using  musketry  rule 81 

Determination  of  front  to  be  covered  in  mils,  using  mus- 
ketry rule 81 

Use  of  mil  rule  as  a  range-tinding  instrument 81 

Laying  out  a  mils  scale  in  feet  on  a  building  or  board  fence 

on  which  to  adjust  the  mil  rule,  rear  sight,  and  finger —  82 

To  test  the  length  of  the  cord  on  the  musketry  rule 83 

To  teach  the  use  of  the  I'ear  sight 84 

To  teach  the  use  of  the  finger 85 

To  teach  the  use  of  horizontal  and  vertical  clock  faces 97 

To  teach  the  selection  of  a  reference  point 97 

To  teach  when  not  to  use  reference  points 97 

To  teach  observation  and  memory  (visual  training) 98 

To  teach  an  effective  method  of  searching  a  given  area 99 

To  teach  the  effect  of  distance  on  the  appearance  of  ob- 
jects and  the  recognition  of  service  targets 99 

To   teach   the   effect   of  backgrounds   and   distinct   and 

neutral-tinted  uniforms  on  the  visibility  of  targets 99 

To  teach  the  effect  of  movement  on  the  visibility  of  tar- 
gets and  the  need  for  avoiding  unnecessary  movements 

in  loading  and  firing 99 

To  teach  the  unit  of  measure  in  estimating  distance 110 

To  teach  the  estimation  of  distance  by  the  eye 130-111. 116 

To  teach  the  collective  estimation  of  distance 112-113 

To  teach  the  determination  of  the  range  with  the  range 

finder 122 

To  teach  fire  leaders  the  apportionment  of  the  target ; 
determination  of  the  range  by  the  use  of  range  esti- 
mators, and  the  issuance  of  fire  orders 139-140 

12 


EXERCISES   AND   PROBLEMS.  13 

r;ilil;.'l;il)li. 

To  teach  "men  are  so  instructetl  that  ear!i  (ires  oii  ili.ii 

part  of  the  target  wliich  is  directly  opposite  iiim  "_.  1 40 

To  toacli  the  "  wifiw r.f?  " ITiii 

To  teach  tlie  sciuaphore ir»:i 

To  teacii  men  to  (iciivcr  sliort  v(>rl)al  mi»ssa^;es I'A 

To  teacli  tlie  triiiisiulssioii  of  lirin^  dala  raitidly  and  acf-n- 

rately  and  witliont  dt'<  rojisinii-  ihc  riitf  of  liiv ITiri 

To  teach  the  prescril)ed  si.-n;ils  (II   47,  I.  I).  1{.) IHO 

To  train  an  oriranizati' r.  In  sndi  manner  tlial  tiie  cliain  of 
connnaiid    and    h'adersliip    will    nut    he    iiilcii-uiiled    by 

casualties ir»7 

To  train  the  men  not  to  shift  their  fire  to  unauthorized 
targets,  hut  tn  c<intinne  firing  in  the  assigninl  sector  and 

at  (he  designated  objective  until  ordered  to  change T.tl 

To  train  men  to  fire  at  the  ordered  rate 214 

To  train  men  to  load  rapidly 215 

To  train  men  to  set  their  sights  quickly  and  accurately 216 

To  train  the  battalion  in  the  supply  and  distribution  of 

annnunition  to  the  firing  line 236 

To  teach  the  attack  in  trench  warfare 240 

A  map  problem  and  a  possible  solution 262 

A  terrain  exercise  and  a  possible  solution 26o 

A  terrain  problem  without  ball  annnunition 268 

Estimation  of  front  of  a  definite  extent  at  various  ranges^       286 
To  teach  harmonizing  ranges  used  throughout  a  given 

firing  line 2S7 

To  teach  designation  of  targets 288 

To  teach  the  use  of  auxiliary  aiming  targets 281) 

To  teach  accurate  and  quick  sight  setting  and  the  use  of 

combined  sights 21)0 

To  teach  fire  direction 201 

To  teach  fire  control 292 

To  teach  fire  discipline 293 

To  teach  to  apply  all  the  principles  of  fire  direction, 
fire  control,  and  fire  discipline,  covered  in  previous 
exercises,  and,  in  addition,  the  use  of  suitable  means  to 
maintain  fire  superiority  during  advances  of  the  firing 
line,  particularly  the  proper  distrilnition  of  fire  cover  of 

the  entire  target  during  rushes 294 

Same  as  preceding  and,  in  addition,  the  particular  appli- 
cation of  the  various  prescribed  methods  of  communi- 
cation        295 


14  EXERCISES  AND  PROBLEMS. 

Paragraph. 

To  teach  the  supply  of  amiuunitioii  of  the  Hrinj^  line 296 

Example  of  the  eoustruction  of  a  fire  problem 801-306 

Example  of  the  solution  of  a  lire  i)rol)lem 3U7-308 

Example  of  a  critique  on  the  construction  and  solution 

of  a  fire  problem 309-316 

Problem  suitable  for  a  class  A  ran^'e : 

To  illustrate  the  leadership  of  the  squad 329 

To  illustrate  the  leadership  of  a  platoon 330 

To  illustrate  fire  direction,  control,  and  discipline  of 

a  company  on  the  offensive 331 

To  teach  quick  estimation  of  distances,  quick  sight 
setting,  study  of  the  foreground,  and  apportion- 
ment of  target,  for  a  company  on  the  defensive 332 


ILLUSTRATIONS. 

Paragraph. 

Fi{,'.    1.  IllustruUn^'  toi'iiis  rclaliuj,'  lu  the  lr;ijeclui'y -^i 

2.  lUustratiiifi  iiu>:ui  or  .">0  per  cent  disper.sion 37 

S.   IllustrMtiiii;'  (l.uifiin-  spare 41 

4.  Illustrating  elTect  of  slopes  and  sites 4.'j 

5.  lilustratinj,'  difference  in  tiring  at  targets  on  a 

slightly  rising  .slope  and  level  ground 48 

6.  Illustrating  upper  and  lower  sheaf  in  combined 

sights ^li 

7.  Arrangement  of  lenses  in  the  Galilean  glass r»9 

8.  Illustrating  the  path  of  rays  through  the  prisms 

of  the  I'orro  prism  glass 61 

9.  Illustrating  method  of  measuring  the  field  of  a 

field  glass 08 

10.  Illustrating  the  mil  scale  engraved  on  type  EK 

glass 74 

11.  Method  of  holding  rifle  when  rear  sight  is  used 

as  a  mil  measuring  instrument 75 

12.  The  mil  rule 77 

13.  The  nnisketry  rule,  front  view 78 

14.  The  musketry  rule,  hack  view 78 

1.").  Designation  of  target,  using  mil  scale 92 

16.  Designation  of  target,  using  rear  sight 92 

17.  Designation  of  target,  using  fingers 92 

18-19.  Illustrating  teaching  of  clock  face  systems___  97 

20.  Illustrating  needless  movements  in  assuming  firing 

positions   I'K) 

21.  Illustrating  evils  of  needless  exposure  when  pre- 

paring to  rush 100 

22.  Effect  on   trajectory  of  error   in  estimation   of 

range 191 

23.  Range  card  for  attack 123 

24.  Range  card  in  defense 124 

25.  Sight  correction  in  ranging 126 

16 


16  ILLUSTRATIONS. 

Paragraph. 
Fig.  26.  Sight  correction  with  glasses  fitted  with  mil  scale.       126 

27.  Showing  nselessness  of  ranging  when  ground  in 

front   and   rear  of  target  is  not  visihle  from 

firing    point 128 

28.  Illustrating  volleys  in  ranging 130 

29.  Illustrating  individiial  shot  groups  of  a  squad 132 

30.  Platoon  fronts  of  a  battalion  in  attack 135 

31.  Illustrating  use  of  reference  point 137 

32.  Illustrating  the  apportionment  of  fire  sectors  to 

companies  in  a  battalion  in  defense 138 

33.  The  aiming  tripod 139 

34.  Illustrating  the  use  of  the  aiming  tripod 139 

35.  Illustrating  distribution  over  target  only  partly 

visible 141 

86.  Illustrating  method  of  teaching  men  to  fire  on  that 

part  of  target  which  is  directly  opposite  him 141 

87.  Illustrating  the  principle  on  which  the  use  of 

the  range   scale  is  based   in  connection   with 
auxiliary  aiming  targets 142 

38.  Use   of  field   glass   in   designating  an   auxiliary 

aiming    target ' 146 

39.  Illustrating  chain  of  battle-field  signals  and  chan- 

nels for  transmission  of  commands  within  the 

battalion 148 

40;  Illustrating  correct  position  firing  from   a   fold 

in  the  ground 162 

41.  Illustrating  incorrect  position  firing  from  a  fold 

in  the  ground 162 

42.  Correct  position  for  a  right-handed  man  firing 

from  behind  a  tree 162 

43.  Incorrect  position  of  a  right-handed  man  firing 

from  behind  a  tree 162 

44.  Platoon  columns — checkerboard  formation 193 

45.  Platoon  columns — echeloned  from  left  to  rear 193 

46.  Advance  in  thin  lines 193 

47.  Illustrating  bunching  in  rushing 195 

48.  Illustrating  skirmish  line  crowded  so  den.sely  that 

men  can  not  fire 195 

49.  Illustrating  indii'ect  (aimed)  fii'e 198 

50.  Illustrating  unaimed  or  sw^eeping  fire 198 

51.  Illustrating  fire  of  position,  or  covering  fire 199 


ILLVSTRATIONS.  17 

Paragraph. 

FIg.o2.  IllustnUinf,' oiifilMdo  fire 201 

r»3.  Ilhisti-iitinii  (.oiutMil Tilted  lire 202 

54.  IlliistraliiiK  distributed  fire 203 

55.  Converf^in^    lire . 204 

5G.  Mutual  supportiufj  or  covering  lire 205 

57.  Relative  size  of  target  offered  yy  a  company  of  15 

squads  in  cctUunn  of  s((Uiitls,  jjlaloon  coluiuiis, 


squad  columns,  and  skirmish  line 


224 


58.  Map  for  use  in  solution  of  example  of  map  prob- 
lem      262 

59-68.  Maps    illustrating    situations    for    fire    prob- 
lems    319-328 

3529°— 17 2 


MANUAL  ON  MUSKETRY. 


chapti:r  I. 

THE  CONDUCT  OF  FIRE. 

1.  The  conduct  of  fire  includes  fire  direction,  fire  control,  juul 
fire  discipline. 

FIRE  DIRECTION  is  the  function  of  the  captain  and  higher 
commanders.  Above  the  grade  of  captain  the  direction  is  princi- 
pally tactical.  The  maximum  fire  effect  of  an  organization  is 
attainable  only  through  efficient  fire  direction.  Efficient  fire 
direction,  on  the  part  of  the  captain,  implies  the  ability  quickly 
and  accurately  to  estimate  any  given  situation,  arrive  at  a  cor- 
rect decision,  and  to  issue  simple  and  effective  orders  to  carry 
out  that  decision. 

FIRE  CONTROL  is  the  function  of  subordinate  leaders  and 
their  assistants  within  the  company.  It  consists  of  the  issue 
and  transmission  of  orders  and  of  the  enforcement  of  fire  disci- 
pline in  such  a  manner  as  to  carry  into  effect  the  will  of  the  fire 
director. 

FIRE  DISCIPLINE  is  a  term  used  to  express  the  degree  to 
which  the  individual  riflemen  of  an  organization  are  amenable 
to  fire  control. 

As  appliiHl  to  an  organization,  the  expres.sion  "good  firo 
discipline "  implies,  first,  that  the  individual  riflemen  po.ssess 
the  knowledge  and  training  requisite  to  good  niarksniiinship,  and, 
second,  that  their  state  of  mind  is  such  that  their  expert  knowl- 
edge and  training  is  placed  promptly,  willingly,  and  inielligently 
at  the  disposal  of  their  leaders,  to  he  used  in  delivering  an 
effective  fire  when,  where,  whence,  and  in  such  maimer  as  the 
latter  may  dictate,  and  this  in  rigorous  subordination  of  their 
own  will. 

10 


20  MUSKETRY. 

Similarly  appliod,  tlio  oxi)ression  "  poor  fire  discipline "  im- 
plies that  some  or  all  of  the  riflemen  of  the  organization  are 
lacking  in  one  or  both  of  the  essential  attributes  of  "  good  fire 
discipline." 

In    musketry,    the   instructor    must   distinguish    betweiMi    the 
things  which  the  men  merely  need  to  know  or  to  understand 
and  those  which  need  to  be  practiced  until  they  become  habits. 
For  instance,  the  men  should  be  taught : 
aiilitary  terms. 

The  fundamentals  of  the  theory  of  rifle  fire. 
The  principles  used  in  the  construction  and  operation  of  the 

instruments  used  in  the  direction  and  control  of  fire. 
A  system  in  the  designation  and  recognition  of  targets. 
To  use  their  eyes. 

The  use  of  auxiliary  aiming  targets. 
Battle-field  communication. 
The  use  of  cover. 
Battle-field  reconnaissance. 

The  fundamentals  of  fire  tactics,  consisting  of — 
Troop  leading. 
Choice  of  target. 
The  distribution  of  fire. 
The  density  of  the  firing  line. 
The  determination  of  the  range. 
The  time  of  opening  fire. 
The  kinds  of  fire. 
The  rate  and  volume  of  fire. 
The  distance  between  echelons. 
The  service  of  observation  of  the  enemy. 
The  ammunition  supply. 
The  officer,  to  be  qualified  as  an  instructor,  must  understand: 
The  construction  and  solution  of  fire  problems,  and  exercises 

with  and  without  ball  ammunition. 
The  duties  of  umpires,  including  the  making  of  the  critique, 

and  use  of  umpire's  reference  tables. 
The  duties  of  the  statistical  officer. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  men  must  be  trained  by  practice  and 
repetition  until  the  things  they  should  do  on  the  battle  field  have 
become  fixed  habits  with  them. 

The  following  oiitline  gives  in  convenient  form  the  duties  of 
the  personnel  in  the  conduct  of  fire : 

Note. — It  is  to  he  emphasized  that  all  cfficers  and  nonconimissioned 
officers  must  be  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  duties  of  all  below  them. 


MUSKETRY.  21, 

I.   THE   PRIVATE. 

2.  Position. — Deployed  in  liiu':  Oiu"  yard  per  man  (lliH,  I.  I). 
H. ),  unless  a  greater  extension  is  dlreeteil  in  the  order  U>r  de- 
ployment (120,  I.  1).  R.). 

3.  Duties.— (0.  42-47,  1(»4,  l.'^:^.  VM.  VAX,  ^:v.).  141».  l.'.2-ir.(;.  iju:!. 
2(>9.  23;i,  247,  2r>].  2.".4.  2.V..  .-{ID.  :5.'.4.  and  :{(;7,  I.  1  >.  It.,  ami  2ti<i. 
S.  A.  F.  M.) 

The  individual  soldier  must  he  trained  : 

1.  To  obey  commands  promptly  and  without  question. 

2.  To  transmit    simple  veri)al   mi'ssa.ires   rapidly  and  ac- 

curately. 

3.  To  transmit   and  receive  hattle-lield  signals. 

4.  To  recognize  tar^'ets  from  description  (piicUly. 

5.  To  descrihe  and  define  targets. 

G.  To  use  rear  sight  in  de.scrihing  targets. 

7.  To  use  horizontal  and  vertical  clock  systems,  singly 

or  in  comhination  in  descrihing  targets. 

8.  To  set  sights  (puckly  and  accurately  as  ordered. 

9.  To  bring  jiiece  to  shoulder,  aim  carefully  and  deliber- 

ately from  lial)it,  and  to  reload  (luickly. 

10.  To  fire  at  tiie  orderetLrate. 

11.  To  fire  at  the  part  of  the  designated  objective  which 

corresponds  to  his  position  in  the  firing  line,  unless 
otherwise  directed. 

12.  To  continue  firing  in  the  designated  sector  and  not  to 

change  therefrom  unless  ordere<l. 

13.  Not  to  slight    invisible  parts  of  the  target  for  more 

visible  ones. 

14.  To  maintain  constant  observation  to  the  front. 

15.  To   utilize   folds   of   ground   for   concealment    in    ad- 

vancing and  firing. 
IG.  To  distinguish  between  concealment  and  defilade. 

17.  To  select  firing  positions. 

18.  To  recognize  dead  ground  in  his  vicinity. 

19.  To  recognize  a  good  and  bad  field  of  fire. 

20.  To  understand  etTects  of  visibility   and   the  selection 

of  backgrounds. 

21.  To  fire  from  all  iiositions.  from  behind  hillocks,  trees, 

heaps    of    earth     and     i-ocks,    depressions,    gullies, 
ditches,  doorways,  and  windows. 

22.  To  obey  promptly  orders  to  susijeud  and  cease  firing. 


22  MUSKETRY. 

23.  To  ignore  whistle  signals,   except  suspend  firing. 

24.  To  watcli  closely  for  tlie  expected  target  after  having 

suspended  firing. 
2r>.  To  drop  into  the  nearest  interval  when  reinforcing  the 
firing    line,    and    obey    the   orders   of   the    nearest 
squad  leader. 

26.  To   transmit   firing   data    rapidly    and    accui'ately    to 

men  of  tlie  supports  joining  the  firing  line,  and  this 
without  decreasing  his  own  rate  of  fire. 

27.  To  cjill  for  range  and  target  when  reinforcing  firing 

line. 

28.  To  liave  confidence  in  his  own  ability  to  hit. 

29.  To  a  system  of  sight  setting  and  fixing  bayonets  in 

order  that  there  may  be  no  cessation  of  fire  in  the 
unit  during  tliis  operation. 

30.  To  prepare  for  rushes  witliout  decreasing  tlie  fire  of 

tlie  unit  unduly. 

31.  To    avoid    unnecessary    movement    in    preparing    for 

rushes. 
.32.  To  spring  forward  at  command,  "  Rush  !  ".  or,  "  Fol- 
low me  !  "  without  preliminary  rising. 

33.  To  avoid  bunching  in  rushing. 

34.  Not  to  swerve  to  the  right  or  left  in  search  of  cover, 

but  to  advance  in  a  straight  line  in  order  not  to 
blanket  the  fire  of  men  in  his  rear. 

35.  To  droi>  quickly  at  end  of  rush  and  crawl  up  to  the 

line  if  in  rear  of  it. 

36.  To  appreciate  the  comparative  vulnerability  of  men — 

(o)   Making  long  rushes, 
(ft)   Making  short  rushes. 

37.  To  remain  with"  his  own   company,   but   if  he    acci- 

dentally becomes  separated  from  his  company  or 
squad  to  join  the  nearest  one. 

38.  To    maintain    silence    except    when    transmitting    or 

receiving  firing  data  and  charging. 

39.  To  retain  presence  of  mind. 

40.  To  be  careful  not  to  waste  ammunition. 

41.  To   use   the  30  rounds   of   ammunition    in   the   right 

pocket  section  of  the  belt  only  upon  the  order  of 
an  officer. 


MUSKETRY.  23 

42.  To  remain  with  tiie  liiiiit^  line  after  bringing  up  ain- 

nuinition. 

43.  To  utilize  anummitiou  of  the  dead  or  wounded. 

44.  Never  to  attempt  to  eare  for  dead  or  wounded  duriiiii 

the  action. 

45.  To  have  contidence  in  liis  ability  to  use  tlie  bayonet. 

46.  To  a  firm  determination  to  dose  with  the  enemy. 

47.  To  preserve  the  line  in  charging. 

48.  To   untlerstand    that   a   charge  should   be   slow   and 

steady.     (The  more  agile  men  must  not  run  away 
from  the  slower  one.s. ) 

49.  To  form  up  innnediately  after  the  charge  and  follow 

the  enemy  with  tire,  not  attempting  a  disorganized 
pursuit. 

50.  To  understand   that  it  is  suicidal  to  turn  his  back 

to  an  enemy,  and  that  if  lie  can  not  advance  he 
must  intrench  and  hold  on  until  dark. 

51.  To  construct  hasty  cover  giving  him  protection  from 

rifle  and  shrapnel  bullets. 

52.  To  intrench  himself  at  night. 

53.  To  conceal  his  trench. 

54.  To  provide  himself  with  substantial  head  cover. 

55.  To  protect  himself  from  flank  and  enfilade  fire. 

56.  To  make  loopholes  giving  him  a  wide  field  of  fire. 

57.  To  make  his  trench  a  comfortable  one,  so  that  he  can 

sit  in  it  for  several  hours  without  constraint. 

58.  To  count  distant  groups  of  objects  or  beings. 

59.  To  recognize  s(>rvice  targets. 

60.  Never  to  fire  until  he  understands  what  the  target  is, 

at  what  part  he  is  to  fire,  and  with  what  sight  set- 
ting. 

II.  CORPORAL. 

4.  Position. —  (1)  Marching  in  line  as  center  skirmisher  of 
squad  (124.  I.  D.  R. )  or,  (2)  when  skirmish  line  is  halted,  innne- 
diately behind  his  squad. 

5.  Duties.—  !  Tars.  42.  222,  2.-.2.  2.54,  2.-)5.  411,  and  .j51,  I.  D.  11.. 
cover  in  general  the  corporal's  duties.) 

1.  Ileceives  his  instructions  from  the  platoon  leader. 

2.  .Vnnounces  sight  setting. 

3.  Points  out  indicated  objectives  to  his  squad. 


24  MUSKETRY. 

4.  Assigns  as  the  squad  target  that  portion  of  the  platoon 

target  which  corresponds  to  tlie  position  of  tlie 
squad  in  tl>e  platoon. 

5.  Announces  class  and  rate  of  fire. 

G.  When  liis  squad  is  ready  to  fire,  looks  toward  the 
platoon    leader    and    holds    up    his    hand.      At    the 
platoon  leader's  signal  to  commence  firing,  he  sees 
that  the  squad  opens  fire. 
Thereafter — 

1.  Requires  all  to  fire  from  the  shoulder. 

2.  Requires  all  to  use'  ordered  rate  of  fire. 

3.  Assures  himself  that  all  fire  at  designated  objective. 

4.  Prevents  slighting  of  invisible  portions  of  the  target 

for  more  visible  parts. 

5.  Prevents  men  from  changing  fire  to  unauthorized  tar- 

gets not  in  the  assigned  front  or  sector. 

6.  Maintains   constant  observation   to   the  front   when 

squad  is  firing,  for  effect  of  fire ;  when  squad  is  not 
firing,  for  appearance  of  enemy. 

7.  Insures  prompt  obedience  to  orders  to  suspend  and 

cease  firing. 

8.  Makes  men  utilize  ground  to  fullest  extent  for  con- 

cealment in  firing  and  advancing. 

9.  In  sight  setting,  changing  sights,  and  fixing  bayonets 

has  front  rank  perform  operations  first  (rear-rank 
men  increasing  rate  of  fire)  and  then  the  rear  rank 
follow  while  the  front-rank  men  make  up  for  loss 
of  fire  for  the  rear  rank,  thus  insuring  that  the 
rate  of  fire  for  the  squad  does  not  fall  off. 

10.  Prevents  increasing  vulnerability  of  the  squad  while 

preparing  for  a  rush,  and  rushes  as  soon  after 
cease  firing  as  possible. 

11.  When  other  squads  of  his  platoon  are  rushing,  or  the 

platoon  which  is  covering  the  same  target  as  is  his 
platoon  is  rushing,  he  has  his  squad  increase  its 
rate  of  fire  to  make  up  for  the  lost-fire  effect  of  the 
rushing  element. 

12.  In  rushing,  causes  men  to  spring  to  feet,  running  at 

full  speed ;  all  men  drop  to  the  ground  at  the  same 
time,  and  those  who  are  in  rear  to  crawl  up  to  the 
line. 


MUSKETRY.  25 

13.  When  rein  forcing  the  liriiij;  line,  takes  over  the  dulifs 

of  disabled  squad  leaders.  For  this  purpose  his 
squad  may  ilroj)  into  line  at  one  i)lace  and  he  may 
move  to  the  rij^ht  or  left  where  there  is  a  squad 
leader  needed.  If  there  are  no  vaeaneies  caused  by 
disabled  scjuad  leaders,  he  drops  into  line  and  as- 
sists the  squad  leaders  wlui  nvr  there. 

14.  Prevents  decreasing;  rate  of  lire  when  men  are  trans- 

niittiuK  data  to  arriving:  supports. 

15.  Prevents  wasting  of  ammunition. 

16.  I'revents  use  of  30  rounds  in  right-pocket  section  of 

belts,  exce])t  on  order  of  an  oflicer. 

17.  Distributes   amnuuiilion   of   dead   and    wouikIcmI    jukI 

ammunition  brought  up  from  rear. 

18.  I'revents  decreasing  the  rate  of  tire  while  ammunition 

is  being  distributed,  or  when  at  other  times  there 
is  reasonable  assurance  that  the  fire  will  continue 
to  be  effective  without  further  control. 

19.  Notilies  the  platoon  leader  when  the  ammunition  in 

the  bandoliers  has  been  iised. 

20.  Looks  to  the  rear  only  at  the  sound  of  his  platoon 

leader's  whistle  "Attention." 

21.  Takes  his  position  in  rear  of  his  squad  when  it  is  tir- 

ing and  remains  there,  where  he  can  control  its 
fire,  and  only  crawls  into  line  and  adds  his  ritle 
when  all  control  is  lost  (short  ranges). 

22.  To  control  his  squad  he  does  not  walk  up  and  down 

behind  it,  but  rolls  along  behind  his  line  and  keejis 
down. 

23.  Leads  his  squad  in  moving  to  the  front  or  rear. 

24.  Must  know   thoroughly   the  drill   regulation  signals, 

and  have  a  good  practical  knowledge  of  the  theory 
of  lire. 

25.  In    rushing,    maintains   the    direction    of   advance    of 

his  squad,  so  as  not  to  blanket  the  tire  of  scpiads 
in   his   rear. 

26.  Takes    advantage    of   every    lull    in    the    action    and 

every  favorable  opportunity  to  reorganize  his  s(piad 
and  get  it  more  under  control. 

27.  Checks  every  breach  of  fire  discipline,  abates  excite- 

ment, and  prevents  any  man  from  leaving  the  squad 
to  go  to  the  rear  for  any  purpose  whatsoever. 


26  MUSKETRY. 

28.  If  called  out  of  line  to  act  as  guide,  notifies  desig- 
nated private  (103,  I.  I).  R.)  to  take  command  of 
squad. 

III.  PLATOON  GUIDES. 

6.  Position. 

1.  Behind   lii-ini:   line,    near   the   platoon    leader.      (163, 

I.  D.  II.) 

2.  Advancing  in  line,   behind   center   of  platoon.      (213 

and  223,  I.  D.  R.) 

3.  "Advanci-  l)y  thin  lines,"  leads  even  numbered  lines. 

(218,  I.  D.  R.) 

7.  Duties.— (104,  213,  223,  229,  2.52,  367,  375,  and  376,  I.  D.  R.) 

1.  The  platoon  leader's  assistant,  and  may  be  assigned 

any  duty  the  platoon  leader  sees  fit. 

2.  Keeps  adjoining  units  under  observation. 

3.  Watches  firing  line. 

4.  Checks  every  breach  of  fire  discipline. 

5.  Prevents  skulking,  men  leaving  the  ranks  at  any  time 

to  care  for  wounded,  etc. 

6.  Designates    new    squad    leaders    and    organizes    new 

squads  when  necessary. 

7.  Attaches  men  that  h.ave  become  separated  from  their 

own  squads  to  other  squads. 

8.  Insures  prompt  and  orderly  advance. 

9.  On  joining  firing  line  from  the  support  takes  over  du- 

ties of  sergeants  disabled. 

10.  May  receive  and  transmit  signals  to  the  captain. 

11.  If  the  platoon  leader  is  disabled,  he  takes  over  his 

duties.     Hence  he  should   know  what  the  platoon 
leader  is  doing  and  how. 

12.  When  taking  over  the  duties  of  the  platoon  leader 

he  calls  the  senior  corporal  of  his  platoon  out  to  act 
as  guide. 

IV.  THE  PLATOON  LEADER. 

(The  fire  controller.) 

8.  Position. — Where  he  can  best — 

1.  Control   the   squads   constituting  his   platoon.      (2.52, 

I.  D.  R.) 

2.  Observe  the  target  and  fire  effect.      (252,  414,  415, 

I.  D.  R.,  and  216,  S.  A.  F.  M.) 

3.  Observe  the  captain  for  signals  or  commands.      (234 

and  2.51,  I.  D.  R.) 


MUSKETRY.  27 

4.  In    "Advaiu'e    l».v    thin    lines,"    leads    odd    nunihi'nMl 
lines.     (218.  I.  I).  U.) 
9.  Duties.— (0,  42,   104.  229.  231-233,  244,  24.'5-2o7,   310.  .37r., 
;iii(l  .").")(».  I.  D.  U.)     Controls  tlie  lire  of  his  platoon  and  in  his 
lire  orders — 

1.  Receives  his  orders  from  the  company  comm.iiKlt'r. 

2.  If  necessary,  may  indicate  the  tire  position  that  has 

been  ordered. 

3.  Announces  sight  setting, 

4.  Points  out  designated  targets  to  his  platoon.  If  prac- 

ticable; otherwise  to  his  corporals  only,  or 

5.  When  the  target  can  not  be  seen,  indicates  an  aiming 

target. 

6.  Assigns   targets   to    insure    that   the   entire    front   or 

sector  given  him  by  the  company  commander  will 
be  covered  with  tire. 

7.  Gives  class  of  tire. 

8.  Announces  rate  of  tire. 

9.  If  commanding   a    tlank   platoon,    details   a    man    to 

watch  for  signals  from  the  combat  pjilrols. 

10.  When  his  corporals  have  signaled  that   their  squads 

are  ready   to   lire,   signals   the   captain  by   looking 
toward  him  and  holding  up  hand. 

11,  When    captain    signals    "  Commence    tiring,"    repeats 

same  to  corporals. 
Thereafter— 

1.  Observes  for  tire  effect, 

2.  When  platoon  is  not  tiring,  takes  the  necessary  steps 

to  insure  that  the  front  assigned  is  kept  luider 
constant  observation  for  any  appearance  of  the 
enemy  or  any  change  of  position, 

3.  Changes  sight  setting  of  his  platoon  when  necessary. 

4.  Regulates  rate  of  tire. 

f).  Increases  rate  of  tire  when  large  and  distinct  targets 
appear,  and  decreases  it  when  the  target  becomes 
small  and  indistinct. 

6.  Prevents  decrease  in  rate  of  fire  when — 

(a)  Changing  sight  setting. 

(b)  Preparing  for  rushes. 

(c)  Fixing  bayonets. 

(d)  Transmitting  firing  data  to  supports. 

(e)  Distributing  ammunition. 


28  MUSKETRY. 

7.  Increases  the  rate  of  lire  to  cover  the  advance  of  adja- 

cent units ;  for  this  purpose  progress  and  move- 
ments of  adjoining  units  are  Ivept  under  observa- 
tion. 

8.  Maintains    direction    of   advance   of   his   platoon    in 

rushing,  so  as  not  to  bhinl<et  fire  of  adjacent  units. 

9.  Is  on  the  alert  for  captain's  commands  or  signals ;  for 

this  purpose  he  may  use  his  platoon  guide. 

10.  May  use  his  platoon  guide  to  observe  adjoining  units. 

11.  Must  understand  all  signals. 

12.  Leads  his  platoon  in  advancing  and  charging. 

13.  Prevents  changing  fire  to  unauthorized  targets. 

14.  Insures  distribution  of  ammunition  brought  up  from 

the  rear  and  the  collection  and  distribution  of  same 
from  dead  and  wounded.     (.550,  I.  D.  R.) 

15.  Notifies  the  company  commander  when  the  ammuni- 

tion in  the  bandoleers  has  been  used. 

16.  In  coming  up  with  reinforcements,  he  takes  over  the 

duties  of  disabled  platoon  leaders  of  the  platoons 
into  which  his  men  have  dropped,  or  it  may  be  some 
other  section  of  the  line  needs  his  service,  in  which 
case  he  goes  there. 

17.  Endeavors  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  squads,  desig- 

nates new  squad  leaders  to  replace  those  disabled, 
organizes  new  squads  when  necessary,  sees  that 
every  man  is  placed  in  a  squad,  and  takes  every 
opportunity  for  restoring  order  in  the  firing  line. 
(104  and  375,  I.  D.  R.) 

V.  THE  FIRST  SERGEANT. 

9.  Commands  a  platoon. 

VI.  RANGE   ESTIMATORS. 

10.  Five  or  six  officers  or  men,  selected  from  the  most  accurate 
estimators  in  the  company,  are  designated  "  Range  Estimators." 
(240,  I.  D.  R.) 

Duties. — To  estimate  the  range  to  target  when  directed  to 
do  so. 


MUSKETRY.  29 

VII.   BUGLERS. 

11.  Position. — Joins  tlic  ("iidMiii   wlicn  ilic  cuiupaiiy  deitlo.vs. 
(164,  I.  D.  R.) 

Duties.— (liHr),  I.  D.  U.) 

1.  ( )iie  bugler — 

(«)   Ob.sorves  tlie  enemy. 

(b)  Observe.s  the  tarfret. 

(c)  Observes  for  tire  elVect. 

(rf)   Watelies  platoon  leaders  for  siirnals. 
(c)   Transmits  si{;nals  to  i)lafoon  leaders. 

2.  The  other — 

(«)    Wateiies  the  major  lor  sijrnals  ;iiid  repeals  tiiem 

back. 
(h)  Transmits  Information  to  tlie  major. 

3.  Both— 

(fl)   Repeat  bugle  .signal  "  Tharge."     CilO.  T.  T).  U.) 
(ft)  Carry  field  gla.sse.«!.  message  pads,  pencils,    and 

signal  flags.     (I.  U.  A.  E.  M.,  387.  I.  D.  R.) 
(c)  Act  as  messenger.s. 
All  the  foregoing  requires  that  they  be  proficient  in — 
(«)   Signaling;  hand,  arm.  and  letter  codes. 
(b)   Ob.servation  for  fire  effect. 

(<■)   Location  and  definition  or  description  of  targets. 
(d)  Bugle  calls. 

VIII.  THE  CAPTAIN. 

(The  fire  director.) 

12.  Position. — Wliere  he  can  best — 

1.  Control  his  four  platoons.     (24.S.  T.  D.  R.) 

2.  Observe  fire  effect.     (240,  I.  D.  R.) 

3.  See  the  ma.jor  and  platoon  chi(>fs.      (2.34.  I.  D.  R.) 

13.  Duties. — Before  fire  action  : 

1.  In  compliance  with  tlie  ma.j«»r's  orders,  conducts  his 

company    to   the   i)lace  of  deployment    in    the  best 
manner.     (212  and  207.  I.  D.  R.) 

2.  Designates   target    and    allots   jtart    to   each    i^latoon. 

(24.'i  and  240.  I.  D.  R.) 

3.  Determines  the  range.      (240  and  240.  I.  D.  R.) 

4.  Announces  sight  settiug.     (240,  I.  D.  R.) 


80  MUSKETRY. 

5.  Indicates  the  class  of  lire.     (249,  I.  D.  R.) 

6.  Time  to  open  tire.     (249,  I.  D.  R.) 

7.  Informs   tlie  subordinates  as  to  tlie  location  of  the 

battalion    commander    and,    when    necessary,    an- 
nounces his  own  position. 
During  the  action: 

1.  Observes  fire  effect.      (249,  414,  415,  I.   D.  R.,   and 

216,  S.  A.  F.  M.) 

2.  Corrects    material    errors    in    sight    setting.       (249, 

I.  D.  R.) 

3.  Prevents  exhaustion  of  ammunition.     (249,  550,  and 

551,  I.  D.  R.) 

4.  Distributes  ammunition  received  from  the  rear.     (249 

I.  D.  R.) 

5.  Provides   for   the  collection  and   distribution   of  the 

ammunition  of  the  dead  and  wounded.  (551, 
I.  D.  R.) 

6.  Notifies    the    major    when    the    ammunition    in    the 

bandoleers  has  been  used. 

7.  Is  on  the  alert  for  the  major's  signals  or  commands. 

(226  and  234,  I.  D.  R.) 

8.  In  the  absence  of  express  directions  from  the  major, 

if  commanding  a  flank  company,  determines  when 
advances  by  rushes  shall  be  attempted.  (311, 
I.  D.  R.) 

9.  Indicates  size  of  fractions  to  rush.     (311,  I.  D.  R.) 

10.  Leads  a  rush  by  entire  company.     (223,  I.  D.  R.) 

11.  Leads  the  charge.     (319,  I.  D.  R.) 

12.  When  necessary,  designates  new  platoon  leaders  and 

sees  that  new  squads  are  organized  and  new  squad 
leaders  designated  to  replace  those  disabled.  (104 
and  375,  I.  D.  R.) 

IX.  BATTALION   STAFF. 

14.  Positions. — Battalion  adjutant  and  battalion  sergeant  ma- 
jor, with  major. 

Mounted  orderlies,  both  with  major  (one  with  major  and 
one  with  adjutant)  until  horses  are  sent  to  rear,  when  both 
may  be  with  the  horses  or  one  take  the  horses  and  the  other 
remain  with  the  major. 


MUSKETRY.  81 

15.  Duties. — All  assist  the  major  in  any  way  dircctod  by — 
(a)   Kec'«»iiiiaissaiK-e.      (5G5,  I.  D.  U..  and  25,  F.  S.  K.) 
(6)   Observation  of  the  firing  line. 

(c)  Maintaining  contact  with  regimental  headquarters. 

(d)  Maintaining  contact  with  the  support. 

(e)  Receiving,  conununicating,  and  sending  visual  signals 

from  and  to  front  and  rear. 
(/)   Observing  lire  effects  and  progress  of  events. 
((/)   Keeping  copies  of  all   orders,  messages,   and   other 
data  necessary  for  his  war  diary.     (35,  F.  S.  K.) 
When  there  is  only  one  range  finder  to  the  battalion,  the  bat- 
talion sergeant  major  is  the  "  Battalion  range  taker."     When 
not  actually  engaged  in  taking  ranges,  he  assists  the  major  as 
heretofore  outlined  or.  preferably,  he  may  be  charged  with  the 
duty  of  maintaining  communication  with  the  companies  of  the 
firing  line. 

The  major  designates  a  sergeant  to  take  charge  of  the  bat- 
talion combat  train.  Under  the  major's  direction,  this 
sergeant — 

(a)  Conducts  the  combat  train  as  far  to  the  front  with  ihe 

battalion  as  directed. 
(6)   Issues  amnuinition  to  the  battalion. 

(c)  Takes  the  combat  train  to  rendezvous  for  refilling,  un- 

der direction  of  the  regimental  commander.  The 
emi)ty  combat  wagons  of  a  brigade  are  usually  sent 
to  the  distributing  station  in  a  body. 

(d)  Rejoins  the  battalion,  if  it  is  not  in  action,  or,  if  it  be 

engaged,  joins  or  establishes  communication  with  the 
regimental  reserve.     (548.  549.  and  553,  I.  D.  R.) 

X.  THE  MAJOR. 

The  battalion  is  the  attack  unit  whether  acting  alone  or  as  a 
part  of  a  larger  force.     (305.  I.  D.  R.) 

16.  Position  (the  general  rules  for  a  colonel  apply). 

1.  Where  he  can  best — 

(c)  Direct  the  reinforcing  of  the  firing  line  from 

the  support.     (315,  I.  D.  R.) 
(&)  Observe  the  progress  of  events.     (369.  I.  D.  R. ) 
(c)   Maintain    contact    with    regimental    headquar- 
ters.    (309.  I.  1).  R.) 

2.  On  the  firing  lino  when  all  the  supports  have  joined. 

(315,  I.  D.  R.) 


82  MUSKETRY. 

17.  Duties. — 

GENKRAL  RULES. 

1.  Conducts  liis  hattaliou  nccordinj;-  to  the  sector  nnd  the  mis- 

sion assigned  liiui. 

2.  Directs  first  disposition  of  tlie  battalion  l)y  tactical  orders, 

giving  subordinates — 
(a)   Information  of  tlie  enemy. 
(&)   Position  of  supporting  and  neighboring  troops. 

(c)  The  general  object  to  be  attained. 

(d)  The    special    problem    for    each    company.       (291, 

I.  D.  R.)     30.3  I.  D.  R.  the  primary  apportionment 
of  the  target. 

(e)  The  point  of  time,  if  practicable,  at  whicli  tlie  fire 

fight  is  to  open.     (304,  I.  D.  R.) 

(/)  Oi'ders  for  flank  protection  and  reconnaissance,  un- 
less specifically  provided  for  by  higher  authority. 
(293,  397,  and  398,  I.  D.  R.) 

(g)  His  position  and  that  of  the  next  higher  com- 
mander. 

3.  Controls,  supports,  dispatches,  reinforcements  from  support 

to  firing  line.     (226  and  297,  I.  D.  R.) 

4.  Controls  subsequent  movements  by  suitable  orders  or  com- 

mands.    (291,  I.  D.  R.) 

5.  Regulates  ammunition  supply,  under  which  heading  he  (316 

and  317,  F.   S.  R. ;  the  combat  train  is  the  Immediate 
reserve  supply  of  the  battalion) — 
(a)   Is   responsible   for   the  proper  use  of  the  combat 

train. 
(6)  insures  maintenance  of  the  prescribed  allowance  at 
all  times. 

(c)  Causes  combat  trains  to  march  Immediately  in  rear 

of  the  battalion  unless  directed  otherwise.  (548, 
I.  D.  R.) 

(d)  When  battalion  deployed  on  his  own  initiative.  Indi- 

cates whether  extra  ammunition  shall  be  Issued. 
(294.  I.  D.  R.) 

(e)  When  battalion  deployed  pursuant  to  orders  from 

higher  authority,  causes  issue  of  extra  ammuni- 
tion imless  specifically  ordered  not  to  do  so. 
(294  and  548,  I.  D.  R.) 


MUSKETRY.  33 

(/)    A\'li('ii  coiiiliat    wa^'otis  jirc  ciiiiit  ic^d,  directs  tliciii  to 
l)ri)]K'r  rciuk'zvoiis  (<>  l»e  rrlilletl.     (HiS,  I.  I).  R.) 

((/)   Sees  tliJit  eoiiihat  wajrons  and  Itolts  of  men  are  re- 
lilled   as   soon    as  i)ossil»le   afliT  an   «'iif;af,'t'iiK'iit. 
(."53.  I.  D.  II.) 
(I.   ;N!aiMtaiiis  contact    \\\\\\   ad.joiiiin:^  troojis.      (30!).    I.   I).   K.) 

7.  May  liarnionizo  ran.u'os  used  Ity  tlio  conipanii's  on  tlie  lirini; 

line. 

8.  IX'tt'i-nunos  when  bayonets  sliall  be  fixed.      (31.S,  I.  D.  R.) 

9.  Sul>jert    to    orders    from    liiulier    autliority,    «leterinines    tlie 

l)oint  from  wlncli  the  cliarse  is  to  be  made.     (310,  I.  D.  R. ) 
Tt.  Ord.-rs  the  charfie.     (318,  I.  D.  R.) 

SPECI.VT.. 

1.  In  attack: 

(^0   May  .select  forn:ation  in  wliicli  companii's  advance. 

(212,  I.  D.  R.) 
(b)   Designates — 

1.  The  direction  of  the  objective.     (303,  I.  D.  R. ) 

2.  The  companies  for  the  firing  line. 

3.  The  compaines  for  tlie  support. 

4.  The  order   and  front  of  the  comjianies   in  the 

tiring  line. 

5.  The  right  or  left  company  of  the  firing  line  as 

the  base  company, 

6.  If  he  desires,  when  the  advance  by  rushes  is  to 

start.     (311,  I.  D.  R.) 

2.  In  defense: 

(a)  Describes  the  front  of  each  company.     (292,  I.  D.  R.) 

(b)  Assigns  sector  of  tire.     (244  and  302,  I.  D.  R.) 

(c)  Locates  tire,  communicating,  and  cover  trenches. 

(d)  Directs  preparation  of  obstacles. 

(c)  Assigns  companies  to  construct  trenches  and  ob- 
stacles. 

(/)   Details  troops  to  occupy  trenches.     (.321.  I.  D.  R.) 

(i/)  Causes  firing  line  and  supjiorts  to  fix  bayonets  when 
a  charge  by  the  enemy  is  imminent.     (324,  I.  D.  R. ) 

(h)  Seeks  opportunities  for  counter  attack.  (326,  I. 
D.  R.) 


34  MUSKETRY. 

XI.  THE  COLONEL. 

18.  Position  (.360.  .380.  ami  .528,  I.  D.  R.) 

1.  Advuncins  to  the  battle  field  as — 

(«)  ludependent  coininander  ordinarily  marches  with  the 
advance  jiuard  in  order  that  he  may— 

1.  Receive  infoi-mation  promptly. 

2.  Personally  see  the  situation   (reconnoiter). 

3.  Order  the  deployment. 

4.  Begin  the  action  strictly  iu  accordance  with 

his  own  wishes. 

(b)  Subordinate  commander.     (427,  I.  D.  R.)     After  re- 

ceiving his  order  for  the  action,  precedes  his  com- 
mand as  far  as  possible  in  order  to — 

1.  Personally  reconnoiter  the  ground. 

2.  Be  prepared  to  issue  his  orders  promptly. 

2.  During  the  action,  such  as  will  enable  him  to — 

(a)   Observe  the  progress  of  events. 

(h)   Receive  and  transmit  messages  and  orders. 

(c)  Be  in  constant,  direct,  and  easy  communication  with 

the  reserve.     (369,  I.  D.  R.) 

19.  Duties: 

(«)  After  having  received  his  orders,  the  regimental  com- 
mander leads  his  regiment  forward  In  column  or  in 
line  of  columns  until  the  time  arrives  for  issuing 
the  regimental  order.    He  then  (426,  I.  D.  R.)  — 

(&)  Assigns  targets  and  sectors  or  .tasks  to  battalions 
and  special  units.     (.842,  381,  and  426.  I.  D.  R.) 

(c)  Provides  for  necessary  reconnais.sance  to  front  and 
flank.     (428,  I.  D.  R.) 

((J)  Announces  his  position  and  also  that  of  the  next 
higher  commander. 

(e)  Controls  the  reserve  as  the  tactical  situation  de- 
mands.    (441,  I.  D.  R.) 

(/)  Regulates  ammunition  supply.  (316,  F.  S.  R.,  and 
.552,  I.  D.  R.) 

Note. — The  colonel  is  assisted  in  the  performance  of  his  duties  by  the 
regimental  staff. 


CHAPTER  II. 
MILITARY  TERMS. 

20.  Tlio  avor;ifie  man  upon  enlisting;  in  the  Armj'  finds  him- 
self in  a  little  coinnuinity  set  apart  from  the  rest  of  the  world, 
stranj,'e  in  its  life,  its  customs,  and  its  lanj^uage. 

Misunderstandinjis  are  avoided  and  instruction  facilitated  if 
the  recruit  in  his  early  training  is  taught  to  talk  tlie  lany^age. 

The  following  exercise  is  suggested :  The  sciuad  is  taken  to 
some  prominent  point  from  which  there  is  a  good  view  of  the 
surrounding  country,  or.  if  available,  a  landscape  target  may 
be  used. 

The  instructor  describes  in  detail  simple  prominent  features, 
such  as  a  part  of  the  skyline  or  the  line  of  a  bank  or  hedge, 
and  then  requires  each  man  in  the  squad  to  describe  in  similar 
terms  another  part  of  that  line.  The  men  are  instructed 
as  to : 

Skyline,  horizon,  crest  of  hill,  ridge,  knoll,  peak,  cliff,  col  or 
.saddle,  gentle  slope,  steep  slope,  hollow  or  valley,  spur,  ravine, 
clearing,  fold  in  the  ground,  dense  cover,  culvert,  cut  embank- 
iuent,  sunken  road,  parapet,  crossroads,  road  fork  or  road  junc- 
tion, right  and  left  bank  of  a  stream,  a  path. 

The  shape  and  nature  of  the  ground  is  described ;  whether  it 
is  level,  undulating,  or  broken ;  rock,  sandy,  or  pasture  land. 

Natural  and  artificial  features,  the  different  kinds  of  trees, 
fences,  undergrowth,  and  the  shape  and  size  of  the  fields  with 
the  col(»r  of  the  earth  or  crops  growing  are  iiointed  out  and  ex- 
plained. 

The  approximate  measurements  of  objects,  roughly  estimated, 
are  given,  a.s,  for  instance,  whether  they  are  large,  small,  of 
moderate  size,  tall,  short,  wide,  or  narrow. 

These  rough  measurements  often  help  to  distinguish  objects, 
such  as  trees,  fields,  hedges,  or  houses,  from  one  or  more  objects 
of  a  similar  nature.  Jlen  are  first  practical  in  completing  the 
description  of  sections  or  areas  of  ground  and  features  com- 
mence<l  by  the  instructor,  and  as  i)rogress  is  made  they  describe 
areas  which  are  merely  jjointed  out  by  tlie  instructor. 

35 


36  MUSKETRY. 

21.  Instruction  in  military  terms  provides  an  opportunit.v  for 
training  tlie  men  in  the  study  of  ground,  witli  referenee  to  de- 
fensive features,  lines  of  ai>proacli,  etc.  This  is  of  the  greatest 
military  importance.  Tlierefore,  while  on  tliis  subject  the 
instructors  train  the  men  to  recognize  all  features  of  military 
importance,  such  as  good  defensive  positions,  good  lines  of 
approach,  good  halting  places  for  attack,  covered  approaches, 
dead  ground,  obstacles,  and  good  or  dangerous  cover.  When 
the  men  have  learned  to  recognize  all  features  of  military 
importance  the  instructor  indicates  an  area  of  ground  and  ques- 
tions each  man  of  the  squad  as  to  what  military  features  may 
be  seen.  The  men  then  describe  these  military  features  in  cor- 
rect terms. 

The  men  should  also  be  taught  simple  geometrical  terms,  as 
round,  square,  conical,  right  angles,  parallel,  horizontal,  vertical, 
perpendicular,  etc.,  and  such  military  terms  as  line,  column, 
infantry,  and  cavalry,  etc. 


CTTAITKK  ITT. 
THE  THEORY  OF  FIRE. 

22.  Tlio  fire  director  works  witli  a  most  powerful  and  flexible 
medium — the  fire  of  the  modern  rillc  He  should  l>e  a  master 
of  this  medium.  al>le  to  jrauw  its  powers  and  to  recofndze  its 
weaivuess.  lie  must  know  when  it  is  protitalile  to  fire  and  when 
it  is  not  profital)le.  He  should  know  how  to  increase  fire  elli- 
ciency  when  necessary  acc<jrding  to  the  particular  local  condi- 
tions surrounding  a  concrete  case.  All  of  which  implies  that  he 
have  a  tliorough  knowletlge  of  the  theory  of  fire. 

23.  Definitions. — In  the  discussion  of  ritle  fire  the  following 
terms  are  commonly  us(h1  (see  fig.  1 )  : 

"^(1)  Trajectory. — The  curve  dpscj;jh(Ml  by  tlie  bullet  in  its 
flight  througli  the  air — bdf.  It  is  divided  into  the  rising  and 
falling  branches,  the  highest  point,  called  the  summit,  being 
the  division.  Tim  distance  of  the  sunnnit  from  the  muzzle  of  the 
rifle  is  a  little  greater  than  half  the  range. 


Kit;.  1. 


^{2)  Range. — The  distance  from  the  nuizzle  of  tli(>  rill(>  to 
the  target  ihf). 

.(.S)  Line  of  aim. — Tiie  prolongation  of  llie  line  of  collimation 
established  by  the  front  and  rear  sights  or  by  the  telescopic 
sight. 

••'(4)  Line  of  site. — The  imaginary  line  joining  the  target  and 
the  axis  of  the  l»i)re  at  the  muzzle  {bf). 

v(5)  Line  of  departure. — The  prolongati(»n  of  the  axis  of  the 
bore  at  the  iustaut  the  bullet  !eaves  the  rifle  {be). 

37 


38  MUSKETRY. 

(G)  Angle  of  departure. — The  viTticul  ani^le  between  the  line 
of  departure  and  the  line  of  site.  It  is  the  angle  of  elevation 
plus  the  jump. 

(7)  Angle  of  elevation. — The  vertical  angle  between  the  line 
of  site  and  the  prolongation  of  the  axis  of  the  bore  when  the 
riUc  is  aimed   (/(). 

(8)  ftuadrant  angle  of  departure.^ — The  vertical  angle  between 
the  lino  oi  departure  and  a  horizontal  plane  passing  through 
the  axis  of  the  bore  at  the  muzzle  (y).  It  is  the  angle  of 
departure  plus  the  angle  of  site. 

(9)  Quadrant  angle  of  elevation. — The  vertical  angle  between 
the  axis  of  the  bore  when  the  rifle  is  aimed  and  a  horizontal 
plane  pa.ssing  through  the  axis  of  the  bore  at  the  muzzle  {x). 
It  is  the  angle  of  elevation  plus  the  angle  of  site. 

(10)  Angle  of  site. — The  vertical  angle  between  the  line  of 
site  and  a  horizontal  plane  passing  through  the  axis  of  the  bore 
at  the  muzzle  (~). 

(11)  Angle  of  fall. — The  vertical  angle  between  the.. line  of 
site  and  the  tangent  to  the  trajectory  at  the  point  of  fall  (/>:). 

(12)  Jump. — The  vertical  angle  through  which  the  barrel 
moves  during  the  travel  of  the  projectile  from  breech  to  muzzle 
(/).  It  is  the  difference  between  the  angle  of  elevation  and  the 
angle  of  departure. 

(13)  Point  of  impact. — The  point  at  which  the  bullet  strilies 

(14)  Point  of  aim. — The  point  at  which  the  line  of  aim  is  or 
should  be  directed  (/).  ^ 

(15)  Initial  velocity. — The  rate  of  speed  of  the  bullet  as  it 
leaves  the  muzzle. 

(16)  Remaining  velocity. — The  velocity  of  the  bullet  at  any 
point  of  the  trajectory. 

(17)  Plane  of  fire. — The  vertical  plane  containing  the  line  of 
departure. 

(IS)  Drift. — The  departure  of  the  bullet  from  the  plane  of 
fire. 

(19)  Ordinate. — The  vertical  distance  between  the  trajectory 
and  the  line  of  sight.  This  distance  is  measured  at  any  point  in 
the  flight  of  the  projectile  and  on  a  line  perpendicular  to  the  line 
of  sight. 

(20)  Shot  group. — The  pattern  made  on  the  target  by  all  of 
the  bullets  fired  by  an  individual  or  a  body  of  men.  If  made  on 
a  vertical  target,  it  is  called  a  vertical  shot  group;  if  on  a 
horizontal  target,  a  horizontal  shot  gi'oup. 


MUSKETRY.  30 

^(21)  The  sheai. — A  cpiu^  coiitainiii!^  all  the  trajectories  of  a 
series  of  shots.  I^  is  called  an  individual  sheaf  when  the  series 
of  shots  in  tiie  jtattern  has  l)een  lired  by  a  single  individual.  It 
is  called  a  colle<'tive  sheaf  when  the  pattern  is  the  result  of  the 
collective  hriiiir  of  more  than  one  individual. 

,,(22)  The  rifling. — A  jjun  barrel  is  said  to  be  rilled  when  it 
lias  spirtijl  jjrooves  cut  down  the  bore. 

The  rifling  directly  affects  the  trajectory,  by  enabling  the 
elongated  bullet  to  be  used  instead  of  the  round  ball  of  former 
days.  The  advantage  of  this  bullet  over  the  round  ball  is  that 
the  long  pointed  bullet  has  great  weight  in  comitarison  to  the 
surface  directly  olTered  to  the  air.  The  combination  of  the 
rirting  ami  tlie  long  bullet  also  gives  the  bullet  stability  or  steadi- 
ness of  flight  and  increases  the  accuracy  of  the  arm. 

THE   TIJA.IKCTORY. 

n.  The  curvature  or  shape  of  the  trajectory  is  influenced  by — 

(1)  The  propelling  force  (explosion  of  the  powder  charge). 

(2)  Gravity. 

(3)  The  resistance  of  the  air. 

25.  (1)  The  proiiclliiu/  force. — The  explosion  of  the  charge 
drives  the  bullet  forward  and  causes  it  to  leave  the  muzzle 
with  a  very  high  rate  of  speed.  This  rate  is  called  the  initial 
velocity. 

The  service  amnmnition  is  loaded  with  a  charge  of  powder 
which,  when  fired  from  a  standard  Springfield  rifle  with  se- 
lected bullets  and  with  the  air  at  a  temperature  of  70°  P.  at 
the  time  of  firing,  gives  a  muzzle  velocity  of  2.700  feet  per 
.second.  That  is  to  say,  this  bullet  would  travel  2.700  feet  in 
the  first  second  if  the  rate  of  motion  remained  unchanged. 

Due  to  unavoidable  variations  in  manufacture,  this  standard 
Initial  velocity  will  vary  by  plus  or  minus  (±)  20  foot-seconds 
(f.  s. )  even  with  the  best  ammunition. 

Further  variations  in  initial  velocity  are  caused  by  variations 
in  temperature,  barometric  firessure,  and  humidity. 

For  additional  study  o'f  this  subject  the  student  is  referred 
to  Ordnance  publication  No.  192,'?,  "Description  of  the  United 
States  magazine  rifle." 

26.  (2)  Gravity. — Gravity  is  the  natural  attraction  which 
draws  all  unsupported  bodies  toward  the  center  of  the  earth 
with  ever-increasing  spee<l.  This  attraction  commences  to  act 
on  the  bullet  the  moment  it  leaves  the  muzzle  of  the  rifle  barrel. 


40  MUSKETRY. 

The  effect  of  the  force  of  sravity  is  to  change  the  path  of  the 
bullet  from  a  straight  to  a  curved  line  and  finally  bring  it  to 
the  earth. 

Elevation. — In  order  to  allow  for  the  fall  of  the  bullet,  owing 
to  the  force  of  gravity,  it  is  necessary  to  direct  the  line  of 
departure  as  much  above  the  object  to  be  hit  as  the  bullet  will 
fall  below  it  in  any  given  distance  if  the  axis  of  the  barrel  is 
pointed  at  the  mark.  The  rifle  is  provided  with  a  sight  which 
permits  the  soldier  to  keep  in  sight,  while  the  muzzle  of  the 
barrel  is  elevated,  the  point  that  it  is  desired  to  hit. 

Every  soldier  knows  that  elevating  the  muzzle  of  the  rifle 
causes  the  bullet  to  go  higher  in  the  air  and  as  a  result  go 
farther.  This  elevating  the  muzzle  by  raising  the  slide  on  the 
leaf  sight  and  sighting  at  an  object  causes  the  bullet  to  leave 
the  rifle  not  along  the  line  of  aim  but  above  that  line. 

27.  (3)  Resistance  of  the  air. — The  bullet  in  its  flight  from 
the  rifle  to  the  target  displaces  the  air  in  every  direction ;  the 
resistance  of  the  air  offered  to  the  displacement  depends  upon 
the  shape  of  the  bullet,  its  rate  of  motion,  and  the  density  of 
the  air.  It  is  much  gi'eater  for  those  bullets  having  a  high 
than  a  low  velocity. 

The  effect  of  wind  increases  or  decreases  with  its  velocity 
and  depends  upon  its  direction.  A  side  wind  catises  the  bullet 
to  move  sideways,  one  blowing  into  the  face  of  the  firer  in- 
creases the  resistance  of  the  air,  and  one  blowing  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  fire  reduces  the  resistance. 

Rifllemen  increase  their  elevation  for — 

(1)  Ammunition  of  low  velocity. 

(2)  High  Iiarometer. 

(3)  Low  temperature. 

(4)  Dry  weather. 

(5)  Bright  sights  and  a  dark  target. 

(6)  Wind  coming  from  the  target. 
They  decrease  it  for — 

(1)  Ammunition  of  high  velocity. 

(2)  Low  barometer. 

(3)  High  temperature. 

(4)  Damp  weather. 

(5)  Dark  sights  and  a  bright  target. 

(6)  Wind  blowing  toward  target. 


MUSKETRY.  41 

Under  the  coinbiiieil  viivct  of  tin;  itropellinR  force,  force  of 
Kravity,  and  the  resistance  of  the  air.  tlie  trajcrtory  lirst  rises 
above  the  liorizontal  witli  a  scarcely  perceptible  curve  to  the 
summit,  beyond  which  i)oint  it  curves  downward  with  ever- 
increasing  curvature  until  it  strikes  the  tarjiet  or  the  ground. 
W'heu  the  rear  sight  has  been  set  at  the  proper  elevation,  and 
when  the  line  of  aim  has  been  directed  at  the  target,  then,  in 
theory,  the  firing  of  the  ritie  should  result  in  the  target  being 
struck  by  the  projectile,  1.  e.,  the  points  of  aim  and  impact 
should  coincide.  Because  of  the  numerous  variations  in  condi- 
tions just  discus.sed,  tliis  seldom  if  ever  occurs  in  practice. 
Tlie  greater  the  skill  of  the  marksman  and  the  gi*cater,tjie_i)£i:; 
fpction  iff  the  arm  an(|  it^  aiinniipition  the  more  nearly  will 
the  results  in  practice  approach  the  theoretical  ideal. 

OTHER   FACTORS   AFFECTING    THE   TRAJECTORY. 

28.  Angle  of  departure. — On  account  of  the  imperfections  of 
tin*  Iniiiiaii  eye,  tiii'  line  of  aim  of  successive  shots  are  not 
identical ;  that  is,  are  not  directed  at  the  same  spot  (error  in 
aiming).  As  a  result  of  the  shock  of  the  discharge,  the  posi- 
tion of  the  axis  of  the  bore  changes,  with  reference  to  the  line 
of  site,  at  the  moment  that  the  bullet  leaves  the  muzzle 
("  jump  ")■  and  the  amount  of  this  change  varies  with  every 
shot.  In  addition  to  the  jump  and  the  errors  in  aiming  are 
the  errors  in  holding ;  that  is,  the  errors  which  are  caused  by 
the  ffrer's  inability  to  keep  the  line  of  aim  correctly  directed 
at  the  moment  of  discharge  and  to  avoid  canting  the  piece  or 
to  maintain  a  uniform  cant.  These  factors  cause  variations  in 
the  angles  of  departure  of  successive  shots,  and  thus  they  ac- 
count, in  part,  for  the  fact  that  no  two  shots,  tired  under  seem- 
ingly identical  conditions,  strike  the  same  point.  Training  in 
mnrksmansliip  reduces  the  amount  of  these  variations  to  a 
iiiiiiiniuiii. 

29.  Sighting  of  rifles. — In  the  sighting  of  rilles  a  mean  gradu- 
ation for  each  range  has  been  adopted,  and  a  high  standard  of 
accuracy  for  all  practical  purposes  is  thus  obtained.  Each  rifle 
is  carefully  tested  before  issue,  but  it  must  be  understood  that 
no  two  rifles  behave  in  exactly  the  .same  manner,  and  that,  if 
compensation  could  be  made  for  every  error  in  sighting  of  the 
rifle  before  issue,  the  wear  of  parts  and  the  loosening  and  tight- 
ening of  screws,  etc.,  woultl  bring  about  faults  from  time  to 
time  which  would  alTect  the  .shooting  of  each  rifle  differently. 


42    •  MUSKETRY. 

30.  Jump. — The  rifle,  when  tired  by  .the  soldier,  is  not  held  in 
ji  rifiid  support  l)ut  in  an  elastic  one.  This  elasticity  is  found 
not  only  in  the  tirer's  body  but  also  in  the  parts  of  the  rifle  itself. 
Acted  upon  by  the  force  of  recoil,  there  is  a  slight  yielding  of 
these  various  elastic  elements  which  support  the  barrel.  antW 
this  results  in  a  movement  of  the  barrel  through  a  small  vertical 
arc  during  the  period  of  the  travel  of  the  projectile  from  breech 
to  muzzle.  This  movement  is  termed  the  "  .iiunp  "  and  is  apart 
from  and  not  to  be  confused  with  the  vibration  within  the  barrel 
itself,  which  is  termed  the  "  flip." 

Jump  may  be  either  positive  or  negative,  dep(Miding  upon 
whether  the  angle  of  departure  is  greater  or  less  than  fhe  angle 
of  elevation. 

31.  Drift.— The  drift  of  the  bullet  is  the  lateral  deviation  of 
the  bullet  after  it  has  left  the  barrel.  This  drift  is  to  the  right 
and  is  due  to  the  right-hand  rifling  of  the  barrel,  which  causes 
the  bullet  to  twist  in  that  direction.  The  drift  is  automatically 
corrected  by  the  rear  sight. 

32.  Fixing  the  bayonet. — Fixing  the  bayonet  to  the  rifle  affects 
the  trajectory  by  checking  with  its  weight  the  jump  of  the  rifle. 
This  is  why,  with  the  bayonet  fixed,  the  shot  is  usually  low. 
With  the  bayonet  fixed  it  is  necessary  to  increase  the  elevation 
about  50  5'ards. 

33.  Rests.— For  practical- purposes  the  shootlng'of  the  rifle  is 
not  affected  by  resting  the  muzzle  or  any  portion  of  the  stock 
lightly  on  earth  or  other  substance.  If.  however,  a  rtst  is  used 
for  two  successive  shots  it  should  be  applied  at  the  same  point 
for  each  shot,  or  the  points  of  strike  will  be  different. 

35.  Rigidity  of  the  trajectory. — According  to  the  principle  of 
the  rigidity  of  the  trajectory  the  relations  existing  between 
the  trajectory  and  the  line  representing  the  range  are  sensibly 
the  same  whether  the  range  be  horizontal  or  inclined  to  the 
horizon  prcvided  that  the  quadrant  angle  of  deijarture  (?/,  fig.  1) 
is  small.  That  is  to  say,  considering  the  angle  made  by  the  line 
of  departure  with  the  horizontal  (quadrant  angle  of  departure), 
as  small,  in  figui'e  1,  if  the  trajectory  bdf  and  the  range  bf 
were  revolved  about  the  point  b  until  bf  were  horizontal  the 
relation  of  the  trajectory  to  bf  would  not  change.  A  trajectory 
calculated  for  a  horizontal  range  equal  to  bf  would  then  answer 
as  the  trajectory  for  the  actual  inclined  range  bf. 


MUSKETRY.  43 

THE  SHEAF. 

36.  The  bullets  from  two  successivie  shots  fired  from  a  rifle 
iiiuhT  s('eiiiiiij.'ly  identical  conditions  (i.  e.,  tlie  same  sit;ht  set- 
tinf?,  the  same  ainnny:  point,  the  same  weather  conditions,  and 
tlie  same  hold)  will,  after  leavinj:  the  mnz-zle  of  the  rifle,  travel 
a  different  path  or  trajectory.  The  amount  of  the  difference 
between  tlie.se  trajectories  will  dejiend  upon — 

(1)  The  accuracy  of  the  rifle  itself. 

(2)  The  ammutntion. 

(3)  The  error  in  aiming. 

(4)  The  difference  in  holding. 

(;■))   The  chani^e  ,in  atmo.spheric  condition.?. 

It  therefore  follows  that  the  bullets  do  not  hit  at  exactly  tlic 
same  spot. 

If  one  rifle  be  fired  a  great  number  of  times  there  results  a 
great  number  of  trajectories  forming  a  cone  analogous  to  a 
stream  of  water  from  a  hose.  At  the  muzzle  all  the  bullets 
pass  through  the  same  point.  This  cone  is  called  the  individual 
sheaf.  A  number  of  individual  sheafs  is  called  the  collective 
sheaf,  visually  termed  the  sheaf. 

The  intercept  of  the  sheaf  on  a  vertical  surface  is  called 
the  vertical-shot  group ;  that  on  a  horizontal  surface  a  hori- 
zontal-shot group. 

The  central  point  about  which  the  projectiles  group  them- 
selves is  the  center  of  impact. 

There  is  an  imaginary  curve  which  occupies  a  mean  position 
among  all  these  trajectories.  It  is  called  the  mean  trajectory, 
and  is  that  which  the  bullet  would  probably  have  followed 
had  the  causes  of  deviation  not  existed.  All  ordinates  are 
computed  to  this  mean  trajectory,  and  also  it  is  the  basis  for 
the  computation  of  the  angles  of  fall  and  departure. 

The  relation  between  the  vertical  and  horizontal  shot  groups 
may  be  expressed  in  quite  rough  api>roximation.  thus:  The 
height  of  the  vertical-shot  group  is  equal  to  the  depth  of  the 
horizontal-shot  group  multiplied  by  the  natural  tangent  of  the 
angle  of  fall,  and  the  depth  of  the  horizontal-shot  group  is 
equal  to  the  height  of  the  vertical-shot  group  multiplied  by  the 
natural  cotangent  of  the  angle  of  fall. 

37.  When  a  number  of  marksmen  fire  either  simultaneously 
or  "at  will"  with  tlu>  same  jioint  of  aim  and  the  same  eleva- 
tion   the   bullets   will    form    a    vertical-shot    group    having    the 


44 


MTJSKETEY. 


general  shape  of  an  ellipse,  with  its  major  axis  vertical,  and 
will  be  symetrically  grouped  about  the  center  of  impact — not 
necessarily  about  tlie  r^'^int  of  aim.  They  will  be  groupe<l  more 
den.sely  near  the  center  of  impact  than  at  the  efJges,  and  at 
ranges  less  than  1/XXJ  yards  one-half  of  all  the  shots  will  be 
found  in  a  strip  about  one-fourth  of  the  size  of  the  whole 
group. 


ACTUAL  GROUP" 
iNG  SHOTS  FIREO 


AT  ISO  YARDS 

SO  ^JoH/TS 
ABOVE  LINE 

50«/a  aETLOW 


Thus  if  the  whole  group  is  found  to  be,  say,  40  inches  high, 
then  a  strip  about  10  inches  wide  placed  so  that  about  5  inches 
lie  on  each  side  of  the  center  of  impact  will  contain  oO  per  cent 
of  all  hits. 

The  width  of  a  central  strip  containing  .50  per  cent  of  all  the 
hits  of  any  shot  group  is  called  the  "  mean  or  .50  per  cent  dis- 
persion."   This  may  be  vertical,  lateral,  or  longitudinal. 

As  the  range  is  increased  beyond  1.000  yards  the  feature  of 
the  dense  grouping  of  the  bulk  of  the  shots  about  the  center 
of  impact  begins  to  disappear.  The  greater  the  range  the  more 
nearly  does  the  pattern  show  an  equal  disti-ibution  of  .shots 
throughout  the  entire  group ;  i.  e.,  it  approaches  this  equal 
distribution  as  a  limit.  In  theory  this  limit  would  be  reached 
at  a  range  of  infinity.  In  practice  the  approach  to  this  limit 
is  denied  beyond  a  distance  of  4,891.6  yards,  the  extreme  range 
of  the  rifle. 


MUSKETRY.  46 

With  an  equal  distribution  of  shots  throughout  the  pattern, 
50  per  cent  of  tliese  shots  would  be  fontained  in  a  central  strip 
that  was  half  tlie  height  of  the  entire  group,  and  similarly  75 
per  cent  of  the  shots  would  be  contained  in  a  strip  three- 
quarters  the  size  of  the  whole  group. 

Test  firing  shows  the  following  results : 

At  1.000  yards  the  75  per  cent  zone  measure<l  47  per  cent  of 
the  entire  group. 

At  2.(XX)  yards  the  75  per  cent  zone  measured  54  per  cent  of 
the  entire  group. 

At  2,900  yards  the  75  per  cent  zone  measured  60  per  cent  of 
the  entire  group. 

38.  The  greater  the  skill  of  the  marksman  and  the  more  per- 
fect the  rifle  and  tlie  ammunition  the  smaller  the  dispersion. 
Hence  the  Ordnance  Department  is  concerned  in  increasing  the 
accuracy  of  the  rifle  and  ammunition  while  the  trrxjp  leader  is 
interested  in  increasing  the  siiill  of  the  soldier  in  shooting. 

The  soldier  is  taught  to  aim,  hold,  and  .shoot  accurately,  so  ^s 
to  make  as  small  a  shot  group  as  possible,  and  the  officer  is 
taught  how  to  direct  the  corresponding  sheaf  so  as  to  a.ssure  the 
highe.st  returns  in  hits. 

It  is  the  collective  fire  of  masses  of  men  that  must  occupy  the 
attention  of  the  officer  in  war. 

39.  All  inquiiy  Into  the  eflFect  of  fire  is  based  upon  a  thorough 
understanding  of  the  cone  of  dispersion  of  fire,  for  any  conclu- 
sion reached  as  to  the  influence  of  thLs  or  that  modifying  factor 
on  the  efficacy  of  fire  must  be  based  either  upon  a  long  and  care- 
fully prepared  series  of  experimental  firings  or  upon  the  theory 
of  probabilities  as  applicable  to  known  dispersions.  Tlieoretical 
results  have  been  amply  verified  by  actual  firing,  and  the  student 
may  be  assured  that  in  studying  the  theory  of  fire  he  has  not 
made  the  mistake  of  d^arting  from  things  which  are  real  and 
practical. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  explain  the  mathematical  principles  in- 
volved in  these  computations;  it  is  sufficient  for  present  pur- 
poses to  know  that  probable  effects  can  be  foretold  and  that 
by  foretelling  the  results  in  two  c-onrrasting  cases  the  value  of 
any  given  influenc-e  on  shooting  can  be  ascertained. 

In  order  that  c-omparisons  in  shooting  may  be  made,  in  order 
that  the  influenc-e  of  an  inct)rrect  elevation  may  oe  demonstrated, 
and  for  other  and  analogous  reasons,  the  whole  subject  of  war 
shooting  is  based  upon  an  understanaing  of  dispCTsio'^  mig^ 


46  MUSKETRY. 

phiced    centers    of    impact,    densities,    and    such    fundamental 
principles. 

Tables  of  fire  have  been  constructed  from  which  it  is  possible 
to  calculate  the  number  of  hits  expected  on  a  target  of  given 
dimensions  with  a  certain  class  of  marksmen  at  any  given  range. 
These  tables  are  ordinarily  used  as  standards  of  comparison 
for  judging  results  in  field  firings. 

DANGER    SPACE. 

40.  Danger  space  is  defined  by  the  Small-Arms  Firing  Manual 
as  being  the  sum  of  the  distances  in  the  path  of  the  bullet  in 
which  an  object  of  given  height  will  be  struck. 

If  a  man  in  the  standing  position  fire  a  rifie  with  a  horizon- 
tal line  of  aim,  it  is  evident  that  for  a  certain  distance  in  front 
of  the  muzzle  another  man  may  be  hit  by  the  bullet  while  it  Is 
in  the  rising  branch  of  the  trajectory.  If  the  muzzle  is  at  a 
height  of  56  inches  from  the  ground,  and  the  height  of  the 
man  standing  is  68  inches,  then  it  will  be  dangerous  for  a  man 
to  stand  anywhere  in  the  line  of  fire  between  the  muzzle  and  the 
point  where  the  bullet  in  its  upward  flight  rises  above  the  head 
of  the  man  (68  inches). 

Since  the  line  of  sight  is  5G  inches  above  the  ground,  the 
trajectory  will  be  6S  inches  above  the  ground  when  it  has  risen 
12  inches  above  the  line  of  aim.  If  the  firer  is  using  a  great 
angle  of  elevation,  the  trajectory  will  rise  to  a  height  of  12 
inches  above  the  line  of  aim  in  a  rather  short  distance ;  if,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  angle  of  elevation  is  small,  the  bullet  will 
travel  so  nearly  horizontal  that  it  will  not  attain  the  12  inches 
in  a  very  great  distance,  if  at  all. 

Whatever  this  distance  is  in  front  of  the  muzzle  within 
which  the  bullet  does  not  rise  higher  than  the  oljject,  it  is  called 
the  danger  space  of  the  rising  branch  of  the  trajectory.  If  the 
firer  is  shooting  from  a  prone  position,  so  that  the  muzzle,  in- 
stead of  being  56  inches  from  the  ground,  is  only  12  inches,  then 
the  space  would  be  dangerous  for  a  standing  man  the  entire 
distance  from  the  muzzle  to  a  point  where  the  trajectory  rises 
68  minus  12  inches  equals  56  inches  above  the  line  of  aim. 

The  danger  space  for  a  mounted  man  is,  obviously,  greater 
than  for  a  man  lying  down,  and  so  in  each  case  it  is  necessary 
to  know  all  the  conditions  before  the  table  of  danger  spaces,  as 
published  by  the  Ordnance  Department,  can  be  of  any  value. 


MUSKETRY. 


47 


41.  In  tlie  falling  l)raiicli  <tf  the  trajoctory  is  another  danj^or 
space  analofious  to  tliat  just  disciissi'd.  and.  liko  tlnit,  di'iicnd- 
ent  uiKtn  certain  conditions  of  (ire,  line  of  aim,  anl  tlie  liei;,dit 
of  the  object  for  \vlii<li  I  he  space  is  dangerous. 


DANGER  -SPACE 
Fm.  :!. 

In  fiffure  3.  if  tlie  point  of  aim  is  talcen  at  the  head  of  a 
standing  man,  all  the  danger  space  is  in  rear  of  the  target.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  aim  be  taken  at  the  foot  of  the  target,  the 
entire  danger  .space  is  in  front  of  the  target. 

If  the  point  of  aim  is  at  the  middle  of  tlie  object  firwl  at.  part 
of  the  danger  space  will  be  in  front  of  the  target  and  part  in 
rear. 

By  using  an  elevation  of  7(X)  yards  against  the  middle  point 
of  a  cavalryman  S  feet  high,  the  danger  space  extends  from 
the  firer  to  801.5  yards.  Against  an  infantryman,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  extends  from  the  586.8-yard  point  (high  strike)  to 
7712.6  yards  (ground  strike),  or  a  total  distance  of  185.8  yards. 

If  the  point  of  aim  is  taken  at  the  bottom  of  the  target  in 
t!ie  foregoing  cases,  it  is  70()  yards  long  in  each  case — a  notice- 
able gain  in  the  latt(>r  case  but  a  loss  in  the  case  of  the  cav- 
alryman. ^ 

42.  The  term  "  danger  space  "  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the* 
term  "beaten  zone."  which  means  tlie  intersection  of  the  cone 
of  dispersion  (or  sheaf)  with  the  surface  on  wliich  the  objective 
f-f  the  fire  .stands  or  the  space  on  the  ground  in  winch  the  bull^'ts 
strike  in  a  series  of  shots  fired  by  a  body  of  soldiers  with  the 
same  aiming  i>oint  and  the  same  rear  sight  setting. 

Swept  space  is  the  danger  space  as  modified  by  the  ground 
slopes. 

In  dealing  with  danger  spaces  it  is  usual  to  distinguish  be- 
tween the  danger  space  and  the  swept  space,  both  of  which  are 
functions  of  the  mean  trajectory,   and  between  these  and   the 


4S 


MUSKETRY. 


dangerous  zone,  wliicli  is  a  rvinctioii  of  tlie  wliole  or  a  part  of 
tlie  cone  of  lire. 

It  will  be  observed  that  for  a  given  height  of  target  and  point 
of  aim  the  danger  space  is  of  tixed  dimensions  at  the  several 
ranges,  while  the  swept  space  varies  in  addition  with  the  slope 
of  the  ground,  being  shorter  on  rising  ground  and  longer  on 
falling  ground  than  the  danger  space,  and  all  the  functions  of 
the  dangerous  zone,  such  as  the  density  of  the  group  at  given 
distances  from  the  center  of  impact,  etc.,  are  correspondingly 
modified. 

43.  The  fire  controller  must  remember  that  the  danger  space 
under  700  yards  is  affected  by  the  position  of  the  firer  (height 
of  muzzle  from  the  ground),  the  danger  space  increasing  as  the 
height  of  the  muzzle  decreases.  At  the  longer  ranges  no  mate- 
rial effect  is  felt  from  the  different  positions  of  the  firer  due 
to  the  Increased  angle  of  fall. 

The  Ordnance  Department  publishes  a  table  of  danger  spaces 
calculated  under  the  assumption  that  the  gun  when  fired  is 
12  inches  above  the  ground,  that  the  height  of  a  man  is  6S 
inches,  that  the  head  of  a  man  on  horseback  is  8  feet  above  the 
ground,  and  that  the  point  of  aim  is  at  the  center  of  the  target. 

Under  these  conditions  the  total  dangerous  spaces  for  infantry 
and  cavalry  at  the  various  ranges  are  given  as  follows : 


Range. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

100 

6S0. 9 

468.  3 

200 

547.3 

666.5 

300 

540.4 

676.8 

400 

672.9 

633.  7 

500 

628.  3 

670.  5 

600 

696.  7 

731.9 

700 

420.  S 

801.5 

800 

301.8 

473.8 

900 

233.7 

3.32.  6 

1,000 

187.2 

275.3 

EFFECT    OF    SLOPES    AND    SITES. 

44.  The  influence  of  the  ground  on  fire  effect  is  manifested  by 
a  modification  of  the  depth  beaten  and  grazed  by  the  cone  of 
collective  fire.  This  depth  decreases  if  the  surface  of  reception 
rises,  and  increases  if  the  surface  of  reception  falls  with  respect 
to  the  line  of  site. 

The  effect  of  slopes  and  sites  on  the  efficacy  of  fire  is  so 
important  that  it  is  essential  fcr  all  officers  and  noncommis- 


MUSKETRY.  49 

sifHietl  officers  to  understand  tli(inni;:ldy  t\\o  itrohabilities  of 
tire  elTect  as  increased  or  dlniinisiied  Ity  tlie  inclination  of  tlu? 
ground  witli  resi>ect  to  tiie  line  of  site. 

In  the  attack,  such  information  will  guide  them  In  adopting 
.suital)le  forniJitions  antl  directinj;  tlio  tire  of  their  or^'anizations 
to  the  best  advania^re. 

In  defcns«»  sudi  kno\\ie<lt:e  will  assist  them  in  the  selections 
of  tlie  hest  lirinu:  itosjtion,  at  the  same  time  enahlin;.'  them  to 
take  tire  necessjiry  steps  to  minimize  tlie  inherent  disadvan- 
tages (tf  these  fire  positions. 

Only  plane  surfaces  without  undulations  or  accidents  are 
liere  consideretl. 

45.  There  are  three  general  cases  to  be  considered : 

(1)  When  the  ground  rises  with  respect  to  the  line  of  .«:ite. 

(2)  When  the  ground  is  level. 

(3)  When  the  slope  is  falling  with  reference  to  the  line  of 
site. 

In  case  1  (fig.  4)  the  sheaf  covers  a  space  of  1  inch  on  the 
slope  B-C.  In  case  2  the  same  sheaf  on  level  ground  covers 
1%  inches,  while  in  case  3  it  covers  2%  inches. 


LINE  OF  SITE 


E       1  3/4  inobes  q 


^^wor 


3529"— 17- 


Fig.  4. 


60  MUSKETRY. 

46.  The  simple  equation  by  means  of  which  the  effect  of 
slopes  ancl  sites  upon  the  longitudinal  (or  horizontal)  <lisper- 
sion  may  be  calculated,  knowing  the  longitudinal,  is  for  rising 

/  / 

ground  S—d  xi— and  for  falling  ground,  S=d  ^ZT- 

Where  g  is  greater  than  /  there  is  a  dead  space. 

In  which  )S=Dispersioii  as  influenced  by  the  slope, 

d=Depth  of  longitudinal  dispersion,  or  swept  space, 

/= Angle  of  fall  of  the  trajectory,  and 

g'= Angle  of  slope  of  the  ground. 

The  angle  y  is  the  vertical  angle  between  the  plane  which 

receives  the  impact  of  the  shot  group  and  the  prolongation  of  the 

line  of  site.    In  case  1  tlUs  angle  is  positive,  in  case  2  it  is  ?ero, 

and  in  case  3  it  is  negative, 

Ewample:  At  1,000  yards  tbe  depth  of  the  mean  (50  per  cent) 

beaten  2,gne  on  level  ground  is  approximately  lOQ  yards  and  the 

angle  of  fall  approximately  l^". 

Assuming  that  tlie  ground  x\mn  1°  with  reference  to  tiie  line 

of  ^ite,  tlien— = 

iosxiH_.„ . 

Assuming  that  the  ground  falls  1*  with  reference  to  the  lino 
of  site,  then— 

46  J4.  The  influence  of  slopes  upon  the  depth  of  beaten  zones 
must  not  be  confused  with  the  influence  of  those  same  slopes 
upon  the  probable  number  of  hits  that  may  be  expected. 

When  firing  at  a  linear  target,  i.  e.,  at  a  hostile  formation 
that  has  no  depth  (such  as  a  skirmish  line),  a  given  error  in 
the  determination  of  the  range  may  be  expected  to  be  productive 
of  the  same  reduction  in  hits  no  matter  whether  the  ground  be 
rising,  tailing,  or  level  with  respect  to  the  line  of  site — this  with 
the  proviso  that  the  target  is  not  defiladed  in  any  case;  that 
the  range,  the  angle  of  departure,  the  direction  of  the  line  of 
aim  in  reference  to  the  target,  and  the  conditions  of  light  and. 
atmosphere  are  identical  in  each  case ;  that  the  same  number  of 
shots  are  fired ;  and  that  the  firing  in  each  case  results  in  the 
same  vertical  dispersion.  In  other  words,  for  a  given  sheaf 
directed  at  a  given  linear  target  with  a  given  error  In  range, 
the  slope  of  th©  ground  on  which  the  target  stands  (barring 
defilade)  does  not  in  Itself  act  in  any  way  to  increase  or  de- 
crease the  number  of  hits  to  be  expected,  except  that  at  the 


MUSKETRY.  51 

shorter  raiiKt's  tlioro  usually  will  bo  a  trreator  porcenta^^e  ot 
ricochets  on  level  and  falling  ground  than  on  rising  ground. 

Certain  authors  whose  writings  <in  nuiskciry  have  been  ac- 
cepted in  the  past  as  authoritative  have  advanced  the  argu- 
ment (hat  as  the  depth  of  i)eaten  zone  was  decreased  on  rising 
ground,  then  for  a  given  error  in  estimating  the  range  it  would 
be  necessary  to  resort  to  combined  sights  to  insure  eflect  on 
the  target  when  it  stood  on  rising  ground,  wliereas  a  single 
elevation  would  suffice  to  secure  the  same  effect  if  the  only 
change  in  conditions  were  the  i)lacing  of  the  target  on  level 
ground. 

When  there  is  depth  to  the  hostile  formation,  e.  g.,  when  the 
target  is  a  column,  then  rising  ground  would  iiave  the  effect 
of  reducing  the  amount  of  the  column  that  will  be  covered  by 
ft  given  sheaf,  wiiilo  falling  ground  would  result  in  a  greater 
lK)i-tion  of  the  target  being  covered  by  the  same  shenf. 

For  example,  assume  that  the  torgat  is  a  column,  AB,  and 
that  fire  is  directed  upon  the  head  of  the  column  from  C  with 
jm  error  of  AD  In  range: 


C 


Firing  Paint 


-JS» 


yctr 


Can -I, 


Til-ins  Point,  A  -5         ^ 

' !         I         ' 


3  80-5;; ►>«3j'rf.*»3j'»»' 

t       t       1 

Fio.  .5. 

Let  CA  be  the  line  of  site,  C.U.I/  be  the  mean  tra.iertory, 
CVY  be  the  upper  limit  of  the  75  per  cent  zone,  and  CLL  be 
the  lower  limit  of  the  75  per  cent  zone. 

By  reference  to  the  figure  it  is  i-eadily  seen  that  when  the 
column  is  on  rising  ground,  RAR,  only  about  one-fourth  of  tlie 


62 


MUSKETRY. 


column  is  under  fire;  on  levt'l  Kfound,  DAB,  about  one-half  of 
the  cohunn  is  under  fire ;  while  on  falling  ground,  PAF,  all  of 
the  oolumn  is  under  tire. 

But  it  will  be  noted  also  that  the  changes  in  ground  .slope 
do  not  effect  any  change  in  the  position  of  the  linear  element  A, 
at  the  head  of  the  cohnnn,  with  reference  to  the  mean  trajec- 
tory. Hence,  barring  ricochets,  the  percentage  of  hits  to  be 
expected  on  the  head  of  the  column  would  be  the  same  In  any 
of  the  three  cases  notetl. 

From  this  comes  the  principle  that  ground  slopes  affect  hits 
only  in  those  portions  of  the  target  that  are  in  front  or  in  rear 
of  the  line  at  which  the  fire  is  directed. 

47.  The  mistake  must  not  be  made  of  assuming  that  reverse 
slopes  are  safe  because  out  of  sight,  and  that  the  formation  to 
adopt  behind  crests  is  the  line  of  skirmishers.  This  false  as- 
sumption has  cost  many  lives  in  battle. 

As  an  illustration  of  the  effect  of  fire  against  a  line  of  skir- 
mishers on  the  reverse  slope  of  a  hill  may  be  mentioned  a  fire 
problem  conducted  at  the  School  of  Musketry  in  which  the  tar- 
gets were  invisible  to  the  firers. 


Fig.  6. 


A  skirmish  lina  of  127  kneeling  figures  on  a  i'  reverse  slope 
50  yards  in  rear  of  the  aiming  point,  on  the  crest,  received  251 
hits  on  97  figures.  Again,  out  of  a  total  of  2,429  shots  fired  by 
a  company  of  122  men  at  a  range  of  900  yards  in  the  same  prob- 
lem, 116  figures  out  of  the  127  were  hit. 

48.  The  following  demonstration  at  the  School  of  Musketry 
during  the  special  course  for  noncommissioned  officers,  1915, 
shows  in  a  very  graphic  manner  the  difference  in  firing  at  tar- 
gets on  a  slightly  rising  slope  and  level  ground. 

Object. — To  illustrate  the  influence  on  the  beaten  zone  of 
ground  rising  with  respect  to  the  line  of  sight  and  the  scope  of 
a  single  sight  setting  when  the  ground  ?$  favorable. 


MUSKETRY.  68 

Method. —  (1)  A  )»l!il(»tiii  <>r  24  men  fired  a  series  of  10  shots 
IHM-  iiiiin  with  a  sight  settiiij;  of  580  yards  and  ainiiii«  at  tar- 
get A. 

(2)  Same  siylit  sotting  iind  aiming  at  target  A,  tiring  s;ime 
ninnlier  of"  r<»un<Is  as  in  lirst  ease. 

Target. —  (1)  Tluve  Itoard  targets  (widl),  eaeh  4.S  feet  long. 
2  feet  liigh,  placed  on  a  3^2°  slope,  in  eolnmn  ;il  distiinees  of  H."> 
yards    (ease  1,  fig.  5), 

Results. — rMrst  case — rising  slope,  (53  hit.s,  target  A;  11  hits, 
target  B ;   none,   target  C 

Target. —  (2)    Same  target,  case  2,  figure  5,  h>vel. 

Result. — Second  case — level  ground,  57  hits,  target  A;  (JO  hits, 
target  B;   13  hits,  target  0. 

From  the  foregoing,  certain  well-defined  conclusions  may  be 
drawn  with  reference  to  the  utilization  of  ground  slopes. 

49.  On  ground  raising  witlLrespect  to  the  line  of  sight  the 
supports  and  reserves  may  be  placed  closer  to  the  firing' line 
than  on  level  ground,  so  far  as  danger  from  fire  directed  on  the 
first  line  is  concerned.  The  steeper  the  .slope  the  closer  in  tliey 
may  be. 

On  falling  slopes  the  supports  and  reserves  must  be  farther 
back  than  on  level  ground  except  when  the  slope  exceeds  the 
Jingle  of  fall  enough  to  give  a  defiladed  space  nearer  the  firing 
line. 

A  knowledge  of  anglt>s  of  fall,  of  slopes  and  of  their  relation 
to  eacli  other  are  of  great  importance  to  leaders  of  figliting  men. 
The  o.strichlike  tendency  to  think  the  supports  secure  from  fire 
because  the  enemy  cun  not  see  Ihem  nuist  be  overcome. 

No  one  is  expected  to  work  out  on  the  ground  the  fornuil;e  for 
reduction  of  dispersions  to  different  slopes,  but  it  can  be  re- 
membered that  the  effective^  (75  perj^t^^lepth_of_beateu  zone 
atSOt)  yards  extends  from  the  muzzle  to  5(30  yards ;  at  1,000 
yards  it  is  re<luced  to  about  200  yards  in  depj^h ;  at  a  range  of 
about  1.500  yards  it  is  reduced  to  about  150  yards,  and  tTiere 
remains  until  a  range  of  about  2,(K)0  yards  is  reached;  beyond 
2,000  ynrds  the  depth  increases,  reaching  a  depth  of  200  yards 
again  at  a  range  of  2.700  y.-irds. 

50.  Ricochets. — The  modern  bullet,  with  its  elongated  form, 
tends  to  tuml)le  on  striking  even  slight  objects.  They  ricochet 
most  frequently  on  water,  on  rocky  and  hard  ground,  more 
rarely  on  wet  meadows  and  on  tilled  soil,  but  they  do  not 
ricochet  at  all  on  snndy  soil.  Ploughed  fields  in  which  the  fur- 
rows run  obli(iuely  to  the  line  of  fire  eliminate  ricochets. 


64  MUSKETRY. 

The  number  of  riooohcts  tleixnids  on  many  elements,  such  as 
the  character  of  the  surface  of  the  strike,  its  slope,  and  the 
mass  and  shape  of  the  bullet,  as  well  as  the  range  and  the 
accuracy  of  fire.  At  Ions  ranges  the  angle  of  fall  becomes  great 
enough  to  reduce  the  number. 

Untrained  men,  many  of  whose  shots  strike  close  to  the  firing 
point,  increase  the  number  of  ricochets  beyond  the  average, 
which  is  generally  accepted  as  about  16  per  cent. 

Usually  a  small-arm  projectile  is  deflected  on  ricocheting  to 
the  right  of  the  plane  of  fire,  apparently  due  to  the  twist  of  the 
Inillet  in  flight.  Sometimes,  due  to  favorable  irregularities  of 
the  ground,  this  deflection  may  amount  to  30°  when  the  limit 
of  the  range  will  not  exceed  1,500  yards.  The  range  of  the 
ricochet  may  be  as  great  as  2,700  yards.  Certain  experiments 
in  France,  when  firing  at  800  meters  (874.9  yards),  gave  4  per 
cent  of  the  ricochets  on  targets  the  height  of  a  man  at  1,400 
meters  (1,531.09  yards)  and  1  per  cent  on  similar  targets  placed 
at  1,850  meters  (2,023.21  yards). 

The  effect  of  ricochets  is  such  that  in  the  occupation  of  a 
defensive  position  due  consideration  should  be  given  to  the 
nature  of  the  ground  immediately  in  front  of  the  line  of 
trenches,  with  a  view  to  eliminating  as  much  as  possible  the 
effect  of  ricochets,  thus  adding  to  the  essentials  of  an  ideal 
defensive  position,  which  is  never  found,  another  item  to  he 
included  in  the  final  compromise  location  of  the  trenches. 

THE  INFLrENCE  OF  THE  POINT  OF  AIM. 

51.  The  effectiveness  of  the  shot  group  or  sheaf  is  directly- 
dependent,  other  conditions  being  equal,  upon  the  point  of  aim 
used  in  any  particular  firing. 

Under  the  head  of  danger  space  it  has  been  pointed  out  that 
if  aim  be  taken  at  the  head  of  the  enemy  the  danger  space  will 
lie  in  rear  of  him,  while  if  it  be  taken  at  the  middle  of  the 
figure  the  danger  space  will  lie  partly  in  rear  and.  partly  in 
front  of  the  target.  If  aim  be  taken  at  the  foot  of  the  target 
all  the  danger  space  will  lie  in  front  of  it  (fig.  3). 

If  an  enemy  is  advancing,  aim  should  be  taken  at  his  feet, 
because  he  will  then  be  walking  into  the  danger  space.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  enemy  were  running  away,  by  the  same 
token  aim  should  be  at  his  head. 

As  a  rule  men  in  action  will  not  alter  their  sights  at  the  close 
ranges,  say,  under  400  yards. 


MUSKETRY.  65 

It  is  also  believed  to  be  nn  aceepted  fnct  tbat  in  the  beal 
of  action  men  will  unconsciously  take  more  front  slplit  tbaii 
they  will  in  peace  practice  on  the  target  ranjie. 

Soldiers  of  praclically  all  nations  are  taught  to  aim  at  tlu- 
feet  or  bottom  line  of  the  tariret  lor  tlie  followinp:  reasons: 

(1)  The  line  of  siglit  inclines  more  and  more  toward  the 
ground  as  the  enemy  gets  nearer. 

When  aim  is  taken  at  the  middle  of  an  ol)ject  this  result  Im 
not  obtiiiried  in  the  kiiccliiii;  iiiid  jinmc  ]»ositions.  In  fact  the 
line  of  si;rlit  is  horizoiilal  if  the  lirer  is  kneeling;,  because  tlie 
height  of  the  origin  is  tlie  same  as  the  jjoint  aimed  at.  while 
when  the  firer  is  lyinii  down  it  rises  as  the  ohjective  ai>proache.s 
(the  lieight  of  the  origin  being  below  the  ])oint  of  aim). 

Moreover,  the  position  of  the  shot  group  does  not  depend  on 
the  height  of  the  origin  of  tire. 

(2)  It  gives  a  more  advantageous  position  to  the  shot  group 
and  makes  the  zone  grazed  by  the  whole  cone  longer. 

(3)  The  ricochets  from  the  lower  half  of  the  sheaf  are 
effective. 

(4)  When  aim  is  taken  at  the  middle  of  the  object,  if  a  shot 
is  fired  with  a  little  too  much  elevation,  or  if  too  much  of  the 
front  sight  is  used  the  bullet  may  pass  above  the  head  of  a 
standing  man.  This  is  avoided  by  aiming  at  the  bottom  of  the 
target. 

(5)  The  frcmt  sight  which  covers  about  half  the  height  of  a 
man  standing  when  the  hitter  is  at  a  distance  of  200  yards  is 
not  so  likely  to  liide  the  ohject  from  view. 

With  small  objects,  such  as  a  trench  where  oidy  a  line  of  heads 
is  visible,  if  aim  be  not  taken  at  the  bottom  edge  of  the  line  of 
heads  the  front  sight  is  likely  to  obscure  the  target  in  such 
manner  that  the  soldier  will  get  few  hits. 

(6)  The  lower  edge  of  a  line  of  figures,  be  they  only  heads 
or  prone  figures,  furnishes  a  more  distinct  aiming  point  than 
does  the  top  edge  of  the  target. 

COMIUNED    SIGHTS. 

(Par.  217,  S.  A.  F.  M.) 

52.  rmnhined  sights  is  the  siiuult.meous  use  of  two  or  more 
sight  settings  in  order  to  increase  the  depth  of  the  heaten  zone. 

The  object  of  combined  sights  is  to  cqnipensate  for  an  error 
In  the  determination  of  the  range  and  to  increase  the  probability 


58  MUSKETRY. 

of  liittinp:  the  tar^ot.     Such  tire  loses  in  concentration  and  lience 
must  he  offset  hy  an  increase  in  vohinie. 

Tlie  two  i)r(>l)l(>ins  connected  with  tlie  use  of  conihined  siglits 
are — 

(1 )  At  wluit  ran.Lic'  slionld  they  first  be  used? 

(2)  AMiiit  sliouhl  he  tlie  difference  in  sight  setting? 

In  theory,  conihined  sights  are  employed  when  the  i)rohal)le 
error  in  the  determination  of  the  range  exceeds  half  the  depth 
of  the  effective  (75  per  cent)  heaten  zone.  The  number  of  sights 
to  be  employed  is  found  by  dividing  twice  the  prol>able  error  in 
i-ange  ))y  the  depth  of  the  75  i)er  cent  beaten  zone,  any  fraction 
in  the  quotient  being  considered  as  1. 

Lacking  an  instrument  or  table  for  determining  the  exact 
depths  of  beaten  zones  at  given  ranges,  the  fire  director  may 
accept  this  rule  of  thumb  as  giving  fairly  satisfactory  results. 
The  rule  is  as  follows:  Between  1,000  and  2,700  yards  the  depth 
of  the  effective  (75  per  cent)  beaten  zone  of  average  shots  is  150 
yards ;  at  ranges  less  than  1,000  yards  or  greater  than  2,700 
yards  the  depth  of  this  same  zone  is  200  yards. 

In  using  combined  sights  the  elevations  employed  should 
differ  from  each  other  by  an  amount  equal  to  the  depth  of  the 
75  per  cent  beaten  zone,  the  center  of  the  resulting-shot  group 
being  at  the  estimated  range.  For  example,  assuming  a  10 
per  cent  error  and  an  estimated  range  of  1.400  yards,  the  total 
zone  to  be  covered  would  be  280  yards.  The  depth  of  beaten 
zone  being  taken  at  150  yards,  then  150  is  contained  twice  in 
280,  and  hence  two  elevations  should  be  used.  As  these  eleva- 
tions are  to  differ  by  150  yards,  and  as  the  resulting-shot  group 
is  to  be  centered  at  the  estimated  range  (1,400  yards),  then 
one  elevation  should  be  75  yards  less  than  1.400,  and  the  other 
75  yards  more  tiian  1.400,  1.  e.,  1,325  and  1,475  are  the  elevations 
to  he  used. 

In  like  manner,  assuming  a  10  per  cent  error  and  an  estimated 
range  of  1,700  yards,  the  elevations  required  are  found  to  be 
1550,  1,700,  and  1,8.50.   ' 

53.  When  the  range  is  known  combined  sights  are  not  used. 

Combined  sights  are  not  used  by  a  force  of  less  strength  than 
two  platoons.  Paragraph  217,  S.  A.  F.  M.,  says,  "The  expe- 
dient will  not  usually  be  employed  by  bodies  of  less  strength 
than  a  battalion."  This  statement  apparently  applies  only  to 
fire  of  position  at  the  extreme  ranges. 


MUSKETRY.  67 

54.  In  tlio  nvor.'ipro  <-(»iiiii.iny.  :inil  coiisidprin?  a  prohnble  error 
of  10  [tor  (-cut  ill  tlip  (h'tiMMiiiiiatioii  of  the  rnii^re  and  also  that 
the  tactieal  situath»n  demands  that  a  yiven  tartlet  he  taken  under 
tire,  then  eoinhined  sights  shouhl  l)e  used  to  eoinpen.sate  for  this 
It)  per  cent  error  as  follows:  Two  elevations  at  ranges  greater 
than  l,fK)0  yard.s,  three  elevations  at  ranges  greater  than  l.r/K) 
yards,  and  four  elevations  at  ranges  greater  than  2,'.iiH)  yards. 

Thes(»  limiting  ranges  would  he  increased  if  the  marksman- 
8hip  fell  helow  the  average  or  if  there  was  a  greater  precision 
in  the  determinatiftn  of  the  range;  they  would  he  decreased  when 
the  marksmanship  was  hetter  than  the  average  and  when  the 
prohahle  error  in  range  was  greater  than  10  per  cent. 

The  use  of  combined  siglits  to  compensate  for  probable  errors 
[n  range  must  not  be  confused  with  their  use  to  secure  distri- 
bution in  d«'pth  on  a  column  formation.  In  the  latter  case  the 
ranges  at  which  combine^l  sights  are  necessary  and  the  num- 
ber of  elevations  required  would  depend  upon  the  depth  of  the 
target  and  slope  of  the  ground  on  which  it  stood. 

TIIK    HATTI.K    SHJIIT. 

55.  The  .setting  of  tlie  rear  sight  when  the  leaf  is  dovra  is 
termed  tlie  "  battle  sight."  In  theory  this  sight  corresp(nids  to 
an  elevation  of  547  yards.  In  practice  it  is  found  that  the 
average  battle  sight  when  used  by  troops  corresponds  to  an 
elevation  of  al)f)Ut  4l'C)  yards. 

It  is  not  good  practice  to  consider  that  the  battle  sight  must 
be  used  at  all  ranges  within  its  zone,  i.  e.,  at  all  ranges  less 
than  436  yards.  Tlie  correct  use  of  the  battle  sight  is  in  emer- 
gencies when,  for  any  reason,  it  is  impossible  to  use  the  leaf 
sight  with  greater  accuracy. 

Examples  of  a  correct  use  of  the  battle  sight  would  be  when 
the  vulnerable  surface  of  the  target  is  .so  large,  and  it  is  at 
such  close  range  that  errors  in  sight  setting  of  even  several 
hundred  yards  would  have  no  tendency  to  re<luce  the  effect  of 
the  tire;  when  the  target  is  fl(vting  and  time  is  lacking  in 
which  to  estimate  the  range  and  set  the  leaf  sight  accordingly, 
the  situation  demanding  fire  of  some  etTect  instantly  even 
though  tliat  effect  be  moral  only  and  not  pliysical ;  and  when 
the  morale  of  the  troops  has  be<na  reduced  to  such  au  extent 
as  to  preclude  the  idea  of  accurate  sight  setting. 


58  MTTSKETRf. 

The  greatest  depth  of  zon(>  will  bi'  obtained  with  the  battle 
sight  if  the  sohlier  is  tauglit  to  aim  always  at  the  bivast  of 
tlie  enemy  irrespective  of  whether  the  enemy  be  mounted  or 
dismounted  and,  in  the  hitter  case,  irrespective  of  his  posture — 
standing,  kneeling,  sitting,  or  prone. 


f 


CHAPTER  IV. 
INSTRUMENTS. 

57.  Certain  instninionts  are  necessary  for  the  proper  ol)serva- 
tiiin  and  control  of  the  lire  of  modern  arms.     These  are 

The  range  finder. 

The  field  glass. 

The  musketry  rule. 
Conditions  of  Held  service  reqnire  that  these  instnunonts  l»e 
rnpcged  in  construction  and  simple  to  use.  In  jicneral.  the  field 
jrlass  is  required  for  oliservation  of  the  terrain  and  the  effect  of 
fire ;  some  form  of  instrument,  such  as  the  mil  scale,  is  re- 
quired for  determining  angles;  and  the  range  tinder  is  required, 
or  at  least  desirable,  for  determining  ranges. 

THK  KA.\(;i-:  FINDKR  (see  par.  121). 

58.  Field  glasses. — The  Itinocular  glass,  consisting  of  two  com- 
plete optical  .system.s,  connected  b.v  a  rigid  or  hinged  frame,  is 
universally  u.sed  for  military  purpo.ses.  However,  if  one  of  the 
two  optical  systems  should  be  damaged,  or  if  parallelism  of  the 
two  systems  should  be  destroyed  by  accident  to  the  frame  or 
displacement  of  the  lenses  or  prisms,  it  is  well  to  remember  that 
the  field  glass  can  still  be  used  effectively  as  a  monocidar. 

The  two  types  of  field  glasses  in  connnon  iise  are  tlie  Galilean 
glass  and  the  Porro  iirisiii  glass. 

59.  The  Galilean  glass. — The  Galilean  glass  has  convex  objec- 
tives and  concave  eyepieces.  It  is  of  low  power  (magnifying 
from  2  to  ;i  diameters)  and  is  a  conii)aratively  inexpensive  instru- 
ment. The  type  A  and  tyjie  15  glas.ses  of  the  Signal  Cori)s  are 
examples  of  this  form  <»f  field  glass.  Figure  7  shows  dia- 
gramatically  the  arrangement  of  lenses  in  the  Galilean  glass. 

59 


60 


MUSKETRY. 


In  this  field  glass  the  rays  from  an  object  are  converged  by 
llie  object  glass  (O)  and  would  normally  focus  at  the  focal 
plane  (C)  and  there  form  the  inverted  image  b — a  were  it  not 
that  the  double  concave  eyeglass  or  ocular  (/))  is  so  located 
in  the  barrel  of  the  glass  as  to  intercept  the  pencils  before  they 
are  focused.  This  double  concave  eyeglass  diverges  these  pen- 
cils and  forms  a  magnified  erect  image  a — b  apparently  at  E. 

Due  to  the  diverging  action  of  the  concave  eye  lens  the  cone 
of  the  pencils  entering  the  eye  is  larger  than  the  pupil  of  the 
eye,  and  therefore  but  a  small  part  of  the  field  gathered  by  the 
the  object  glass  is  utilized,  which  causes  field  glasses  of  this 
type  to  have  a  comparatively  small  field  of  view. 


Fig.  7. 


In  the  Galilean  type  of  field  glass  the  two  optical  systems 
are  lasually  mounted  rigidly  and  a  single  focusing  screw  moves 
both  eyepieces  in  or  out  for  adjustment  of  the  focus  only.  The 
concave-eyepiece  lenses  are  quite  large;  and  for  ordinary  eyes 
accurate  adjustment  for  interpupillary  distance  is  therefore 
unnecessary.  This  means  that  the  two  lens  tubes  do  not  have 
to  be  hinged  so  that  their  distance  apart  can  be  adjusted  to 
correspond  with  the  distance  apart  of  the  pupils  of  the  eye. 

The  optical  principle  of  the  Galilean  glass  makes  it  necessary 
to  change  the  focus  for  maximum  enlargement  when  viewing 
objects  at  different  distances  unless  both  objects  are  at  a 
distance  of  several  hundred  yards  from  the  observer.  With 
this  glass  the  eye,  by  being  trained,  can  get  a  temporary  focus 
with  wrong  adjustment  of  the  eyepieces ;  but  this  is  very  hard 
on  the  eyes,  and  the  glass  may  seem  to  go  out  of  focus  after 
a  time  because  of  eye  fatigue  and  inability  to  keep  up  the 
strain.  For  this  reason  the  focusing  of  the  Galilean  glass 
.should  be  done  carefully. 


MirSKETRY.  ei 

60.  To  focus  the  Galilean  glass. — Start  with  the  eyepiece  well 
in,  turn  the  fdcusinj;  screw  until  the  field  is  in  !ii»parent  focus, 
and  then  ;;()  on  heyund  al)(»ut  one  turn  of  the  .screw.  Then  very 
shiwiy  turn  tlie  screw  Ixick  until  the  focus  i.s  obtained  afiaiii. 
ir  llii>  ^^lass  is  tile  jtersonal  i)rniu'rty  of  the  user,  it  is  well  to 
pul  a  niarlv  on  llie  Itarrei  corresponding  to  the  correct  focus  for 
a  ranjjce  of  about  HOO  yards.  It  will  then  he  correct  for  every- 
thinji  beyond  tliat  distance.  If  the  user's  eyes  have  marked 
different  optical  characteristics,  so  that  the  broad  focus  of  this 
type  of  gla.ss  will  not  be  approximately  correct  for  each  eye,  he 
siiouhl  fret  a  glass  of  the  prism  type  witli  .separately  adjusted 
eyi'ideces.  However,  there  are  ghisses  of  tlie  (Jalilean  type,  of 
foreign  manufacture,  with  interpupillary  adjustment  and  sepa- 
rately adjustable  eyei)ieces. 

•  61.  The  Porro  prism  glass. — The  Porro  prism  glass  has  con- 
vex objectives  and  eyepieces  and  prisms  for  erecting  the  image 
and  shortening  the  length  of  the  glass.  It  can  be  built  of  the 
highest  powers  and  has  a  practically  universal  focus. 

In  the  astronomical  telescoi>e,  whicli  consists  simply  of  a  con- 
vex object  gl a. ss  and  a  smaller  convex  eyepiece,  the  image  is 
magnified  but  inverted.  It  is  possible  to  erect  this  image  by  a 
system  of  erecting  lenses,  but  this  increases  the  length  of  the 
telescope  and  usually  decreases  the  brilliancy  of  the  image  and 
the  clearness  of  definition. 

In  1850  Porro,  a  French  engineer,  discovered  ,a  combination 
of  two  prisms  which,  when  inserted  between  the  object  glass 
and  eyepiece  of  an  astronondcal  telescope,  showed  the  image 
erect  or  in  its  natural  position.  These  prisms  have  an  additional 
advantage — the  ray  is  twice  turned  upon  itself,  and  the  tele- 
scope can  in  con.sequence  be  shortened.  Figure  8  shows  the  path 
of  rays  through  tlie  prisms. 


L 


Fig.   8. 


62.  The  Porro  prism  glass  h.ns  two  ndvantsges  inherent  in  the 
astronomical  telescope.  It  is  possible  to  get  a  large  magnifying 
power  combined  with  a  large  field  of  view.     In  addition,  by 


62  MUSKETRY. 

the  use  of  prisms,  the  glass  can  be  reiluced  iu  size  to  very  small 
dimensions.  This  alone  makes  it  the  ideal  glass  for  military 
purposes.  The  Signal  Corps  furnishes  four  glasses  of  this  type, 
viz,  type  C,  10  power;  type  D,  8  power;  type  E,  6  power; 
and  type  EE,  similar  to  type  E,  but  equipped  with  a  mil  scale 
ill  the  tieUl  and  with  other  constructional  reliiiemeiits.  A  sp«'ial 
sight  scale  in  addition  t<.>  the  mil  scale  has  been  applied  to  the 
type  EE  glass  (par.  74,  tig.  10). 

The  glasses  of  the  prismatic  type  are  usually  built  with  a 
jointed  frame  which  permits  of  an  adjustment  so  that  the  dis- 
tance between  the  optical  axes  of  the  eyepieces  can  be  made 
exactly  that  of  the  distance  between  the  pupils  of  the  user's 
eyes.  There  is  a  scale  at  the  joint  with  tigures  GO  and  70  and 
intermediate  divisions.  The  normal  interpupillary  distance  is 
id»out  64  millimeters  (2%  inches)  and  this  scale  shows  the 
distance  between  the  optical  axes  of  the  eyepieces  in  milli- 
nieters.  Many  glasses  have  an  adjustment  ratchet  or  stop 
which  drops  into  a  notch,  and  being  once  set  for  a  certain 
interpupillary  distance  the  glass  can  be  opened  until  the  etop 
drops  into  Its  notch  and  the  iuterpupiUaiy  distance  will  be 
correct  for  the  user. 

63.  To  determine  interpupillary  distance. — Point  the  glass  at 
the  sky  and  open  and  close  the  joint  until  the  field  ceases  to 
be  two  overlapping  circles  and  appears  to  be  one  sharply  defined 
circle.  The  interpupillary  distance  can  then  be  read  in  milli- 
meters from  the  scale  at  the  joint.  If  one  knows  this  constant 
for  his  eyes,  he  can  at  once  set  it  off  on  the  joint  scale  of  a 
strange  pair  of  glasses ;  otherwise  the  determination  must 
always  be  made  and  the  glasses  adjusted  for  interpupillaiT  dis- 
tance before  attempting  to  use  strange  glasses. 

64.  To  focus  the  eyepiece. — All  prism  glasses  have  independ- 
ent focusing  arrangements  for  each  eyepiece.  In  some  types 
both  eyepieces  focus  with  one  screw,  and,  in  addition,  one  of  the 
eyepieces  has  an  independent  adjustment.  In  other  types  each 
eyepiece  is  independently  adjustable  and  there  is  no  common 
adjusting  screw.  An  index  is  generally  engraved  on  the  barrel 
and  the  eyepiece  screws  in  and  out,  a  scale  with  a  middle  zero 
being  engraved  on  its  circumference.  Each  division  of  the  scale 
corresponds  to  a  movement  in  or  out  of  one-third  millimeter,  the 
movement  outward  or  lengthening  the  focus  being  indicated  as  +. 
and  tlie  opposite  movement  being  indicated  as  — .  For  a  person 
with  normal  eyes  a  prism  glass  with  eyepiece  scales  set  at  0  is 


MUSKETRY.  68 

in  focus  for  evorytliiiij;  hi'twccn  iilxnjt  ."o  feet  and  intinily.  If 
the  t'jes  are  not  normal,  oi-.  in  any  case,  witli  !i  new  glass,  each 
optical  system  should  he  focused  separately  on  some  object 
several  hundred  yards  distant  after  the  interpupillary  distance 
has  been  carefully  determined  and  fidjusted.  If  tlie  glass  has 
the  common  ajusting  screw  and  scale  on  hut  one  eyepiece  the 
eyepiece  without  the  scale  should  l)e  focused  lirst  and  then  the 
other  eyepiece  adjusted  by  turning  it  without  touching  t lie  com- 
mon niljusting  screw. 

Anytic  with  one  or  both  eyes  abnormal  may  instantly  focus 
ony  prism  glass  if  ho  remembers  and  sets  off  on  the  eyepiece 
ficaleiji  tlu»  same  roiulings  that  he  uses  on  his  own  glasses. 

65.  Characteristics  of  a  good  field  glass. — The  standards  for 
eomparison  of  field  glasses  are  based  on  the  capabilities  of  the 
unaided  normal  human  eye.  There  are  four  properties,  meas- 
urable  by  these  standards,  that  every  field  glass  has,  viz,  povircr, 
Jight,  field,  and  definition. 

^68.  Power. — The  power  of  a  field  glass  Is  defined  as  the  ratio 
of  the  diameter  of  an  object  os  seen  tlirough  the  glass  to  the 
diameter  as  seen  by  the  unaided  eye. 

The  power  of  a  field  glass  can  be  determined  with  sufficient 
accuracy  by  focusing  the  Instrument  on  a  wall,  or,  preferably, 
a  range  rod  at  least  200  yards  distant.  By  looking  at  the  object 
through  the  Instrument  with  one  eye  and  at  the  same  time  view- 
ing the  object  with  the  other  unaided  eye  it  is  possible  to  make  a 
comparison  of  the  apparent  length  or  height  of  the  two  Images. 
The  ratio  of  the  two  Is  the  power  of  the  glass. 

The  actual  power  of  most  glasses  varies  more  or  less  from  the 
l)ower  marke<l  thereon,  but  it  is  on  cheap  glasses  that  the 
greatest  discrepancy  is  found. 

For  the  mounted  man  a  glass  of  but  4,  or  at  most  (1.  powers 
can  be  used  to  advantage ;  on  foot,  with  free  hand,  instruments 
of  not  to  exceed  10  powers  can  be  used.  If  more  than  10  pow- 
ers are  desired,  a  holder  or  tripod  becomes  necessary,  and  if  the 
holder  is  intended  to  be  portable  a  greater  power  than  30  is 
not  practicable,  as  the  movements  of  the  air  or  the  slightest 
touch  of  the  bands  sets  up  vibration  tlint  renders  clear  vision 
impossible. 

67.  Light. — The  illumination  of  an  object  when  observed  with 
the  unaided  eye  is  impressed  upon  the  retina  with  a  brightness 
In  strict  propoi-tlon  to  that  of  the  object  Itself.  If  an  object  be 
viewed  under  equal  Illuminating  conditions  alternately  with  the 


64  MUSKETRY. 

unaided  eye  and  with  a  glass,  tlie  briglitness  of  tho  object  seen 
witli  the  naked  eye  may  be  represented  by  1.  wliile  that  of  the 
image  in  the  glass  will  generally  differ,  being  more  or  less 
bright.  Light  is  a  function  of  the  dimensions  of  the  object 
glass,  of  the  power  of  the  instrument,  and  of  the  dimensions  ami 
character  of  the  mediji,  such  as  prisms  or  erecting  lenses,  inter- 
posed between  the  oliject  glass  and  the  eyepiece.  There  is  n<» 
easy  method  of  measuring  this  property  except  with  special 
instruments,  but  in  glasses  of  the  same  general  type  the  light 
varies  directly  as  the  square  of  the  effective  diameter  of  the 
object  glass  and  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  power. 

68.  Field. — The  field  of  the  human  eye  for  perception  only  is 
at  least  9U°,  but  for  diHtuwt  vision  it  is  much  smaller,  say,  45°. 

The  field  of  a  field  glass  is  always  smaller  and  is,  in  any  but 
very  inferior  glasses,  sharply  defined  and  capable  of  exact 
measurement.  To  measure  the  field  of  a  glass,  stake  out  a  T 
on  any  convenient  ground.  The  stem  of  the  T  is,  for  conven- 
ience in  obtaining  results  without  calculation,  laid  out  1,000  feet 
in  length. 

Figure  9  shows  the  arrangement  and  dimensions  of  the  T  in 
conventional  perspective. 

6 


•,bb«''' 


Fio.  9. 


The  observer  with  the  glass  stands  at  A  and  holds  the  glass 
so  that  the  pole  B  is  just  visible  at  the  left-hand  edge  of  the 
field.  An  assistant  moves  pole  D  until  the  observer  notes  that 
it  is  just  visible  on  the  right-hand  edge  of  the  field.  The 
assistant  is  then  signaled  to  halt  and  make  any  fine  adjust- 
ments of  the  position  of  the  pole  D  as  .signaled  from  A.  The 
assistant  keeps  pole  D  lined  in  on  poles  Band  C.  The  dis- 
tance B  D  is  then  measured  with  a  tape  in  feet  and  is  the 
field  of  the  glass  in  feet  at  1,000  feet  or  in  yards  at  1,000  yai'ds 


MUSKETRY.  66 

(M-  ill  mils.  If  the  ilistaiRo  15  C  is  liiiti  out  oxattly  50  lei-t.  llio 
distance  0  D+50  feet  equals  B  D.  If  it  is  desired  to  reduce 
(lie  value  to  angular  moasure,  we  may  use  the  formula 

2 A /j=tan  i  "\isual  angle." 

69.  The  most  important  and  essential  quality  of  a  field  glass, 
and  tln>  (juaiity  most  lre(|uently  nciilected  in  choosing  a  glass, 
is  delinition ;  that  is,  the  shari)ness,  the  clearness,  and  the 
purity  of  the  images  seen  through  it. 

To  obtain  good  definition  it  is  necessary  that  si)herical  and 
chromatic  aberration  be  overcome,  that  the  polish  of  the  lenses 
be  a.s  perfect  as  possible,  that  the  l3ns  cement  possess  no  in- 
equalities, that  the  lenses  (and  prisms,  if  any)  be  well  focused 
and  rigidly  mounlcd  with  reference  to  one  another,  and,  gen- 
erally, that  the  instrument  be  without  optical  defect. 

Faults  in  this  direction  are  discovered  at  once  by  examina- 
tion of  definition,  whereas  in  determining  the  other  constants 
they  are  hardly  noticeable.  In  comparing  tlie  definition  of  any 
two  instruments  it  is  ordinarily  necessary  only  to  scan  distant 
objects  and  observe  to  what  extent  details  may  be  distinguished. 

The  following  test  may  be  used  :  Focus  on  printed  matter  at 
a  distance  just  b(\vond  that  at  which  perfect  clearness  is  given 
and  gradually  approach  until  the  letters  are  distinctly  defined. 
The  instrument  with  which  tho  print  can  he  read  at  the  greatest 
distance  has  the  best  definition. 

70.  Suggestions  for  the  use  of  glasses  in  the  field. — The  strain 
upon  the  eye  unaccustomed  to  the  use  of  field  glasses  is  very 
severe,  and  without  proi)er  traniing  the  advantage  to  be  gained 
by  using  the  glass  is  almost  negligible.  Therefore  frequent 
liractice  in  observation,  using  tlie  lieh!  gla.ss,  is  necessary  to 
insure  proficieney. 

In  using  the  glasses  tliey  should  be  securely  focu.'<ed  at  all 
times  and  should  be  held  with  both  hands,  pressed  firmly 
enough  to  the  eye  .sockets  to  keei>  the  relation  with  the  eyes 
con.stant  but  not  so  tight  as  to  impress  on  them  the  beating  of 
the  imlse  or  the  bodily  tremors. 

It  nuist  be  remenibere<l  that  when  using  glasses  the  eye  is 
looking  through  a  microscope  at  a  small  image  of  the  distant 
object,  and  that  it  is  very  tiresome.  Using  glasses  incorrectly 
3529°— 17 5 


66  MUSKETRY. 

lociised  or  glasses  having  i»oor  definition,  or  in  long-continued 
()l>servation  even  under  the  best  conditions  may  cause  headache 
or  dizziness. 

The  observer  should  use  tlie  glasses  as  little  as  possible  con- 
sistent with  the  work  in  hand  and  he  should  take  every  oppor- 
tunity to  rest  his  eyes.  Oflicers  in  charge  of  observing  parties 
on  work  requiring  continuous  observation  should  see  that  the 
observers  are  frequently  relieved  and  should  give  every  con- 
sideration to  men  who  complain  of  eyestrain  or  lieadaches  from 
the  use  of  field  glasses. 

At  present  machine  gun  rompanies  are  equipped  with  a  10- 
power  glass.  Some  men  find  it  impossible  to  hold  a  glass  of 
this  power  steady  enough  with  the  hands  alone  for  proper  ob- 
servation. This  is  largely  a  matter  of  practice,  but  for  those 
who  have  difficulty  in  the  use  of  these  high-power  glasses  a  re.st 
is  recommended.  This  may  consist  of  a  simple  rod  with 
means  of  attaching  it  to  the  glass  and  permitting  of  a  move- 
ment of  the  glass  in  azimuth  and  elevation.  The  rod  may  be 
forced  into  the  ground  or  merely  rest  on  the  surface.  The  rod 
should  be  adjustable  in  length  to  permit  of  use  while  standing 
or  kneeling;  its  use  in  the  prone  position  is  unnecessary. 

71.  Care  and  preservation. — The  ordinary  military  field  glass 
is  a  rugged,  serviceable  instrument.  Occasionally  screws  work 
loose ;  therefore  all  screws  should  be  periodically  tightened.  In 
hot,  moist  climates  there  is  a  tendency  for  the  Canada  balsam 
cement  between  the  lenses  of  the  object  glasses  to  deteriorate, 
and  this  causes  spots  on  the  object  glass,  but  unless  the  damage 
is  extensive  the  glass  is  still  usable. 

The  majority  of  cases  of  damage  to  lield  glasses,  especially 
those  of  the  pi'ism  type,  can  be  traced  to  the  fact  that  they  have 
been  taken  apart  by  their  owners  who  have  been  unable  to  put 
them  together  again  with  the  exact  original  adjustment. 

It  is  seldom  necessary  to  open  a  pair  of  field  glasses  for 
cleaning  or  otherwise,  and  when  it  is  necessary  the  work  should 
be  done  at  the  factoi'y  or  by  an  expert. 

If  a  glass  has  been  damaged  by  a  fall  or  blow  and  dupli- 
cation of  the  image  occurs,  it  may  sometimes  be  corrected  by 
taking  one  of  the  lens  tubes  in  each  hand  and  while  looking 
through  the  glasses  cautiously  twisting  or  tui'uing  the  hands 
until  the  duplication  disappears.  It  is  never  possible  entirely 
and  permanently  to  correct  duplication  by  this  means,  and  the 


MUSKETRY.  67 

Rlnsses  sliould  be  reluriHMl  to  the  iiiiiUcrs  for  ()V(M-haiil  at  th(> 
first  <ii)i)ortunity. 

The  exposi'd  surfaci's  of  llu'  (»l»Jcc't  and  oyopioco  lenses  should 
be  kept  elean  by  an  occasional  liu'bt  wiping  with  a  soft,  clean 
cloth  very  slijihtly  moistened  with  water  or  alcohol.  The  lenses 
can  be  scratched  by  dust  or  grit  on  the  cloth  if  they  are  rubbc^l 
vigorously.  If  alcohol  is  used  care  must  be  taken  not  to  yet 
it  on  the  lacquer  of  the  frame  and  the  Ions  holders. 

72.  Exercises  in  the  use  of  field  glasses. 


Object:   To  tench  the  use  of  field  glasses. 

Method:  («)  Each  man  adjusts  the  interpupillary  distance  of 
a  pair  of  tield  gla.sses  so  that  it  is  correct  for  his  eyes.  Eacli 
man  then  adjusts  the  focus  for  each  eye. 

{h)  Each  man  then  describes  number  of  telephone  or  tele- 
graph jtoh's  or  other  objects  in  a  certain  direction  and  gives  any 
distinguishing  marks  thereon. 

(c)  Each  man  copies  signs  within  range  of  the  field  glasses, 
such  as  signs  and  numbers  on  box  cars,  etc. 

II. 

Object:  To  teach  how  to  locate  an  object  with  the  field  glasses 
and  then  pick  it  up  with  the  naked  eye. 

Method:  A  target  is  placed  in  such  position  and  against  such 
background  that  it  is  difficult  to  see  with  the  glass. 

The  observer  is  given  the  general  direction  an«l  instructed  to 
find  the  target,  losing  the  field  glasses  he  will  note  some  promi- 
nent object  or  distinguishing  fejiture  of  the  landscape  near  the 
target  which  will  also  be  visible  with  the  naked  eye.  He  will 
then  note  the  position  of  this  object  with  reference  to  tlu'  tar- 
get in  order  that  he  may  pick  up  the  target  without  the  aid  of 
glasses. 

THE   iriL  AS   AN   ANGULAR   UNIT  OF   MEASUKK. 

73.  An  angular  unit  of  measure  is  required  in  the  direction 
and  control  of  fire  as  an  aid — 

(a)  In  the  e.stimation  of  the  range. 

(b)  In  determining  the  number  of  yards  and  men  on  ari  occu- 
pitHl  front. 

(c)  In  laying  off  tbe  distance  from  the  reference  point  to  the 
target. 


68  MUSKETRY. 

(d)  lu  indicating  the  width  and  tlie  subdivision  of  the  target 
into  parts  for  the  purpose  of  distribution. 

The  system  of  angular  measui-ement  in  terms  of  degrees,  min- 
utes, and  seconds  is  very  cuinber.some.  A  much  more  satis- 
factory angular  unit  is  the  mil.  This  is  the  angle  whose  nat- 
ural tangent  is  0.001 ;  an  object  1  yard  long  at  a  distance  of  1,000 
yards  subtends  an  angle  of  1  mil.  The  value  of  the  mil  in  the 
conventional  angular  mea.sure  is  3'  26.2". 

74.  Mils  are  conveniently  measured  with — 
(«)  A  field  glass  fitted  with  a  mil  scale. 
(&)  The  rear  siglit  leaf  of  the  rifle. 

(c)  The  finger. 

(d)  The  mil  rule. 

(a)  The  most  accurate  and  convenient  instrument  for  meas- 
uring mils  is  tlie  field  glass  fitted  with  a  mil  scale,  as  is  tlie  type 


Fig.  10. 

EE  glass  of  the  Signal  Corps.  The  mil  scale  is  engraved  on  a 
thin  glass  reticule  which  is  accurately  placed  in  the  focal  plane 
of  the  object  glass.  As  a  result  the  scale  and  distant  field  of 
view  are  in  focus  at  the  same  time,  and  the  scale  can  be  super- 
imposed on  any  object  in  the  field  of  view  by  a  slight  movement 
of  the  glass.     (Fig.  10.) 

75.  (b)  The  rear  sight  leaf. — It  is  essential  that  every  man 
firing  have  a  mil  measuring  instrument  in  order  to  interpret 
and  carry  out  the  orders  of  his  superiors  when  these  orders 
ai'e  given  in  mils  in  target  and  sector  designation.  A  satisfac- 
tory unit  is  the  "  sight."  The  rear  sight  of  the  service  rifle  is 
0.7  inch  wide.  If  the  eye  of  the  firer  is  held  14  inches  from  the 
rear  sight  (fig.  11),  i.  e.,  over  the  comb  of  the  stock,  the  sight 
will  then  subtend  an  angle  of — 

0_JxUMX»=.50mils. 
14 


MUSKETRY. 


69 


All  orders  iiivolviiiLC  flir  use  of  mils  in  tiii'^rct  dcsi^iiiMtioii  ^ivcii 
(lie  men  slioiilil  !>(>  in  Ici-nis  ol'  n':ii-  siixlils  -  tlic  wonl  sight 
Itcin^  nsctl. 

76.  ('I  The  finger.  'I'lic  linLrcr  ni.i.v  he  nscd  in  cnicrircncics 
iind  should  lie  held  .-d  snch  dislMncc  Ironi  the  cyt'  as  to  subtend 
r»()  yards  at  I.M(M)  yards.     As  the  liu^'ers  o{'  all  men  are  nut  the 


E»=i> 


nc.     11. 

same  width  the  distance  that  the  finjier  is  to  he  held  from  the 
eye  must  he  determined  in  each  <-ase. 

77.  ((/)  The  mil  rule. — A  <5-in(h  ruler  with  a  cord  20  inches 
h)nf?  forms  a  convenient  mil'  nieasurini:  instrument.  If  con- 
structed as  shown  in  tipure  12,  it  will  st'rve  for  measurements 
of  3(M)  mils  or  less. 


-/N ^[WN/X^/ts/^^A/WN- 


-t- 


100 


20  Inch  Cord 


Fio.   12. 


THE  MUSKETRY  RULE. 


78.  The  Ordnance  Department  makes  a  comLnnation  mil  rule 
and  auxiliary  rear-sight  scale  in  the  form  of  n  musketry  rule. 
(FiRS.  l.S  and  14.) 

With  this  instrument  an  anj,de  may  he  measui-cd  in  mils  or  in 
terms  of  the  scale  ou  the  rille  sight. 


70 


MUSKETRY. 


The  musketry  rule  (.onsists  of  an  aluniimmi  bar  4f  inches 
long,  l\i  inches  wide  and  i\  inch  thiclv.  It  is  beveled  on 
both    ediies   and    has    a    grooved    slot,    in    the   contpr   of   whicli 


Fig.  13. 

two  brass  sliders  may  be  moved  back  and  forth.  A  small 
spiral  spring  and  friction  pin  is- set  in  a  hole  in  each  slider  so 
that  the  pin  bears  in  the  slot  of  the  rule.     This  holds  the  slider 


Fig.  14. 


by  friction  at  the  point  desired  by  the  operator.  A  small  steel 
stop  pin  set  in  the  rule  through  the  beveled  edge  and  projecting 
into  the  slot  for  the  sliders  keeps  the  latter  from  being  acci- 
dentally slipped  out  of  the  slots. 


MUSKETRY.  71 

It  will  rarfly,  if  cvcf.  ln>  iicccssMry  lo  rciiiovo  tiii"  slidiTS  from 
the  rule;  but  if  (liis  should  have  to  l>o  done  for  any  puri)oso,  the 
stop  pin  should  he  pushed  out  to  clear  the  slot,  and  ihe  sliders 
may  then  be  slipped  into  the  enlarjietl  part  of  the  sl«)t  and  re- 
moved. Care  should  be  taken  not  to  lose  the  spiral  sprins  and 
pin  which  tit  in  the  hole  in  the  slider.  In  asseuiblinij;  the  slider, 
the  friction  spring;  and  i)in  imist  be  in  place,  insert  the  slider  in 
the  enlarj^ed  end  of  the  slot,  hold  l)ack  the  friction  pin  with  tlie 
point  of  a  knife  or  similar  instrument,  and  slip  the  slider  into 
its  grooves  in  the  slot.  Push  back  the  stop  pin  when  Ibis  opera- 
tion is  completed  so  that  the  slider  can  not  slip  out  of  the 
gi'ooves. 

79.  In  measuring  angles,  the  rule  is  designed  to  be  held  15 
inches  from  the  eye  and  ])erpendicular  to  the  line  of  sight.  In 
order  to  insure  this  there  is  a  small  bole  in  the  center  line  of  the 
rule,  and  through  this  passes  a  nonstretching  cord  with  a  knot 
in  it  15  inches  from  the  rule.  The  knot  is  held  just  iinder  the 
observing  eye  with  one  hand  while  the  rule  is  held  with  the  other 
hand  at  right  angles  to  the  line  of  sight,  the  cord  stretched 
lightly,  and  the  scale  in  use  superimposed  on  the  area  under 
observation. 

The  beveled  e<lges  of  the  rule  are  graduated  from  0  to  300 
mils  in  10-mil  divisions.  The  graduations  consist  of  simple 
lines  on  one  edge  and  of  black  sawteeth  on  the  other,  as  each  of 
these  nicthods  of  graduation  has  its  place  in  varying  lights  and 
backgrounds.  The  table  on  the  face  of  the  rule  "  100  yards 
front "  and  the  three  formulas  are  for  use  in  connection  with 
mil  measurements. 

The  graduations  along  the  center  slot  are  reproductions  on  a 
reduced  scale  of  the  graduations  on  the  rear  sight  of  the  s«Tvice 
rifle  and  the  two  sliders  have  the  same  function  as  the  leaf 
slide  on  the  rifle  sight. 

80.  The  equations  stamped  on  the  b;ick  of  the  musketry  rule 
are  for  the  .solution  of  simple  pntblems  involved  in  lire  direction 
and  control  and  are: 

(I)  n=^J» 

Where  R  equals  range  in  yards,  W  equals  width  or  height  in 
yards,  M  equals  number  of  mils  subtended  by  W. 


72  MUSKETRY. 

81.  'I'lie  following  examplos  indiciite  tbe  practical  use  of  these 
formulas : 

Examples. 

I  («). 

Object:   Estimation  of  range. 

Method:  A  certain  tree  is  estimated  to  be  15  yards  high.  It 
covers  an  angle  of  25  mils.     It  is  therefore  600  yards  away,  for — • 

„      Wxl,000     15yardsxl,000     15,000 

I  (b). 

Object:    E.stimation  of  range. 

Method:  The  telegraph  poles  on  a  distant  railroad  running  at 
right  angles  to  our  line  of  sight  are  known  (from  previous  meas- 
urement of  such  poles)  to  be  44  yards  apart;  the  angle  between 
two  adjacent  poles  is  observed  to  be  40  mils ;  the  range  to  the 
railroad  is,  therefore,  1.100  yards,  for — 

^      Wxl,000      44  yards  X 1 ,000     44,000 

R= j^i = 40 -  =  -^0"^^'-^^^  y^'"^^- 

II   (a). 

Object:  E.stimation  of  fronts. 

Method:  A  line  of  skirmishers  at  about  one  man  per  yard  of 
front  covers  40  mils  on  the  scale ;  the  range  Ls  known  to  be  800 
yards ;  the  number  of  men  is  therefore  32,  for — 

„,     RxM     8  yards X 40    32,000     „„        ,    , 
W=i;000=       1,000       =i;000=^2  yards  (or  men). 

(&)  A  column  of  infantry  in  "  fours  "  is  seen  by  a  patrol  at  a 
range  of  1,200  yards.  It  is  moving  aci'oss  his  front  and  covers 
120  mils  from  head  to  rear  of  column.  How  many  are  in  the 
column  ? 

RxM^l,200  yards  x  120_144,000_ 
^^  1,000  ~  1,000  ~  1,000  -l^-l  yards. 

At  two  men  per  yard,  the  column,  contained  288  men. 


MUSKETRY.  78 

III   (a). 

Object:  Detoriniiiation  of  the  front  to  be  covered  in  mils. 
Method:  A  hostile  force  known  to  contain  al)out  KH)  men 
is  deployed  in  position  l.OiX)  yards  away,  but  so  concealed  tbaf 
its  Haid<s  can  not  be  seen  or  determined  definitely.  The  company 
conunandcr  decides  to  cover  a  front  of  2<^)  yards  with  bis  tire, 
lUO  yards  on  each  side  of  a  visible  ;rroni)  of  beads  in  the  hostile 
line.    How  many  mils  should  be  covered? 

„     Wx  1,000     200x1.000     ,  „      ., 
M= g^-=  -1^000      =-^  '^'^'- 

(b)  A  machlne-frun  platoon  known  to  contain  two  guns  is  con- 
cealed at  a  range  of  0(MJ  yards  with  one  of  Its  guns  visible 
through  glas.ses.  The  company  commander  decides  to  cover  a 
front  of  50  yards  on  each  side  of  the  visible  gun.  How  many 
mils  should  be  covered  ? 

„    Wx  1,000    100x1.000 

M= R— =— 900"*  =  ^"  '»»'«• 

THE  MIL  RULE  AS   A  RANGE  FINDER   AND   TELEMETER. 

The  mil  rule  may  be  used  as  a  fairly  accurate  range  finder 
and  telemeter  if  it  Is  possible  to  measure  off  a  base,  by  pacing 
or  otherwise,  directly  toward  or  away  from  the  object,  such  as 
a  trench,  whose  ranw  and  length  is  required.  The  factors  In 
.such  a  case  are  the  length  of  the  base  and  the  angle  in  nnls 
subtended  by  the  object  .-is  measured  from  each  end  of  the  base. 
The  formulas,  derived  from  formulas  (1)  and  (2)  are: 

When  the  base  is  measured  toirard  the  object  in  question: 

When  the  base  is  measured  from  the  object  in  question: 

(5)R=M^_M3 

In  which — 

D=length  of  base  in  yards. 

R=range  in  yards. 

Mi=mils  sulttended  by  the  object  at  the  end  of  the  base 

line  from  which  the  range  Is  desired,  and 
M2=mils  subtended  by  the  object  at  the  opposite  enil  of 
the  base  line. 


74  MUSKETRY. 

Exdiiiijlcs. 

I  (a). 

Object:  Use  of  mil  rule  as  a  ranse-finding  instrument. 

Method:  From  a  jioint  A,  a  hostile  trench  is  visible  in  the 
distance.  A  mil  measurement  shows  that  the  anjile  subtended 
by  the  trench  is  150  mils  (Mi).  A  scout  now  goes  forward  360 
paces  (300  yards),  thus  getting  a  base  line  D,  and  measures  the 
angle  subtended  by  the  trench  from  liis  advanced  position.  He 
finds  that  the  trench  covers  an  angle  of  200  mil.^  (M2).  and 
signals  back  to  point  A  this  information  and  the  distance  D 
tliat  he  went  forwar<l.  The  range  from  A  to  the  hostile  trench 
and  the  length  of  the  trench  may  now  be  calculated,  using 
formulas  (4)  and  (2)  : 

„     300x200    60,000    ,  „^^        , 

=20fr— ro~  ~50 —  =  1'200  yards,  range  to  trench. 

The  range  having  been  found,  the  width  is  determined  by  the 
use  of  formula  (2)  : 

1,000"      1,000      "~^" 

(6)  AVe  have  come  to  a  river  bank  and  a  village  across  the 
river  covers  angle  of  150  mils  (Mi).  An  observer  walks  back 
200  yards  (D),  keeping  our  party  on  the  river  bank  in  line  with 
the  village,  and  tinds  at  that  point  that  the  village  covers  an 
angle  of  but  120  mils  (Ms).  Using  in  the  case  formulas  (5) 
and  (2),  the  range  from  the  river  bank  to  the  village  and  the 
size  of  the  village  may  now  be  calculated. 

_,     200X120    24,000     ^^^         ,  ^       .„ 

.R=jvq--,2o~~q()~~°00  yards  range  to  village. 

The  range  having  l)een  found,  the  width  is  determined  by  the 
use 

„,      RM     800X150       _         ,         .,,..,. 
lOOO"   TWK)    ~        yards=width  01  village. 

The  u.se  of  the  mil  rule  for  such  range-finding  work  is  of 
great  value  just  prior  to  an  attack.  The  range  to  the  enemy 
and  the  length  of  a  certain  part  of  his  trenches  or  the  distance 
between  two  prominent  objects  along  his  line  can  be  determined 
with  accuracy  beyond  effective  rifle  range.  Thereafter,  as  the 
attacking  line  approaches  the  enemy,  the  range  can  be  esti- 


MUSKETRY.  75 

mated  by  deducting  tliu  distance  advanced  from  the  orij^imil 
measurement.  The  range  can  then  be  obtained  with  accuracy 
at  any  time  simply  by  taking  one  observation  willi  the  mil  rule 
and  using  lornnHa  (1)  as  given  on  the  back  of  the  rule. 

In  using  this  method  at  ranges  between  SIK)  and  1.5()U  yards 
the  base  D  siiould  be  from  100  to  300  yards  long  (longer  as 
the  range  is  greater),  and  the  mil  measurements  should  be 
made  on  objects  that  subtend  angles  of  50  to  300  mils.  The 
method  will  work  with  longer  or  shorter  bases  and  larger  or 
smaller  angles,  but  the  figures  given  will  insure  suiliciently 
accurate  results. 

EXERCISES   IN   THE   USE   OF  THE  MIL   SCALE,   REAR   SIGHT.   AND 

FINGER. 

82.  I. — Object:  Laying  out  a  mil  scale  in  feet  on  a  building  or 
board  fence  on  which  to  adjust  the  mil  rule  rear  sight,  and 
finger. 

Method:  IMck  out  a  building  or  board  fence  where  a  clear 
horizontal  length  of  over  30  feet  is  available.  Lay  out  on  this 
surface  a  scale  of  feet.  30  feet  long,  marking  the  zero,  5,  10, 
15,  20,  25,  and  30  foot  marks  prominently,  and  respectively 
50,  100,  1.50.  200.  250,  and  3(X).  The  marks  should  be  heavy 
enough  to  be  seen  clearly  from  a  distance  of  100  feet.  Lay  ofif 
from  the  center  of  this  scale  a  distance  of  exactly  100  feet  per- 
pendicular to  the  scale  and  set  a  stake  there.  Then  witli  the 
ob.server  at  the  stake  5  feet  on  the  scale  equals  50  mils,  or  one 
rear  sight,  or  one  finger. 

83.  II.— Object:  To  test  the  length  of  the  cord  on  the  Mus- 
ketry Rule. 

Method:  The  (tbserver  now  stands  so  that  the  observing  eye  is 
exactly  over  this  stake  (par.  82),  and  holding  the  instrument 
as  described,  observes  the  .30-foot  scale.  The  length  of  the  cord 
should  be  such  that  the  whole  mil  scale  coincides  with  the  30- 
foot  scale  at  100  feet  distance.  If  not.  the  length  of  the  cord 
must  be  changed  until  it  does.  The  mil  scale  should  also  be 
tested  on  the  interior  marks  of  the  30-foot  scale,  not  so  much 
on  account  of  possible  inaccuracies  in  the  graduati(ms  of  the  mil 
scale  as  to  afford  practice  to  the  observer  in  the  use  of  the  in- 
strument. It  should  be  teste<l  in  the  standing,  sitting,  and  prone 
positions,  particularly  the  lasj. 


76  MUSKETRY. 

84.  III. — Object:  To  tenth  the  use  of  the  rear  sight. 
Method:   Tlie  inetliod  of  holdiiiji;  the  riile  and  using  the  I'ear 

sight  (tig.  11)  as  an  instrunieni  tor  mailing  angidar  measure- 
ments is  explained  to  tlie  soldier.  Each  man  tlien  steps  to  tlie 
stalce  (par.  82)  and  liolds  Ids  lille  in  such  a  position  that  tlie 
intercept  of  the  rear  sight  leaf  subtends  50  mils  on  the  scale. 
The  man  is  then  told  to  measure  the  length  of  the  scale  in  rear 
sights.  Practice  is  i-epeated  as  with  the  mil  scale ;  such  exer- 
cises being  given  as  "two  and  one-half  sights  from  that  (nam- 
ing some  pronnnent  object)  as  a  small  bush."  In  this  manner 
the  men  soon  learn  to  use  1/5,  1/4,  1/3,  and  1/2  of  a  rear  sight. 

85.  IV. — Object:  To  teach  tlie  use  of  the  tinger. 

Method:  The  advantage  of  at  times  being  able  to  use  the 
linger  in  the  same  manner  as  the  rear  sight  is  at  first  ex- 
plained. Each  man  is  then  directed  to  hold  liis  forefinger  at 
such  distance  from  his  eye  that  it  subtends  an  angle  of  50  mils 
on  the  scale. 

This  is  repeated  until  proficiency  is  acquired  in  holding  the 
finger  at  the  proiter  distance,  the  men  using  the  forefinger,  nnd- 
dle  finger,  and  index  finger  only.  The  little  finger  being  smaller 
is  not  used. 

The  soldier  first  makes  measurements  with  tlie  fingers,  then 
verifies  this  measurement  with  the  sight.  After  some  practice 
the  accuracy  of  the  finger  method,  while  not  equal  to  the  mil 
scale  or  sight,  is  remarkable. 

Precision  and  rapidity  of  observation  can  not  be  attained 
without  constant  practice  and,  if  the  user  desires  really  to  be- 
come proficient  in  the  use  of  the  mil  scale,  he  should  lay  out, 
in  addition  to  the  horizontal  scale,  other  vertical  and  inclined 
scales  of  feet  and  practice  on  them  from  the  stake  100  feet 
distant.  .  £. 

86.  Switching  fire. — The  mil  system  as  described  jftay  be  used 
in  switching  targets.  If,  for  instance,  it  is  desired  to  change 
laterally  to  a  new  target,  the  prescribed  signal  for  switching 
fire  is  made,  "  two  fingers  to  the  right,"  for  example,  and  each 
and  every  man  then  changes  his  fire  the  designated  distance  to 
the  right  as  has  been  signaled.  The  front  covered  by  the  fii-e 
of  the  unit  remains  the  same  width  but  the  center  of  the  sheaf 
has  been  moved  100  mils  to  the  right. 

87.  Use  of  musketry  rule  in  connection  with  combined 
sights. — One  other  feature  of  tlie  musketry  rule  remains  to  be 
mentioned.    This  is  the  simple  device  to  obtain  the  sight  settings 


MUSKETRY.  77 

when  it  is  (iesircd  to  use  ((iiiihiiuMl  si^lits.  Set  both  sliders  at 
the  niiiKe.  estimated  or  ineasured.  to  the  target.  If  two  « leva- 
tions  are  to  l)e  used,  use  tlie  si;rlit  settinj;  indicated  l).v  tiie  mark 
numbered  2  on  eacli  slider.  If  thret'  elevations  are  to  be  use<l, 
use  the  settings  indicated  by  the  mark  numbered  3  on  each 
slider  and  the  sifiht  setting  corresponding  to  the  true  or  esti- 
mated ranjre,  making  three  in  all.  This  device  is  approximately 
accurate  ouly  for  ranges  less  thau  1,3U0  yards. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   DESIGNATION   AND  RECOGNITION   OF  SERVICE 
TARGETS. 

88.  The  adoption  of  smokeless  powder,  neutral-tiiited  uni- 
forms, and  tlie  prominence  given  to  tlie  concealment  of  trenches, 
use  of  cover,  and  suitable  backgrounds  all  tend  to  diminish 
the  visibility  of  the  enemy  and  thus  increase  the  necessity  for 
training  in  the  designation  and  recognition  of  targets.  Poor 
description  of  targets  or  a  delay  in  opening  fire  results  in  a 
loss  of  fire  effect  that  may  prove  disastrous  in  the  critical 
stages  of  an  action. 

For  example,  a  faulty  description  is  confusing,  all  of  the  men 
will  not  recognize  the  target,  and  there  is  a  consequent  delay 
in  the  opening  of  fire.  This  is  especially  true  with  fleeting 
targets.  Bad  description  may  I'esult  in  a  part  or  the  whole 
of  the  unit  mistaking  the  target,  the  outcome  being  a  total  loss 
of  fire  effect  on  account  of  firing  at  the  wrong  target.  Part  of 
the  line  may  become  confused  and  not  fire  at  all. 

89.  Facility  in  target  designation  and  recognition  requires 
that  the  soldier  be  given  a  thorough  course  in — 

(1)  A  system  of  describing  targets. 

(2)  The  determination  of  the  range. 

(3)  Visual  training. 

The  system  in  describing  targets  is  taken  up  first,  in  order 
that  the  soldier  may  be  able  to  describe  what  he  sees  and 
practice  the  system  while  engaged  in  estimation  of  distances 
and  in  the  visual  training  course. 

The  estimation  of  distances  follows,  and  is  taken  up  in  con- 
nection with  visual  training. 

The  range  is  given  first  in  the  fire  order  for  two  reasons : 

(1)  The  men  set  their  sights,  and  thereafter  devote  all  their 
attention  to  locating  the  enemy. 

(2)  The  range  is  part  of  the  designation,  in  that  it  helps  the 
soldier  to  locate  the  target. 

78 


MUSKETRY.  79 

90.  Tilt'  systems  used  in  dcsc  rildii;:  tarf^ets  are  ^iven  iindtT 
(he  headinj; — 

TARGET   DESIGNATION. 

Within  the  regiment  implies  an  ability  on  the  part  of  the 
regimental  commander  to  describe  an  objective  and  its  subdivi- 
sions from  the  map  as  well  as  from  the  ground,  and  such  train- 
ing on  the  part  of  his  subordinates  as  will  insure  the  correct 
translation  of  his  map  designation  into  parts  of  actual  terrain. 

A  rejriiiunital  cumniander  under  ordinary  conditions  of  serv- 
ice deals  witli  fronts  or  sectors  of  such  dimensions  that,  even  in 
describinn  tlie  tars«^t  on  the  jji'ound,  physical  features  will  be 
found  marking  tlie  limits  of  tlie  battalion  objectives,  and  a  re- 
sort to  any  elaborate  system  of  description  would  not  be  neces- 
sary. However,  regimental  commanders  as  well  as  battalion 
commanders  should  be  able  to  describe  a  target  with  the  same 
facility  as  can  tlio  platoon  leader. 

"  Within  the  battalion  "  implies  not  only  an  ability  on  the 
part  of  the  battalion  commander  to  describe  an  objective  without 
ambiguity,  but  also  a  uniformity  of  training  throughout  the 
battalion  which  will  enable  the  men  of  one  company  to  de- 
scribe intelligently  to  men  of  other  companies  of  the  battalion 
both  targets  and  fronts  or  sectors  in  language  and  by  methods 
with  which  both  are  familiar. 

"  Within  the  company  "  implies  an  ability  on  the  part  of  the 
company  commander  to  describe  the  objectives  or  fronts  for  his 
platoons  within  the  limits  assigned  to  the  company.  It  also 
implies  an  ability  to  cover  the  whole  target  of  the  company 
during  a  forward  movement  of  part  of  the  company. 

"  Within  the  platoon  "  implies  an  ability  on  the  part  of  the 
platoon  leaders  to  understand  the  company  commander's  desig- 
nation of  the  target  and  to  transmit  that  information  to  their 
platoons  in  such  a  manner  as  to  insure  an  equal  distribution  of 
their  fire  within  the  front  assigned  them  as  objectives,  not 
slighting  the  less  visible  parts. 

All  of  tlie  foregoing  makes  necessary  a  system  of  describing 
and  defining  targets  that  will  enable  connnanders"  to  describe 
in  the  shortest  possible  terms  the  most  difiicult  targets  to  their 
men.  This  .system  must  be  simple  and  easy  to  learn.  A  good 
system  of  indicating  targets  is  by  reference  points  consisting 
of  natural  or  other  features  of  the  ground  located  in  the  front- 
age a.ssigued  to  a  unit.     If  targets  can  not  be  indicated  with 


80  MUSKETRY, 

sufficient   accuracy   by   reference   points   alone,   supplementary 
methofls  are  iised  In  description  in  connection  with  those  points. 

91.  In  general,  targets,  with  reference  to  their  designation, 
will  fall  under  the  following  heads: 

(1)  Those  that  stand  out  so  plainly  that  there  can  be  no 
possibility  of  doubt  as  to  what  and  which  target  is  meant. 

(2)  Those  that  are  plainly  visible  but  about  which  there 
might  be  some  misunderstanding. 

(8)   Those  which  are  partially  visible  but  which,  on  account 
of  backgrounds  or  other  conditions,  are  difficult  to  pick  up. 
(4)   Those  which  can  be  seen  only  with  field  glasses. 

92.  Methods  of  designation. 

Case  I. 

i^listem.  Example. 

1.  Announce  range.  "  Range  1,000." 

2.  Announce  objective.  "A  troop  of  cavalry." 

Case  II. 

The  horizontal  clock  system  may  be  used  (with  visible  tar- 
gets). To  avoid  confusion  it  is  necessary  when  using  a  clock 
system  to  preface  the  direction  with  the  words  "  reference 
point  "  or  "  target." 

i^ijstem.  Example. 

1.  Announce  range.  "Range  1,000"  (men  set  sights). 

(If  sights  are  to  be 
set,  allow  time 
necessary. ) 

2.  Announce  direction.  "  Target  at  2  o'clock." 

3.  Announce  objective.  "A  troop  of  cavalry  dismounted." 

PKOCEDUKE. 

1.  All  set  sights  at  1,000  yards. 

2.  In  using  the  horizontal  clock  system,  the  flrer  considers 
himself  to  be  at  the  center  of  the  clock  dial,  12  o'clock  being 
his  true  front,  i.  e..  on  a  line  perpendicular  to  the  firing  line. 
Six  o'clock,  then,  would  be  to  his  rear,  9  o'clock  to  his  left, 
.•ind  3  o'clock  to  his  right.  The  individual  would  be  facing 
toward  2  o'clock  in  this  instance  if  he  made  a  little  more  than 
a  half  right  face ;  to  be  precise,  a  two-thii-ds  right  face. 

When  the  direction  is  announced,  all  look  in  the  designateil 
direction ;  in  this  case,  toward  2  o'clock. 

3.  T>()<ik  for  ()l)j('ctivo  at  1,000  vards  on  this  2  o'clock  line. 


MUSKETRY. 
Cask  111. 


81 


The  vertical  clock  system  is  used  either  singly  or  in  combina- 
tion with  the  horizontal   (against  small  or  iudistiiict  targets). 


System. 


Example. 


Ilango     1,000"     (men     set 
sights). 

Ki'fereiue  point  to  our  right 
front  "  (or  '*  at  2  o'clock  "). 


1.  Annoinice  range.     ( If  sights 

are  to  he  .set,   allow  time 
necessary ). 

2.  Annctunce  the  general  direc- 

tion     of     tlie      reference 
point. 

3.  De.signate    as    a     reference     "A     stone     liouse     with     two 

point  the  most  prominent  cliimneys.'' 

oh.lect    in    the    zone    indi- 
cated. • 

4.  Aimounce  the  position  of  the     "  Target  at  3  o'clock." 

target  with  respect  to  the 
reference   i)oint. 
r>.  Announce  objective.  "A     hostile     patrol     of     four 

men." 

rUOCEUlIRK. 

1.  Men  set  sights  at  1,000  yards. 

2.  All  men  look  to  tlieir  right  front    (or  along  the  2  o'clock 
line). 

DESCRIPTION  OF  TARGET. 
T&rget   Inaistinot  using  mil  scale. 


rV^r^T— -;a 


RANGE  -  1000 

REFERENCE  POINT  -  AT  ELEVEN 

O'CLOCK  -   THAT  SUAHP  PEAK. 
TARGET  -   niREE   IHIRrY  O'CLOCK. 
100   MU5   13  THE  RIGHT  OF  AN 

EKSMT'S  LINE   (C  -  D)   SO 

U1L3  UMG. 

Fu;.   15. 


Horiiimtol 


Observer. 


3.  The   reference   point    (stone   house)    is    found    in   the   Indi- 
cated direction. 
:!r)i:9°— 17 c 


82 


MUSKETRY. 


DSSCBIPIION  OF  lAE^GET. 
Target  inilotinot  using  rear  sight. 


RANGK  -  1000 

tSimfSCE  fOIMT  -  ta  EUYBI  O'CLOOC 
BtAT  SHAXP  PEAK. 

XARGBT  >  XHREE  XUIRTY  O'CLOCK 

2  IS^&R  SICH7S  lb   THE  BEHT  OP 
AH  ENBWr  <S  LINE   (C  -  D}  ONE 
REAH  SiaH7  LONG. 


Fig.  16. 


Observer . 


9ESCBIPTI0H  OF  X&RGET. 
Target  iadistiact  using  fingers. 


RAKGE  -  1000 

ISFi3l£NCE  POINT  -  Al  EL&7I97 
O'CLOCK  -  IHAT  SHARP  PEAK. 

TABCBT  -  THHEE  THIRTY  O'CLOCK 

£  FINGERS  IS  TH£  RIGHT 
OF  AN  ENiailY'S  LUTE 
(C-D)  1  FINGER  LONG. 


Fig. 


MUSKETRY.  88 

4.  A  clock  face  (vertical)  is  iiiiauMucd  centered  on  the  refer- 
ence point,  and  tlie  men  look  nlonjr  tlie  line  leading  from  the 
clock  center  throup:li  3  o'clock  and — 

n.  Find  hostile  jiatrol  at  ],()(K)  yards  from  the  lirnis  point. 

Fiirures  1.1,  1(i,  and  17  show  the  application  of  the  system 
u.sinff  the  horizontal  and  vertical  clock  syst(Mns  in  combination. 

The  rear  sijrht  shonld  he  used  wlien  descriiiini,'  tarjrets  to  the 
men:  Iniwever.  all  men  sliould  un<k'rstand  tlic  use  df  mils  and 
tinjrers. 

Cask  IV. 

Keciuircs  the  use  of  an  auxili.iix  aiiiiiiiii  tar.wt.  (See  Cliaji- 
ter  IX). 

Its  de.scriiition  is  llie  same  as  any  other  tar;iet. 

93.  Company  connnanders,  i)latoon  leaders,  and  leaders  of 
indepemlent  organizations,  at  the  conclusion  of  a  movement  or 
when  occupying  a  position,  should  select  reference  points  and 
describe  them  to  the  men.  The  numhei-  of  points  necessary 
will  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  ground  ami  whether  it  has 
little  or  much  detail  in  the  shape  of  pronunent  natural  or  other 
features,  hut  points  should  be  .selected  so  as  to  facilitate  the 
indication  of  targets  in  all  parts  of  the  field  of  tire.  In  selecting 
these  reference  points,  the  most  prominent  should  be  chosen. 
They  should  be  in  the  distance  or  middle  of  the  field  of  fire, 
and  as  far  off  as  possible.  No  two  points,  if  it  can  be  avoided, 
should  be  similar ;  as,  for  instance,  two  church  spires  and  two 
clumps  of  trees.  The  points  should  be  as  far  apart  as  possible. 
Each  point  should  be  Indicated  and  the  men  told  the  name  by 
which  it  is  known.  Targets  are  indicated  by  short,  accurate, 
clearly  understood  descriptions  as  to  their  nature,  features,  and 
exact  position. 

94.  Field  glas.ses  may  be  used  to  pick  up  targets  thai  ai'e 
dillicnlt  to  locate,  but  the  aiming  targets  .are  always  described 
as  they  are  .seen  wit!;  the  naked  eye  and  not  as  seen  through 
the  field  glasses.  Otherwise  men  wlio  are  without  glasses  will 
not  recognize  the  target.  In  both  attack  or  advance  the  front 
or  12  o'clock  point  is  Indicated  in' order  that  when  a  direction 
is  u.sed  to  indicate  a  target  the  men  will  look  in  the  proper 
direction  with  regard  to  the  front. 

95.  The  mil,  rear  sight,  finger,  and  clock-face  methods  of 
describing  targets  are  oidy  to  be  used  when  they  simplify, 
shorten,  and  make  more  accurate  the  method   of  designation 


84 


MUSKETRY. 


jind  (leisicriplion.  Only  one  system  of  indicating  targets  should 
ever  be  employed  in  a  battalion,  and.  if  possil)le.  in  an  army, 
so  that  the  men  may  recognize  targets  described  by  connnand- 
ers  other  than  their  own.  Men  sejiarated  from  their  own 
organization  will  then  not  be  confused  by  strange  systems. 

If  possible,  targets  are  described  and  their  range  given  be- 
fore occasion  for  firing  arises,  in  order  that  the  men  may  ad- 
just their  siglits  and  be  ready  to  open  fir(>  without  further 
orders  as  soon  as  the  target  appears. 

Reference  points  are  not  used  when  the  target  is  plain  and 
of  suci 


Fig.   is. 

Orders  should  always  be  as  short  as  possible  without  losing 
clearness.  Hence,  to  use  a  reference  point  when  not  called  for 
is  to  add  more  to  the  order  than  necessary. 

Reference  points  should  be  definite  and  easily  distingnished. 

Of  what  value  is  it  to  announce  a  reference  point  that  is  as 
hard  to  see  as  the  target? 

Data  given  from  reference  point  must  be  complete. 

The  distance  from  the  reference  point  to  the  right,  left,  oi- 
center  of  the  enemy's  line  should  always  be  stated,  as  well  as 
the  width  of  the  target  that  it  is  intended  to  cover.  Do  not 
sacrifice  clearness  to  brevity. 


MUSKETRY. 


85 


The  company  is  always  deployed  facing  the  target. 

96.  Tlu'  syslciii  of  dcsi  riliinu  tar;;('ts  as  ^.'ivcn  herein  is  tliat 
followed  l).v  most  niilitar.v  autlioritios  on  tliis  suhjcct.  Some 
writers  sliortoii  tlu»  form  .somewiiat  by  the  so-called  unit  systeni, 
giving  tlie  mimher  of  rear  siglits  or  fingers  as  "J.  H.  etc.  but 
leaving  out  the  unit,  this  l)eing  understood  by  the  men.  The 
School  of  Musketry  board  at  Fort  Sill  is  unanimously  of  the 
opinion  that  it  is  preferable  to  add  the  unit  of  measure  and  say 
"  2  fingers,"  "  sights,"  etc. 

The  "  face  as  I  face  "  method,  advocated  by  .some,  is  not  good. 
A  slight  difference  in  the  front  is  likely  to  cause  confusion. 


Fm;.    ]'.i. 

97.  Suggested  exercises.^ — The  recruits  should  lie  taught  the 
designation  of  targets  in  slow  and  easy  steps.  It  is  assumed 
that  while  studying  the  subject  of  Instruments  he  has  learned  to 
use  the  mil.  rear  sight,  and  fingers  in  the  measurement  of 
angles. 

I. — Object:  To  teach  the  use  of  horizontal  and  vertical  clock 
faces. 

Method:  Many  men,  due  to  lack  of  imagination,  will  find  it 
hard  to  understand  the  ai)plication  of  the  clock  face  t<»  the 
designation  of  targets. 


86  MUSKETRY. 

Fi^'uros  IS  iiiitl  1!»  sliow  a  ;;riiiiliii'al  iuf>tli<i<l  <>1:  teachiii.u,"  lliat 
has  been  succcsslully  trunl. 

Tlie  2-clock  faces  aie  uuule  on  regular  G  l)y  (j  laryet  fraiut's. 
The  strings  indiciite  the  line  of  sight  of  tlie  soldier.  The  center 
of  tlie  vertical  clock  is  at  the  top  of  the  post.  The  whole  appa- 
ratus can  be  made  in  a  very  short  time  and  is  very  useful  in 
stimulating  the  men's  imagination. 

II. — Object:  To  teach  the  selection  of  a  reference  point. 

Method:  The  squad  is  taken  to  some  point  from  which  several 
good  reference  points  might  be  selected,  and  the  good  and  bad 
features  of  several  are  pointed  out.  Men  are  cautioned  that 
two  points  of  a  similar  nature  in  the  same  field  of  view  are 
not  to  be  selected.  For  instance,  one  of  several  telegraph  poles, 
one  of  several  trees,  etc.  Each  man  is  directed  to  take  aim  at 
the  reference  point  and  the  aim  is  checked. 

III. — Object:  To  use  a  reference  point  in  connection  with  the 
clock  system. 

Method:  A  reference  point  is  selected  and  described,  using  the 
horizontal  clock.  A  target  is  named  as  "  Target,  3  o'clock,  two 
sights,  a  small  biish."  Each  man  aims  his  rifle  at  the  bush, 
using  a  sandbag  rest.  The  aim  is  verified  by  the  instructor. 
This  is  repeated  luitil  all  are  proficient. 

IV. — Object:  To  teach  when  not  to  use  reference  points. 

Method:  At  this  stage  of  the  instruction  it  will  be  found  that 
tlie  men  have  become  wedded  to  reference  points  and  that  they 
will  use  them  in  describing  objects  and  targets  when  such  de- 
scription is  unnecessary. 

The  squad  under  instruction  is  taken  to  some  point  screened 
from  the  target.  The  target  is  represented  by  a  squad  of  men 
concealed  a  short  distance  in  front  of  the  men  under  instruc- 
tion. At  a  signal  from  the  instructor  the  squad  acting  as  the 
target  stands  up  in  plain  view.  The  men  under  instruction 
then  write  their  description  of  the  target. 

All  solutions  are  then  read  and  errors  pointed  out. 

If  advisable,  a  landscape  target  may  be  used  to  advantage 
in  the  designation  and  recognition  of  targets. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
VISUAL  TRAINING. 

98.  One  of  tlie  e.ssentijils  in  teaching  tlie  designation  and 
recognition  of  service  targets  is  the  cultivation  of  the  recruit's 
vision,  that  is  to  teacli  him  what  to  look  for  and  Jioir  to  loolc 
for  it. 

(I'ar.  ].")7,  I.  D.  K.,  in  part:)  "The  al)ilit.v  to  use  liis  eye  is 
of  great  importance  to  tlie  sohlier.  The  recruit  should  he  trained 
in  ol).s(»rviiig  Ins  surroundings  from  positions  and  wlien  on  the 
marcli." 

Scouts  or  patrols  preceding  the  command  going  into  action  or 
those  providing  for  security  on  the  march  or  in  action  must  be 
able  to  i-ecognize  and  distinguish  hostile  and  frientlly  troops. 

Exorcises  framed  to  stimulate  the  soldier's  power  of  vision 
should  be  connncnccd  at  the  earliest  period  of  his  training  and 
continued  throughout  his  service,  in  order  that  he  may  appre- 
ciate, by  daily  association,  the  necessity  for  cultivating  a  quality 
of  such  importance  in  modern  warfare. 

Visual  training  includes  general  reconnaissance,  the  i-ecog- 
nition  of  targets  described,  impressions  as  to  size,  and  observa- 
tion of  the  result  of  fire. 

The  training  usually  commences  w^ith  questions  framed  to 
develop  the  recruit's  memory,  his  power  of  oi)servation  and  his 
ability  to  describe  what  he  has  seen. 

99.  Suggested  exercises. 

I. — Object:   To  leach  observation  and  memory. 

Method:  The  recruit  is  taken  to  a  window  in  the  barracks 
and  directeil  to  look  out  the  window  for  five  seconds,  then  face 
about  and  descril)e  what  objects  he  has  seen.  His  attention  is 
then  called  to  the  numerous  objects  he  missed. 

The  ri'cruit  is  directtMl  to  count  the  panes  in  the  windows  of 
a  building. 

The  s(iuad  is  taken  for  a  short  march  and  upon  return  to  tiie 
barracks  or  camp  the  men  are  called  upon  to  tell  what  they  saw 
on  the  march. 

II. — Object:  To  teach  an  effective  method  of  searching  a  given 
area. 

87 


88  MUSKETRY. 

Method:  To  search  a  ^iveii  area  thoroughly  the  man's  sight 
niust  not  be  permitted  to  wander  aimlessly,  but  must  be  di- 
rected in  such  manner  tliat  every  portion  of  the  area  is  sub- 
jected to  rigid  scrutiny.  To  meet  this  demand,  a  system  Is 
necessary  that  will  assure  that  no  portion  of  the  area  is  over- 
looked or  slighted. 

There  are  two  systems  or  methods  in  general  use.  Both  sys- 
tems subdivide  the  area  by  a  number  of  Imaginary  lines,  in 
one  case  these  lines  being  at  right  angles  to  the  line  of  sight 
and  in  the  other  case  being  parallel  to  it.  The  division  by  lines 
parallel  to  the  line  of  sight  usually  will  be  productive  of  the 
better  results. 

It  is  explained  to  the  recruit  that  it  is  of  no  special  impor- 
tance loliat  system  is  used,  but  that  it  is  important  that  some 
system  be  used  that  will  give  the  required  results. 

Having  completed  the  explanation  of'  the  exercise,  the  in- 
structor indicates  certain  boundaries  in  whicli  various  ob- 
jectives of  a  military  nature  have  been  placed  beforehand  and 
directs  the  men  to  search  this  area  and  describe  all  such  ob- 
jectives as  they  are  able  to  locate. 

As  progress  is  made,  the  area,  the  amount  of  cover  used,  the 
size  and  number  of  the  objectives,  and  the  ranges  are  gradually 
increased. 

As  a  check  on  the  man's  imagination,  the  instructor  occasion- 
ally designates  an  area  in  which  no  objectives  have  been  placed. 

Up  to  this  point  only  natural  cover  has  been  considered.  It 
is  also  important  for  the  soldier  to  become  familiar  with  natural 
or  cultural  features,  and  then  to  note  the  changes  that  occur 
when  the  same  objects  have  been  adapted  to  military  uses. 

Usually  a  saving  in  time  may  be  affected  by  having  this  prac- 
tice in  conjunction  with  that  in  field  engineering. 

III. — Object:  To  teach  the  effect  of  distance  on  the  appear- 
ance of  objects,  and  the  ivcognitlon  of  service  targets. 

(I.  D.  R.,  158,  in  part:)  "They  (the  men)  should  be  taught 
to  distinguish  from  a  prone  position  distant  objects,  particu- 
larly troops,  both  with  the  naked  eye  and  field  glasses." 

Method:  Targets  and  men  are  placed  beforehand  in  different 
positions  at  various  ranges  and  on  different  radial  lines  from 
the  point  at  which  the  exercise  is  to  be  carried  out.  Some  of 
the  targets  are  wholly  exposed  and  some  partly  behind  cover. 

The  men  undergoing  instruction  are  informed  where  to  look 
for  the  targets  and  are  given  the  distance  to  each.  The  prin^ 
ciple  illustrated  is  carefully  explained,   and  it  is  pointed  out 


MUSKETRY.  89 

that  a  knowledge  of  tlic  aiipcaraiicr  nf  larjiots  at  dift'oBciil 
ranjies  is  at  times  an  iiivaluahie  aid  in  tiic  csliiiiatinii  (if  dis- 
tances, to  ho  tal<on  up  later. 

IV. — Object:  To  teach  the  effect  of  hackffrouiids  and  distinct 
ami  neutral  tinted  uniforms  on  tlie  visibility  of  tarf,'eis. 

(I.  I\  R.  407.  in  part:)  "By  skillful  use  of  f,Tound  a  lirin^ 
line  may  reduce  its  visibility  \vitho\it  loss  of  tire  power." 

Method:  It  is  n  safe  rule  that  a  term  \ised  for  the  fir.st  time 
slionid  he  exitlaintxl  to  tiie  men.  Hence  the  instructor  explains 
what  is  meant  by  background  and  visibility. 

Unknown  to  the  squad  under  instruction,  a  numitcr  of  tar- 
Rets  and  men  representing  the  tarjjet  are  i)laced  in  various 
selected  positions,  some  in  the  ojten,  some  partly  behind  cover, 
and  some  against  different  backgrounds. 

The  targets  should  include  both  known  distance  targets, 
A,  K,  and  C,  and  the  service  targets.  The  men  representing 
targets  should  be  dressed  in  uniforms  of  distinct  and  neutral 
tints,  with  the  objcK-t  of  showing  the  difference  in  visibility  of 
distinct  and  neutral  colors  against  the  same  background.  The 
difference  between  the  visibility  of  an  olive-drab  uniform 
against  a  white  wall,  a  sheet  of  water,  a  sky  liiu-.  dark  ploughed 
liind.  and  a  green  field  should  he  illustrated. 

During  the  exercises  instructors  take  advantage  of  the  oppor- 
tuiMty  to  utilize  the  useful  object  les.sons  they  provide  for  in- 
struction in  the  use  of  ground  and  cover. 

It  is  pointed  out  that  the  more  visible  the  target  the  easier 
it  is  .seen,  and  consequently  it  is  easier  to  aim  at  and  hit. 
Therefore  the  efAvt  of  fire  against  this  target  will  be  greater 
than  will  be  fire  against  one  less  visible,  other  conditions  being 
equal.  A  target  clearly  visible  facilitates  the  estimation  of 
distance,  while  ou  the  other  hand  the  vulnerability  of  targets — 
that  is.  the  likelihood  of  their  being  hit — is  decreased  in  jiro- 
portion  as  they  are  indistinct  or  hard  to  see. 

The  men  are  told  to  note  that  concealment  may  be  possibU> 
even  in  the  ojien  without  cover  and  that  cover  from  view  is 
often  best  obtaincNl  by  a  suitable  background.  In  the  selectloi, 
of  a  background  one  must  consider  the  possibility  of  hostile 
observation  from  the  flanks  as  well  as  from  the  fi*ont. 

There  is  nothing  more  demoralizing,  nothing  in  war  that  tends 
to  lower  the  morale  of  a  fighting  force  so  much  as  to  tind  itself 
lying  down  within  effective'  or  even  decisive  range  of  an  enemy 
and.  while  losing  men.  yet  be  unable  to  locate  the  enemy.  British 
.soldiers  often  had  this  experience  in  the  Boer  war.     The  Boers 


90 


MUSKETRY. 


woro  piist  iiinstci-s  in  tlie  seleotiou  of  bnckgrounds,  and  when 
Hiey  Silt  down  in  a  ))ositi<)n  they  were  sure  that  Ihey  had  behind 
them  rocks  or  (U'y  jj;rass  of  the  same  color  as  their  clotlies.  In 
many  engagements  the  Britisli  fired  hundreds  of  rounds  at  the 
hills  without  killiiiii  n  I5oer,  simply  because  the  Roers  could  not 
lie  seen. 

\. — Object:  To  teach  the  effect  of  movement  on  the  visibility 
of  tar;;»^ts  and  the  need  for  avoiding  unnecessary  movements  in 
loadiufi  and  tiring. 

Method:  It  is  explained  that  the  enemy  will  use  every  en- 
deavor to  obtain  concealment  and  when  seen  at  all  will  usually 
be  in  the  prone  position.  Perhaps' only  the  head  and  shoulders 
are  seen  above  the  parapet  of  a  trench,  or  part  of  the  head  and 
shoulders  will  appear  from  behind  a  tree  or  wall. 


Fig.  20. 


The  Instructor  then  conducts  the  men  to  the  point  selected 
for  the  exercise.  This  point  sliould  admit  of  a  wide  arc  of 
vision  and  should  permit  of  an  uninterrupted  view  for  a  distance 
of  from  100  to  200  yards. 

Several  assistants  are  posted  beforehand  at  various  short 
ranges  and  in  various  directions  from  the  central  point.  They 
make  use  of  no  cover,  but  are  in  the  prone  position  and  are  re- 
quired to  remain  quiet  or  at  least  to  make  no  conspicucjus  move- 
ments. 

The  instructor  informs  the  men  that  one  of  his  assistants  is 

lying  prone  at  a  distance  of  less  than yards ;  that  he 

is  in  the  open  and  in  the  general  direction  of [indi- 
cating by  pointing  the  general  direction  of  the  first  ob.1ective]. 
He  then  directs  them  to  look  the  ground  over  carefully  and 
attempt  to  locate  this  man.  and  then  calls  them  up  in  turn  and 


MUSKETRY. 


91 


causes  them  to  point  out  liis  jiosition.  I'm-  this  j)iiii)<>so  a  rillc 
with  sandbuK  and  liiiMxl  may  1)0  used  t<i  advantage,  the  recruit 
being  refiuireil  to  siu^ht  tlie  rill(>  at  wiiat  lie  iK'Iieves  to  be  Ibr 
objective. 

Should  any  of  the  men  fail  to  locate  the  objective  the  in- 
structor signals  to  the  assistant  to  raise  his  arm  or  move  from 
side  to  .side.  A  very  slijrht  movement  usually  will  betray  his 
position. 

This  is  repeatetl  until  all  the  objectives  have  been  located. 

100.  It  is  jtointed  out  to  the  s(|uad  that — 

(a)  A  tifiure  which  is  invisible  to  the  naked  eye  while  niotion- 
less  catches  the  eye  throujih  movement,  and 

(b)  Wlule  quick,  short  movements  nuiy  escape  the  eye.  and 
even  if  seen  may  make  location  (iiHicull.  movements  i)rolonse<l, 

^  H 


'^^-^'S^^-^Jfs^^  \9L.  >.  .# 


v*1S>-^^ 


Fui.  L'l. 

even  for  a  short  time,  catdi  the  eye  and  facilitate  aiming.  This 
object  lesson  empliasizes  the  rule  that  movements  in  the  open 
should  be  confined  to  tho.se  which  are  absolutely  necessary,  and 
that  these  should  be  made  smartly.  Recruits  are  trained  to 
assume  various  firing  positions  rapidly  and  to  perform  the  load- 
ing and  aiming  motions  with  as  little  movement  as  possible. 
All  unnecessary  movements  in  performing  these  motions  are 
avoid(Ml. 

Note  the  unnecessary  movement  of  the  man  on  tiie  h>ft  in 
loading. 

In  ligure  21  the  men  are  preparing  for  a  rush.  Note  that  only 
one  man  (the  man  on  the  right)  is  keeping  his  head  down, 
('ompare  the  size  target  he  offers  to  an  enemy  with  that  of  the 
(»ther  men  in  the  squa<l.  especially  the  second  man  from  the  left. 


CHAPTEE  VII. 
THE  DETERMINATION  OF  RANGES. 

101.  Any  error  in  the  determination  of  the  range  to  the  target 
plays  a  most  important  part  in  the  efficacy  of  the  fire. 

When  it  is  remeiubered  that  the  placing  of  the  center  of  im- 
pact is  not  a  question  of  aiming  but  the  result  of  an  ordered 
angle  of  sight  (range),  and  that  in  war  ranges  are  estimated— 
and  usually  very  poorly — it  will  be  seen  that  miless  the  range  be 
accurately  determined,  more  hits  will  result  from  average  shoot- 
ing than  from  very  fine  shooting.  That  marksmanship  has 
nothing  to  do  with  location  of  the  center  of  impact  is  easily 
demonstrated  by  reference  to  a  table  of  ordinates.  To  examine 
an  extreme  case,  suppose  that  the  range  is  actually  600  yards, 
but  is  estimated  at  1,200  yards,  the  firing  being  over  a  level 
plain. 


'^  6.0O  i%9a 

Fig.  22. 

The  line  of  aim  is  horizontal  and  is  not  changed  by  an  in- 
correct estimate  of  the  range.  With  a  correct  elevation,  the 
trajectory  rises  to  its  summit  and  then  falls,  meeting  the  line  of 
aim  at  the  target  where  the  point  of  aim  and  center  of  imi)act 
should  coincide.  With  sights  set  at  1,200  yards,  the  tra.jectory 
is  still  rising  at  a  range  of  600  yards  and  is  24  feet  above  tlie 
line  of  aim  and  point  of  aim.     (Fig.  22.) 

If  the  target  is  6  feet  high  and  the  point  of  aim  is  at  the  center 
of  the  target,  the  mean  trajectory  will  be  21  feet  above  the  top 
edge  of  the  target.  With  an  assumed  cone  or  sheaf  24  feet  in 
diameter  at  600  yards,  so  that  the  lowest  bullets  are  12  feet 
below  the  center  of  the  sheaf  (mean  trajectory),  it  is  evident 
that  these  lowest  bullets  are  9  feet  above  the  top  of  rhe  target, 
making  no  hits  at  all.  And  this  displacement  of  the  i-enter  of 
U2 


MUSKETRY. 


93 


impact  is  tlie  case  \vitlnnit:  any  rc;,Mnl  at  all  to  tlie  skill  of  tliu 
fircrs,  the  only  result  of  skill  in  sliootintr  luanifestiii;;  itself  in 
tlie  size  of  tiie  cone.  With  poorer  shots  (assumed  -disjiersion 
such  a.s  to  produce  a  cone  30  feet  in  diameter)  a  few  scatterint? 
hits  would  be  expected.  The  point  of  aim  in  each  case  beinj; 
the  same  would  not  inlluence  the  result;  but  the  shooting;  skill 
of  the  marksmen  does  atTect  the  result  in  a  manner  entirely  un- 
expected to  one  icnorant  of  the  principles  involved. 

102.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  two  factors  enter  into  the  prob- 
ability of  hitting: 

(1)  The  skill  of  the  men  in  individual  shooting';  (2)  the  accu- 
rate deternunation  of  the  range. 

If  an  ofHcer  can  not  obtain  and  announce  the  elevation  with 
reasonable  accuracy  to  his  men  it  is  self-evident  that  his  or- 
ganization will  attain  results  in  war  in  inverse  ratio  to  the 
skill  of  the  men  in  shooting. 

Experiments  conducted  in  the  tilth  brigade  at  Galveston  with 
four  regiments  of  Infantry,  involving  hundreds  of  estimates  by 
trained  estimators,  confirmed  previous  experiments  here  and 
abroad  that  the  "probable  error"  in  estimating  the  range  to 
battle  targets  over  unknown  ground  and  at  Infantry  ranges  is 
12.5  per  cent.  By  using  the  "  probable  error "  as  a  basis  of 
di.scussion  one  recognizes  that  in  one-half  of  all  cases  the  error 
will  be  greater  than  the  pi'obable,  and  that  in  the  other  half  the 
error  will  be  less  than  the  "  probable  error." 

If  a  series  of  target  screens  be  placed  one  behind  the  other 
on  a  horizontal  plane  and  at  25  yards  apart,  each  screen  3  feet 
high,  and  the  line  of  sight  at  the  center  of  the  targets,  average 
marksmen,  good  marksmen,  and  poor  marksmen  with  sights  set 
at  1,000  yards  should  make  the  number  of  hits  shown  on  each 
of  the  targets,  as  follows: 


Yards,  tar-     ^75      900 

1           { 
925      950      975     1,000 

1,025 

1,050    1,075 

1,100 

1,125 

Good 

Average 

Poor 

0.0      1.5 
3.1      7.5 
8.9     10.3 

8.2     19.0     33.5     40.0 
12.9  1  1U.6     24.6     26.4 
11.7  '  12.5     13.3     13.4 

1 

31.0 

23.2 
12.6 

15.4       4.8 
16.8     10.0 
11.0      O.A 

0.8 

4.7 
7.3 

0.0 
2.3 
6.4 

From  this  table  it  is  seen  that  the  target  at  the  correct 
range — 1.000  yards — received  the  most  hits  when  fired  at  by 
the  good  marksnnen  and  the  least  when  tiretl  at  by  the  poor 
marksmen.     Good  marksmenship,  therefore,  brings  its  reward 


94  MUSKETRY. 

in  the  number  of  hits  made  on  a  target ;  that  is,  at  the  range 
for  which  the  siglits  are  set.  Examining  the  end  targets,  which 
are  in  error  12.5  per  cent,  these  results  are  reversed,  and  the 
poor  marlvsmen  made  more  liits  tlian  either  of  the  otlier 
classes. 

103.  An  examination  of  the  foregoing  table  shows  that  tlie 
results  expected  from  average  marksmen  exceed  those  ex- 
pected from  good  marksmen  if  an  error  of  50  yards  has  "been 
made  in  estimating  the  range  to  a  1.000-yard  target,  but  tliat 
if  tlie  range  is  correctly  determined  the  good  marksmen  will 
attain  50  per  cent  more  hits  than  tlie  average  marksmen. 
The  purpose  of  training  is  to  secure  a  maximum  of  hits;  there- 
fore individual  marksmanship  and  range  determination  are 
equally  essential. 

In  the  foregoing  discussion  it  is  assmned  that  a  group  of  men 
are  firing  with  a  conunon  sight  setting.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
each  man  estimates  the  range  for  liimself  and  fires  individually 
with  liis  own  clioice  of  elevation,  assuming  that  tlie  men  can 
estimate  as  well  as  the  company  range  estimators,  the  error 
to  be  expected  of  each  man  is  12.5  per  cent,  as  before,  but 
since  some  are  shooting  witli  an  elevation  12.5  per  cent  too 
high  and  others  with  the  same  error  but  too  low  there  results 
a  combined  shot  group  made  up  of  many  smaller  groups  each 
of  the  same  size,  but  arranged  each  about  its  own  center  of 
impact.  The  combined  group  being  larger  than  any  one  of  the 
individual  groups'.  Such  a  procedure  lias  the  effect  of  lowering 
the  classification  of  the  marksmen  so  that  good  shots  are 
reduced  to  average,  while  average  marksmen  fall  into  the  poor 
class. 

Average  marksmen,  when  using  a  common  sight  setting, 
at  800  yards  expect  34.4  per  cent  of  hits  against  a  certain 
target.  With  individual  estimates  of  the  range,  they  can 
expect  but  15  per  cent.  This  htss  of  effect  varies  with  the 
range  and  the  quality  of  the  marksmen. 

104.  To  summarize. — It  has  been  proven : 

(1)  That  there  is  a  great  advantage  in  small  dispersions 
(individual  expertness  in  shooting)  when  the  range  is  exactly 
known. 

(2)  That  the  advantage  of  small  dispersions  (individual 
expertness  in  shooting)  decreases  witli  the  range  ichen  a  correct 
elevation  is  not  used. 


MUSKETRY. 


96 


(3)  That  the  smalh^r  the  dispersion  ( iiulividiial  expei'tness 
in  sho(»tinji)  the  more  rapidly  tlie  effect  decreases  witli  an  incor- 
rect elevation. 

(4)  Tlial  up  to  .")()()  yards  precision  is  of  more  importance  than 
the  estiiiiiite  of  (lie  ran.nc 

Thoroforo.  thorough  tr.-iinliiir  in  the  th'tcruiinatioii  of  r:iimes 
is  a  necessary  pari  of  lli(>  trainiMt:  in  marksmanship. 

105.  The  following  table  shows  the  theoretical  effect  of  errors 
in  the  determination  of  the  range: 


F.rroiH  in  yards. 


Hange  used. 

0 

50 

100 

150 

200 

250 

300 

350 

400 

400 

100 
100 
100 
100 
100 

96 
95 
93 
92 
91 

83 
81 

78 
74 
69 

67 
62 
67 
50 
43 

49 
43 
36 
30 
23 

32 
27 
21 

15 
9 

21 

16 
10 
7 
4 

12 
9 
6 
4 
2 

g 

4.")0 

(i 

oOO 

3 

5.')0   

1 

600 

0 

6.T0 

100 

90 

64 

38 

18 

7 

3 

0 

700 

100 

88 

59 

32 

13 

5 

1 

0 

750 

100 

80 

65 

27 

10 

3 

0 

SOO 

100 

84 

SO 

22 

6 

1 

0 

850 

100 

82 

40 

18 

5 

1 

0 

9(K) 

100 

80 

41 

13 

3 

0 

950 

100 

78 

37 

11 

2 

0 

1,000 

100 
100 

75 
73 

32 
30 

8 
7 

1 

1 

0 
0 

1,050 

1,100 

100 
100 
100 
100 
100 

70 
69 
67 
65 
63 

27 
24 
20 
18 
15 

5 
5 
4 
3 
2 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 



1,150 

1,200 

1 

1,250 

1,300 

1,3.50 

100 

59 

13 

1 

^ 

ijon 

100 

55 

10 

1 

1,450 

100 

54 

9 

1 



The  figures  in  the  body  of  the  table  show,  in  theory,  the  prob- 
able number  of  hits  that  would  be  obtained  for  any  given  esti- 
mate of  the  range  and  for  any  given  error  in  that  estimate. 
This  is  on  tlie  assumption  that  100  hits  will  be  obtained  when 
there  is  no  error  in  the  decermination  of  the  range. 

For  example,  assume  a  true  range  of  950  yards  to  have  been 
determined  as  1,000.  The  error  is  50  yards.  What  is  the  effect 
of  this  error? 

In  the  column  headed  "  Range  used,"  find  the  amount  corre- 
sponding to  the  estimated  range  (1.000).  Follow  this  line  to  the 
right  until  entering  the  column  correspondijig  to  the  ern^-  (.50). 
Here  is  found  the  number  75.  This  number  75  indicates  that 
for  every  100  hits  that  wouhl  have  been  obtained  with  the 
correct  range,  but  75  hits  would  have  been  obtained  with  this 
particular  error. 


96  MUSKETRY. 

106.  Before  fire  for  effect  is  opened  ranges  may  be  determined 
by  one  of  the  following  methods: 

(«)   Estimatinf;-  distances  by  the  eye. 

(b)  Taking  the  range  from  a  map  of  large  scale. 

(tO  Obtaining  it  direct  from  infantry  or  artillery  already 
engaged. 

{(J)   Measuring  the  range  directly  on  the  ground. 

(c)  Estimating  distance  by  sound.     (Fur,  82,  S.  A.  F.  M.) 
(/)   Range  tinders. 

(//)   Mil  rule.     (Par.  78.) 
( // )   Ranging  fire. 

ESTIMATING  DISTANCES. 

107.  Estimation  of  distance  by  the  eye. — To  estimate  distance 
by  the  eye  with  accuracy  it  is  necessary  to  be  familiar  with  the 
appearance,  as  to  length,  of  a  unit  of  measure  which  can  be 
compared  mentally  with  the  distance  which  is  to  be  estimated. 
The  most  convenient  unit  of  length  is  100  yards.  To  impress 
upon  the  soldier  the  extent  of  a  stretch  of  100  yards  two  posts 
100  yards  apart,  with  short  stakes  between  to  mark  each  2.5 
yards,  should  be  placed  near  the  barracks  or  on  the  drill  ground 
and  the  soldier  required  to  pace  off  the  marked  distance  several 
times,  counting  his  steps.  He  will  thus  learn  how  many  of  his 
steps  make  100  yards  and  will  become  familiar  with  the  appear- 
ance of  the  whole  distance  and  of  its  fractional  parts. 

Next  a  distance  of  more  than  100  yards  will  be  shown  him  and 
he  will  be  required  to  compare  this  distance  wilh  the  100-yard 
unit  and  to  estimate  it.  Having  made  this  estimate,  he  will  be 
required  to  verify  its  accuracy  by  pacing  the  distance. 

A  few  minutes  each  day  should  be  spent  in  the  practice,  the 
soldier  often  being  required  to  make  his  estimate  by  raising 
his  rear-sight  leaf  and  showing  it  to  the  instructor.  After  the. 
first  drills  the  soldier  should  be  required  to  pace  the  distance 
only  when  the  estimate  is  unusually  inaccurate. 

The  soldier  should  be  taught  that,  in  judging  the  distance  from 
the  enemy,  his  estimate  may  be  corrected  by  a  careful  observa- 
tion of  the  clearness  with  which  details  of  dress,  the  movement 
of  limbs,  or  of  the  files  in  a  line  may  be  seen.  In  order  to  derive 
the  benefit  of  this  method  the  soldier  will  be  required  to  observe 
closely  all  the  details  noted  above  in  single  men  or  squads  of 
men  posted  at  varying  distances,  which  will  be  measured  and 
announced. 


MUSKETRY.  97 

Although  the  standing'  :iiul  kiici'liiii,'  silhouettes  used  in  fiehl 
practice  atTord  good  olgects  upon  whifh  to  estimate  distances, 
tlie  instructor  should  make  frcipuMit  use  of  living  tigures  and 
natural  ol)jects,  as  this  is  tiie  class  of  targets  from  which  the 
soldier  will  he  compelled  to  estimate  his  range  in  active  service. 

108.  Methods  of  estimating  long  distances  by  the  eye. — The 
following  methods  are  found  useful : 

(a)  The  soldier  may  decide  that  the  ohject  can  not  be  more 
than  a  certain  distance  away  nor  less  than  a  certain  distance; 
his  estimates  must  be  kept  within  the  closest  possible  limits 
and  the  mean  of  the  two  taken  as  the  range. 

(b)  The  soldier  selects  a  point  which  he  considers  the  middle 
point  of  the  whole  distance,  estimates  this  half  distance,  and 
doubles  it,  or  he  similarly  divides  the  distance  into  a  certain 
number  of  lengths  which  are  familiar  to  him. 

(c)  The  soldier  estimates  the  distance  along  a  parallel  line, 
as  a  road  on  one  side,  having  on  it  well-defined  objects. 

(d)  The  .soldier  takes  the  mean  of  several  estimates  made 
by  different,  persons.  This  method  is  not  applicable  to  in- 
struction. 

Appearance  of  objects;  how  modi  fled  by  varying  conditions 
of  light;  difference  of  level,  etc. — During  instruction  the  men 
should  he  taught  the  effect  of  varying  conditions  of  light  and 
terrain  ui)on  the  apparent  distance  of  an  object. 

Objects  seem  nearer — 

(a)  When  the  object  is  in  a  bright  light. 

(b)  When  the  color  of  the  object  contrasts  sharply  with  the 
color  of  the  background. 

(c)  When  looking  over  water,  snow,  or  a  uniform  surface, 
like  a  wheat  field. 

(d)  When  looking  from  a  height  downward. 

(e)  In  the  clear  atmosphere  of  high  altitudes. 
Objects  seem  more  distant — 

(o)  When  looking  over  a  depression  in  the  ground, 
(ft)   When  there  is  a  poor  light  or  a  fog. 
(r)  When  only  a  small  part  of  the  object  can  be  seen. 
(d)  When  looking  from  low  ground  upward  toward  higher 
ground.     (S.  A.  F.  M.) 

109.  The  manner  in  which  the  subject  of  estimating  dis- 
tances is  taught  will  depend  in  a  large  measure  upon  the  local 
facilities  as  well  as  upon  the  experience  and  ingenuity  of  the 
instructor. 

3529'— 17 7 


98  MTJSKETRY. 

The  following  exercises  are  given  as  a  guide  to  instructors, 
who  may  use  them  as  they  are  or  modify  them  at  will  to  suit 
local  conditions: 

Organization  commanders  should  utilize  the  rest  periods  while 
drilling,  etc.,  in  estimating  distance  drills  and  should  appreciate 
that  after  the  first  preliminary  drills  very  few,  if  any,  special 
drills  are  required  to  teach  the  men  to  estimate  distance. 

As  an  illustration,  the  company  is  drilling  around  a  central 
point,  from  which  the  company  commander  has  previously  deter- 
mined the  range  to  otlier  prominent  points  in  the  vicinity.  The 
company  halts  at  the  central  point.  The  men  are  directed  to 
estimate  the  range  to  one  of  the  objects  and  set  their  sights  for 
that  range.  Time,  10  seconds.  Squad  leaders  check  sight  set- 
ting.   Captain  announces  true  range. 

The  course  of  training  in  estimating  distances  is  divided  into 
two  distinct  steps  or  stages : 

First.  Creating  in  the  memory  of  the  soldier  an  Indelible  pic- 
ture of  the  appearance  of  the  unit  of  measure  from  every  possible 
viewpoint. 

Second.  Giving  him  practice  in  applying  this  unit  of  measure 
to  all  possible  varieties  of  terrain  and  under  all  possible  condi- 
tions of  light  and  atmosphere. 

110.  First  Stage. — First  exercise. — A  distance  of  100  yai'ds 
(the  unit  of  measure)  is  measured  accurately  on  level,  open 
ground  and  conspicuous  marks  are  placed  at  each  extremity  of 
the  line.  It  is  explained  to  the  soldier  that  this  is  the  unit  by 
which  he  is  to  estimate  distances  and  that  the  attainment  of  pro- 
ficiency depends  upon  his  becoming  familiar  with  the  appearance 
of  this  unit. 

He  is  then  required  to  view  this  distance  from  each  extremity 
of  the  line,  and  also  from  different  points  that  are  neither  on 
the  line  nor  in  prolongation  of  it.  He  is  then  required  to  pace 
the  distance  several  times  that  he  may  remember  the  average 
number  of  his  paces  per  100  yards. 

Second  exercise. — The  unit  of  measure  is  marked  as  in  the 
first  exercise.  Considering  one  extremity  of  this  line  (the  ex- 
tremity at  which  the  soldier  is  to  stand)  as  the  center  of  an 
imaginary  circle  of  100  yards  radius,  stakes  are  placed  on  the 
circumference  of  said  circle  at  every  30°  or  each  hour  of  the 
clock.  The  stake  "B"  (see  sketch)  at  the  further"  extremity 
of  the  unit  of  measure  is  made  quite  conspicuous  and  is  con- 


MUSKETRY.  99 

sidered  as  geing  at  12  o'clock,  "i'lu"  other  stakes  are  care- 
fully concejiled  in  sudi  inaniicr  that  their  location  is  not  ap- 
parent from  the  center  stake  at  "A."  Tiiey  are  referre<l  to  hy 
the  usual  clock  designation.  The  arrangement  of  the  stakes 
will  be  modified  to  suit  the  conditions  impcsed  by  whatever 
ground  happens  to  he  available. 

Shctch. 
B 
O 

0  o 

o  o 


9   0  •  0  3 

A 


O 


0 


The  instructor  designates  one  or  more  men  to  assist  hiin. 

When  the  stakes  are  in  place  and  the  men  (usually  not 
more  than  a  squad  at  a  time)  are  assembled  at  the  center  the 
instructor  directs  one  of  his  assistants  to  stand  on  the  line 
from  the  center  to  the  1  o'clock  or  11  o'clock  stake  and  at  a 
certain  distance  either  short  of  or  beyond  said  stake.  He 
requires  the  men  to  turn  their  backs  while  the  assistant  is 
being  posted. 

The  assistant  being  posted,  the  instructor  <-aus-cs  tlie  men 
to  face  toward  the  12  o'clock  stake.  He  then  directs  the  men 
to  compare  the  distance  to  the  assistant  with  the  true  unit  of 
measure  and  to  decide  whether  the  former  is  greater  or  less 
than  100  yards. 

He  then  calls  upon  one  of  the  men  to  direct  the  assistant 
to  move  forward  or  back  and  halt  at  a  point  that  he.  the 
estimator,  considers  is  exactly  100  yards  from  the  center  stake. 
A  memorandum  is  kept  showing  the  assistant's  actual  distance 


100  inJSKETRY. 

from  the  center  stake,  and  the  same  procedure  is  repeated  for 
each  man  in  the  squad,  when  tlie  instructor  causes  the  assistant 
to  post  himself  accurately  at  300  yards  from  the  center  stake, 
and  then  notiiies  tlie  men  of  the  amount  and  direction  of  tlieir- 
errors. 

Under  these  conditions  the  errors  sliould  he  small,  as  the 
soldier  constantly  has  before  him  the  measured  100-yard  unit, 
which  is  in  such  close  proximity  to  the  line  on  which  he  is 
estimating  that  comparisons  are  quite  simple. 

As  soon  as  the  men  show  proficency  in  this  first  step  the 
instructor  causes  the  assistant  to  move  to  the  2  o'clock  or  10 
o'clock  stake,  then  to  the  3  or  9  o'clock  stake,  etc.,  gradually 
working  away  from  the  visible  measured  unit  in  order  to  make 
comparisons  with  it  more  difficult. 

Third  exercise. — This  is  the  same  as  the  second  exercise, 
except  that  all  marks  showing  the  location  of  the  farther  end 
of  the  measured  unit  are  obliterated. 

The  basis  of  comparison  now  must  be  the  man's  recollection 
of  the  appearance  of  the  unit  of  measure. 

When  practicable  this  should  not  be  held  on  exactly  the 
same  ground  as  the  second  exercise. 

Fourth  exercise. — From  practice  in  the  foregoing  exercises 
the  men  will  have  become  familiar  with  the  appearance  of 
the  unit  of  measure  when  standing  at  one  of  its  extremities. 
It  next  becomes  necessary  to  familiarize  them  with  its  appear- 
ance when  they  are  at  a  point  in  prolongation  of  the  line  and 
at  various  distances  from  its  nearer  extremity. 

Level,  open  ground  is  used  in  this  as  in  the  foregoing  exercises. 

Stakes  are  arranged  as  prescribed  in  the  second  exercise, 
except  that  they  will  be  placed  on  the  circumferences  of  two 
concentric  circles  (or  as  extensive  arcs  as  the  nature  of  the 
terrain  will  permit),  one  having  a  radius  of  100  yards  and  the 
other  a  radius  of  200  yards.  The  stakes  on  the  smaller  circum- 
ference or  arc  will  be  made  plainly  visible,  those  on  the  larger 
being  carefully  concealed  except  one  which  marks  the  farther 
extremity  of  the  unit  of  measure. 

The  procedure  in  this  exercise  is  the  same  as  in  the  second 
exercise,  the  men  being  required  to  place  the  assistant  at  a  point 
which  they  consider  100  yards  beyond  the  inner  row  of  stakes, 
first  in  conjunction  with  a  visible  unit  of  measure  and  later 
basing  their  judgment  on  their  recollection  of  its  appearance. 


MUSKETRY.  101 

This  exercise  is  repealed  at  sucli  ioiit,'cr  ranges  as  tiie  terrain 
affords  up  to  1,000  yards. 

So  far,  all  estimates  have  been  uuule  from  the  standing  posi- 
tion. In  combat  the  necessities  of  concealment  and  defilade 
will  make  the  prone  position  the  habitual  one,  hence  the  corre- 
siiondiiig  necessity  of  be<.'oming  adei)t  at  estimating  distanc-es 
in  th.-it  ijosition. 

The  foregoing  exercises  are  therefore  repeated,  the  soldier 
making  all  his  estimati's  from  the  prone  position. 

Up  to  this  point  only  open  level  ground  has  been  used,  this 
being  the  foundation  or  basis  for  all  future  progi-ess  in  the 
estimation  of  distances. 

It  now  remains  to  repeat  these  exercises  under  as  great  a 
variety  of  conditions  as  the  terrain  and  the  climate  will  afford. 
The  soUlier  should  be  made  familiar  with  the  appearance  of  the 
luiit  of  measure  on  bright,  sunny  days,  and  on  overcast  days; 
in  rain,  fog,  or  snow;  on  ground  that  is  rising,  falling,  even,  or 
undulating;  over  ground  that  is  plowed,  bare,  grassy,  or  cov- 
ered with  brush ;  in  fact,  under  every  conceivable  condition  or 
combination  of  conditions  that  might  surround  a  fire  fight. 

111.  Second  stage. — Up  to  this  time  it  has  been  the  endeavor 
to  impress  upon  the  soldier's  memory  the  appearance  of  the  unit 
of  measure  under  all  possible  conditions. 

In  the  .second  stage  of  instruction  he  is  required  to  apply  this 
knowledge  in  the  determination  of  unknown  distances. 

Fifth  exercise. — The  instructor  selects  an  observation  point 
from  which  a  wide  arc  of  vision  may  be  had. 

He  picks  out  some  prominent  landmark  about  300  to  600 
yards  distant  and  points  it  out  to  the  men,  explaining  that  they 
are  now  to  apply  their  knowledge  of  the  appeai-ance  of  the  unit 
of  measure  in  determining  the  range  to  this  object. 

He  further  explains  that,  in  order  to  make  this  estimate,  it  is 
necessary  to  recall  to  the  memory  the  appearance  of  the  unit 
of  measure  and  to  apply  this  unit  to  the  ground  in  the  same 
manner  that  a  ruler  is  applied  in  the  measurement  of  short 
lengths. 

He  then  cautions  the  men  against  the  malpractice  of  attempt- 
ing to  .judge  of  the  distance  to  an  ol>ject  by  its  appearance  only, 
although  it  is  well,  should  time  admit,  to  use  the  appearance  of 
the  ob.iect  as  a  check  against  the  unit-of-measnre  system. 

He  further  explains  to  the  men  that,  in  the  use  of  the  unit-of- 
measure  system,  the  objective  is  to  be  considered  merely  as  in- 


102  MUSKETRY. 

(licating  the  direction  of  the  line  upon  which  tlie  estimate  is  to 
Be  niiule  and  as  the  limit  to  whicli  the  estimate  is  to  extend. 

Tlie  instructor  then  adds  sucli  remarks  as  may  apply  to  the 
special  peculiarities  of  the  ground  that  is  to  be  measured  and 
explains  that  it  is  necessary  for  the  soldier  first  to  pick  out  some 
point  in  the  direction  of  the  objective  that  he  considers  to  be 
100  yards  distant ;  then  to  pick  out  a  second  point  100  yai'ds  be- 
yond the  first ;  then  a  third  point  100  yards  beyond  the  second, 
and  so  on  until  tlie  objective  is  reached. 

The  men  are  now  directed  to  estimate  the  distance  to  the 
objective,  to  write  their  estimates  on  a  piece  of  paper,  and, 
without  communicating  their  decisions  to  each  other,  to  turn  in 
the  written  estimates  to  the  instructor. 

Unless  the  instructor  has  had  the  true  ranges  measured 
before  the  exercise  begins,  he  should  adopt  some  speedy  and 
accurate  means  of  determining  these  distances  such  as  a  large 
scale  map  or  with  a  range  finder.  If  time  must  be  taken  to 
measure  the  true  range  with  a  chain  or  tape  after  each  esti- 
mate, the  enforced  inactivity  of  tlie  majority  of  the  men  is  apt 
to  cause  their  interest  to  lag,  with  the  result  that  much  of  the 
instructional  value  of  the  exercise  is  lost. 

Speed  is  not  sought  in  these  first  estimates.  On  the  con- 
trary, as  much  deliberation  is  allowed  as  may  be  required  to 
Insure  results  that  are  really  estimates  and  not  mere  guesse-i. 

When  all  the  men  have  handed  in  their  estimates  the  in- 
structor announces  the  true  range  and  enters  into  such  explana- 
tion as  he  may  deem  necessary  as  to  the  amount  and  direction 
of  unusual  errors. 

Additional  objectives  are  then  selected  and  the  same  proce- 
dure repeated. 

When  the  men  begin  to  exhibit  a  reasonable  degree  of  accu- 
racy then  speed  is  sought  and  the  practice  continued  from  day 
to  day  until  the  desired  standard  of  proficiency  is  attained. 

In  the  selection  of  objectives  it  would  be  well  at  this  stage 
of  the  training  to  include  some  that  resemble  the  targets  that 
would  be  encountered  in  combat. 

112.  Collective  estimating. — The  training  of  an  organization 
in  the  estimation  of  distances  is  not  complete  until  the  leaders 
(and  those  individuals  who,  in  the  exigencies  of  a  campaign, 
might  be  called  upon  to  act  as  leaders),  are  able  quickly  to  take 
advantage  of  the  combined  estimates  of  some  or  all  of  the  indi- 
viduals under  their  command. 


MUSKETRY. 


108 


It  is  of  little  luoiiK'iit  wliut  system  is  used,  so  lotij;  as  it  is 
simple  and  uniform  in  the  organization. 

The  followinf:  system  is  suggested  as  meeting  these  require- 
ments :  * 

Let  two  good  estimators  in  each  squad  estimate  the  distance 
and  signal  their  estimates  to  their  respective  squad  leaders.  The 
squad  leaders  (mentally)  average  the  two  estimates  that  they 
receive  and  signal  these  averages  to  their  respective  platoon 
leaders.  The  platoon  leaders  (mentally)  average  the  mean  esti- 
mates that  they  receive  from  their  squad  leaders  anil  then  signal 
these  averages  to  the  company  commander.  The  company  com- 
mander then  averages  the  two  means  that  he  receives  from  the 
platoon  leaders  and  announces  the  result  as  the  range  to  be  used. 

It  will  l)e  noted  tliat  by  the  use  of  this  system  no  single  leader 
is  called  upon  to  obtain  the  mean  of  more  than  two  quantities, 
a  comparatively  simple  task  in  mental  arithmetic.  And  yet, 
finally,  the  company  receives  the  means  of  16  estimates  as  the 
range  to  be  used. 

In  the  training  of  leaders  and  prospective  leaders  in  the  sub- 
ject of  collective  estimating,  it  is  well  to  remember  that  it  is  the 
eye  and  not  the  ear  that  is  to  be  trained,  i.  e.,  that  the  estimated 
ranges  usually  will  be  Hicnudcd  to  the  leaders  ratlier  than  com- 
municated to  them  by  word  of  mouth. 

The  preliminary  exercLses  in  this  subject  are  nothing  more 
than  a  form  of  mental  gj^mnastics.  For  example,  some  such 
exercise  as  the  following  might  be  used : 

The  instructor  assigns  two  men  as  assistants  and  furnishes 
each  with  a  paper  on  which  a  series  of  assumed  ranges  are 
noted,  thus — 


To  No.  1 

To  No.  2 

assistant. 

assistsint. 

1 

600 

800 

2 

too 

700 

3 

COO 

400 

4 

1          (00 

500 

5 

700 

800 

f. 

900 

700 

7 

700 

500 

etc. 

etc. 

The  two  assistants,  standing  about  .5  or  10  yards  apart,  face 
the  instructor  at  a  distance  of  about  25  yards.     The  leaders 


104  MUSKETRY. 

undergoing  instruction  are  in  line  at  convenient  intervals  fac- 
ing the  assistants  at  a  distance  of  about  15  yards,  thus — 


Assistant  No.  1. 
0 

Assistant  No.  2. 

0 

0              0 

0               0              0 

Leaders. 

O 

Ins  >^i  actor. 

The  instructor  calls  to  the  assistants,  "  Range  No.  1."  No.  1 
assistant  would  then  signal  "600,'  v/hile  No.  2  assistant  would 
signal  "  800."  The  leaders  then  (ietermine  the  mean  of  these 
two  quantities  and,  facing  about,  signal  their  results  to  the 
instructor. 

At  first  there  should  be  an  appreciable  Interval  between  the 
time  that  the  range  is  signaled  by  assistant  No.  1  and  the  time 
when  it  is  signaled  by  No.  2.  As  progress  is  made,  however, 
this  interval  of  time  gradually  may  be  reduced  until  finally 
both  assistants  signal  their  ranges  at  the  same  time. 

In  similar  manner,  the  instructor  first  demands  absolute 
accuracy  in  the  announcement  of  the  mean  ranges,  speed  being 
sought  later  but  never  at  the  expense  of  accuracy. 

113.  Leaders  may  be  considered  proficient  in  this  work  when, 
in  the  prone  position,  they  can  receive  two  ranges  by  signal, 
determine  the  mean  accurately,  and  transmit  that  mean  by  an 
intelligible  signal  in  a  reasonable  time. 

An  organization  may  be  considered  proficient  when,  in  the 
prone  position,  ranges  are  estimated  by  individuals  in  the  firing 
Mne,  transmitted  by  signal  through  squad  and  platoon  leaders 
to  the  company  commander,  an  accurate  mean  announced  by  him 
that  shall  not  differ  from  the  true  range  by  more  than  10 
per  cent,  sights  are  set  according  to  the  range  announced  by 
the  company  commander,  and  all  this  in  a  reasonable  time. 

To  carry  such  a  system  farther,  means  could  be  devised  to 
the  end  that  each  unit  (squad  and  platoon)  in  the  organization 
should  it  happen  to  be  acting  alone,  could  use  easily  and 
quickly  the  average  of  the  estimates  of  its  six  or  eight  most 
skillful  estimators. 

Doubtless  there  will  be  occasions,  in  the  preliminary  stages 
of  an  attack  as  well  as  during  the  preparation  of  defensive 
works,  when  there  will  be  ample  time  to  assemble  the  skillful 


MUSKETRY.  106 

estimators  of  a  coiiiiitmy  jiiid  obtain  tlie  mean  of  tlieir  estimates 
without  recourse  to  tlie  cluinnel  of  squad  and  platoon  leailers. 
On  such  occasions,  however,  tlie  necessity  for  ostimatinR  the 
distance  i)roi)ai)ly  will  be  lacUiiiR,  for,  as  a  general  rule,  in- 
struments will  be  available  for  this  purpose.  In  the  prepara- 
tion of  delVusive  works,  it  even  would  be  feasilile  to  pace  or 
actually  to  measure  the  dislaiice  on  tlie  f^round  before  contact 
with  the  enemy  had  been  estaiillshcd. 

The  individual  proficiency  test  is  i)r(»scrib('d  in  paratrraph  8.'). 
S.  A.  F.  M. 

114.  ((/ 1  Range  estimators. — The  estimatiuf;  test  ha  vine  been 
completed,  five  or  six  ollicers  or  men,  selected  from  the  most 
accurate  estimators  in  the  ccnupany,  are  (lesi<;nated  "  Ranjre  esti- 
mators."    (240,  I.  D.  R.,  and  SO,  S.  A.  F.  M.) 

Platoon  leaders,  by  reason  of  their  duties,  are  not  suitable 
for  detail  as  range  estimators. 

The  range  estimators  are  given  special  training  in  the  es- 
timation of  ranges  up  to  2,000  yards. 

115.  The  following  is  illusti'ative  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  range  estimators  should  work. 

Assuming  an  attack  against  a  prepared  position,  the  captain 
having  received  orders  as  to  the  primary  apportionment  of  the 
target  or  .sector  of  fire  (303,  I.  D.  R. ),  he  assembles  the  platoon 
leaders  and  range  estimators  and  points  out  to  both  the  target 
of  the  battalion  and  company. 

The  range  estimators  inunediately  begin  their  estimation  of 
the  range  to  the  company  target;  the  captain  meanwhile  con- 
tinues with  his  instructions  to  the  platoon  leaders. 

The  instructions  to  the  platoon  leaders  completed,  the  range 
estimators  announce  to  the  cajitain  either  their  individual  esti- 
mates or  the  mean  of  their  estimates  as  computed  by  one  of 
the  estimators.  The  range  estimators  then  take  their  custom- 
ary posts  (240,  I.  D.  R.)  and  the  captain  indicates  to  the 
platoon  leaders  the  range  to  be  usefl. 

The  range  estimators  act  in  an  advisory  capacity  to  the  cap- 
tain. The  mean  of  their  estimates  will  usually  be  the  most 
accurate  range  available  in  biittle.  The  adoption  by  the  cap- 
tain of  the  range  thus  determined,  however,  is  not  obligatory. 

Range  estimators  should  be  ready  to  signal  their  estimates 
of  the  range  to  the  platoon  leaders  at  any  time  during  an  action. 

Thorough  training  of  range  estimators  is  to  be  sought,  irre- 
spective of  the  fact  that  the  organization  may  be  supplied  with 
accurate  range-finding  instruments. 


106  MUSKETRY. 

EXERCISE. 

116.  I. — Object:  Determination  of  range  by  eye. 

Method:  (a)  Each  organization  commander  will  be  accom- 
panied by  his  "  range  estimators."  When  called  to  the  estimating 
point,  the  organization  commander  will  be  shown  a  line  some- 
where upon  which  will  be  stationed  a  squad  with  a  flag.  At  a 
signal  from  the  officer  in  charge  the  squad  will  rise  and  its 
flag  conspicuously  displayed.  The  officer  undergoing  the  test 
will  then  estimate  the  range  in  the  manner  contemplated  in 
paragraph  240,  I.  D.  R.  When  he  has  found  the  range  he  will 
call  "  Time "  and  announce  the  range.  Five  ranges  will  be 
determined  in  this  manner. 

Time:  Fifty  seconds  is  the  limit  in  which  the  range  may  be 
announced,  counting  from  the  appearance  of  the  flag  to  the  an- 
nouncement of  the  range. 

Standard  of  proficiency  :  Accuracy,  90  per  cent. 

117.  (&)  Taking  the  range  from  a  map. — At  the  effective 
ranges  of  the  small-arms  projectile  it  rarely  will  be  practicable 
to  scale  the  distances  directly  from  the  map.  Infantry  ranges 
usually  are  so  short  in  comparison  to  the  scale  of  such  maps  as 
generally  would  be  available  to  the  company  commander  in  the 
field  that  it  is  most  difficult  to  measure  them  with  the  required 
degree  of  accuracy.  It  should  be  remembered  also  that  the 
minute  details  of  the  terrain,  by  which  the  position  of  the  guns 
and  that  of  the  enemy  might  be  identified,  usually  will  not  be 
found  on  a  small-scale  map.  while,  on  the  other  hand,  experienced 
troops  will  avoid  locating  themselves  in  the  vicinity  of  prominent 
landmarks,  such  as  might  be  shown  on  a  map  of  this  character. 

In  the  rare  instances  when  a  company  commander  has  a  large- 
scale  map  available  the  determination  of  ranges  from  it  is  merely 
a  matter  of  reading  the  map. 

Training  in  this  phase  of  the  determination  of  ranges  might 
be  taken  up  with  most  profit  in  connection  with  instruction  in 
the  subject  of  topography. 

118.  (c)  Obtaining  the  range  from  troops  already  engaged. — 
This  is  merely  a  matter  of  inquiry  on  the  part  of  the  company 
commander  of  the  nearest  leader  whom  he  finds  on  the  firing 
line.  This  inquiry  may  be  verbal  or  by  the  signals  prescribed 
in  the  Drill  Regulations. 

119.  (r7)  Measuring  the  range  directly  on  the  ground.. — The 
distance  on  the  ground  may  be  measured  by  (1)  the  use  of  a 
tape  or  chain,  (2)  the  pacing  of  horse  or  man,  or  (3)  the  instru- 
ments of  precision  of  the  engineer. 


MUSKETRY.  107 

It  Is  obvious  that  none  of  these  methods  are  practicable  except 
on  the  defensive  wlien  ample  time  is  available  before  the  pos- 
sibility of  contact  with  the  enemy. 

Training  in  this,  as  in  the  use  of  maps  for  the  determination 
of  ranges,  may  be  had  in  connection  with  the  instruction  in 
topography. 

120.  (<■)  Estimating  distance  by  sound. — On  Ihi ;  sul)ject  tiie 
Small  Arms  Firing  I\I:innal  states: 

"Sound  travels  at  tlie  rate  of  1,100  feet,  or  306  yard.s,  per 
second.  If  a  gun  is  fired  at  a  distance  a  certain  time  elapses 
before  the  sound  is  heard.  If  the  number  of  seconds  or  parts 
of  seconds  between  the  flash  and  the  report  be  carefully  taken 
and  multiplied  by  366,  the  product  will  be  approximately  the 
distance  in  yards  to  the  gun.  Lacking  special  instruments  of 
precision,  this  method  will  be  of  doubtful  use  on  the  battle  field, 
owing  to  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  the  sound  of  the  gun, 
who.se  flash  is  seen,  from  tiiat  of  any  other.  It  will  probably 
be  useful  in  determining  the  range  to  a  hostile  battery  when  it 
first  opens  fire."     (Par.  82.) 

121.  (/)  Range  finders. — Training  in  the  use  of  range-finding 
instruments  depends  upon  the  type  of  instrument  that  is  sup- 
plied to  the  organization.  Pamphlets  describing  these  instru- 
ments are  issued  with  them. 

In  the  training  of  au  organization  in  the  u.se  of  range  finders 
it  should  be  the  endeavor  not  only  to  train  the  particular  Indi- 
viduals who  ai'e  designated  to  use  it,  but  also  a  number  of  otliers 
who  should  be  perfectly  competent  to  take  the  place  ot  the 
"  range  taker  "  should  he  become  a  casualty  in  action. 

Exercises  should  cover  adjustments  for  height  and  distance, 
measuring  ranges,  and  the  preparation  of  range  cards. 

EXERCISE. 

122.  I. — Object:  Determination  of  ranges  with  the  range 
finder. 

Method:  The  battalion  range  takers  are  taken  to  the  point 
from  which  the  ranges  are  to  be  taken.  Instnmients  out  of 
adjustment.  They  will  each,  independently  of  the  others,  de- 
termine and  announce  the  range.  Ranges  should  be  determined 
as  quickly  as  possible,  but  accuracy  must  not  be  sacrificed. 

Time:  Record  kept  for  each  man,  for  information  of  the  ofli- 
cer  in  charge  only. 

Standard  of  proficiency  :  Accuracy,  90  per  cent. 


108  MUSKETRY. 

RANGE  CARDS  AND  RANGE  MARKS. 

123.  Range  card. — A  range  card  is  a  device  for  giving  ranges 
to  various  points  in  a  field  of  fire  for  iise  in  attack  or  defense. 
Hange  cards  sliould  bo  prepared  by  organization  commanders 
for  their  own  nse  and  for  use  by  platoon  leaders  and  observers. 
When  possible,  the  best  vi^ay  to  prepare  a  range  card  is  to  use  a 
piece  of  a  large-scale  map  of  the  country  on  which  to  draw  the 
range  circles  and  direction  lines.     There  will  usually  be  more 

RANGE  CAM)  HJ  ATTACK 


300 ..SCHOOL  flOUSE 

400. RIVER 

80Q_ FENCE 


1200- 


.CR0S3  ROADS 


I 


Fk..  23. — Simple  range  card  for  attack. 

time  for  preparing  range  cards  in  defense  than  in  attack  and 
consequently  range  cards  prepared  for  defensive  positions  will, 
as  a  rule,  be  more  elaborate  than  those  made  for  use  in  attack. 
124.  A  simple  range  card  for  attack. — Figure  23  shows  a 
rough  example  of  a  simple  range  card  made  for  use  in  attack. 
The  ranges  are  taken  from  the  crossroads  at  X  to  a  series  of 
prominent  objects  on  or  a  little  to  either  side  of  the  line  of  ad- 
vance. The  distance  of  each  of  these  points  from  the  enemifs 
position  is  carefully  noted,  and  thus  ranging  during  the  attack 
is  greatly  facilitated. 

Note. — The  point  from  which  rancres  are  taken  should  always  be  de- 
scribed clearly  on  the  card  to  facilitate  orientation. 


MUSKETRY. 


109 


125.  A  simple  range  card  for  defense. — Figure  24  is  an  e\ 
ainitle  of  a  ranj;o  card  for  use  in  dcfciis*'.  Tlie  ranges  In  tliis 
case  are  supposed  to  be  tatcen  from  a  point  "A"  innnediatoly 
soutli  of  tlie  church.  The  direction  line  from  "A"  to  the  cliurcli 
is  lieavier  than  the  other  line  to  facilitate  orienting  the  range 
card  in  the  same  manner  as  a  map.  When  the  card  is  oriented 
for  the  point  from  which  ranges  are  taken — which  is  noted  on 
the  card — by  pointing  the  thick  direction  line  on  the  church,  the 
other  direction  linos  will   indicate  the  ranges  to  other  points 

RANGE  CARD  IN  DEFENSE 


Fig.  24. — Simple  range  card  for  defense. 


marked  on  the  card.  Each  point  registered  on  the  range  card  Is 
numbered  consecutively  from  right  to  left. 

The  actual  marking  of  ranges  on  the  ground  by  means  of 
visil)le  marks  may  be  by  providing  range  marks  and  'i)lacing 
them  on  the  side  of  large  trees,  houses,  banks,  small  f(»lds  in  the 
ground,  etc..  only  visible  to  the  <lefense. 

126.  Ranging. — When  other  conditions  are  favorable  and  the 
ground  in  the  vicinit.v  of  the  enemy  is  such  as  to  give  visible 
signs  of  the  strike  of  the  bullets,  the  range  may  be  determined 
by  firing  trial  or  ranging  volleys. 


110 


MUSKETRY. 


The  determination  of  the  range  by  firing  volleys  is  prac- 
ti(\able  only  when : 

(1)  The  terrain  in  the  vicinity  of  the  target  is  visible. 

(2)  The  target  itself  is  stationary. 

(3)  The  ground  or  surface  is  such  that  the  strike  of  the 
bullets  can  be  observed. 

(4)  The  firing  party  is  not  under  heavy  fire. 

(5)  Tlie  time  is  available. 

(6)  The  observer  is  trained. 

As  but  a  few  of  these  conditions  are  likely  to  be  found,  this 
method  of  determining  the  range  is  of  rare  utility. 

In  determining  the  I'ange  by  volleys,  assuming  two  platoons, 
one  platoon  sets  its  sight  at  a  range  of  200  yards  under  the 


s^ 

V 

\H-]^ 

N 

T 

T' 

^-^-.^^.^^^ 

^^^r 

^^"■^-^ 

-^==:5s^A 

T" 

V* 

K 

^H- 

V 

estimated  range  and  the  other  200  yards  over  with  a  view  to 
bracketing  the  target. 

The  terrain  near  the  target  must  be  visible,  otherwise  there 
is  nothing  upon  which  to  base  an  estimate  of  the  change.  In 
(»ther  words,  the  ground  must  be  rising  with  respect  to  the  line 
of  site. 

127.  The  correction  of  sights,  as  a  result  of  ranging,  is  based 
upon  the  observation  of  the  impact  and  the  subsequent  estimate 
as  to  its  distance  and  direction  from  the  objective. 

In  known  distance  practice,  the  strike  of  the  bullet  is  on  a 
vertical  surface,  and,  when  the  position  is  shown  by  the  mark- 
ing disk,  the  sight  is  corrected  accordingly. 

In  combat,  however,  as  the  observation  of  impact  is  usually 
on  a  surface  that  is  rising  with  respect  to  the  line  of  site,  the 


MUSKETRY.  Ill 

correction  of  the  sielit  must  (•(Miipcnsate  not  only  for  the  hori- 
zontal (listiince  short  or  over,  but  also  for  the  vertical  distance 
above  or  below  the  objective. 

In  tigure  25  suppose  VV  to  represent  a  vertical  surface  and 
the  point  T  to  be  the  target.  If  a  shot  fired  at  T  strilces  at 
the  point  H,  the  sight  correction  to  be  applied  corresponds  to 
the  vertical  distance  HT.  If  T  be  assumed  to  be  on  a  horizontal 
surface  AT,  the  same  trajectory  will  cut  the  horizontal  surface 
at  //"  and  the  sight  cori*ection  to  be  made  will  correspond  to 
the  horizontal  distance  H"T.  If  T  be  assumed  to  be  ou  the 
surface  STS,  rising  with  respect  to  the  line  of  site,  the  same 
trajectory  will  intersect  this  sloping  surface  at  the  point  //'. 
The  required  correction  in  this  case  embodies  two  elements,  a 
correction  for  the  horizontal  distance  short,  H'V,  and  a  cor- 
rection for  the  vertical  distance  below  the  target,  represented 
by  H'T'. 

Similarly,  the  corredion  to  be  applied  to  a  shot  that  is  over 
is  represented  by  the  distance  H"  '  T"  plus  H"  '  V". 

From  the  above  it  is  olivicms  that  wlieu  tlie  target  is  on  slop- 
ing ground  the  correction  applied  to  the  rear  sight  will  be  too 
small  unless,  in  addition  to  the  correction  for  the  actual  dis- 
tance short  or  over,  allowance  is  made  also  for  the  angular 
distance  of  the  point  of  impact  above  or  below  the  target. 

In  practice,  the  actual  distance  in  yards  that  the  center  of 
impact  is  distant  from  the  target  must,  in  most  cases,  be  esti- 
mated. The  vertical  correction,  however,  may  be  measured 
Avlth  a  fair  degree  of  accuracy  by  using  the  type  EE  field 
glass  with  the  range  and  mil  s<ale  or  else  the  musketry  rule. 

To  measure  the  amount  of  this  vertical  correction  with  either 
the  glass  or  the  ruler  place  the  graduation  of  the  range  scale 
corresponding  to  the  elevation  actually  used,  in  coincidence  with 
the  target.  Then  the  graduation  opposite  the  point  wliere  the 
impact  was  noted  will  be  the  elevation  necessary  to  take  in 
order  to  correct  for  the  vertical  error.  It  is  to  be  noted  that 
this  vertical  correction  gives  the  range  (in  terms  of  the  sight) 
to  the  point  of  impact. 

The  vertical  correction  having  been  made,  then  the  correc- 
tion is  completed  by  adding  (if  the  impact  is  short)  or  sub- 
tracting (if  the  impact  is  over)  a  number  of  yards  equal  to 
the  estimate  of  the  horizontal  distance  from  the  impact  to  the 
objective  and  setting  the  sight  accordingly.     (Fig.  2G.) 


112 


MUSKETRY. 


Assume  the  range  to  have  been  estimated  at  800  yards. 
Then,  with  the  800-yard  graduation  held  opposite  the  target, 
tlie  splash  of  impact  is  observed  opposite  the  1.100-yard  gradua- 
tion and  is  estimated  to  be  150  yards  short.    The  full  correction, 


VERTICAL  CORReCTION 
FULL  CORRECTION   -- 


•TARGET 


^vV  'MPACT 


-15 


«-20 

Fig.  26. 

therefore,  would  be  1,100  yards  (vertical  correction)  plus  150 
yards  (horizontal  correction),  or  a  final  elevation  of  1,250 
yards,  as  a  result  of  this  observation. 

128.  The  terrain  should  be  visible,  both  in  front  and  rear  of 
the  target. 


Indications  will  be  only  partial  when  the  objective  is  along 
the  crest,  as  shown  in  figure  27.  The  same  will  be  true  when 
the  objective  occupies  the  near  edge  of  a  woods  or  is  along  a 
hedge  which  completely  screens  from  view  the  ground  in  rear 
of  it. 

An  objective  is  difficult  to  adjust  upon  when  it  occupies  one 
of  a  succession  of  parallel  ridges,  the  ground  appearing  from 


MUSKETRY.  113 

the  liiiiij,'  point  as  a  c(tntiiuimis  surface.  In  sueh  cases  tlie  only 
indications  will  come  from  shots  which  strike  the  ridges,  those 
falling  in  the  depressions  hein>jr  lost.  I*"'rom  such  indications 
wronfi  conclusions  may  he  drawn  unless  the  formation  of  the 
ground  is  discovered. 

129.  Ranging  nt  moving  targets  is  possihle  only  when  the 
ohjectlve  can  not  materially  change  its  course.  Sudi  targets 
are  wngon  trains  or  artillery  In  cohnun*on  a  '"oad. 

The  ground  surface  uuist  ho  such  that  the  strike  of  the 
hullet  can  be  observed. 

The  best  Indication  Is  given  by  the  bullets  striking  lu  loose, 
dry  sandy  soil. 

In  the  full  of  the  year  when  tho  cross  Is  dead  the  bullets 
will  usually  knock  up  enough  dust  from  the  grass  to  be  visible. 

In  noting  the  strike  of  the  shots  it  should  be  remembered 
that  the  dust  will  be  seen  somewhat  above  tlie  actual  point  of 
impact  and  to  the  right  or  left,  depending  upon  the  direction 
of  the  w'ind. 

A  perfect  condition  will  not  as*  a  rule  be  realized.  The 
ground  may  be  wet  or  covered  with  turf,  sod,  tall  grass,  or 
brush,  in  which  case  the  indications  may  be  entii'ely  lacking 
or  else  so  slight  as  to  form  no  basis  of  judgnient. 

When  the  sm-face  of  tlie  ground  is  such  as  not  to  furnish 
any  indication  to  an  observer  at  the  firing  point  of  the  effect 
of  fire  the  correctness  of  the  rear-sight  elevation  may  some- 
times be  inferred  by  careful  observation  of  the  actions  or 
movements  of  the  enemy. 

It  is  manifest  that  definite  results  are  not  possilile  when  the 
firing  party  is  under  heavy  fire. 

Time  nuist  be  available  and  the  ob.server  must  be  trained. 

The  observer  must  be  acquainted  with  the  appearance  and 
dimensions  of  the  shot  group  as  it  will  api)ear  on  various 
surfaces  in  order  to  recognize  the  center  of  impact,  and  he 
must  liave  had  some  experience  in  the  observation  of  fire. 

To  the  untrained  eye  there  will  be  a  continuous  space  from 
front  to  rear  of  the  target  that  is  covered  with  bullets — that 
is,  the  center  of  the  shot  groups  (the  center  of  impact)  of  the 
two  separate  volleys  will  not  be  apparent. 

Ground   rising  with   respect  to  the  line  of  .site  produces   a 
shortening  effect  on  the  shot  group.     Rising  slopes  of  less  than 
one  degree  will  not  orrlinarily  give  very  positive  results. 
3529°— 17 8 


114 


MUSKETRY. 


When  the  indications  of  impact  are  sufficient  to  form  a 
basis  of  judgment  it  may  be  stated  as  a  rough  rule  that  tlie 
fire  will  be  properly  adjusted  when  about  one-third  of  the 
shots  of  a  trial  volley  appear  to  strike  in  front  and  two-thirds 
in  rear,  it  being  remembered  that  the  direct  hits  will  pass 
through  and  strike  in  rear  of  the  target. 

Let  it  be  assumed  that  the  bullets  fall  about  as  shown  In 
figure  28.  - 

It  is  apparent  that  there  are  a  few  bullets  that  have  fallen 
between  the  center  of  impact  of  both  groups,  but  there  is  a 
distinct  center  of  Impact  to  each  volley,  and  in  this  case  thQ 
center  of  the  upper  one  being  at  100  yards  over  the  new  range 
to  be  used  would  be  about  100  yards  less  than  the  upper,  the 
amount  dependent  upon  the  degree  of  slope. 


^•i-iiia  Tilrtj 


130.  Not  more  than  two  trial  volleys  should  be  required  for 
fire  adjustment,  and  as  soon  as  the  range  is  determined  a 
cliange  should  be  made  at  once  to  "  Fire  at  will "  at  a  rate 
suited  to  the  range  and  the  visibility  of  the  target.  In  making 
rear-sight  corrections  it  is  necessary  to  make  positive  changes. 
It  IS  an  insufficient  and  faulty  procedure  to  attempt  to  correct 
adjustment  through  indefinite  instructions,  such  as  directing 
the  men  to  aim  a  "little  lower"  or  a  "little  higher."  Habitual 
practice  on  favorable  ground  may  tend  to  cultivate  too  great  a 
dependence  on  signs  of  impact  for  making  rear-sight  correc- 
tions. This  must  be  guarded  against.  Even  on  favorable 
ground,  where  large  numbers  of  troops  are  engaged,  it  will  be 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  commanders  and  leaders  to 
distinguish  indications  of  their  own  fire  from  that  of  other 
troops. 

However  partial  or  imperfect  the  signs  of  Impact,  close  ob- 
servation should  be  resorted  to  in  every  case,  as  slight  indi- 
cations may  sometimes  furnish  a  basis  for  rear-sight  correc- 
tions. 

Good  field  glasses  are  indispensable  for  observing  the  effect 
of  fire,  and  the  necessary  skill  in  their  use,  through  which  cor- 


MUSKETRY.  115 

n'll  (■(iiiclusiims  imiy  lie  (Iriiwii.   is  (u  lie  iiciiiiircd  only  tlir<)u;;li 
practice. 

(>l)si'rv!i(inii  frdiii  tlic  ll.iiiks  or  from  a  point  iil>ove  flio  liriii;; 
p:irty  will  ofti'U  be  pitssihic.  Such  a  jHtsition  is  far  preferable 
t(»  one  at  the  line  of  the  lirers,  as  observation  is  facilitateil  ami 
the  accuracy  of  the  corrections  is  incn-ascd.  To  an  observer 
on  or  behind  a  flank  of  the  tirers,  shots  whicli  pass  over  the 
target  will  appear  to  fall  toward  the  flank  ou  which  the  ob- 
.server  is  posted.  Those  shots  which  drop  short  will  appear 
to  fall  toward  the  other  flank.  Therefore  if  the  greatest  num- 
ber of  shots  seem,  to  an  observer  on  the  right  flank,  to  fall 
to  the  right  of  the  target  the  sight  setting  being  used  is  too 
great,  and  if  they  seem  to  fall  to  the  left  the  sight  setting  Is 
too  small. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
FIRE  DISTRIBUTION. 

131.  The  combined  fire  of  an  organisation  must  necessarily 
be  either  concentrated  or  distributed.  In  concentrated  tire  the 
men  all  use  the  same  sight  setting  and  aim  at  the  same  point. 
This  class  of  fire  is  favorable  for  observation  and  has  great  effect 
but  only  at  one  spot.  (The  distribution  of  fire  over  the  entire 
target  is  of  special  importance — 240,  I.  D.  R.). 

Fire  may  be  distributed  either  in  depth  or  width. 

The  object  of  distribution  in  depth  (combined  sights— par.  52) 
is  to  increase  the  length  of  the  beaten  zone  from  front  to  rear. 

Distribution  in  width  is  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  all  parts 
of  the  enemy's  line  under  such  an  effective  fire  that  no  part  of 

Firing  Line  .  Shot  Groujo  . 

a 
n 

D 

a 

D 

a 

•   D 

D 

Fig.  29. 

that  line  can  fire  undisturbed.     Therefore  fire  distribution  is  an 
essential  to  the  gaining  of  fiiv  superiority. 

132.  Distribution  is  both  individual  and  collective.  The  in- 
dividual soldier  fires  at  that  part  of  his  platoon  or  squad  target 
which  corresponds  to  his  position  in  the  platoon  or  squad. 

The  combined  result  of  the  platoon  or  squad  fire  is  a  line  of 
individual  .shot  groups,  each  overlapping  the  one  adjoining,  the 
whole  malving  the  squad  or  platoon. 

Proper  fire  distribution  means  that  all  of  the  target  and  not 
part  of  it  is  kept  under  fire.    This  is  not  as  easy  as  one  might 
think,  and  the  attainment  of  proficiency  necessitates  much  prac- 
tice on  the  part  of  leaders  and  men. 
116 


MUSKETRY.  117 

133.  In  the  original  doitloyineut  for  battle,  the  division  com- 
uuuultT  assi;j;n.s  U>  liis  ItiiKadcs  a  i)art  of  the  j^ciicral  Iroiil  or 
objective  in  sucli  niaiincr  lliat  tlie  (livision's  objective  is  all 
coveretl. 

Tliese  brijiatle  fi'diils  art-  siibiiividrd  a.irain  ijnwn  llirouu'ii  the 
rcp^iinciils  In  battalions,  conipaiiios,  iiiid  |ilatoons. 

The  division  ot  tlio  objective  into  parts  and  the  assiLcnnienI  to 
units  nuist  b<>  made  witli  .u^reat  care.  It  the  .-idjacent  thinks  of 
two  organizations  advancinji  from  slij^htly  different  directions 
guide  on  the  same  iioini  in  liH>  cnciiiy's  line  diii-ing  the  advance, 
tliey  will  arrive  in  a  (.-onlinuous  lint-  ujion  its  frtmt.  If  the  ])oint 
is  in  advance  of  the  line,  there  will  be  crowding  and  overlapping. 
Tliis  is  objectionable,  as  it  causes  confusion  and  may  sul)ject 
one  portion  of  tlie  line  to  the  tire  of  the  »)ther.  Casualties  during 
the  advance  may  tend  to  reduce  this  dillicnlty. 

If  the  guiding  i)oint  is  in  rear  of  the  enemy's  line,  tliere  will 
be  a  gap  between  the  two  organizations,  which,  however,  may 
be  filled,  if  desirable.  If  two  organizations  are  advancing  in 
the  same  direction,  contiguous  to  each  other  (as  in  a  ]iurely 
frontal  attack),  no  difliculty  is  encountered.  This  is  the  simplest 
form  of  attack. 

The  higher  the  connnander  the  easier  the  siibdivision  of  his 
target.  The  leaders  of  smaller  units,  battalions,  comjianies, 
and  platoons  have  the  ditlicult  task. 

134.  The  battalion  conun.mder  must  describe  the  targets  to 
his  caj)tains  in  such  terms  that  there  will  be  no  chance  of  a 
misunderstanding. 

The  drill  regulations  prescribe  that  the  major  designate: 

(rt)   The  direction  of  the  advance  or, 

(b)  Tlie  objective  for  each  company  of  his  battalion  in  tin- 
firing  line  or, 

((•)   The  position  of  the  enemy  or. 

(if)  The  gencM'al  object  to  be  obtained  and  the  special  i)rolih'in 
for  each  company,  and 

(e)  The  order  anil  front  of  each  company, 

(/)  The  right  or  left  company  as  the  base  company. 

The  above  are  principles  which  are  comparatively  easy  to 
state.  Their  i)racticid  applic-ition  to  conci-el*'  cases  is  not  always 
so  simple. 

Taking  the  first — that  of  giving  the  direction  of  attack. 

Von  Kiesling  gives  a  i)roblem  where  a  railroa<l  runs  through 
the  enemy's  lines.  The  battalion  front  extends  to  one  side  of 
the  railroad.     Tlie  major  directs — 


118  MUSKETRY. 

"  Nos.  1  and  2  companies  will  he  in  the  front  line,  No.  1  com- 
jiany  will  be  on  tlie  ri}j;ht  with  its  riglit  on  the  roud  and  will  con- 
ii(<ct  with  No.  2  company,  which  will  be  on  Ihe  left.  P'rontajie  of 
«'a('Ii  company,  l-')*)  meters  (165  yards)."  (P.  r.3,  Operation 
oi-dcrs. )     Frequently  nothing  more  will  be  possil)lt\ 

In  this  problem,  of  course,  each  and  every  man  is  a  trained 
soldier  and  tires  on  that  part  of  the  target  directly  in  front  of 
liim. 

An  imaginary  line  to  some  physical  object  that  can  be  seen 
back  of  the  line  may  be  taken  at  times  as  the  guiding  line. 

135.  Generally    it   will    be    sufficient   with   trained   troops   to 
acquaint  them  with  the  width  of  the  sector  in  defense  or  front 
of  the  troops  in  attack,  assuming  that  it  is  not  {'.esired  to  follow 
BN  IN  ATTACK  AS  PART  OF 
LARGER    FORCE    SHOWING     PLATOON  FRONTS 

A  P  B  EC 

I   s   S^   S   I 

0  IDI  olQ  ,Q»  1I| 

!o  /S»   d:o   »s»   s 


I    0  I    °    1   M    Q    I    J    I   n 

;  5*  sl;  [  o;  S  iJ! 
!  g  a  'tf  '.  ^  g  <i ! 

;4_32_3      ,:J 3        2 I, 

CO.  B  CO. A 

i       ,  i    CO.C6D     SUPPORT 

Fig.   30. 

l)rearranged  and  obvious  system  of  appctrtionment,  as  where  each 
company  takes  its  proportion  of  the  whole  target  depending  upon 
the  number  of  companies  in  the  line.     (303.  I.  D.  K. ) 

Assuming  that,  in  a  given  situation,  the  major  commanding 
a  battalion,  as  a  part  of  a  large  force,  has  been  given  a  front 
or  part  of  the  enemy's  line  A-C  to  attack,  he  might  divide  his 
target  as  shown  in  figure  30,  putting  two  companies  in  the 
firing  line  and  two  in  support. 

The  captains  then  subdivide  their  target  as  shown,  assinning 
four  platoons.  Company  A :  The  first  and  second  platoons  each 
cover  E-C.  Third  and  fourth  platoons  each  B-E.  This  is 
known  as  the  overlapping  method,  and  where  one  of  these  pla- 


MUSKETRY.  119 

toons  ceases  fire  to  advance,  llie  other,  having  the  same  objec- 
tive or  part,  replaces  the  lost  ritles  by  increasing  its  rate  of 
fire.  With  three  platoons  the  company  front  is  dividetl  into 
two  parts,  one  is  assigned  to  each  tlauk  platoon  and  the  whole 
company  front  to  the  center  platoon.  With  two  platoons  each 
takes  the  whole  company  objective. 

136.  There  is  another  system  known  as  the  switcli  method. 
The  company  objective  is  divided  into  a  numbiT  of  j)arts.  one 

less  than  the  number  of  platoons  in  the  company.  One  pla- 
toon is  designated  as  the  switch  platoon.  Thus  with  four  pla- 
toons and  assuming  platoon  rushes  to  start  from  the  right,  the 
company  objective  is  divided  into  three  parts,  assigned  to  the 
first,  second,  and  third  platoons,  the  fourth  being  the  "  switch." 
Number  1  ceases  fire  to  advance,  No.  4  fires  at  No.  I's  target. 
No.  2  ceases  fire  to  advance,  No.  4  fires  at  No.  2's  target,  then 
at  No.  3's  target,  and  finally  No.  4  advances.  This  method  is 
not  approved,  as  it  can  only  be  usc<l  by  troops  exceptionally 
Mell  in  hand. 

No  attempt  is  made  to  assign  tlie  squads  to  parts  of  the  tar- 
get any  more  than  to  have  the  squads  take  as  their  target  tlu^ 
part  of  the  platoon's  target  that  corresponds  to  the  .squad's 
position  in  the  platoon.  This  is  all  that  will  be  possible  luidcr 
the  ordinary  conditions  of  an  attack. 

The  fori'going  giv(>s  the  theoretical  method.  No  rule  can  be 
made  in  the  al)stract  that  will  apply  to  all  concrete  cases. 

137.  The  use  of  reference  points  and  the  mil  rule  (par.  92) 
should  eliminate  most  of  the  dilliculties  in  the  distribution  of 
the  target.  (See  Designation  and  Recognition  of  Service  Tar- 
gets. ) 

This  Implies  facility  on  the  part  of  the  iiiajoi-  and  all  ofiicers 
in  the  conversion  of  mils  into  yards,  fingers,  and  rear  sight. 

The  l)est  possible  designation  of  the  target  nuist  be  made. 

In  moving  from  one  |)osition  lo  another,  and  after  the  target 
has  been  a.ssigned.  it  must  be  kept  under  constant  observaticm, 
care  being  exercised  to  guard  against  the  apparent  shifting  of 
the  target  when  viewed  from  somo  point  other  than  that  at 
which  it  was  first  pointetl  out.  It  nmst  be  rcmcmltered  that 
objects  viewed  from  dilTtM-cnt  angles  do  not  always  look  the 
same. 

P^or  instance,  in  case  1.  figure  '.U,  the  captain  from  his  position 
at  0,  and  in  the  manner  (h'scril^ed,  points  out  the  target  to  the 
lieutenant  of  the  left  i)latoon.     The  lieutenant  moves  to  point 


120 


MUSKETRY. 


X  without  making  any  measurement  or  paying  any  particular 
attention  to  the  target.  At  point  X  he  assigns  the  target  to 
his  platoon,  Init  the  left  o'f  the  platoon  is  assigned  to  the  foot 
of  the  trees.  Twenty  mils  of  the  company  target  to  the  left  of 
the  tree  is  not  covered. 

Had  he,  the  lieutenant,  found  the  point  C  in  the  line,  or  with 
his  mil  rule  measured  off  100  mils  from  the  foot  of  the  tree 
-while  with  the  captain  and  picked  up  the  point  A  in  the  line, 
lie  could  have  moved  to  X  observing  the  point  C  constantly,  or 
measured  off  100  mils  from  A  as  seen  from  his  new  position, 
and  he  would  have  had  the  entire  target  covei-ed  as  in  case  2. 
By  this  method  of  keeping  the  target  constantly  imder  observa- 
tion and  measuring  off  the  distance  in  the  manner  iiidicatod, 
errors  in  reassignment  of  targets  may  be  avoided. 


C-f\sa  I . 


explain  to  Lt  0  here  directs  The 
KComp»rn4S  iarqet  IS  lOO  rriih  /o/>J 
its    r.ijhl   »/   thil    Irem" 


FlO.    31. 


138.  In  defense. — In  apportioning  the  battalion  target  to  the 
companies  on  the  firing  line,  the  difference  between  the  bat- 
talion in-  attack  and  defense  should  be  noted.  In  defense  the 
division  of  the  battalion  sector  should  be  made  with  reference 
to  physical  objects,  if  possible.  This  has  reference  to  the  fire 
.vector  which  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  actual  amount  of 
gi-ound  the  battalion  trenches  cover.  An  order  to  one  of  the 
companies  might  be  something  like  the  following:  "Company 
C,  with  its  right  I'esting  on  this  point  [indicated  on  the  ground], 
will  intrench  on  a  front  of  100  yards,  covering  the  sector  from 
the  railroad,  inclusive,  to  the  tree  [both  indicated  on  the  ground  J, 
exclusively,  crossing  fire  with  the  battalion  on  our  right  and  with 
Company  B  on  its  left."     (Fig.  32.) 


MUSKETRY. 


121 


The  incii  iniisf  he  ti-.-iincd  imt  Id  sli;^lit  invisible  iM)r1i<)ns  (»r 
tii(>  l!irjrc(. 

139.  Exercises  in  target  distribution.-  It  is  ;issuiium1  lluil  :iil 
!ir(>  acc'iistniucd  to  iiiciisniiii;;  widlli.s  l»y  tlii'  use  of  tliQ  mil  .scak', 
rear  .'^ifrlit.  and  tlie  u.><e  of  reference  points. 

I. — Object:  To  teach  lire  leaders  the  apportionment  of  the 
target,  (let<>rmiiiation  of  lli(>  ran^ic  by  tin-  nsc  of  r:iiij.'('  esii- 
malors.  and  the  issuance  of  lire  orders. 

Method:  Tlie  tarjrets  for  these  exercises  niiiy  be  either  r(>i)re- 
sented,  ontlined.  or  assnm;'d.  Wlien  rei»resenled  <ii-  outlined, 
either  men  or  silhonettes  may  be  nsed  for  the  puri>osc.  The 
limit.s  of  the  objcclive  arc  indicated  by  llaus,  and  may  iiH'lnde 
tl.e  «Mitir(>  line  <;r  oid,\   a  jioi-tion  of  it. 


A 


.     A 

^/-u■ 

F  £ 


F/RE  S£:CTOR 

com.tn£:a/c// 


c 

J3^         A 


Co.  If 

Fi<i.  Wl. 


-     ^OPPOffT-TNCUC/f 


The  nnit  rejiresented  by  the  jilatoon  and  squad  leaders  is 
halted  at  .some  i)oint  from  which  it  is  not  jiossihle  to  obtain  a 
view  of  tlie  tarf.'et.  The  instructor  calls  the  leader  forward  to 
a  l)oint  from  wliich  the  target  is  visible  and  at  the  same  time 
causes  the  flags  to  he  displayed  at  the  target.  He  points  out 
the  target  to  the  leader  and  informs  him  tliat  the  tings  mark 
the  Hanks  of  his  objective.  The  instructor  f'uithcr  informs  the 
leader  that  these  Hags  will  he  removed  before  his  unit  is  per- 
mitted to  come  within  view  of  the  target  and  tliat  therefore 
X\\i  Hanks  of  the  objective  must  be  fixed  in  the  mind  by  refer- 
ence to  natural  landmarks.  When  the  leader  informs  the  in- 
structor that  he  has  the  target  definitely  located  with  reference 
to  natural  landmarks,  the  latter  causes  the  Hags  to  be  removed. 


122 


MUSKETRY. 


Tripod 


^^ 


^^3 


Fig.  33. 


MUSKETRY.  128 

The  leader  is  now  directed  to  coiiiplete  his  reeonnnissanee  of 
the  position,  to  (xf-upy  it  with  ids  unit,  and  to  issue?  Ids  tire 
ordei* — all  this  under  the  assumption  that  his  mission  recpiires 
this  target  to  l)e  taktni  under  lire.  The  instructor  may  add 
further  condition.s  to  the  prohleni,  as,  for  example,  that  the  fire 
must  be  opened  without  delay,  that  the  position  is  or  is  not 
under  hostile  fire. 

The  leader  then  issues  his  lire  order  (pars.  2">  '2Ct())  in  a 
manner  that  would  be  feasible  under  the  assumed  conditions  of 
the  problem. 

Each  sultordinat;'  connuander  in  t\irn  issues  his  tire  order  in 
a  similar  maimer. 

When  the  tire  ordens  have  been  issued,  each  leader  (by  use 
of  the  aiming  tripod,  figs.  33-34)  indicates  what  he  believes  to 
be  the  limits  of  the  objective  or  of  the  fraction  of  the  objective 
upon  which  he  has  been  ordered  to  direct  his  fire. 


cx 


\      / 

0 
SMI  put  Ion   I 
totlr.  urc.1 
tad  no  sax* 

I   cov«t«4 

Daal 

th«t 

Ob]. 

SUA' 

or 

c 

lion  redu 

ivarod    !• 

the  ^aml] 

Inec 

ice 

Fig. 

a 

DoalOAtlon    reduced 
to   i    in    v.lu.   n, 
front   covcr*4   Ic  ooli 
half    tHat  of    tht  ••■ 
■.bjrctlo.. 

34. 

Tills  Itein.ir  done,  tlie  instructor  causes  the  flags  again  to  be 
displiiyed  at  the  target,  verities  the  sighting  of  the  aiming  tri- 
pods, checks  the  elevations  used  with  the  true  range  to  the 
objective,  and  then  gives  a  critique  on  the  execution  of  the 
exercise. 

140.  The  aiming  tripod  heretofore  mentioned  is  made  as  fol- 
loirs:  Referring  to  figure  33.\,  the  base,  AB,  and  the  arms,  DE 
and  FCJ,  are  made  of  hardwood.  They  are  each  about  y^  inch 
square  in  -cross  section  and  about  10  inches  in  length. 

At  its  center  the  base  is  made  fast  to  the  tripod  (any  camera 
or  sket<'hing  triixid  is  satisfactory  for  this  purpose)  by  a  bolt 
and  wing  nut  at  G. 


124  MUSKETRY. 

'I'liis  point  is  made  loose  enouj:;h  to  permit  of  the  base  bein^ 
tunuMl  in  a  liorizontal  phme  without  undue  muscubir  exertion, 
but  thei-e  must  still  be  sutRcient  friction  at  this  point  to  prevent: 
the  base  being  turned  on  the  tripod  by  the  action  of  a  strong 
wind. 

In  like  manner  the  amis  ai-e  fastened  to  the  ends  of  the  base 
at  A  and  B,  the  pivot  of  the  arms  being  about  i  an  inch  off 
the  center  to  permit  of  the  device  being  folded  as  shown  in 
ligure  33B. 

The  pointers,  HD,  IE,  .IF,  and  KG,  may  be  made  of  any  avail- 
able pieces  of  thin  sheet  metal — zinc,  copper,  brass;  tin.  etc. 

The  shape  and  size  of  these  pointers,  as  cut  from  the  flat 
metal  sheet,  are  as  shown  in  figure  33C.  This  piece  is  then  bent 
in  the  shape  show^n  in  figure  33D. 

These  pointers  are  riveted  to  tlie  ends  of  the  arms  in  such 
manner  as  to  permit  of  their  being  placed  in  an  upright  position 
for  use,  figure  33A,  or  folded  down  for  packing  or  transporta- 
tion, figure  33B. 

In  use  the  tripod  is  set  up  with  the  base  approximately  per- 
pendicular to  the  line  of  fire.  When  the  leader  has  received 
his  fire  order,  he  decides  upon  what  he  believes  to  be  the  loca- 
tion of  his  target,  and  then,  using  the  pointers  as  front  and 
rear  sights,  directs  the  arm  DE  at  the  point  which  marks  the 
rigb.t  flank  of  his  particular  fraction  of  the  objective,  while 
tlie  arm  FG  is  similarly  directed  at  the  left  flank. 

In  judging  of  the  execution  of  any  particular  exercise,  the 
instructor  takes  into  account  the  probable  material  effect  of  the 
fire,  assuming  it  to  have  been  carried  out  in  strict  compliance 
with  the  fire  order.     (Chap.  XVIII,  pars.  255-201.) 

141.  It  is  not  sufficient  for  the  instructor  to  state  that  the 
range  is  in  error  by  a  certain  amount.  He  should  observe  the 
manner  in  which  the  range  was  determined  and  decide  whether 
this  method  would  have  been  practicable  under  the  assumed 
conditions ;  point  out  the  possible  or  probable  causes  of  error ; 
show  how  these  errors  may  be  eliminated  or  at  least  reduced  in 
amount ;  and  state  wdiether  the  error  is  or  is  not  excessive. 

The  instructor  next  turns  his  attention  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  target  has  been  designated  and  to  the  precision  of 
direction  and  control  resulting  from  this  designation. 

The  instructor's  conclusions  as  to  the  correctness  or  incorrect- 
ness of  the  designation  are  based  on  his  own  observation  of  the 
manner  in  which  the  leader  and  his  subordinates  issue  their  fire 


MUSKETRY.  125 

onlcrs.  Tlw  pcrfcctiiin  of  (listriliiitiuii  is  vcriru'd  by  the  aiiiiiiiK 
tripod. 

Ileferriiiff  to  figure  34.  let  TV  be  the  line  of  tar.irots,  and  .1 
aiKl  li  bo  the  lla^'s  marking:  the  flanks  of  tlie  particular  fraction 
of  that  line  at  which  fire  is  to  be  directed.  I^et  G  rer»resent  the 
position  of  the  gunner  or  leader,  and  the  lines  fin  and  fib  rep. 
resent  the  two  lines  of  aim  as  sIkjwu  by  the  arms  of  aiming 
tripod. 

Case  A  shows  that  the  designation  and  the  understanding  ot 
the  designation  were  perfect,  the  arms  of  the  aiming  tripod 
pointing  with  precision  at  tlie  flanks  of  the  target. 

Cases  B  and  C  show  that  the  designation  or  the  understanding 
of  it  (the  instructor  determines  by  observation  whether  the 
error  lies  with  the  leader  or  the  subordinate),  is  lacking  in 
accuracy  to  such  an  extent  as  to  reduce  the  effect  of  the  fire  by 
one-half;  in  case  B  because  twice  the  allotted  front  is  covered 
and  hence  the  assigned  target  received  but  half  of  the  volume  of 
fire  that  should  have  been  directed  upon  it ;  in  case  C  but  half 
of  the  target  is  covered  with  fire. 

In  case  D  no  credit  whatever  can  be  allowed  for  designation, 
as  there  is  no  portion  of  the  target  that  is  covered  with  fire. 

By  showing  how  the  effect  of  fire  is  reduced  by  the  combined 
errors  in  range  and  designation,  the  instructor  may  give  a  forci- 
ble demonstration  of  the  fact  that  the  best  marksmanship  is  of 
n(.  avail  if  acting  under  the  direction  of  a  faulty  fire  order. 

Take  case  B  for  example  and  assume  that  the  true  range  of 
800  yards  was  estimated  at  900  yards.  From  the  table  (par.  lO.j) 
it  is  found  that  this  error  will  reduce  the  hits  from  TOO  to  50. 
As  only  half  of  the  fire  is  directed  at  the  target  these  50  hits 
would  also  be  reduced  by  one-half.  Hence  good  marksmen,  who 
are  capable  of  making  100  hits  on  the  target  if  properly  directed, 
make  only  25  hits  because  of  the  errors  of  their  leaders. 

This  exercise  may  be  varied  in  several  ways. 

One  variation  is  to  point  out  the  target  to  the  leader  and 
then  require  him  to  occupy  a  position  several  hundred  yards 
nearer  the  ob.ifH'tive  and  there  issue  his  fire  order. 

A  second  variation  is  similar  to  the  first  except  that  the  new 
position  is  well  off  to  one  flank  as  well  as  to  the  front. 

Advantage  of  this  exercise  may  be  taken  to  instruct  the  men 
in  distribution  and  also  in  not  slighting  invisible  portions  of  the 
target  for  more  prominent  parts. 


126  MUSKETRY. 

For  (liis  purpose  a  part  of  the  assijiiicd  target  should  lie  only 
partially  visible.  The  fire  leaders  give  the  orders,  indicating 
target  to  be  covered,  etc.,  and  the  men  align  their  rifles,  u.sing 
sandbags  or  other  improvised  re.sts,  or  the  aiming  tripod. 

The  alignment  of  the  rilles  is  then  verified  by  the  instructor, 
and  usually  at  first  it  will  be  found  that  none  of  the  rifles  are 
aimed  at  that  part  of  the  line  which  is  partially  concealed. 

At  this  poinl  it  should  be  explained  to  the  men  that  the 
enemy's  men  occupying  that  part  of  the  line  at  which  their  rifles 
were  not  aimed  represent  a  part  of  the  enemy's  line  that  is  not 
disturbed  at  all,  as  no  one  Is  firing  at  them.  As  a  result  they 
will  do  just  as  good  shooting  as  on  the  target  range. 

A  C h I  B      T^g  CNtwy 


'.I'm;;*  u\    "; 


""lilt,  .S\\\ 


"I,,;  i  '•  :\^^. \ 


nili'.h'.  P,\o\//'  ,llin  :  1  >  '.\\\  \^ 
Fig.    35. 


Mil 

!'V\\\\\         Attack  IMG 


FORCe. 


It  can  be  readily  seen  that  if  the  enemy  holds  the  line  A-B, 
figure  35,  and  the  attacking  force  keeps  A-C  and  DE  only 
under  fire,  that  that  part  of  the  enemy  C-D  and  EB  will  do 
good  execution. 

II. — Object:   As  for  first  exercise  tactical  walk. 

Method:  Assume  the  target  assigned  to  the  colonel.  G've  the 
colonel's  attack  order,  then  the  major's,  carrying  this  down  to 
the  platoon  leaders  of  one  or  more  platoons. 


Fig.    36. 

These  designations  should  always  be  made  at  the  same  distance 
from  the  target  that  they  would  be  made  were  a  real  enemy 
there.  Two  or  three  men  should  act  as  subordinates  to  deter- 
mine whether  or  not  the  subdivision  is  understood. 

III. — Object:  To  teach,  "Men  are  so  instructed  that  each 
fires  on  that  part  of  the  target  which  is  directly  opposite  him  " 
(245  I.  D.  R.),  or,  in  other  words,  the  individual  fires  at  that 


MUSKETRY.  127 

p;irt  of  his  platoon  or  s(ni;i(l  target  wliicli  rorrospoiKls  \i>  liis 
position  in  tliat  iilatnon. 

Method;  Malve  a  frauic  :>  by  <">  foot  on  the  order  of  an  A 
|ar.i,'ot  I'miiu'.  Cover  tliis  I'liinio  w  iiii  taii;ot  cloth  antl  tlien  paste 
tliereoM  Itlanlc  paper.  Ordinary  yellow  wrapping  paper  will 
answer  liie  i)urpi>st».  Taste  a  row  ol'  i)laclv  target  pasters  al)onl 
4  ilU'lu's  from  the  bottom  edi^e  of  tlie  tarjiet,  as  in  li.mire  3(1. 

Handliaj;  n^sts  are  pr(jvided  at  the  tirinj.?  point  for  tlie  rifles, 

The  Individual  soldier  is  then  called  to  the  firing  point  and 
(old  that  his  squad  or  platoon  is  firing  at  a  line  of  the  enemy, 
representetl  by  the  row  of  black  pasters  on  the  target,  and  that 
he  is  No.  3,  front  rank,  or  some  other  number,  of  the  ftr.st,  second, 
third,  or  fourth  squad  of  his  platoon,  He  Is  then  directed  to 
sight  his  rifle  at  that  part  of  the  line  at  which  he  thinks  he 
^liould  tire,  using  the  sandbag.  The  instructor  then  verifies  the 
sighting. 

For  convenience  in  verifying  the  pasters  may  be  numbered 
in  pencil  in  such  manner  as  not  to  be  visible  to  the  soldier  at 
the  tiring  point 

This  target  may  be  used  by  the  squad  actually  firing  and  usin:^ 
the  gallery  rifle  and  .22  ammunition.  The  corporal  is  given  a 
part  or  the  whole  of  the  target  to  cover;  he  then  gives  his  fire 
onhM*  and  the  squad  tires.  Tlie  distribution  is  verified  by  tlie 
liits. 


CHAPTER  IX. 
AUXILIARY  AIMING  TARGETS. 

142.  If  the  tiirset  cm  not  be  seen  with  the  naked  eye,  platoon 
leaders  select  an  object  in  front  of,  or  behind  it.  designate  this 
as  tlie  aiming  target,  and  direct  a  sight  setting  v.  hlch  will  carry 
tlio  cone  of  tire  into  the  target,     (Par.  247,  I.  D,  R.) 

THE   RANGE   SCALE   FOR   USE   WITH   THE   AUXILIARY   TARGETS. 

This  is  the  reversed  and  reduced  reproduction  of  the  gradua- 
tions of  the  rear  sight  leaf  of  the  rifle.  The  theory  upon  which 
this  device  is  constructed  will  be  understood  by  reference  to 
figure  37. 

B 


TAR8ET 


Fig   37. 

143.  The  illustration  shows  a  cross  section  through  two  hill 
features  with  the  flrer  at  F  and  the  target  at  A  (1,000  yards 
distant  from  F).  It  also  shows  two  possible  aiming  points  at  B 
and  at  C  and  the  trajectory  necessary  to  hit  the  target  at  A. 

Case  1. — The  target  at  A  is  clearly  visible.  Thei  rifle  is  there- 
fore aimed  directly  at  the  target  with  sight  setting  1,000  yards. 
The  line  of  aim  is  the  line  F-A,  the  angle  of  departure  is  the 
angle  a  and  the  trajectory  is  the  line  F-B'-A  which  the  bullet 
travels  and  so  strikes  the  target  at  A,  as  intended.  No  matter 
what  auxiliary  target  is  used,  the  bullet  will  travel  this  same 
trajectory  and  strike  at  A  when  the  appropriate  sight  setting 
is  used. 

Case  2. — The  target  A  is  invisible  except  through  glasses. 
Aim  can  not  now  be  taken  at  the  target  and  an  auxiliary  aiming 
128 


MUSKETRY.  129 

target  is  necessary.  At  C  is  a  well-defintvl  point.  If  tlie  rille 
is  aiiniHl  at  V  tlie  desireil  trajectory  will  be  produced  when  the 
angle  of  departure  is  c,  the  line  of  aim  /''-(',  the  sight  setting  on 
the  sight  is  (Hiunl  to  F-C. 

Cane  3. — The  target  at  A  is  invisililc  and  the  sky  line  at  Ji  is 
chosen  as  an  aiming  target.  If  the  rille  is  aimed  at  B  with  an 
elevation  b,  the  line  of  aim  will  be  F-B,  the  angle  of  departure 
will  be  b,  and  the  bullet  will  travel  along  the  trajectory  F-B'-A, 
passing  the  line  of  aim  at  the  range  F-B'  and  striking  the  tar- 
get at  -1,  as  desired. 

USE  OF  THE  MUSKETRY  RULE  TO  OBTAIN  SIGHT  SETTING  TO  BE 
USED  WITH  AUXILIARY  AIMING  TARGET. 

144.  An  auxiliary  aiming  target  having  been  chosen,  approxi- 
mately in  line  with  the  target  and  above  or  below  it,  an  estimate 
or  measurement  of  the  range  to  the  target  is  matle.  Both 
sliders  on  the  musketry  rule  are  then  set  to  this  range.  The 
rule  is  held  so  that  the  zero  is  up  and  the  distance  of  15  inches 
is  obtained  by  means  of  the  cord  and  knot.  (Par.  78.)  If  the 
aiming  target  is  above  the  target,  the  upper  slider  is  now 
moved  up  until  both  the  target  and  the  aiming  target  can  just 
be  seen  through  the  gap  between  the  sliders.  The  scale  reading 
opposite  I  lie  upper  slider  is  that  to  be  set  on  the  rifle  sights  of 
the  firers  if  they  are  to  aim  at  the  auxiliary  aiming  target  and 
expect  to  hit  the  target.  If  the  aiming  target  is  below  the 
target,  the  procedure  is  the  same,  except  that  the  lower  slide  Is 
moved  down  tintil  both  the  aiming  target  and  target  are  visible. 
The  sight  setting  for  the  firers  is  then  that  opposite  the  lower 
slider. 

The  rule  of  thumb  for  this  operation  is:  Aiming  target 
beyond  target  elevation  to  be  used  /c,s,s  than  that  for  direct 
aim ;  aiming  target  nearer  than  target,  elevation  to  be  used 
greater  than  for  direct  aim. 

CHOICE  OF  AN  AIMING  TARGET. 

145.  The  choice  of  an  aiming  target  depends  primarily  on  the 
available  features  of  the  terrain  that  are  innnediately  in  line 
with  the  area  that  is  to  be  covered  with  fire.  At  onlinary 
ranges  care  must  be  taken  not  to  choose  an  aiming  target  so 
that  a  minus  sight  setting  will  result.  Sky  lines  are  often  not 
available  on  this  account.     Assuming  that  the  enemy's  line  to 

.s.^L'n"— 17 9 


ISO 


MUSKETRY. 


l)o  covered  with  fire  is  of  tlie  same  len.iitli  as  tlie  attacking  line, 
tliere  are  three  satisfactory  aiining  targets  from  a  theoretical 
standpoint. 

First,  an  aiming  target  consisting  of  a  point  so  far  in  rear 
of  tlie  enemy's  line  (several  miles)  that  the  fire  will  be  slightly 
convergent.  In  this  case  the  distribution  and  accuracy  of  fire 
should  be  excellent,  but  if  the  aiming  target  is  too  close  the 
flanivs  of  the  enemy  will  not  be  covered. 

Second,  an  aiming  target  consisting  of  a  well  defined  hori- 
zontal line  within  100  yards  or  so  of  the  enemy's  line.  In  this 
case  the  accuracy  of  fire  slioukl  be  excellent. 


Lzo 

Fig.  38. 

Third,  an  aiming  target  consisting  of  a  point  half  way  be- 
tween the  firing  line  and  the  enemy,  so  that  tlie  fire  crosses  at 
the  aiming  target.  Tlien  tlie  fire  of  the  right  flank  strikes  the 
enemy's  right  flank.  In  tliis  case  the  accuracy  and  distribution 
should  both  be  excellent,  but  here,  again,  if  the  aiming  target 
is  not  exactly  half  way  to  the  enemy  the  fire  may  cover  too 
much  or  too  little  of  the  enemy's  line. 

146.  Considerable  judgment  and  experience  is  required  in  the 
choice  of  aiming  targets.  Excellent  results  may  be  obtained 
by  their  judicious  use,  but  they  should  rarely  if  ever  be  used 
if  the  real  target  is  visible  to  the  firing  line. 

Figure  38  shows  the  use  of  the  field  glass  in  designating  an 
auxiliary  aiming  target. 

All  men  must  understand  that  they  are  to  take  just  as  careful 
aim  and  hold  just  as  carefully  when  using  an  aiming  target  as 
when  firing  at  tlie  actual  target.  Otherwise  they  can  not  expect 
their  fire  to  be  effective. 


MUSKETRY.  131 

All  oHiccrs  and  noncoiniiiissioiaHl  oUiters  should  have  practical 
instruction  in  the  selection  and  designation  of  auxiliary  aiming 
targets.  This  is  well  taught  by  means  of  terrain  exercises. 
The  enemy  is  outlined  hy  suitable  field  targets.  The  men  under 
instruction  select  an  aiming  target,  determining  the  range  to 
l)e  used,  etc.,  and  write  tlu'lr  data  on  slips  of  pajier  of  convenient 
size.  These  slips  are  then  taken  up  by  the  instructor  and  read 
and  criticized  on  the  spot. 


CHAPTER  X. 
BATTLE-FIELD  COMMUNICATION. 

147.  The  Signal  Corps  furnishes  electrical  communication, 
supplemented  by  other  means,  down  to  and  including  brigade 
headquarters. 

Communication  within  the  brigade  Is  ordinarily  by  means  of 
visual  signals,  written  or  verbal  messages,  and,  except  in  posi- 
tion and  siege  warfare,  seldom  by  electrical  means. 


LUES  iKSiOin  aua  or  sicaiis. 
Par.  163-I.O.R. 


Fig.  39. 


The  personnel  for  this  duty  within  the  brigade  is  furnished 
by  the  troops  themselves. 

Paragraph  1562.  A.  R.,  requires  that  at  least  two  men  in  each 
organization  be  proficient  in  visual  signaling.  The  number  of 
qualified  signalists  in  a  company  or  troop  should  by  no  means 
be  limited  by  these  provisions.  As  many  men  as  possible  should 
be  qualified  in  the  general  service  code  (wigwag)  and 

In  sending  and  receiving  messages  by  semaphore. 
In  delivering  short  verbal  messages. 
In  transmitting  firing  data. 

In  using  the  prescribed  battle-field  signals  (41-47, 1.  D.  11.). 
In  the  duties  of  messengers. 
132 


MUSKETRY.  133 

148.  Fifrure  39  illiislralt's  tlie  chain  of  battle-field  signals  and 
the  channels  for  the  transmission  of  commands  within  the  bat- 
talion. The  trainin;;  of  the  battalion  must  be  such  that  this 
chain  is  not  interrupted  by  casualties.  All  sifj;nals  are  reiieated 
back  to  prevent  errors. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  tlie  men  resi)onsible  lor  maintenance 
of  this  communication  do  nut  necessarily  face  continuously  in 
the  direction  indicated  ])y  the  ])oints,  as  they  are  also  chart^ed 
with  other  duties ;  but  they  do  look  in  that  direction  instantly 
at  the  sound  of  the  whistle  "Attention,"  and  at  otlii-r  times 
they  frequently  j,'lance  in  that  diri'ction. 

MESSENGERS. 

149.  The  occasion  will  be  rare  wIhmi  verbal  messages  may  be 
carriLHl  on  the  battle  field  in  the  attack.  However,  the  importance 
of  this  feature  of  a  soldier's  training  i.s  so  apparent  and  it  is  so 
closely  related  to  musketry  that  the  following  short  paragraph 
on  verbal  messages  is  included: 

VERBAL  MESSAGES. 

150.  Verbal  messages  should  alirays  be  brief,  and,  if  sent  by 
otlii'r  than  a  staff  oflicer,  be  linuted  to  the  minimum  number  of 
items.  The  messenger  should  repeat  the  message  before  starting 
and  understand  what  he  is  to  carry.  Within  the  regiment  the 
distance  over  which  messengers  will  move  will  usually  be  short. 
If  the  messages  are  brief  and  clear-cut,  like  telegrams,  there 
should  be  little  confusion. 

The  messenger  nuist  be  instructed  specifically  as  to  whom  lu> 
will  deliver  the  message,  and  whether  or  not  there  is  a  reply. 

A  verbal  message  which  is  the  subject  of  a  fatal  change  in 
sense  by  the  omission  of  one  word  should  be  avoided.  For 
example: 

"  The  support  will  not  move  north  of  Cache  Creek." 
This  message  is  subject  to  a  reversal  in  meaning  by  the  omis- 
sion of  "  not."  antl  should  read  : 

"  The  supjxirt  will  halt  south  of  Cache  Creek." 
The  verbal  message  should  include  the  address  and  the  name 
of  the  .sender,  for  example : 

"  To  Capt.  Jones, 

"  Halt  south  of  Cache  Creek. 

"  Fn>ni  Col.  Smith." 


134  MUSKETRY. 

After  delivering?  the  message,  tlie  messenger  will  ask  if  there 
is  a  reply.  Unless  otherwise  instructed,  he  will  return  to  the 
sending  authority  and  deliver  the  reply,  or  report  the  message 
delivered  and  that  there  was  no  reply. 

DUTIES  OF  MESSENGERS. 

151.  (1)  Keeps  himself  informed  as  far  as  possihle  as  to  the 
location  of  the  headquarters  of  the  units  to  which  communica- 
tion is  maintained,  both  to  the  rear  and  front. 

(2)  Studies  and  notes  the  best  routes  to  the  various  units. 

(3)  Before  starting  with  the  message,  asks  the  following  ques- 
t  ions  if  not  clear  : 

(a)   What  is  the  official  designation  of  the  person  to 

whom  I  am  to  deliver  the  message? 
(6)   Where  is  this  person? 

(c)  What  is  the  nearest  and  shortest  way  there?     Or, 

can  I  be  given  a  map  of  the  route? 

(d)  Is  there  an  answer? 

(e)  Am  I  to  report  back  as  soon  as  the  message  is  de- 

livered?   If  not,  to  whom  shall  I  report? 

(4)  Important  messages  in  writing,  unless  confidential,  should 
be  understood  by  the  bearer  so  that  they  may  Ije  delivered  ver- 
bally if  the  written  message  is  destroyed  to  prevent  the  infor- 
mation falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

(5)  Always  repeat  a  verbal  message  word  for  word  to  the 
sender  before  starting.  Be  sure  to  understand  the  meaning. 
Do  iK^t  attempt  to  merely  memorize  the  words,  but  beware  of 
false  interpretation. 

(G)   The  envelope  containing  the  message  will  bear: 

(a)  Address;  complete  location  of  addressee  not  given 
or  entirely  omitted.  The  organization  to  which 
the  addressee  belongs  should  not  be  included  in 
the  address  if  it  is  possible  to  identify  him  in 
some  other  manner,  as  "  C.  O.,  advance  guard," 
"  C.  O.,  outpost." 
(&)  The  name  of  the  messenger. 

(c)  Date  and  hour  of  departure. 

(d)  Rate  of  speed.     Do  not  use  the  terms  ordinary. 

rapid,  urgent ;  instead  tell  the  mounted  messen- 
ger either  to  walk,  to  walk  and  trot,  to  trot,  to 
trot  and  gallop,  to  gallop,  or  to  go  at  top  speed. 
Tell  the  dismounted  messenger  either  to  walk,  to 
double  time,  or  to  run. 


MUSKETRY.  136 

(c)  ir  iiKiuiited  and  Kiveii  a  written  message  to  deliver 
on  which  tlie  sju'ed  is  not  indicated,  ask  for  it. 
Tliis  constitutes  an  iniijortant  safeguard  to  tlie 
messenger.  With  verbal  messages  a  messenger 
usually  receives  instructions  as  to  speed ;  if  in 
doubt,  aslv. 

(7)  On  reaching  ilostination,  call  out  "  Message  for."  After 
inti'liigi'nl  searcli,  if  the  person  to  wlioni  the  message  is  sent 
can  not  be  found,  try  to  lind  .some  other  person  wlio  can  talce 
full  advantage  of  the  inlorniation.  Wlictlier  or  not  tliis  can  In* 
done,  always  report  back  to  the  sender  all  facts  in  tiie  case. 

(8)  Ask  if  there  is  a  reply. 

(9)  If  the  recipient  fails  to  do  so,  request  that  the  envelope 
be  initialed  or  signitl  and  the  time  and  date  be  recorded  thereon. 

(10)  If  aware  of  the  nature  of  the  message  and  you  know  of 
any  circumstances  atfecting  the  situation  which  may  have  arisen 
since  you  left  the  .sender,  rei)()rt  the  circumstances  after  <leliver- 
ing  the  message. 

(11)  Alirctj/s  repoit  back  to  the  .sender,  stating  whether  or 
not  the  message  was  delivered,  transmitting  the  answer,  if  any. 

(12)  When  a  messenger  carries  a  message  imsealed  or  not 
marked  "Confidential"  he  will  permit  connuanders  along  the 
route  to  read  same.  Each  commander  so  doing  will  initial  or 
sign  the  «'nve]oi>e  and  record  thereon  the  date  and  exact  time  he 
reads  the  message.  The  messenger  will  rcMpiest.  if  necessary, 
that  this  be  done. 

(1.S)  Written  messages  in  danger  of  falling  iiiio  tlic  iiiinds 
of  the  enemy  may  be  sent  in  code. 

EXERCISES   TO   TEACH  COMMUNICATION   AND   THE   USE   OF 
SIGNALS. 

152.  1. — Object:  To  teach  the  wigwag. 

Method:   The  wigwag  is  easily  taught  by  talcing  tli(»  letters  up 
in  groups  in  the  order  of — 
Dot  letters. 
Dash  letters. 
I>ot-(lasli  letters. 
Dash-dot  letters. 
Mixed  letters. 

153.  II. — Object:   To  teach  the  semai)hore. 


136  MUSKETRY. 

Method:   Teach  the  semaphore  in  the  following  groups  as  a 
part  of  calisthenics: 
A,  B,  C,  D,  E,  F,  and  G. 
K,  L,  M,  N.  P,  (}.  R.  and  S. 
T,  U,  Y,  signals,  letters,  J,  and  V. 
H,  I,  O,  W,  X,  and  Z. 
Opposite  letters,  A— G,  B— F,  H— Z,  I— X,  J— P,  K— V, 

O— W. 
Opposite    letters,    IM — S,    Q — Y,    T — letters,    L — signals, 

N— U. 

154.  III. — Object:  To  teach  the  men  to  deliver  short  verhal 
messages. 

Method:  Form  the  squad  in  single  rank.  The  instructor  gives 
a  simple  verbal  message  to  the  man  on  the  extreme  I'ight  (or 
left)  of  the  line  to  be  passed  down  the  line  to  tlie  man  on  the 
other  flank.  This  is  repeated  at  odd  times,  while  resting  at 
(hill,  waiting  for  assembly,  etc.,  until  the  men  become  proficient. 

155.  IV. — Object:  To  teach  the  transmission  of  firing  data 
rapidly  and  accurately  and  without  decreasing  the  rate  of  fire. 

Method:  A  squad  or  platoon  is  deployed  at  two-pace  intervals 
and  given  certain  firing  data ;  the  men  simulate  firing.  A  sec- 
ond squad  or  platoon  is  then  deployed  and  reinforces  the  first, 
the  men  taking  their  places  in  the  Intervals  between  the  men 
already  firing.  Without  changing  the  rate  of  fire  the  men 
originally  on  the  line  transmit  to  the  new  men  the  firing  data. 
Thirty  seconds  after  the  reinforcements  join  the  line  the 
original  firing  party  is  withdrawn.  Sight  setting  and  the  un- 
derstanding of  the  target  is  then  checked. 

This  exercise  may  be  varied  by  giving  certain  firing  data  to 
a  flank  man  and  direct  its  transmission  through  the  squad. 

156.  V. — Object:  To  teach  the  prescribed  signals.  (41-47, 
I.  I).  R.) 

Method:  The  squad  or  platoon  in  line.  A  signal  is  made  by 
the.  instructor  and  the  men  ai'e  called  upon  to  tell  what  it 
means.  As  progress  is  made  a  command  is  given  and  the  men 
are  told  to  make  the  signals.  This  practice  may  be  had  at 
odd  times,  while  the  men  are  resting,  waiting  for  formations,  etc. 

After  the  signals  are  learned  officers  should  conduct  all  battle 
practice,  extended  order,  etc.,  by  signals  only.  If  during  in- 
struction the  men  have  been  accustomed  to  depend  on  the  use  of 
signals  they  may  be  expected  to  respond  to  them  on  the  battle- 
field. 


MUSKETRY.  137 

Do  not  (It'viso  a  lot  of  a<lililioiial  sijriials.  Those  Kivcn  in  tlu* 
I.  D.  R.  are  ample. 

Here  it  is  well  to  note  that  the  semaphore  is  not  suitahU'  fm- 
the  sifinals  presfi-ihed  hy  paragraph  47,  I.  D.  R. 

157.  VI. — Object:  To  train  an  orj^anization  in  such  manner 
tlia.t  tlie  cliain  of  connnaiul  and  leadershij)  will  not  he  inter- 
niiitcd  liy  casualties. 

Method:  The  company  or  battalion  in  a  combat  exercise. 
Certain  leaders,  desifrnated  beforehand,  drop  out  at  irrefjuhir 
intcM'vals  a.s  the  exercise  develops  as  dead  men.  The  next  in 
rank  should  take  the  place  of  the  dead  man  and  complete  the 
exercise.  The  nien  (Iroi)ping  out  as  dead  make  no  sisjn  and  do 
not  leave  the  field  uutil  the  exercise  is  termiauted. 


CHAPTER  XL 
THE   USE  OF  COVER. 

158.  The  recruit  should  be  given  careful  instruction  in  the 
individual  use  of  cover. 

It  should  be  impressed  upon  him  that,  in  taking  advantage 
of  natural  cover,  he  must  be  able  to  fire  easily  and  effectively 
upon  the  enemy ;  if  advancing  on  an  enemy,  he  must  do  so 
steadily  and  as  rapidly  as  possible;  he  must  conceal  himself 
as  much  as  possible  while  firing  and  while  advancing.  Whii'^ 
setting  his  sight  he  should  be  under  cover  or  lying  i)rone. 

To  teach  him  to  fire  easily  and  effectively,  at  the  same  time 
concealing  hhnself  from  the  view  of  the  enemy,  he  is  practiced  in 
simulated  firing  in  the  prone,  sitting,  kneeling,  and  crouching 
positions,  from  behind  hillocks,  trees,  heaps  of  earth  or  rocks, 
from  depressions,  gullies,  ditches,  doorways,  or  windows.  He 
is  taught  to  fire  around  the  right  side  of  his  concealment  when- 
ever possible,  or,  when  this  is  not  possible,  to  rise  enough  to 
fire  over  the  top  of  his  concealment. 

When  these  details  are  understood,  he  is  required  to  select 
cover  with  reference  to  an  assumed  enemy  and  to  place  himseii 
behind  it  in  proper  position  for  firing.     (1.52,  1.53,  I.  D.  R.) 

159.  There  are  two  kinds  of  cover:  (1)  Cover  from  view 
only;  (2)  cover  that  is  bullet  proof. 

It  is  al)solutely  e.ssential  that  every  man  should  learn  whiu 
cover  is  bullet  proof,  and  how  he  can  best  get  protection  behind 
it.  It  is  certain  that  in  war  hundreds  of  lives  are  lost  through 
men  hiding  behind  small  trees,  thin  banks  of  earth,  and  simihn- 
cover. 

160.  The  following  rules  as  to  bullet-proof  cover  should  be 
impressed  upon  all  men : 

(a)  Most  kinds  of  earth,  a  rifle's  length  thick,  will  stop  bullets. 

(b)  A  tree  usually  turns  a  bullet — few  are  large  enough  to 
stop  one,  unless  squarely  hit. 

(o)   Wooden  walls  and  boards  are  scarcely  ever  thick  enough 
to  stop  bullets. 
138 


MUSKETRY.  139 

(d)  A  fence  or  wall  of  l)rkk  or  stoiiu  will  usually  stop  a  bul- 
let   Walls  and  fences,  however,  are  likely  to  be  shelled. 

The  men  should  understand  that  certain  cover  not  only  does 
not  furnish  i)r(>t«'Ction  a^'ainst  rille  tire,  hut  is  dantrerous. 

Isolati'(l  hushes  or  clumps  of  underf^rowth  which  do  not  afford 
protection  from  tire  are  dant^erous  if  occupied  in  view  of  the 
enemy,  hecause  they  offer  clearly  defined  tarj^ets,  and  the  con- 
cealment they  Rive  is  of  no  value  if  the  enemy  knows  they  are 
occupied. 

Kocks  may  also  be  dangerous  on  account  of  the  liability  of 
men  being  injured  by  fragments. 

Hedges,  banks,  and  walls  give  the  enemy  a  good  aiming  target 
and  may  obstruct  the  advance  of  troops. 

Loss  of  lire  effect  nuist  not  be  sacrificed  to  cover  from  view. 
It  is  al.so  preferable  to  lie  in  the  open  than  to  stop  behind  cover 
which  offers  a  good  target  but  which  does  not  protect  from  tire. 

The  men  must  be  taught  to  crawl,  to  tire  from  all  positions — 
behind  trees,  doorways,  and  small  folds  in  the  ground. 

161.  Crawling. —  ((Jrenadier  says:)  It  is  much  more  difficult 
to  crawl  well  Ihan  would  at  first  be  supposed. 

It  is  quite  certain  that  the  men  will  at  first  think  that  there 
is  nothing  to  be  learned  about  crawling. 

It  is  very  <lesirable  to  demonstrate  to  the  men  how  important 
good  crawling  may  be  a  comparatively  safe  means  of  covering 
ground,  when  to  run  would  be  exceedingly  dangerous. 

To  give  a  good  demonstration,  choose  a  piece  of  almost  flat 
ground,  with  a  few  slight  undulations  in  it. 

I'.efore  the  platoon  arrives,  try  to  find  a  fold  in  the  ground 
from  which  jjart  of  the  field  is  not  visible,  even  if  on&  crawled 
forward  a  few  yards. 

Choose  a  position  for  the  platoon  so  that  if  lying  down  the  men 
of  it  would  not  be  able  to  see  a  man  lying  in  this  fold  of  ground. 
There  are  few  fields  so  flat  that  it  is  not  possible  to  hide  even  a 
whole  company  somewhere  in  them,  if  the  men  lie  quite  flat. 

March  the  platoon  to  the  .selected  place.  Point  out  to  the  men 
that  the -field  appears  almost  fiat  and  that  it  would  swm  difii- 
cult  to  conceal  anyone  in  it. 

Then  make  the  jtlatoon  lie  down,  facing  the  fold  in  the  ground. 
I>etach  four  or  five  men  and  take  them  to  the  further  side  of 
the  hollow.  Let  them  advance  toward  the  platoon,  Init  as  .soon 
as  they  enter  the  fold  in  the  ground  make  them  throw  themselves 
flat,  and  let  them  crawl  forward,  keeping  as  close  to  the  ground 


140 


MUSKETRY. 


as  possible.  This  sliould  iiialu'  clear  to  the  jilatoon  the  great  pos- 
sil)ilities  in  crawliiif?. 

Now  practice  the  men  in  crawling:.  If  the  f^round  is  damp, 
men  can  practice  indoor. 

To  offer  the  least  possible  mark  when  crawling  a  man — 

(1)  Should  lie  absolutely  flat,  with  his  elbows  to  the  front, 
liis  wrists  imder  his  chin.     His  back  should  be  hollow. 

(2)  To  advance  he  should  bring  one  knee  forward,  keeping 
the  inside  of  the  knee  flat  to  the  ground  and  his  back  hollow. 
Above  everything  he  must  not  draw  this  knee  under  him. 

He  nuist  then  push  himself  forward  with  this  leg,  helping 
his  progress  with  his  elbows. 

In  good  crawling  a  man  presents  scarcely  more  of  a  target 
when  moving  than  when  stationary. 


Fig.  40. 

Most  rifle  bullets  in  war  go  too  high. 

A  line  of  men,  when  crawling,  presents  a  very  poor  target  to 
rifle  fire. 

Almost  every  bullet  will  pass  over  their  heads. 

By  night  a  company  might  well  crawl  to  within  a  few  yards 
of  the  enemy  without  suffering  any  loss.    • 

FIRING  FROM  COVER. 


162.  Firing  from  cover  is  best  taught  by  practical  illustra- 
tion. Half  of  the  squad  or  platoon  alternate  in  taking  the  firing 
positions  behind  cover.  The  men  not  taking  position  observe. 
Errors  are  corrected,  and  the  men  are  impressed  with  the  impor- 
tance of  reducing  the  size  target  they  present  to  the  enemy  and 
at  the  same  time  being  able  to  fire  effectively. 

Figure  40  illustrates  the  correct  position  firing  from  a  fold 
in  the  ground.  Note  the  excellent  position  of  the  man  behind 
the  tree. 


MUSKETRY. 


141 


In   ligiire  41   note  tlio  iiicoircct  position  of  tlie  man  on  tiie 
t'Xtrt'ine  li'ft — too  nuidi  exposure. 


Fig.  41. 


A  rislit-lninded  man  shouUl  always  tire  from  the  rij^lit  side 
of  a  tree  and  the  left  side  of  an  open  door  or  window. 


Fig.  42. 

In  lifiurc   l.'>  iioU'  ihe  incorrect  position — liring  from  left  side 
of  th(>  tree. 


142 


MUSKETRY. 
COVER  FROM  SHELL  FIRE. 


163.  It  is  explained  to  the  men  that  nioi?t  shells  fall  at  a 
steeper  angle  than  does  a  bullet  and  that  shells  either  burst  on 
I  he  ground  or  in  the  air.  Cover  from  those  that  burst  on  the 
ground  can  only  be  obtained  by  means  of  a  hole  or  trench. 
Anything  that  will  stop  a  bullet  will  stop  fragments  or  bullets 
from  a  shell  that  bursts  in  the  air. 

Houses  that  can  not  be  seen  by  the  enemy  may  furnish  pro- 
tection against  sliell  fragn)ents.  The  lower  rooms  are  the  safer, 
as  the  roof  is  ordinarily  not  of  sufficient  thickness  to  stop  any- 


FiG.  43. 

thing.  Houses  which  the  enemy  can  see  are  death  traps  and 
to  l)e  avoided.  To  obtain  cover  from  a  bullet  is  rather  easy,  as 
its  trajectory  is  fairly  flat,  like  the  rays  of  a  searchlight.  To 
escape  from  pieces  or  fragments  of  bursting  shells  is  much 
harder,  and  to  do  so  one  must  lie  very  close  to  the  cover,  as 
they  fall  almost  vertically,  like  rain. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  pack  carried  on  the  back  renders 
a  great  deal  of  protection  against  bursting  fragments  when  the 
men  are  in  the  prone  positif)n.  In  the  early  stages  of  the  pres- 
ent war  and  before  the  introduction  of  the  steel  helmet  many 
men  placed  the  small  intrenchlTig  shovel  on  the  pack  in  such 
manner  as  to  give  them,  when  in  the  prone  position  in  the  optMi. 
a  great  deal  of  protection  for  the  back  of  their  necks  and  heads. 


CHAPTER  XIL 

BATTLE-FIELD  RECONNAISSANCE  AND  THE  SELEC- 
TION OF  FIRING  POSITIONS. 

164.  For  the  purposo  of  study,  huttie-liolil  roconnaissaiu-o 
may  ho  divided  into  two  chisoly  related  parts.  I?atlle  rei-oii- 
iiaissance  furnishes  information  of  the  terrain  and  the  enemy  ; 
comhgt  reconnaissance  deals  with  the  security  of  the  conunand 
during  the  advance  and  engagement. 

165.  The  resimental  objective  is  divided  between  the  l)at- 
talion.s  on  the  firing  line. 

From  the  colonel  tli(>  major  receives  information  of  the  hostile 
position,  intervening  terrain,  the  general  situation,  proposed 
plan  of  action,  and  the  limits  of  the  battalion  objective.  By 
battle-field  reconnaissance  the  major  acquires  the  accurate 
knf)wledge  of  the  hostile  lines  and  the  intervening  terrain  essen- 
tial to  Ills  conduct  of  the  attack.  He  will  thus  guard  against 
premature  dei)loyment,  avoid  hostile  lire  while  in  dense  forma- 
tion.s,  and  attempt  to  arrive  within  elTective  range  of  the  enemy 
before  opening  tire. 

166.  All  attacks  may  be  considered  under  three  heads: 

1.  When  there  is  a  delay  in  the  face  of  the  enemy — a  few 
hours  to  several  days — permitting  thorough  exploration  of  the 
battlefield  terrain. 

2.  When  the  attack  is  immediate.  Tn  thi.*^  case  the  func- 
tions of  the  battle  reconnaissance  and  combat  patrols  may  be 
merged  in  the  same  individuals,  or  the  two  patrols  may  advance 
together. 

3.  Intinite  dcgrcM's  of  blending  of  the  above  two  situations. 
The  true  attack  connnences  after  the  advancing  firiiig  line  has 

reached  the  firing  ;^osition  nuirked  by  the  combat  patrols. 

167.  Battle  reconnaissance  explores  the  ground  to  be  trav- 
ersed by  a  imit  advancing  to  an  attack.  This  subject  covers 
tlie  nmte,  fire  positions,  targets,  and  includes  all  information 
desirable  for  a  cDnunander  to  receive  before  moving  forward 
to  an  unknown  position. 

14.3 


144  MUSKETRY. 

168.  Combat  reconnaissance  guards  the  advance  against  sur- 
prise, clears  the  way  to  the  positions  desired,  and  protects  the 
flanks. 

A  l)attle-reconnaissance  patrol  seeking  information  on  tlie 
eve  of  an  engagement  may  become,  by  its  position,  a  combat 
l)atroI  and  provide  tlie  necessary  security  to  tlie  flanlv  and  front 
during  the  ensuing  action. 

Wlien  the  major  begins  tlie  advance  upon  the  enemy,  in  pur- 
suance of  his  orders,  he  must  provide  for  the  reconnaissance 
in  liis  own  immediate  front — and  flanlcs  if  necessai-y — to  avoid 
unexpected  encounters  with  the  enemy.  This  security  is  pro- 
vided during  the  early  stages  of  the  advance  by  patrols.  Ac- 
cording to  their  instructions,  the  flank  patrols  may  become  the 
combat  patrols  of  the  fire  fight,  as  responsibility  for  the  flanks 
does  not  cease  with  the  opening  of  fire.  The  patrols  to  the 
front  advance  through  the  zone  of  artillery  fire,  press  on  to 
within  effective  range  for  musketry,  under  1,000  yards  (807, 
I.  D.  R. ),  select  and,  when  possi!)le,  occupy  and  outline  the  first 
position  of  the  firing  line.  The  strength  and  number  of  these 
patrols  is  determined  by  the  terrain.  In  open  country  oi^.e 
patrol  per  company  on  the  firing  line  might  suffice  to  precede 
the  line  of  skirmishers.  If  the  terrain  be  broken  or  covered 
with  vegetation,  several  patrols  may  be  required.  In  many 
cases  it  will  be  necessary  to  cover  the  battalion  front  with  a 
thin  skirmish  line  of  selected  men  sent  forward  to  develop  the 
hostile  lines,  select  firing  positions,  and  cover  the  advance  of 
the  firing  line.  It  may  be  necessary  to  fight  for  this  infor- 
mation. 

169.  Battle  reconnaissance  requires  training  in  map  reading, 
recognition  of  important  military  features  on  the  terrain,  and 
sketching. 

BATTLE   RECONNAISSANCE    PERSONNEL  AND    TRAINING. 

Battle  reconnaissance  is  a  part  of  the  subject  of  security  ami 
information,  but  is  strictly  limited  to  the  work  done  when  in 
the  proximity  of  the  enemy  and  possibly  in  contact  with  him. 

Except  when  necessary  to  drive  back  hostile  detachments, 
the  battle  reconnaissance  patrol  will  be  small— one,  two,  or 
seldom  more  than  three  men.  Officers  will  frequently  be  util- 
ized. These  patrols  receive  their  instructions  either  from  the 
major  or  from  the  captains  acting  under  specific  instructions 
from  the  major. 


MUSKETRY.  145 

This  duty  of  battlf  rocoimaissiince  tails  for  special  training;, 
courage,  good  judttinent.  and  initiative  on  the  part  of  the  indi- 
vidual. Proficiency  is  rc(|uir('d  in  visual  sifrnalin;;  and  in  send- 
inj;  verbal  and  written  niessaixes. 

170.  The  equipment  for  men  on  this  duty  is  that  prescribed 
for  any  patrol  leailer — compass,  musketry  rule,  watch.  ]ieiicils, 
notebook,  lield-messa^'e  blanks,  and,  when  practicable,  a  map  of 
the  count  rty. 

The  special  training  essential  to  the  piojier  jxTformance  of 
this  important  duty  includes — 

(«)  Map  readinj^  for  .sectors,  routes,  and  liriiijr  jxisitions. 

(?>)  Reconnaissance  of  the  terrain  for  routes,  sectors,  lirlng 
positions,  tarjrets,  and  reports  thereon. 

(c)   Sketchin;:. 

171.  The  area  covered  in  battle  reconnaissance  by  any  one 
patrol  will  usually  be  a  rectangle  lying  between  the  battalion 
front  and  the  section  of  the  enemy's  line  assigned  the  battalion 
as  an  objective.  The  terrain  to  be  reconnoitered  by  each  bat- 
talion will  thus  be  a  rectangle  with  a  maximum  length  of  about 
3  miles  and  a  maximum  breadth  of  500  yards.  When  the  bat- 
talion sector  is  on  a  tlank  the  territory  will  be  extended  on  that 
side  to  a  distance  not  exceeding  1,000  yards,  or  to  Include  the 
terrain  covered  by  the  combat  patrols. 

The  battalion  acting  alone  is  charged  with  the  reconnaissance 
of  its  front  and  lx)th  flanks.  But  in  this  case  much  of  the 
work  to  the  flanks  will  be  <lone  l)y  patrols  preceding  the  engage- 
ment. 

The  battle  reconnaissance  patrols  stxidy  and  report  on — 

(1)  The  best  route  to  the  firing  positions. 

(2)  Firing  positions. 

(3)  The  targets  commanded  by  the  firing  positions. 

172.  Routes. — A  route  through  the  zone  of  hostile  fire,  artil- 
lery and  ><mall  arm.s,  to  the  firing  position  within  effective  rang(> 
should  permit  approach  without  detection  by  the  enemy  and 
be  free  from  any  serious  obstacles  which  might  hinder  the  ad- 
vance. 

The  following  points  should  be  considered  in  choosing  the 
route,  all  of  which  can  be  shown  on  a  route  sketch,  using  mar- 
ginal notes: 

A.  Footuifi. — A    route    off   the    roads    where    the    gi'ound    is 
smooth  and  hard  avoids  objectionable  features  connected  with 
the  use  of  trails  and  roads. 
3529°— 17 10 


146  MUSKETRY. 

(o)  A  triiil  iiiiiy  cause  troops  to  iiinrcli  in  columns  of  twos  or 
files,  but  is  often  the  most  practicable  route. 

(h)  Road:  (1)  Avoid  roads  leading  toward  enemy.  They  are 
.<;ure  to  be  under  observation  and  fire  and  are  where  troops  are 
expected.  (2)  Hostile  artiUery  will  have  data  and  ranges  to 
reference  points  previously  located  in  anticipation  of  targets 
appearing  on  roads.  (3)  Movements  on  roads  may  disclose,  by 
dust  clouds,  position  of  columns  otherwise  hidden. 

B.  Defilade. — The  route  should  be  protected  from  hostile  ob- 
servation and  fire  by  utilizing: 

(o)   The  dead  space  behind  hills. 

(6)   Deep  creek  bottoms  and  sunken  road's. 

(e)   Woods  or  other  high  vegetation. 

C.  Exposed  zones. — A  route  should  avoid  exposed  areas  when 
possible.  If  such  areas  must  be  traversed,  routes  will  be  locate<1 
so  that  proper  formations  for  crossing  can  be  taken  prior  to 
emerging  from  the  last  cover.  Areas  where  uniforms  blend 
with  the  terrain  may  be  crossed  with  little  loss. 

D.  Areas  concealed  from  view  of  the  enemy  may  be  enfiladed 
by  hostile  fire,  providing  the  enemy  has  an  observer  in  the  air 
or  on  some  commanding  position  to  direct  the  fire.  Report  will 
therefore  be  made  of  any  aircraft  observed  and  the  location  of 
any  points  from  which  hostile  observers  may  note  an  advance 
through  the  sector. 

E.  Streams. — It  is  desirable  that  no  streams  be  crossed  that 
are  difficult  to  ford.  If  streams  must  be  crossed,  avoid,  if  pos- 
sible, established  bridges  and  fords.  Report  direction  of  flow, 
depth  and  character  of  bottom,  height  and  character  of  banks. 

F.  Obstacles. — Routes  should  avoid  any  serious  natural  or 
artificial  obstacle  to  the  advance. 

Natural  obstacles  include : 

1.  Cliffs,  diflicult  slopes,  ravines. 

2.  Bogs,  deep  water. 

3.  Cactus  or  other  impeding  vegetation. 
Artificial  obstacles : 

1.  Specially  constructed  obstacles, 

2.  Thorny  hedges. 

3.  Wire  fences. 

4.  Pits,  ditches. 

G.  The  route  should  not  bring  the  column  in  view  of  enemy 
near  a  prominent  object  that  may  serve  as  hostile  registration 
or  aiming  point. 


MUSKETRY.  147 

173.  Firing  positions. — A  knowledge  of  features  constituting 
an  ideal  liiing  position  for  attack  .ir  for  defense  is  essential 
in  battle  reconnaissance. 

The  followiiiK  constitute  the  features  to  be  sought  in  hring 
positions  and  included  in  a  verbal  or  written  report: 

A  position  luiving  all  these  advantages  will  be  found  rarely, 
if  ever.  The  one  should  be  selected  which  conforms  the  closest 
to  the  description,  remembering  that  the  pos'ition  is  chosen  for 
its  .suitability  for  use  as  a  fire  position  rather  than  for  its 
suitability  as  corn: 

174.  Finny  position^Attack  (152,  4UG,  407,  4.jU,  I.  D.  R.)  : 

1.  Clear  held  of  tire. 

2.  Within  ellective  range  of  enemy. 

3.  Length  of  front  sufficient  to  accommodate  command. 

4.  Ground  should  perniit  constant  observation  of  the  enemy 

and  yet  enable  the  men  to  secure  some  cover  when  not 
actually  tiring. 

5.  Not  marked  by  any  objects  tiie  range  to  which  may  be 

known  to  the  enemy.    Hedges,  fences,  and  sky  lines  are 
particularly  to  be  avoided. 

6.  Can  be  approached  luider  cover. 

7.  Presents  no  dilliculties  to  liuiher  advance. 

8.  Flanks  not  enfiladed. 

175.  Firing  position — Defense   (489,  I.  D.  R.)  : 
1.  Clear  tield  of  lire. 

Grenadier  says:  "A  favorable  field  of  fire  should  extend 
about  300  yards  to  the  front.  Before  this*  war  800  yards  would 
have  been  considered  ideal. 

"  The  reason  for  this  change  of  opinion  are  these :  If  on 
Monday  morning  you  had  a  tield  of  fire  of  800  yards,  the 
Germans  would  crawl  up  close  to  you  on  Monday  night  and 
entrench  tliemselves,  so  that  by  Tuesday  morning  you  would 
only  have  a  field  of  fire  of  300  yards. 

"  There  is  another  most  important  reason :  The  German  ar- 
tillery fire  from  concealed  positions,  and  their  fire  (as  they  can 
not  see  you)  is  directed  by  telephone  by  an  officer  near  their 
infantry  firing  line. 

"  If  your  field  of  fire  is  800  yards,  their  ofiicer  at  that  range 
can  see  your  trenches  and  direct  fire  upon  them.  But  if  your 
field  of  fire  is  300  yards  he  will,  to  do  this,  have  to  approach  so 
close  to  you  that  he  can  not  safely  carry  out  his  duty,  so  that 
^ou  will  suffer  less  from  artillery  fire. 


148  MUSKETRY. 

"Also,  if  your  field  of  fire  is  only  300  yards,  the  Germans  to 
attack  you  must  brinj;  their  infantry  within  this  range. 

"  It  will  be  vei-y  ditticult  for  the  German  gunners  to  fire  at 
your  trenches  for  fear  of  shots,  which  go  short,  hitting  their 
own  men.     So  choose  a  field  of  fire  from  150  to  350  yards. 

"  By  night  this  can  be  done  by  sending  out  a  nonconnnissioned 
officer  the  required  distance.  He  will  then  show  a  flash  lamp 
from  below  the  level  of  his  jacket  toward  the  trench,  and  shield 
ic  from  view  in  other  directions  as  he  would  a  match  from  the 
wind." 

2.  Length  of  front  suitable  to  size  of  command. 

3.  Flanks  secure. 

4.  Lateral  communication. 

5.  Cover  for  supports  and  reserves. 

6.  A  position  the  enemy  can  not  avoid,  but  must  attack  or 
give  up  his  mission. 

The  locations  of  firing  positions  are  determined  by  taking 
prone  observations  at  intervals  along  the  lines  under  investiga- 
tion. A  position  viewed  from  a  standing  position  may  appear 
ideal.  The  low^  command  of  the  prone  skirmisher  is  affected  by 
tall  grass,  gentle  folds  in  the  ground,  low-lying  cactus,  etc. 
Such  features  are  accentuated  only  by  the  observer  actually 
placing  himself  in  the  prone  position  and  viewing  the  hostile 
target.  The  patrol  leader  is  given  the  battalion  objective  be- 
fore starting  forward.  Positions  selected  will  be  such  that  the 
enemy  presents  as  favorable  a  target  as  possible. 

The  firing  position  selected  should  lie  within  effective  range 
of  the  enemy — 800  yards — if  possible.  The  actual  firing  posi- 
tion should  lie  along  the  military  crest  facing  the  enemy.  It 
may  be  necessary  for  the  patrol  to  halt  behind  the  crest  of  the 
ridge  and  reconnoiter  the  enemy  from  this  position,  although 
reporting  the  actual  firing  position  farther  to  the  front. 

Natural  or  cultural  features  which  offer  clearly  defined 
targets  for  the  enemy's  fire  and  afford  no  protection  from  its 
effects  are  to  be  avoided,  especially  if  they  must  be  occupied  in 
view  of  the  enemy. 

176.  Reconnaissance  at  night. — The  terrain  to  be  covered  dur- 
ing a  night  operation  should  be  reconnoitered  both  by  day  and 
in  the  darkness  by  trained  men,  who  will  act  as  guides  during 
the  movement. 

Battle  reconnaissance  covers  the  exploration  of  the  battalion 
sector  for  certain  military  features  after  the  advance  against 
the  enemy  has  been  ordered  by  tlie  higher  commander. 


MUSKETRY.  149 

Reconnoitering  at  night  may  be  closely  relatefl  to  battle  re- 
connaissance. An  attack  at  daybreak  must  he  carefully  plmnned 
beforehand.  The  terrain  must  bo  thoroughly  patrolled,  and  the 
different  units,  including  the  battalions,  assigned  their  areas, 
and  each  will  move  forward  through  at  least  a  portion  of  the 
battalion  sector  in  separate  colunms. 

The  orders  for  an  attack  at  daylight  will  not  be  published 
generally  until  the  actual  movement  forward  is  Inaugurated. 
The  majors,  under  their  confidential  orders,  however,  will  send 
forward  patrols  specially  trained  in  battle  recoimaissance  to 
study  the  terrain  within  the  battalion  sector  with  special  refer- 
ence to  the  night  advance.  These  patrols  are  instructed  regard- 
ing the  secrecy  of  their  movements.  An  attack  delivercnl  at  day- 
break necessitates  an  advance  during  what  are  often  the  dark- 
est huurf;  of  the  night,  with  the  possibility  of  Its  interruption 
by  a  counter  attack  at  any  time. 

The  first  and  most  ini/iortant  step  in  the  preparation  of  any 
night  operation  consists  in  obtaining  accurate  information  con- 
cerning the  ground  to  be  traversed  and  the  pctsition  of  the 
enemy.  This  necessitates  as  close  a  reconnaissance  as  is 
possible,  and  the  reconnaissance  should  be  made  by  night  as 
well  as  by  day.  Ground  presents  such  a  different  appearance 
at  night  that  it  is  often  dillicult  to  identify  a  spot  which  has 
been  seen  previously  in  daylight.  Small  incidents  of  the  sur- 
face which  may  not  attract  attention  in  daytime  are  some- 
times sulRcient  to  throw  troops  into  disorder  if  encountered 
luiexpectedly  in  the  dark. 

Every  possible  precaution  must  be  taken  to  prevent  an  acci- 
dental collision  between  any  two  columns  either  before  or 
after  reaching  their  objectives.  Bloody  encounters  between 
friendly  forces  meeting  unexpectedly  in  the  dark  are  not  infre- 
quent in  history. 

177.  Night  advances  vill  be  preceded  and  guided  by  selected 
men  who  have  reconnoitered  the  ground  both  by  day  and  at 
night.  These  "  guides "  will  precede  the  colunm  at  distances 
varying  from  50  to  100  yards,  according  to  the  light,  contact 
being  maintained  by  means  of  connecting  files. 

This  duty  of  guiding  columns  at  night  will  naturally  de- 
volve upon  Ihe  selectnl  ofTicers  and  men  trained  in  the  impor- 
tant duty  of  battle  reconnaissance. 

The  battle  sector  of  a  battalion  is  never  of  extensive  breadth, 
and  must  be  reconnoitered  in  the  dark  as  well  as  by  day. 
Whenever  possible  the  day  reconnaissance  should  precede  the 


160  MUSKETRY. 

night.  The  guide  sliouUl  be  faiuilijir  with  the  identity  of  the 
north  star  and  carry  a  compass  with  a  luminous  face. 

Tlio  aliility  lo  move  freely  and  with  confidence  through  the 
dark  is  easily  cultivated.  With  training  men  develop  a  keen 
sense  of  direction,  and  the  more  adventurous  a  liking  for  the 
work.  With  the  development  of  modern  firearms,  especially 
artillery  and  machine  guns,  night  advances  if  not  night  attacks 
may  have  great  influence  in  the  attainment  of  victory. 

The  officers  and  men  who  show  the  requisite  qualities  for 
battle  reconnaissance,  as  well  as  other  phases  of  the  subject  of 
security  and  information,  shoiild  not  fail  to  develop  the  ability 
to  explore  country  at  night.  Such  men  are  invaluable  in  guiding 
night  advances. 

178.  The  reports  by  a  battle  reconnaissance  patrol  will  cover 
the  routes,  firing  positions,  targets,  and  all  other  military  infor- 
mation of  value  to  the  commander  of  the  firing  line. 

The  reports  made  by  a  leader  of  a  battle  reconnaissance  patrol 
will  be  in  the  form  of  visual  messages ;  brief  messages,  w^ritten 
and  verbal ;  sketches  sent  back  by  a  member  of  his  patrol ;  and 
a  verbal  or  written  report  illustrated  by  route  and  landscape 
sketches. 

When  these  patrols  take  the  form  of  skirmishers  at  extended 
intervals,  covering  the  advance  of  the  firing  line  at  a  distance 
of  from  100  to  1,000  yards,  the  inform'Otion  will  be  transmitted 
largely  by  risyal  signals.  Brief  messages  of  fact  can  be  trans- 
mitted quickly  by  signals.  For  example,  the  presence  of  small 
hdstile  patrols,  which  are  being  driven  back,  may  be  indicated 
by  holding  the  rifle  over  the  head  horizontally.  (29.  F.  S.  R.) 
This  signal  would  explain  any  scattere<^l  firing.  The  final  report, 
verbal  or  written,  will  detail  the  military  features  of  the  sector, 
covering  the  route,  fire  positions,  targets,  and  ranges. 

The  patrol  leader  must  understand  clearly  his  mission.  He 
must  know  what  to  look  for,  be  able  to  describe  intelligently 
what  is  seen,  to  locate  what  is  seen  with  reference  to  features 
on  the  terrain,  the  time  and  place  to  make  his  report.  In  other 
words,  where  to  go,  itifiat  to  look  for,  limr  to  describe,  wlien  to 
report,  and  to  iclinm  to  report. 

The  power  of  accurate  observation  is  the  result  of  training. 
Due  largely  to  differences  in  their  boyhood  environment,  this 
power  varies  greatly  among  recruits.  A  man  raised  in  thinly 
settled  country  will  naturally  give  close  and  careful  attention 
to  the  entire  landscape.     Given  judgment,  keen  eyesight,  pres- 


MUSKETRY.  161 

ence  of  mind  and  courage,  t^uch  a  man  only  requires  instruction 
in  the  military  matters  to  make  an  excellent  patrol  leader. 

The  tueasagcfi  and  rvportft  miifit  he  elear,  emicixe,  and  acettrate. 
The  ability  to  paint  a  clear  and  accurate  word  picture  of  a  sec- 
tion of  co»iiitry  is,  however,  beyond  the  jwwcr  of  most  men.  It 
is  no  less  dillicuit  for  the  person  receiving:  the  report  to  form  a 
mental  picture  of  the  country  described. 

Kesort  is  had,  tlierelore,  to  slcctclta  to  illustrate  and  supple- 
ment the  report.  A  rouuh  sketch  with  all  distances  estimated 
will  usually  convey  more  real  information  of  military  value  than 
many  words. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 
FIRE  TACTICS. 

179.  The  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  paragraphs  351,  354,  400, 
and  401,  says  in  part : 

"  Modern  combat  demands  the  highest  order  of  training,  dis- 
cipline, leadership,  and  morale  on  the  part  of  the  infantry." 

"  The  infantry  must  have  the  tenacity  to  hold  every  advantage 
gained,  the  individual  and  collective  discipline  and  sliill  needed 
to  master  the  enemy's  fire,  the  determination  to  close  with  the 
enemy  in  attack,  and  to  meet  him  with  the  bayonet  in  de- 
fense. *  *  *  Good  infantry  can  defeat  an  enemy  greatly 
superior  in  numbers,  but  lacking  in  training,  discipline,  leader- 
ship, and  morale." 

"  In  a  decisive  battle  success  depends  on  gaining  and  main- 
taining fire  superiority.  Every  effort  must  be  made  to  gain  it 
early  and  then  to  keep  it. 

"  Attacking  troops  nuist  first  gain  fire  superiority  in  order  to 
reach  the  hostile  position.  Over  open  ground  attack  is  possible 
only  when  the  attacking  force  has  a  decided  fire  superiority. 
With  such  superiority  the  attack  is  not  only  possible,  but  suc- 
cess is  probable  and  without  ruinous  losses. 

"  Defending  troops  can  prevent  a  charge  only  when  they  can 
master  the  enemy's  fire  and  inflict  heavy  losses  upon  him." 

"  To  obtain  fire  superiority  it  is  necessary  to  produce  a  heavy 
volume  of  accurate  fire.  Every  increase  in  the  effectiveness  of 
the  fire  means  a  corresponding  decrease  in  the  effectiveness  of 
the  enemy's  fire." 

180.  Fire  superiority  means  the  attainment  and  continuance, 
l)y  troops  better  trained,  better  controlled,  and  with  a  higher 
morale  than  the  enemy,  of  such  an  effective  fire  over  the  enemy's 
lines  as  to  shake  his  morale,  causing  him  to  aim  imperfectly,  if 
at  all,  and  thereby  destroy  the  effectiveness  of  his  fire. 

The  gaining  of  fire  superiority  is  dependent,  among  other 
things,  upon  : 

(1)  The  troop  leading   (par.  181). 

(2)  The  choice  of  target  (par.  190). 

(3)  The  distribution  of  fire  (Chap.  VIII). 

(4)  The  density  of  firing  lines  (par.  192). 

(5)  The  determination  of  the  range  (Chap.  VII). 

(6)  The  time  of  opening  fire  (par.  196). 
152 


MUSKETRY.  158 

(7)  The  kind  of  fire   (par.  198). 

(8)  The  rate  and  volume  of  fire  (par.  207). 

(9)  The  distance  between  echelons  (par.  217). 

(10)  The  service  of  observation  of  the  eiieiny  and  of  Ihc 
effect  of  fire  (par.  220). 

(11)  The  aniniunition  .supplifs  ((Miap.  XIV). 

TROOP   LEADING. 

181.  Troop  leading  is  the  technique  of  command. — The  art  of 
leadership  con.sisls  in  apiilyinu  sduiid  tactical  principles  to  con- 
crete ca.ses  on  the  battlefield. 

"  Self-reliance,  initiative,  aggressiveness,  and  a  conception  of 
teamwork  are  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  successful 
leadership."      (,3.")8,  I.   D.  II.) 

Military  education,  through  the  performance  of  actual  duties, 
is  not  sullicient  to  acfjuire  a  mastery  of  this  sui)ject.  Theory 
nuist  be  combined  with  practice,  and  much  of  what  is  necessary 
to  learn  is  conuuon  to  the  entire  graduation  of  conmianders,  al- 
though the  viewpoint  is  different  from  every  round  of  the  ladder. 

To  be  a  succe.ssful  troop  leader  implies  a  thorough  under- 
standing of  men,  ta^tk^iil  jDiincli^s  jukI  their  application,  and 
the  requ^isTte^  abijity  to  i.ssue  orders  to  meet  given  situations  as 
they  may  ari.se. 

A  knowledge  of  the  psychological  elTect,  of  the  effect  that 
different  orders  luider  diilerent  conditions  will  produce  upon 
the  mind  of  the  individual  man,  is  of  vital  importance  to  the 
troop  leader.  Maude  gives  the  attitude  of  the  instructor  in 
peace  as  follows : 

"  I  tell  you  this  now  in  peace,  because  there  is  time  and  I  am 
teaching;  in  war  there  is  no  time.  I  receive  orders  and  obey 
them  unquestionaldy,  because  I  have  confidence  in  my  chief 
and  know  that  he  has  cards  in  his  hands  which  I  have  not  seen, 
and  in  turn  you  must  then  obey  me  until  I  fall  and  there  is  no 
one  left  to  give  you  further  instructions ;  then  you  must  act 
for  yourself,  each  according  to  Ins  laiiU,  in  liaiiiiony  with  the 
general  principles  of  the  whole  army." 

182.  Correct  orders  are  possible  only  after  an  estimate  of  the 
situation  has  been  made  and  a  definite  decision  reached,  (leu. 
Morrison  says : 

"The  objection  raised  to  the  process  or  method  of  estimating 
the  situatiou  that  it  is  too  loug  except  iu  map  problems  and  that 


154  MUSKETRY. 

in  actual  practice  one  must  act  luoro  promptly  is  not  well  takeu. 
It  miglit  be  if  it  were  contemplated  to  write  the  estimate  all 
out,  l)ut  this  is  not  the  case.  The  mind  works  rapidly  in  ac- 
customed channels.  The  child  beginnins  the  study  of  arithmetic 
is  very  slow  in  determining  the  sum  of  7,  8,  and  9,  but  later 
the  answer  is  announced  almost  at  sight.  The  same  is  true  of 
tactical  problems ;  it  may  be  a  slow  process  at  first,  but  with 
a  little  practice  the  decision  is  reached  very  quickly,  is  likely 
to  be  correct,  and  to  be  the  one  you  will  not  want  to  change 
every  few  minutes.  An  accountant  who  guesses  at  the  sum  of 
a  column  of  figures,  instead  of  correctly  adding  them,  would 
not  be  liable  to  make  more  errors  than  would  a  commander  who 
failed  to  properly  estimate  the  situation." 

Material  differences  manifest  themselves  between  the  actions 
of  small  bodies  acting  independently  and  bodies  in  larger 
commands. 

In  all  problems  it  is  necessary  to  come  to  a  clear  and  correct 
decision,  do  it  promptly,  and  execute  it  vigorously.  The  deci- 
sion is  followed  by  the  order. 

183.  The  arrangement  of  the  order,  or  sequence  of  its  details, 
should  follow  some  logical  system. 

The  sequence  of  details  given  in  the  Field  Service  Regulations 
for  tactical  orders  and  that  for  fire  orders  herein  (par.  255) 
follow  such  a  logical  system.  These  systems  should  not,  as  a 
rule,  be  departed  from.  In  other  words,  a  commander  should  be 
so  in  the  habit  of  following  this  definite  plan  in  the  issuance 
of  ordei's  that  he  will  be  absolutely  certain  he  is  not  omitti'ig 
an  important  detail  when  acting  under  the  mental  strain  inci- 
dent to  combat.  It  should  be  unnecessary  to  state  that  points 
which  have  no  application  to  a  particular  situation  are  simply 
left  out.  The  troop  leader  must  have  the  quick  military  per- 
ception which  enables  him  to  give  the  necessary  order  to  meet 
the  particular  situation  which  confronts  him. 

To  instruct  yrm  must  explain. 

The  division  commander  explains  his  views  to  his  brigadiers, 
allotting  to  each  his  part  in  the  general  scheme  of  operations ; 
the  brigadiers,  in  turn,  explain  and  distribute  the  work  to  their 
colonels,  and  so  on  down  to  the  corporal  and  his  squad,  and  in 
peace  this  is  all  possible. 

In  war  it  may  be  possible  to  go  into  this  detail  and  it  may  not. 

The  officer  who  issues  orders  must  weigh  the  time  factor 
against  all  other  circumstances  surrounding  the  particular 
situation,  and  do  it  instantly. 


MUSKETRY.  185 

A  troop  leader,  in  dealing:  with  this  time  factor,  must  not 
only  consider  the  necessity  for  rapidity  of  action  to  pain  the 
initiative  over  the  enemy  but  must  also  consider  the  actual  time 
necessary  for  the  issuance  of  correct  orders.  If  he  estimates 
that  he  has  10  minutes  within  which  to  issue  his  orders  he  must 
remember  that  his  subordinate  leaders  are  entitled  to  their  pro- 
liortional  share  of  this  time.  He  luust  not  take  eipht  minutes 
of  the  time  and  allow  subordinates  only  two.  It  takes  time  to 
digest  the  order,  to  formulate  and  issue  it  to  subordinates  and 
for  the  subordinates,  in  turn,  to  comprehend  and  act  upon  it. 

184.  The  order,  written  or  verbal,  must  be  as  short  and  to  the 
point  as  clearness  will  permit.  Brevity  must  not,  however,  be 
.secured  at  the  expense  of  lucidity.  The  order  of  the  leader  of 
an  advance  jiarty  mi};ht,  for  instance,  in  a  meeting  engagement 
be  simply  "As  skirmishers,  guide  right  (left).  'March';  Battle 
sight,  '  Fire  at  will.'  "  while  that  of  a  cajitain  whose  C(imi>auy 
is  part  of  a  larger  force  in  a  general  attack  against  a  prei)ared 
position  might  go  into  great  detail.  One  mu.st  not  forget  that 
time,  when  available,  spent  in  explanation  is  not  lost.  The  rule 
should  be  to  give  all  the  information  necessary  to  enable  each 
and  every  one  to  play  his  part  in  the  general  scheme. 

The  order  must  above  all  things  be  clear,  concise,  and  defi- 
nite. There  should  be  no  possibility  of  a  misunderstanding. 
Von  Verdy  says : 

"  The  criterion  of  a  good  order  will  always  be  simplicity  and 
clearness ;  if  one  word  is  stricken  out  of  any  good  order  it  will 
become  unintelligible;  and  any  word  that  can  be  stricken  out 
and  .still  leave  the  order  intelligible  is  superfluous  and  conse- 
quently harmful." 

Most  important  of  all  in  an  order  is  that  it  be  easily  nndei- 
stood ;  the  clearer  it  is  the  more  remote  is  the  possibility  of  a 
misunderstanding. 

It  is  not  an  easy  matter  to  issue  a  good  order.  It  is  an  art 
that  must  be  acquired  and  practiced. 

The  amount  of  detail  given  in  an  order  depends  upon  the 
situation  and  the  rank  and  training  of  the  recipient. 

185.  Tasks  must  be  definitely  assigned.  The  comparatively 
wide  fronts  of  deployed  units  increase  the  difliculties  of  control. 
A  comjiany  commander  with  his  company  deployed  on  a  front 
of  128  yards  can  not  hope  to  exercise  any  control  except  through 
his  platoon  commanders  and  subordinates.  Subordinjites  must 
therefore  be  given  great  latitude  in  tlie  execution  of  their  tasks. 


166  MUSKETRY. 

The  success  of  the  whole  depends  upon  how  well  each  subordi- 
nate coordinates  his  work  with  the  general  plan.     (371,  I.  D.  R.) 

186.  The  latitude  alloived  officers  is  in  direct  proportion  to  the 
size  of  their  commands.  Each  should  see  to  the  general  execu- 
tion of  his  task,  leaving  to  the  proper  subordinates  the  super- 
vision of  details  and  interfering  only  when  mistakes  are  made 
that  threaten  to  seriously  prejudice  the  general  plan.  (370, 
I.  D.  R.) 

At  peace  maneuvers  the  majors  are  everywhere,  and  the  cap- 
tains do  the  work  of  all  platoon  commanders.  It  is  said,  in 
justifying  this  action,  that  it  is  necessax'y  for  instruction  and  will 
be  corrected  by  the  first  bullet.  All  should  kn(»\v  that  this  is 
not  true.  As  a  man  acts  in  peace  so  will  he  also  act  in  war. 
Habit  can  not  be  changed  by  one  bullet. 

"  When  issuing  orders  a  connnander  should  indicate  clearly 
what  is  to  be  done  by  each  subordinate  but  not  how  it  is  to  be 
done.  He  shoud  not  encroach  upon  the  functions  of  a  subordi- 
nate by  prescribing  details  of  execution  unless  he  has  good  rea- 
son to  doubt  the  ability  or  judgment  of  the  subordinate  and 
can  not  substitute  others."     (382,  I.  D.  R.) 

If  clear  and  concise  instructions  are  given  as  to  the  action  to 
be  taken  in  the  combat  by  each  part  of  the  command,  tasks, 
fronts,  or  sectors  being  assigned  in  accordance  with  a  definite, 
simple  plan,  conveying  definite  ideas  and  leaving  no  loophole,  the 
conduct  of  the  subordinates  will  generally  be  correspondingly 
satisfactory. 

187.  Subordinate  leaders,  up  to  and  including  company  com- 
manders, are  mainly  occupied  with  fire  control  and  fire  direc- 
tion, and  should  influence  their  men  by  their  personal  example ; 
superior  commanders  have  other  tasks  which  they  must  not 
neglect  for  the  purpose  of  interfering  in  the  spheres  of  action 
of  their  subordinates.  During  the  action  the  superior  com- 
mander can  influence  its  course  only  by  employing  his  reserves. 

The  difficulties  of  troop  leading  increase  as  the  power  of  the 
commander  to  control  and  direct  all  ranks  in  action  by  word  of 
command  decreases. 

Those  means  must  be  adopted  in  action  that  will  facilitate 
the  transmission  of  orders.  This  requires,  first  of  all,  the 
choice  of  an  appropriate  position  for  the  leader.  The  begin- 
ning of  an  action  should  find  him  as  far  forward  as  possible ; 
(luring  the  advance  to  the  battle  field  with  the  advance  guard, 
for  neither  messages  nor  a  map  can  adequately  take  the  place 


MUSKETRY,  167 

of  ii  personal  view  of  the  t'lieiny.  of  neiKhhoring  units,  and  of 
the  jrround.  So  phiced  he  can  best  direct  the  tirst  deployment 
upon  which  the  future  course  of  the  action  so  largely  depends, 
secure  advantaj,'es  by  niaiciuf?  prompt  decisions  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy,  save  his  troops  from  making  detours,  handle  them  in 
accordance  with  a  definite  plan,  and  preclude  arbitrary  action 
on  the  part  of  the  commander  of  the  leading  unit. 

The  post  of  the  comnuuider  in  action  must  l)e  such  as  will 
enal)le  him  to  observe  the  progress  of  events  and  to  connnunicate 
Ills  orders.  After  having  announced  where  he  will  be  during  the 
action,  he  should  not  quit  that  place  irithout  Iraviun  some  one 
tlicrr  to  direct  iiicssenf/ers  and  others  tvhere  to  find  him. 

188.  A  commander  takes  full  and  direct  charge  of  his  firing 
line  only  when  that  line  has  absorbed  his  whole  comnumd. 

"  Full  and  direct  charge  "  is  not  to  be  construed  that  a  major, 
when  he  sends  in  his  last  company,  moves  up  close  to  the  firing 
line  and  takes  over  the  duties  of  the  captains,  determining 
the  sizes  of  the  elements  to  rush,  how  they  will  rush,  etc.  But 
it  does  mean  that  a  major's  duties  have  changed  somewhat. 
Hefore  the  last  company  went  into  the  line  the  mnj(tr's  posi- 
tion was  back  where  he  could  observe  the  firing  line  and  at  the 
same  time  control  the  movement  of  the  support  and  regulate 
the  ammunition  supply.  After  the  last  company  is  engaged  he 
has  no  support  to  look  after,  and  he  moves  up  where  he  can 
insure  the  coordination  and  cooperation  of  his  companies.  At 
the  same  time  he  nnist  be  back  far  enough  so  that  he  can 
attend  to  his  still  important  duties  of  regulating  the  ammuni- 
tion supply  and  of  directing  any  supports  sent  him  from  the 
reserve.  He  does  not  disturb  the  existing  machinery  of  com- 
mand, but  does  lend  to  the  firing  line  the  effect  of  his  personal 
presence  near  the  line  and  leads  the  charge  of  his  battalion. 

When  the  last  element  of  the  regiment  goes  into  the  line,  the 
colop.el  moves  up  in  tlie  same  way.  as  does  the  brigade  comman- 
der with  the  last  fraction  of  his  brigade. 

Certain  qualities  are  necessary  in  the  troops  themselves  before 
it  is  possible  to  lead  them  to  victory.  Assuming  that  they  have 
been  trainetl  in  the  mechanics  of  their  profession,  there  must  hi' 
added  the  development  of  a  true  soldier  .spirit,  of  character,  of 
loyalty  to  themselves,  their  comrades,  and  their  superiors. 

LoyaJtii  is  part  of  the  soldier's  creed  and  needs  no  discission. 

189.  Initiative  in  a  junior  officer  or  noncommissioned  officer 
is  the  adoption  of  the  proper  methods  to  carry  out  orders  given 
him,  or  the  acting  in  a  manner  different  from  that  ordered  when 


168  MUSKETRY. 

it  is  found  that  clue  to  conditions  whicli  were  not  considered 
wlien  tlie  original  order  was  issued  sucli  action  becomes  neces- 
sary. 

Manifestly  to  use  initiative  an  officer  and  noncommissioned 
oflicor  must  l)o  trained.  No  one  would  or  could  expect  an  officer, 
untrained  in  his  profession,  to  act  independently  and  still  have 
his  action  fit  in  with  the  general  plan  except  by  accident,  and 
accidents  of  this  kind  are  too  rare,  even  improbable,  for  a  com- 
mander to  consider  in  forming  his  plans. 

To  the  company  officer  and  nonconnnissioned  officer  initiative 
in  the  fire  fight  means  the  correct  utilization  of  the  means  In 
his  hands,  men  and  rifles,  to  increase  the  probability  of  the  force 
to  which  he  belongs  gaiinng  fire  superiority  and  the  resultant  vic- 
tory. His  action  must  be  such  that  it  fits  in  with  the  general 
plan. 

THE   CHOICE  OF  TARGET. 

190.  The  target  chosen  should  be  the  hostile  troops  most  dan- 
gerous to  the  firers.  These  will  usually  be  the  nearest  hostile 
infantry.  When  no  target  is  especially  dangerous,  that  one 
should  be  chosen  which  promises  the  most  hits. 

Frequent  changes  of  target  impair  the  fire  effect.  Unimpor- 
tant targets  impair  fire  discipline  and  accomplish  nothing.  At- 
tention should  be  confined  to  the  main  target  until  substantial 
reason  for  change  is  apparent. 

An  opportunity  for  delivering  flanking  fire,  especially  against 
artillery  protected  in  front  by  shields,  is  an  example  warranting 
change  of  target,  and  should  never  be  overlooked.  Such  fire 
demoralizes  the  troops  subjected  to  it.  even  if  the  losses  inflicted 
are  small.  In  this  manner  a  relatively  small  number  of  rifles 
can  produce  Important  results.     (408-410,  I.  D.  R.) 

Each  unit  in  the  attack  is  assigned  a  definite  frontage  or  ob- 
jective. (Chap.  VIII.)  On  the  defensive  it  is  given  a  specified 
sector  to  cover  with  its  fire.  The  unit  is  responsible  that  the 
enemy  does  not  advance  in  that  sector.  The  hostile  troops  most 
dangerous  to  the  firers  are  those  making  the  most  progress  In 
that  sector. 

As  the  combat  develops  it  generally  resolves  itself  into  a  line 
of  separate  fights,  and  small  groups  of  the  enemy  under  natural 
leaders  work  their  way  forward  at  different  points  of  the  line 
and  become  the  rallying  points  upon  which  a  strong  line  is 
built  by  the  attackers.  It  is  the  sum  of  the  efforts  of  these 
groups  that  make  up  the  final  strength  in  the  assault,  hence 
their  initial  efforts  must  be  checked  at  once. 


MUSKETRY.  159 

Individuals  must  be  trained  not  to  fire  outside  the  assigned 
sector  without  orders. 

If  tlie  tire  <»f  an  organization  is  diverted  to  anotiier  sector,  it 
should  l)e  sliilted  l)ael\  to  its  own  sector  as  soon  a.s  possil)le  after 
the  appearance  of  a  target  tlierein. 

It  i.s  to  be  renienii)ered  that  tiie  men  will,  as  a  rule,  tire  only 
on  that  part  of  the  enemy  nearest  tiieui,  as  this  will  appear  to 
tiiein  to  be  the  source  of  greatest  danger. 

Large  and  vulnerable  targets,  that  olTer  gi'eat  returns  for  the 
expenditure  of  ammuiution,  should  not  be  neglected.  At  the 
same  time  tire  superiority  over  the  entire  line  mu.st  be  main- 
tained. 

Troops  deployed  and  under  tire  can  not  change  front ;  in  case 
a  false  deployment  has  been  made,  other  troops  should  be  sent 
forward  in  the  correct  dirtn-tion  and  the  men  already  deployed 
pulled  out  and  re-formed. 

The  correct  way  to  meet  an  enfilade  fire  is  with  fresh  troops. 

In  a  meeting  engagement,  troops  as  they  come  successively  on 
or  into  the  line  of  battle  take  as  their  part  of  the  target  the 
enemy  directly  in  front  of  them. 

EXERCISES. 

191.  I. — Object:  To  train  the  men  not  to  .shift  their  fire  to 
unauthorized  targets,  but  to  continue  firing  in  the  assigned  sector 
and  at  the  designated  objective  until  ordered  to  change. 

Method:  The  squad  or  platoon  on  the  defensive  as  part  of  a 
general  line  watching  a  designated  .sector.  Troops  to  the  right 
and  left,  assumed  or  represented.  The  enemy  represented  by 
two  details,  each  detail  to  consist  of  from  four  to  six  men  con- 
cealed in  the  foreground. 

One  of  the  details  representing  the  enemy  at  a  signal  appears 
in  the  designated  sector  at  a  range  of  about  600  yards.  The 
defense  opens  tire  (sinuiiated  tiring).  In  a  few  seconds  later 
the  second  detail  appears  at  a  signal  at  a  much  closer  range, 
Init  outside  the  assigned  sector.  Some  of  the  men  will  inva- 
riably shift  their  tire  to  the  second  target. 

The  exercise  is  made  more  realistic  if  the  instructor  will  give 
the  men  a  short  talk  before  the  exercise  is  started  on  the  choice 
of  targets,  and  mention,  as  an  incidental  point,  that  the  men 
should  not  shift  their  fire  to  unauthorized  targets  without  or- 
ders. Then  quietly  advise  one  or  two  men  what  is  to  happen, 
and  that  when  the  second  target  appears  they  are  to  call  out, 
"There  they  are;  look  out,  etc." 


160  MUSKETRY. 

THE   DENSITY   OF  THE   FIRING   LINE. 

192.  Based  upon  the  estimate  of  the  situation,  a  commander 
must  decide  the  number  of  men  that  he  is  to  put  in  the  firing 
line. 

This  decision  determines  the  amount  of  fire  tliat  he  will 
direct  uikhi  the  enemy. 

Manifestly,  50  men  on  a  front  of  100  yards  can  not  develop 
as  heavy  a  fire  as  can  100  men  on  the  same  front. 

Extending  the  skirmisliers  to  wide  intervals  keeps  lo.sses  at  a 
minimum,  but  such  a  line  can  not  cau.se  the  enemy  as  much 
loss  as  can  a  heavy  line. 

Two  conflicting  elements  here  enter : 

(1)  The  desire  to  avoid  losses  l)y  the  use  of  a  firing  line  with 
the  men  at  wide  intervals. 

(2)  The  desire  to  attain  the  gi'eatest  fire  effect  by  putting  the 
largest  possible  number  of  rifles  in  the  firing  line. 

One  hundred  men  on  a  200-yard  front  can  obtain  the  same 
fire  effect  on  a  given  target  as  can  the  same  number  of  men 
on  half  that  front.  But  in  battles  there  must  be  taken  into 
consideration  the  question  of  fire  effect  per  yard  of  front  and 
the  space  necessary  for  deployment  of  other  troops.  In  very 
small  combats,  patrols,  and  outposts,  a  line  deployed  at  wide 
intervals  is  possible  and  at  times  may  be  preferable.  The 
difficulty  in  controlling  a  line  of  this  kind  must  always  be  taken 
into  consideration.  In  large  engagements  tactical  considerations 
and  the  lack  of  room  usually  demand  a  thick  line. 

Increasing  the  number  of  rifles  in  the  firing  line  increases  in 
direct  proportion  the  vulnerable  area  of  the  line,  but  the  per- 
centage of  losses  will  be  lower  in  the  thicker  line.  For  instance, 
doubling  the  number  of  men  in  the  line  does  not  double  the 
number  of  men  hit,  because  the  volume  of  fire  on  the  enemy'.^ 
line  is  double  that  possible  with  the  weak  line;  consequently 
the  accuracy  of  the  enemy's  fire  is  reduced. 

The  subject  of  the  proper  density  of  the  firing  line,  while 
really  pertaining  to  the  study  of  maneuver  tactics,  is  such  as 
to  justify  an  inquiry  here  into  those  conditions  which  must  be 
considered  before  determining  in  a  given  case  the  density  of 
the  attacking  lines.  Each  must,  of  course,  be  decided  on  its 
merits.  All  movements  on  the  battle  field  have  but  one  end 
in  view — the  development  of  the  fire  in  a  greater  volume  and 
more  effectively  directed  than  that  of  the  opposing  force — 
and,    although    the   bayonet   plays    an    important   part,    it    is 


MUSKETRY. 


161 


superiority   of  firo  tlmt  (Iccidcs   tlir  contlict  by   permitting  an 
advance  to  wliere  tlie  bayonet  may  be  used. 

Tacticians  approacli  tliis  subject  from  eitlier  one  or  tbe 
other  of  two  quite  different  viewpoints.  In  one  case,  and  un- 
fortunately in  tbe  too  connnon  case,  the  mental  attitude  is 
"  How  best  can  I  reduce  the  loss  of  life?"  while  the  other  and 
correct  attitude  is  "  IIow  can  I  iiicrcaso  the  elTect  of  my  fire?" 
Both  (luestions  must  be  answered  before  a  satisfactory  solution 
can  be  reached,  hut  since  they  lead  to  opposing  replies  one 
must  dominate  and  the  other  assume  a  secondary  i)Iace.  The 
first  gets  nowhere  and  can  not  lead  to  a  success  of  any  mag- 


PUtOON  eoUUMS  CKICXIItKMI^  rOMUTtOX. 


«  1^ 

11 

1 

i 

i 

* 

&    A 

» 3ev<to_ 

--. 

1    —     -- 

«4Vda.    _ 

. 

1 

Fir,.  44. 


:i  :: 

-Platoon   columns,  rhcckprlioard   formation. 


nitud(>;  the  second  attains  results.  In  the  first  the  oflicer 
attempts  to  regulate  the  effect  of  the  hostile  fire,  and  in  the 
second  he  seeks  to  control  the  effect  of  his  own  fire. 

If  small  losses  are  to  be  the  guiding  principle,  it  is  best  that 
the  army  stay  at  home  and  suffer  no  losses  jit  all. 

193.  The  infantry  advancing  to  the  attack  from  the  point 
where  it  first  comes  under  artillery  fire  to  its  first  firing  posi- 
tion is  concerned  with  only  one  question.  "To  reach  that 
firing  po.sition  with  a  inininunu  loss  of  life."  This  is  true  not 
only  from  humanitarian  motives,  but  also  because  the  point 
3529°— 17 11 


162 


MUSKETRY. 


where  the  rifle  fire  must  l^egiii  is  larjrely  dependent  upon  the 
losses  sustained.  The  fewer  the  losses  the  farther  forward  the 
lino  fan  advance  without  firinc,  and  the  farther  it  advances 
without  firing  the  surer  is  fire  supremacy  gained  when  the  line 
does  begin  tlie  fire.  Hence  under  artillery  fire  only  the  infantry 
may  be  formed  in  platoon  colunms,  checkerboard  formation  (fig. 
44),  or  the  coUunns  <'cheloned  to  the  rear  (fig.  4.^),  or  thin  lines 
(fig.  46)  (never  in  squad  columns),  thus  offering  to  artillery  the 
least  favorable  target.  This  advance  is  continued  even  into  the 
first  stages  of  the  defenders'  long-range  infantry  fire. 


«-      I 


.1 


Fig.  45. — Platoon  echeloned  from  left  to  rear 


Platoon  columns,  being  very  vulnerable  to  the  direct  fire  of 
infantry  and  machine  guns,  must  deploy  into  thin  lines  or  as 
skirmishers  at  wide  intervals  to  pass  over  ground  swept  by  the 
enemy's  direct-aimed  fire. 

It  must  be  clearly  understood  that  there  may  be  no  necessity 
for  all  the  columns  to  deploy  at  the  same  time.  When  advancing 
on  a  wide  front  one  platoon  may  be  compelled  to  pass  over  a 
dangerous  piece  of  ground  in  a  skirmish  line.  But  the  platoons 
to  the  right  and  left  may  still  be  in  a  ravine  or  behind  a  hill 
which  hides  them  completely. 

After  having  crossed  dangerous  ground  the  platoon  reforms  its 
column  without  halting  and  continues  the  advance. 

Capt.  E.  J.  Solano,  in  writing  of  the  present  war,  says :  "  Small 
columns  in  what  are  known  as  '  artillery  formations '  should 


MUSKETRY.  163 

never  l)i'  adhered  to  when  there  is  a  iJOssiljUity  of  their  cumin;; 
xmder  close  or  inediuin  ranjre  tire  of  infantry  or  machine  jyuns. 
Troops  liavc  suffered  severely  frojn  insnllicient  extension,  and 
tlie  adoption  of  ri;:id  lines,  ami  also  I'rom  i»ushin;r  forward  in 
close  formations  without  taking;  the  proi)er  military  precautions. 
Loose,  elastic  formations,  adapted  to  the  ground,  "with  men  at 
8  or  10  i)aces  interval  are  the  least  vulnerahle. 

Several  limes  it  has  heen  necessary  to  advance  under  unsul)- 
dued  artillery  tire.  Small  columns  at  50  yards  interval  and  3(X) 
yards  distance  have  heen  found  to  he  the  hest  method  of  avoid- 
ing casualties.    The  nineteenth  brigade  lying  in  tln'  open  In  this 


r  "••-'• 


J.,, 


1 

! 

1 ., „...^.. 


,.♦ 


C»r^«'*l« 


.   J  rrortf  P»»it 


Fig.  4G. — Advance  in  thin  lines.     1.  (Siich  niinihprs)  forw.Trd  :  2.  March. 

formation  were  shelled  hy  two  batteries  for  half  an  hour  and 
had  only  25  casualties."     (Musketry.) 

194.  When,  however,  the  point  is  reached  beyond  which  the 
men  will  not  advance  without  tiring,  the  attacker  begins  to 
build  u\)  a  tiring  line  of  sutlicient  density  to  produce  an  erticient 
fire.  At  this  range,  which  should  not  be  greater  than  800-1,200 
yards  few  hits  can  be  expected. 

Therefore  to  secure  a  sullicient  lunnber  of  hits  the  tire  M'ill 
then  be  Increased  in  volume.  A  rai)idity  of  tire  of  more,  than 
five  shots  per  minute  at  this  range  reduces  the  number  of  hits 
in  a  given  unit  of  time,  unless  the  target  be  an  exce])tionally 
large  and  vulnerable  one.  hence  there  remains  no  other  alterna- 
tive than  a  tiring  line  of  at  least   one  man  ]ier  yard,  whicii  ex- 


164  MUSKETRY. 

perience  shows  to  be  the  space  ordinarily  iicodccl  l)y  a  man  for 
freedom  of  movement  in  tirlnj,'. 

It  is,  of  course,  a  serious  mistalve  to  malce  the  liriiij,'  line  too 
tliick,  for  thereby  one  increases  losses  with  no  conipensatinji; 
train,  l)ut  with  a  line  as  tliiclv  as  may  be  with  proper  i-ocmi  for 
handling?  tlie  ritle,  supremac.v  of  tire  is  not  only  attained  sooner, 
but  tlie  wliole  attaclv  is  made  in  less  time,  the  men  are  kept  out 
in  the  rain  of  bullets  for  a  shorter  time  and  the  spirit  of  the  at- 
tack is  not  allowed  to  lag. 

A  thin  firing  line  may  be  used  when  the  situalion  is  still  in 
doubt — that  is,  in  a  reconnaissance. 


k-     ^1/  -^  ■;:\cynif  2:  ...  ^  _ 

M             •m||^^^H|BhL 

i^^^^^ 

■Hi 

M^^^ 

» ^^'-*^'^  ^"^Wt^ 

I^BHE^p^^p^ 

P^n^ffllvHHp^H 

-?v^^-  /^^ 

"^^^As^iB  -     5« 

IV  ^bP'^'v^^ 'flllV^    " 

w^  ^  T^   '^ft 

Fic.  47. 

In  the  Spanish-American  War  and  in  the  Philippines  thin  lines 
were  used  successfully,  but  the  inferiority  of  the  Spanish  and 
P^ilipino  troops  must  be  considered.  These  were  proper  cases 
for  the  use  of  tliin  lines. 

195.  Officers  and  noncommissioned  officer.^  should  thoroughly 
appreciate  the  relation  existing  between  the  strength  of  the 
firing  line  and  the  resulting  hits  to  be  expected.  The  men 
should  be  taught  the  necessity  for  thick  lines,  but  should  be 
warned  to  avoid  bunching  in  rushing  and  the  accompanying 
crowding  together  so  thickly  that  they  can  not  use  their  rifles. 

Figure  47  shows  a  line  rushing,  the  men  all  bunched  to- 
gether.    Tliis  makes  an  excellent  target. 

The  men  rushing  bunched,  as  in  figure  47,  were  halted,  and 
hgure  48  sliows  what  happens — the  men  in  a  part  of  the  line 


MUSKETRY. 


165 


lire  crowded  so  closely  together  that  they  can  not  use  thi-ir 
rifles.  Hence  their  vulneral)ility  as  ii  target  lias  heen  in- 
creased by  crowding  togetlier,  and  at  the  same  time  there  is 
a  loss  of  lire  elTect.  Kuntpean  writers  in  the  i)resent  war  all 
warn  against  the  evils  of  hunching  in  the  advance  and  insist 
that,  when  rushing,  individual  men  nnist  be  trained  to  advance 
in  a  straight  line  toward  the  enemy,  not  swerving  to  the  right 
or  left  in  search  of  cover. 

The  strength  in  rear,  the  supports  and  reserves,  should  be 
such  Ihat  the  tiring  line  can  be  maintained  at  the  i)roper 
density. 


^.»  •:-  *-    * 


'««ftClMM^i^<^<^l^ 


TIXIK  OF   OPENING    KIKE. 


196.  The  soldier's  first  impulse  when  fired  upon  is  to  re- 
turn the  fire.    In  other  words,  to  shoot  up  his  courage. 

The  men  must  be  taught  the  futility  of  long-range  fire,  and 
they  must  be  so  trained  that  their  leaders  can  get  them  to 
within  an  effective  range  before  fire  is  opened. 

It  nuist  be  impressed  upon  all  that  the  attacking  line  does 
not  stop  to  open  fire,  but  it  only  opens  fire  when  stopped  or 
until  further  progress  can  not  be  made  without  firing. 

The  weight  of  all  military  authority  is  to  the  effect  that  an 
attack  in  which  the  attacking  line  stops  to  open  fire  before  hav- 
ing reached  a  range  at  which  the  fire  will  be  effective  (800  to 
1.2()()  yards)  never  succeeds.  Consid(>rations  of  time,  target, 
ammunition,  and  morale  make  it  imi)erative  that  the  attack 
withhold  its  fire  and  press  forward  to  a  first  firing  jtosition  close 
to  the  enemy. 


166  MUSKETRY. 

Full  ii(lv;iiil;ifie  of  the  lA'rraiii  is  taken  and  the  men  are  kept 
in  .small  cdlunms  in  oi'der  i«i  i»revent  individuals  droppinii  down 
and  commencing  to  fire  without  orders. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  tliat  troops  advancing  to  the  attack' 
without  coveu  will  suffer  losses.  Men  must  be  trained  to  ex- 
pect these,  but  each  and  every  one  should  have  firmly  imbued 
in  his  soul  that  to  stop  to  commence  firing  before  reaching  a 
close  range  is  to  lose  the  fight.  An  enemy  can  not  be  shot  out  of 
his  trenches.     The  bayonet  wins  the  battle. 

Fire,  as  a  general  rule,  should  rarely  be  opened  by  infantry 
in  attack  when  satisfactory  progress  can  be  made  without  it. 
The  leading  troops,  in  particular,  should  save  every  possible 
round  for  the  final  struggle  for  superiority  of  fire  at  close  range, 
as  the  replenishment  of  ammunition  to  the  firing  line  at  that 
time  will  be  almost,  if  not  entirely,  impossible. 

Fire  properly  controlled  and  directed  is  effective  against  large 
targets  at  vei-y  great  ranges. 

Infantry  should  not  hesitate  to  seize  opportunities  for  long- 
range  fire  against  troops  massed,  such  as  reserves  and  other 
formed  bodies,  provided  that  the  opening  of  fire  does  not  pre- 
maturely disclose  the  position. 

Long-range  fire  is  permissible  in  pursuit  on  account  of  the 
moral  effect  of  any  fire  under  the  circumstances. 

In  the  defense,  ranges  are  more  easily  determined,  and  the 
enemy  usually  presents  a  larger  target.  The  defender  may 
therefore  open  fire  and  expect  results  at  longer  ranges  than  the 
attacker,  and  particularly  if  the  defenders  intend  a  delaying 
action  only. 

If  the  enemy  has  powerful  artillery  it  will  often  be  best  for 
the  defending  infantry  to  withhold  its  fire  until  the  enemy  offers 
a  specially  favorable  target.  Vigorous  and  well-directed  bursts 
of  fire  are  then  employed.  The  troops  should  therefore  be  given 
as  much  artificial  protection  as  time  and  means  permit,  and  at  an 
agreed  signal  expose  themselves  as  much  as  necessary  and  open 
fire.     (404,  I.  D.  R.) 

Lony-naige  targets  are  primarily  for  artillery  and  maehine 
guns. 

The  disadvantages  of  long-range  fire  are : 

(1)  Its  effect  is  insignificant  when  compared  with  the  amount 
of  ammunition  used. 

(2)  Amanmition  is  hard  to  replenish  during  the  attack. 

(3)  The  individual  firer  can  hope  to  keep  up  his  fire  only  for 
a  certain  length  of  time.     His  arm  and  eye  get  tired,  the  rifle 


MUSKETRY.  167- 

lidt,  ami  ho  (loi's  not  take  tlu-  (miihlt'  to  aim  (tr  l)rim,'  tlic  piece 
to  his  shoulder. 

(4)  Tiie  I'liemy's  morale  is  increascHl. 

(5)  The  surprise  elTect  of  the  lire  is  often  lost. 

(6)  It  often  indicates  the  jxisition  of  troops  .wliicli  nii;;iit 
otherwise  be  unnoticed  by  the  enemy. 

The  major  usually  indicates  the  point  or  time  at  which  the  lire 
fight  is  to  open.  (304,  I.  D.  R.)  He  may  do  so  in  his  order 
for  deployment  or  he  may  follow  the  firing  line  close  enough  to 
do  so  at  the  proper  time.  If  it  is  impracticable  for  him  to  do 
either,  the  senior  lino  odicor  with  tlio  tiring  lino  in  each  l>attalion 
.selects  the  time  for  opening  fire.  Conditions  may  retpiire  a  com- 
pany c(tmmander  to  open  fire  at  some  i)laco  other  than  that 
designated  by  the  battalion  commander.  However,  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Drill  Regulations  should  be  followed  whenever 
possible,  and,  as  a  rule,  the  battalion  commander  should  desig- 
nate the  tiring  position.  The  firing  line  should,  if  possible,  ad- 
vance without  firing  to  within  800  yards  of  the  enemy's  lino.  At 
this  first  firing  position  the  attack  seeks  to  gain  fire  superiority. 
Fire  on  the  hostile  main  j»ositit)n  should  not  bo  opened  until  all 
or  nearly  all  the  firing  line  can  join  the  fire.  The  major.  <luring 
the  early  stages  of  the  attack,  is  in  a  better  position  to  have  a 
general  grasp  of  the  whole  than  is  one  of  the  captains.  He  Is 
farther  back  from  the  firing  line  and  is  not  influenced  by  losses 
that  may  occur  in  the  advance  to  the  first  firing  position. 

In  unexi)octo(l  close  encounters  a  great  advantage  accrues  to 
the  side  which  first  opens  rapid  and  accurate  fire  wlrli  the  battle 
sight.     (40.'),  I.  D.  R.) 

197.  Fire  of  position — that  is,  fire  of  specially  selo'led  troops 
of  machine  guns  occupying  a  flank  of  elevated  position  from 
which  they  can  bring  an  effective  fire  upon  the  enemy's  line  to 
assist  in  covering  the  advance  of  their  own  firing  line — may  be 
used  at  rather  long  range. 

This  fire  is  usually  very  elTective  on  account  of  the  calmness 
of  the  firers,  the  unchanging  range,  the  fact  that  these  troops 
do  not  participate  in  the  assault  proper,  the  ease  with  which 
they  are  supplied  with  annnunition,  and  because  they  do  not 
di.sclose  their  first  line  and  are  iiot  within  the  effective  zone  of 
the  enemy's  fire. 

The  development  of  machine  guns  practically  excludes  the 
rifle  from  this  class  of  fire. 


168  MUSKETRY. 

KINDS   OF   FIRE. 

198.  Fire  is  classified,  according  to  its  application,  as  in- 
direct, unainied  fire  of  position  or  covering,  enfilade,  concen- 
trated, diistributed,  converging,  mutual-supporting  or  covering 
fire. 


0.     Observer  In  flkttii, j;)osltlon  that  be  c&n  aee  the  target  mot 
direct   the    tlrt  against   It. 

A    Artilleiy 

B    The  ta-get. 

Fig.  49. 

Indirect  fire  (fig.  49)  is  the  class  of  fire  habitually  used  by 
Artillery.    Its  use  by  Infantry  is  most  exceptional. 

199.  Troop  leaders,  to  enable  them  to  avoid  the  effect  of  un- 
aimed  or  sweeping  fire,  must  have  a  correct  grasp  of  the  angles 
tnUilUa)  FIRE  OR  BWEEPINQ  FIRE. 


A.    Attaoking  line. 

B    aieoey's  firing  line 

0    Eaoy'a  reserre. 

Fig.   .50. 

of  fall  of  rifle  bullets  at  various  ranges,  appreciate  the  effect  of 
slopes  and  sites,  and  understand  the  subject  of  the  vulner- 
ability of  formations. 

200.  Fire  of  position,  figure  51,  see  pjiragraph  197. 

201.  Enfllafle  fire  (fig.  52). — This  is  the  most  effective  class  of 
fire.     On  July  31,  1904,  Gen.  Marston,  of  the  Russian  Army,  was 


XUSKET&Y.  im 

in  poeitioD  oo  the  heigliu<  at  Pien  Lins.  Slanchoria.  with  the 
S«ccmk1  Infantry  Brigade.  8  field  ^runs,  2  Dtountain  zuus.  2} 
sotinas  (each  sotica  about  150  men>  of  cavalry,  and  1  comfjunj 
of  eiigineer&  Part  of  the  force  occnpied  a  sunken  road.  The 
Japanese  attacked  the  front  early  in  the  morning  but  oonld  make 
no  progress.  Finally  seven  daring  infantrymen  of  the  Japanese 
Army  worked  their  way  around  into  a  position  frcMn  which  they 
tvooght  an  enfilading  fire  on  the  Rassian  left.  The  fire  of  these 
seren  mm  caused  the  Russian  line  to  give  way. 

tot.  In  figure  53  the  line  A  ha»  concentrate<I  its  fire  on  the 
machine  gun  at  B.  This  class  of  fire  is  very  effectire  agaiost 
machine  guns. 


:r  XTSOB   ITS. 


A    Trocf$  make  <Ir*  t 

yo«ltlae  zr  MTcrUg  ttn. 

Ftc.  51. 

208.  Figure  54  illnJ^tTate»  perfer-t  di.<tribution   (Chap.  Villi. 

SOi.  Coverging  fire  (fig.  55)  combines  the  effect  of  enfilade 
and  concentrated  fire  and  is  very  effective  against  columns, 
machine  guns.  etc. 

205.  3Iutual  supporting  or  covering  fire  (fig.  56)  in  for  tlie 
purpose  of  keeping  the  entire  enemy's  line  covered  with  fire  in 
order  to  permit  other  parts  of  the  attacking  line  to  advance. 

In  figure  -56  the  cr^mpany.  oonsi.«sting  of  four  platoons,  is  cover- 
ing the  target  by  the  overlapping  method  ^par.  1.35)  and  attack- 
ing the  line  AB.  The  second  platoon,  by  temporarily  increasing 
its  rate  of  fire,  is  making  up  for  the  loss  of  fire  effect  of  the  first 
platoon,  which  is  rushing  forward. 

XOTS  rpar.  257.  I.  D.  S.). — ^Troop*  arp  trained  to  ckansp  sll«^tl7 
tb«  dir»«tioD  of  &r»  m>  as  oot  to  endanser  tbfr  flanks  of  adraacMl  por- 
tfoos  of  tke  Srfas  liae. 


170 


MUSKETRY. 


Fig.  52. 
The  lino  at   R  enfllado.s  that  at  A. 


COUCENTRAIED  FIRE. 


A    Firing  line. 

3    Enemy  machine  gun* 


Flu.  53. 


MUSKETRY. 

DISTRIBUTED   FIRE. 


171 


A    Attacking  line. 
B    Enemy  line. 


Fi(i.  r,4. 


B 


CONVERGINa  HRE. 


A  &  B       Two   firing  llnep  directing  their  fire 
on  an  Infaitry  column  at  C. 


Pin.  r>5. 


172 


MTJSKETRY. 


It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  tire  of  position  is  sometimes  called 
covering  lire. 

206.  Fire  is  also  classified  according;  to  the  manner  of  its 
delivery. 

Tlie  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  prescril^e  volley,  at  will,  and 
clip  fire. 

Volley  fire  is  the  simultaneous  discharge  by  a  number  of  men 
of  their  rifles  at  a  word  of  command. 

Mat-ual  supporting  or  covering  fire. 

^  -^     The  enemy 


Attaciting   line 


In  the  days  of  a  slow-loading  rifle  of  limited  range,  the  impor- 
tance of  volley  fire  was  due  to  the  fact  that  it  enabled  the  leader 
to  develop  the  greatest  volume  of  fire  in  tactically  favorable 
moments,  or,  in  other  words,  when  large  targets  were  visible 
for  a  short  time  only.  The  pause  also  permitted  the  powder 
smoke  of  the  old  black  powder  to  clear  away.  Slodern  combat  ts 
conducted  under  different  conditions. 

Except  for  fire  of  position  and  in  the  determination  of  ranges, 
volley  fire  heed  not  be  considered. 

Fire  at  will  is  that  class  of  fire  in  which  the  marksman,  having; 
been  given  the  range  and  the  objective,  sets  his  sight,  opens  fire 
at  the  command  of  the  director  or  controller,  and  thereafter 
continues  to  fire  independently. 


MUSKETRY.  173 

This  is  tlic  only  class  of  liri"  that  luvd  be  seriously  considered  ; 
it  iniplit's  tliat  the  men  are  thoroughly  trained  in  fire  discipline 
and  control. 

Clip  lire  is  sinijily  a  means  \vlierel\v  the  officer  may  control  llio 
amount  of  ainiMiiiiiti()n  that  he  desires  used  at  any  iiariicular 
tirint;  point. 

THE   RATE  AND  VOLUME  OF   FIRE. 

207.  Other  conditions  l)eins  equal,  the  ellicacy  of  fire  depends 
upon  the  rate  at  which  casualties  are  produced  in  the  enemy's 
ranks.  It  is  apparent,  therefore,  that  the  deciding  factor  is 
not  the  prrrrntofic  of  hits,  but  the  number  of  hits  obtained 
within  a  \init  of  time. 

A  great  number  of  hits  jxt  minute  is  obtained  by  (1)  increa.s- 
ing  the  individual  rate  of  accurate  fire  and  (2)  directing  the 
fire  of  more  rilles  at  the  particular  objective  in  question. 

208.  There  is  necessarily  a  limit  to  rapidity  of  fire  which,  if 
exceeded,  will  result  in  some  loss  of  accuracy.  This  rate  of 
effective  fire  depends  upon  a  number  of  factors : 

(1)  It  will  be  faster  for  trained  than  for  untrained  troops. 

(2)  It  will  be  faster  at  a  large  than  a  small  target. 

(3)  It  will  be  faster  at  a  target  which  stands  out  in  bold 

relief  than   at   one   which   is  vague   in   outline  and 
whose  color  blends  with  a  neutral  background. 

(4)  The  physical  condition  and  the  morale  of  the  \intrained 

troops   has  a   marked    influence  on   the  rapidity  of 
effective  fire. 

(5)  The  aiming  position  also  has  its  effect — one  can  fire 

faster  from  an  easy  position  than  from  a  cramped 
one. 

(6)  It  will  be  faster  at  .short  than  at  long  range. 

(7)  It  will  be  faster  at  the  beginning  of  an  action  than  after 

firing  has  continued  for  some  time. 

209.  There  is  some  variety  of  opinion  as  to  the  rates  of  fire 
which  are  consistent  with  accuracy,  and  it  is  obvious  that  in 
proposing  a  standard  of  jierforniance  no  more  can  be  done  tlian 
to  present  an  apjtroximation  to  which  there  must  be  some  ex- 
ceptions. The  standard  rates  of  fire  proposed  below  are  based 
upon  experience  and  observation  at  the  Musketry  School  (Mon- 
terey). When  firing  a  single  clip  the  rate  is  obviously  faster 
than  when  two  or  more  clips  are  fired. 


174  MUSKETRY. 

Range. 

f  200 

10  per  minute ]  300 

I     400 

7.5  per  nunute J     600 

[    700 
I     800 

5  i)er  minute i     900 

[1,  000 

(At  greater  ranges  3  per  minute,  209,  S.  A.  F.  M.) 

This  rate  includes  tlie  time  required  for  recliarging  tlie  maga- 
zine wliieli  is  tal^en  to  be  10  seconds.  Sliould  tlie  rate  of  fire 
at  any  range  fall  very  much  below  the  rate  given  it  may  be 
said  that  a  proper  use  has  not  been  made  of  the  time  element, 
and  should  the  rate  be  very  much  in  excess  of  the  standard 
given,  it  may  be  concluded  that  there  has  been  some  loss  of 
accuracy.  The  rates  given  should  not  exclude  higher  rates  of 
fire,  in  the  case  of  large  and  very  conspicuous  targets,  such  as 
dense  skirmish  lines,  bodies  of  cavalry,  or  batteries  of  artillery. 

An  exceptionally  low  rate  does  not  improve  the  accuracy  of 
the  fire,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  rate  of  10  shots  per  minute 
can  not  be  exceeded  by  the  average  soldier  without  a  loss  in 
accuracy.  A  high  rate  of  fire  may  easily  degenerate  into  un- 
aimed  fire. 

210.  The  following  table  shows  the  result  of  experimental 
firing  by  a  squad  of  average  marksmen  at  the  School  of  Mus- 
ketry : 

[Targets,  8  E,  spacert  at  1  yard  center  to  center.     Range,   500  yards.] 


Rate  of 
fire  per 
minute. 

Number 
rounds 
fired. 

Hits. 

Hits  per 
minute. 

Targets 
hit. 

Per  cent 

of 

acciu-acy 

(hits). 

Per  cent 
of  distri- 
bution. 

15 
10 
5 
10 
15i 

80 
ItiO 
SO 
SO 
124 

2.3 
44 
31 
19 
21 

Hi 

22 

15J 

19 

21 

6 

8 
8 
8 
8 

14.37 
27.75 
19.44 
23.75 
16.94 

71 
100 
100 
100 
100 

From  this  table  it  is  apparent  that  there  is  a  correct  rate  of 
fire  for  the  different  ranges  and  for  the  different  degrees  of 
training  of  the  men.     Manifestly  if  two  forces  are  firing  against 


MUSKETRY.  175 

each  other  at  lliis  rnn^c  ami  one  maintains  a  tire  of  l(t  slmis 
per  man  per  minute  ami  tlie  otlier  fires  at  tiie  rate  of  H  shots  iici- 
man  per  minute,  tlie  lirst  should  have  fire  superiority. 

It  Is  to  be  remembered  that  rapid  fire  is  primarily  rapid 
manipuhition  of  the  piece,  i.  e.,  reloadiiiitixud^aiining. 

211.  The  rale  of  fire  is  dependent  to  a  ^Teat  extent  on  the 
size  and  visibility  of  tlie  target.  The  larger  the  target  and  the 
more  plainly  it  stands  out  the  quicker  and  easier  can  the  soldier 
catch  his  aim.  On  tlie  other  hand,  if  the  target  is  small  and 
indistinct  it  takes  more  time  to  find  the  aiming  point  after  each 
discharge  of  the  rifle. 

Short  bursts  of  rapid  fire,  especially  if  they  are  in  the  nature 
of  surprise  fire,  should  and  will  be  very  effective. 

There  are  two  forms  of  rapid  fire :  That  which  might  be  called 
the  ordinary  rate,  as  given  in  the  Standard  for  Field  Firiiig, 
and  quoted  above,  and  then  a  very  high  rate  of  fire  maintained 
for  a  few  minutes,  which  the  English  call  the  mad  minute. 
The  latter  is  used  against  favorable  targets  appearing  during 
the  fight  and  which  demand  a  veritable  whirlwind  of  fire  (such 
as  repulsing  a  cavalry  charge,  the  moment  before  charging,  etc.). 
This  kind  of  fire  can,  however,  be  kept  \ip  for  only  a  short  time, 
not  exceeding  two  to  four  minutes,  on  account  of  the  enormous 
expenditure  of  ammunition,  the  fatigue  of  the  men,  and  the 
excitement  which  a  prolonged  and  continuous  rapid  fire  pro- 
duces on  tlie  men  (the  physiological  effect).  Col.  von  Sdicrf 
says: 

"  The  physiological  influence  of  a  rapid  fire  on  the  nervous 
system  of  the  combatants  is  such  that  at  the  end  of  a  very  short 
time,  wliich  can  not  reasonably  last  more  than  five  minutes,  tlie 
troops  on  the  otTensive  will  either  dash  forward  or  retire." 

The  expenditure  of  ammunition  during  these  minutes  of  ex- 
treme rapid  fire  will  be  enormous,  but  such  targets  and  such 
opportunities  to  inflict  a  heavy  loss  upon  the  enemy  fully  justify 
the  expenditure. 

The  rate  of  fire  attained  in  these  bursts  without  loss  of  effect 
depends  directly  upon  the  peace  training  of  the  troops;  with 
men  properly  trained  it  niny  be  as  hi^di  as  l^^  to  20  shots  a 
minute. 

With  untrained  or  partially  trained  troops  it  is.  of  course, 
the  height  of  folly  to  exjiect  them  to  reach  this  standard ;  their 
dispersion  increases  to  such  dimensions  as  to  be  of  absolutely 
no  value. 


176  MUSKETRY. 

212.  The  riinse  influences  the  rapidity  of  fire,  as  the  greater 
tlie  distance  the  more  is  time  necessary  in  aiming,  the  position 
of  the  firer  becomes  more  and  more  strainetl,  and  the  target  is 
more  difficult  to  see  and  to  hit. 

Pauses  in  the  fire  in  the  past  were  necessary  to  let  the  smoke 
clear  away ;  at  present  they  are  of  advantage  in  giving  the  men 
a  breathing  spell,  rest  eyes  and  nerves,  enable  ammunition  to 
be  distributed,  and  allow  organizations  to  re-form. 

During  such  pauses  good  cover,  good  observation  of  the  enemy, 
and  instant  readiness  to  resume  the  fire  are  essential.  ^ 

The  officer  or  noncommissioned  officer,  in  determining  the  rate 
of  fire,  must  consider  the  replenishment  of  ammunition.  With 
220  rounds  on  the  person,  the  man  will  be  able  to  maintain  a 
10-round  rate  for  only  22  minutes. 

All  of  the  foregoing  factors  must  be  taken  into  consideration, 
and  then,  if  the  mission  is  such  that  it  demands  a  high  rate, 
even  with  its  tiring  effect  upon  the  men  and  the  expenditure 
of  ammunition,  it  should  be  ordered  without  hesitation. 

EXERCISES. 

214.  I. — Object:   To  train  men  to  fire  at  the  ordered  rate. 

Method:  A  squad  or  platoon  in  the  prone  position.  The  in- 
structor first  explains  the  necessity  and  the  reason  for  the  men 
maintaining  an  ordered  rate  of  fire.  He  then,  by  counting  1, 
2,  3,  4,  5,  etc.,  in  a  minute  indicates  the  different  rates  after 
which  the  men  are  given  a  target  and  a  rate  of  fire.  The  men 
then  simulate  firing,  time  being  kept  by  an  assistant.  This 
is  repeated  until  the  men  can  fire  at  any  ordered  rate. 

215.  II. — Object:   To  train  the  men  to  load  rapidly. 
Method:   Loading  from  belt,  pockets  fastened,  with  a  clip  of 

dummy  cartridges,  in  the  belt.  All  positions  standing,  kneeling, 
sitting,  and  prone.  The  squad  or  platoon  in  line,  instructor 
commands  load.  Maximum  time  limit  of  10  seconds  each  in 
best  five  out  of  seven  consecutive  trials. 

It  should  be  impressed  upon  the  soldier  that  rapid  fire  is 
principally  rapid  loading. 

216.  III. — Object:  To  train  men  to  set  sights  quickly  and 
accurately. 

Method:   The   squad  is  formed  in  single   rank,  arms  at  the 

order.     The   instructor   commands   "  Range  ."     All    men 

then  set  their  sights  and  come  to  the  order.  All  sights  should  be 
correctly  set  in  10  seconds. 


MUSKETRY.  177 

THE   DISTANCE  BETWEEN   ECHELONS. 

217.  The  distance  !)e(\veen  echelons  depends  upon  (o)  the 
object  to  be  attained,  (b)  tlie  nature  of  the  action,  and  (c)  tlie 
terrain. 

In  an  attaclc  tlie  distances  between  echelons  siiould  be  de- 
creased in  the  course  of  the  action.  Leaders  of  all  grades  should 
be  animated  by  but  one  desire,  that  of  being  in  front  in  order 
to  participate  in  the  gaining  of  the  victory.  The  duration  of 
the  crisis  of  the  action  is  usually  brief,  and  in  a  very  few 
rapidly  passing  nioiiit'nts  tlie  leader  must  decide  what  to  do  with 
the  troops  remaining  available. 

^\■hen  an  immediate  decision  is  not  sought,  it  is  advisable  to 
increase  distances  in  order  to  keep  the  echelons  held  in  rear 
from  coming  under  fire.  In  any  case,  the  distance  between  sup- 
ports and  the  firing  line  should  be  less  than  the  distance  be- 
tween the  firing  line  and  the  enemy. 

Supports  should  be  close  enough  to  the  firing  line  (in  an 
attack)  to  prevent,  by  timely  interference,  a  retrograde  move- 
ment of  the  latter. 

All  commanders  must  be  ready  with  supports  to  stop  any 
movement  to  the  rear. 

While  the  lines  in  rear  can  not  be  kept  entirely  out  of  hostile 
fire  during  an  attack,  care  must  nevertheless  be  taken  that  they 
be  held  far  enough  back  to  prevent  their  feeling  the  full  effect 
of  the  fire  directed  at  the  firing  line. 

218.  Supports  held  too  close  to  the  firing  line  in  open  country 
will  cease  to  exist  as  such.  The  boldest  join  the  firing  line  of 
their  own  accord  and  the  timid  seek  cover. 

The  supports  on  the  defensive  are  usually  placed  a  short 
distance  immediately  in  rear  of,  or  within  the  firing  line  (in- 
trenched) at  the  points  where  they  are  to  be  employed.  On  ac- 
count of  the  difficulty  of  bringing  supports  up  for  the  purpose 
of  repulsing  an  as.sault  they  must  be  held  so  near  the  line  that 
they  can  readily  reinforce  it  under  all  emergencies. 

This  may  compel  distances  as  small  as  50  yards,  notwith- 
standing the  consequences  of  the  cover  trenches  coming  within 
the  dispersion  area  of  artillery  directed  at  the  fire  trenches. 
The  prompt  reinforcement  of  the  firing  line  at  the  critical  mo- 
ment is  a  delicate  matter.  The  enemy's  artillery  fire,  having 
supported  his  infantry  at  the  decisive  range,  will  next  be  di- 
rected to  cover  the  rear  of  the  position.  It  Is  at  this  moment 
3520°— 17 12 


178  MUSKETRY. 

that  the  supports  attempt  to  reinforce  the  fire  trench.  If, 
therefore,  the  supports  are  placed  too  far  to  the  rear  they  may 
not  only  fail  to  arrive  in  time,  but  in  order  to  come  up  at  all 
must  cross  ground  likely  to  be  swept  by  artillery  fire. 

219.  Reserves,  both  sector  and  general,  must  be  so  located 
that  they  can  reach  all  equally  important  points  of  the  firing 
line  with  equal  facility. 

The  reserves  should  generally  be  placed  far  enough  to  the 
rear  to  escape  the  effect  of  "  overs  "  from  hostile  artillery ;  that 
is,  not  nearer  than  300  yards. 

For  a  discussion  as  to  the  position  of  supports  on  rising  and 
falling  slopes  and  on  level  ground,  see  paragraph  44. 

OBSERVATION  OF  FIRE. 

220.  The  actions  of  the  enemy  are  usually  the  only  reliable 
indication  of  the  location  of  the  sheaf  of  fire  against  him. 

It  is  especially  difficult  to  judge  of  the  disti'ibution  of  bullets 
from  their  strike  in  front  of  and  in  rear  of  the  target.  Sug- 
gestions from  the  subordinate  leaders,  whose  \iew  of  the  target 
Is  generally  restricted,  are  often  more  confusing  than  valuable. 

If  the  assailant  finds  that  the  defender's  fire  is  steady  and 
continuous,  he  may  assume  that  his  own  fire  is  ineffective.  If 
the  defender  sees  the  front  line  of  the  assailant  advancing  with 
confidence  but  the  supports  In  confusion,  he  may  take  it  that 
his  rear  sight  elevation  is  too  high ;  when  the  advance  is  hesi- 
tating but  continuous,  that  it  is  too  low ;  if  the  enemy  halts 
to  fire  and  gains  ground  by  rushes,  that  it  is  correct. 

If  one  observes  that  the  hostile  bullets  are  going  wild,  some 
striking  far  short,  others  very  high  and  very  ineffective,  he 
has  fire  superiority,  and  it  is  time  to  gain  distance  to  the  front. 
On  the  other  hand,  althougli  he  may  be  suffering  no  losses, 
if  he  sees  that  the  enemy's  bullets,  well  massed,  are  striking, 
say,  50  j  ards  in  his  front,  he  has  no  fire  superiority ;  the  enemy 
has  simi^ly  underestimated  the  range,  and  his,  the  observer's, 
advance  will  bring  him  into  the  center  of  the  beaten  zone.  But 
this  is  the  opportunity  to  gain  fire  superiority.  The  men  are 
suffering  little  or  no  loss ;  they  should  be  less  affected  by  the 
enemy's  fire  and  should  do  better  work.  If  this  opportunity  is 
well  used,  fire  superiority  should  soon  be  wrested  from  the 
enemy. 


MUSKETRY.  179 

221.  ( Htscrvation  lo  the  Irdiil  iiiiist  1k>  <'(tiit  iiiuons  juid  unin- 
terrupted both  for  tlie  elTect  of  tiie  fire  upon  the  enemy  and  for 
his  movements.  Tlie  Hanks  must  also  be  watched ;  this  is  pro- 
vided for  by  flank  or  combat  patrols. 

Tlie  battalion  staff  assist  the  major  in  observation  and  the 
buglers  assist  the  captains  ;  the  guides  assist  the  platoon  leaders. 

Not  the  least  important  is  the  oi)servation  of  the  adjoining 
troops.  Tlieir  action  may  show  the  effect  of  the  fire  upon  the 
enemy.  If  they  are  advancing,  the  fire  is  ajiparently  so  effec- 
tive that  the  enemy  can  not  divert  his  fire  to  them.  Their  con- 
tinued advance,  however,  will  draw  more  fire  to  them.  The  ad- 
vance of  oue  fraction  of  the  line  takes  the  pressure  off  the  ad- 
joining ones. 

Good  field  glas.ses  are  indispensable  in  observing  the  effect  of 
fire  and  in  locating  an  enemy  whose  position  Is  not  exactly 
known. 

On  the  defensive,  when  troops  are  in  trenches  and  not  firing. 
all  the  men  are  not  kept  watching  to  the  front,  but  one  or  two 
men  in  each  platoon  are  designated  to  watch.  The  other  men 
rest. 

Any  man  who  sees  anything  unusual  should  at  once  call  out, 
thereby  attracting  his  squad  or  platoon  leader's  attention  to  it. 
This  is  a  rule. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 
VULNERABILITY  OF  FORMATIONS. 

222.  The  vulnerability  of  a  formation  is  its  likelihood  of  being 
struck  by  hostile  fire.  That  formation  which  by  computation  is 
shown  to  receive  the  greatest  number  of  hits  from  a  given  num- 
ber of  hostile  shots  is  said  to  be  the  most  vulnerable.  Rifle  fire 
only  is  considered. 

The  relative  vulnerability  of  several  formations  is,  therefore, 
determined  by  computing  the  number  of  hits  expected,  under 
identicaJ  conditions,  on  each  of  the  several  formations  and  then 
comparing  these  expected  results. 

A  brief  synopsis  of  vulnerability  is  here  given  in  order  that 
the  student  may  have  at  a  glance  the  deductions  that  have  been 
made  regarding  the  subject. 

223.  In  the  study  of  this  subject  tvro  conflicting  interests  are 
to  be  considered  :  (1)  The  avoidance  of  losses ;  (2)  a  heavy  firing 
line. 

The  first  demands  very  wide  intervals  between  individuals  in 
the  skirmish  line;  the  second  a  very  heavy  line — only  enough 
intervals  between  skirmishers  to  permit  of  the  free  use  of  the 
rifle  and  bayonet.     ( Par.  192. ) 

Troops  may  come  under  aimed  and  unaimed  fire. 

Aimed  fire  is  fire  that  is  directed  at  the  particular  body  whose 
vulnerability  is  being  di.scussed. 

TInaimed  fire  is  that  fire  in  which  some  of  the  shots  aimed  at 
and  intended  for  some  other  objective  fall  into  the  area  occupied 
by  the  body  whose  vulnerability  is  being  considered. 

There  is  a  slight  difference  in  the  method  of  calculating  the 
vulnerability  of  formations  under  aimed  and  unaimed  fire. 

The  vertical  dispersion  of  average  marksmen  between  500  and 
1.000  yax'ds  is  about  1  foot  greater  than  the  lateral  dispersion, 
hence  the  height  of  the  target  under  aimed  fire  is  a  greater 
factor  than  is  the  lateral  width  of  the  target.  In  other  words,  a 
loag,  low  target  will  not  get  as  many  hits  as  a  target,  say,  of 
half  the  length  but  twice  as  high. 
ISO 


MUSKETRY. 


181 


Under  unainied  fire  tlic  iminhcr  of  hits  to  bo  expected  is  abso- 
lutely dcjKMidciit  uiioii  tlie  viTtical  square  surface  presentotl  to 
the  cuciiiy's  liri%  liccjiuse  tlie  lire  is  cousidrnMl  as  evenly  dis- 
tril)iilc(l  over  lltt'  front  coven'd  i)y  (lie  line  rcct-ivin;;  (lie  fire. 


-  mmmmmmmmtBmttmimm^Mumiimit 


Fig. 


224. 

tlie  tar 


225. 
lowiiij; 
(1) 
(3) 
(5) 

226. 
vulner 


vulner 


From  top  to  bottom  tiirure  57  shows  the  relutive  size  of 
;;('ts  (tlTered  by  a  ((tmpany  of  l~)  s([ua(ls  in — 

Column  of  squads, 

Platoon  colunuis, 

Squad  columns, 

A  sl<irmish  line. 
.Vn  organization  may  conic  uialer  fire  in  any  of  the  fol- 
formations : 

('onii)any  front.  (2)    Line  of  jthitoons, 

Squad  columns,  (4)    Platoon  columns. 

Column  of  .s(iuads.  (6)    I>ine  of  skirmishers. 

(7)    Column    of  platoons. 
U   is   thus   api)arent   that,    in   general,   the  line   is  Ica.st 
U)le  under^ainied  fire,  and  the  line  of  small  columns  Jea.st 
ible  under  unaimed  fire. 


CHAPTP]R  XV. 
NIGHT  FIRING. 

228.  "The  invisibility  afforded  by  darkness  neutralizes  the 
power  of  the  ritie  to  a  great  extent  by  making  it  impossible 
to  employ  the  ordinary  means  of  lire  adjustment.  In  night 
attack  the  purpose  of  the  offensive  is  to  gain  rapidly  and 
quickly  a  position  where  the  issue  may  be  decided  in  a  hand-to- 
liand  encounter,  or  a  position  from  wliich  the  superiority  of  tire 
may  be  gained  at  daylight." 

The  offensive  should  not  use  fire  action  at  night.  It  can  not 
be  too  strongly  impressed  upon  all  ranks  that  to  fire  during  a 
night  attack,  on  the  olfensive,  is  not  only  useless  but  is  abso- 
lutely criminal. 

The  bayonet  is  the  weapon  tliat  decides  the  issue.  Hence 
it  sliould  be  fixed  and  the  cliamber  and  magazine,  if  possible, 
should  be  empty. 

It  is  exceedingly  unlikely  that  the  enemy  will  be  completely 
surprised,  but  every  second  of  delay  between  the  discovery  of 
the  attacking  force  and  the  delivery  of  the  assault  is  of  price- 
less value  to  the  defense ;  it  must,  therefore,  be  understood  by 
all  ranks  that  when  the  enemy  opens  fire  the  only  course  open 
to  them  is  to  press  on  to  tlie  assault  and  cross  bayonets  with 
the  enemy. 

Xi(/]if  (iff ticks  arc  onlji  iiossihic  iritli  troops  hifihlii  trahu'd. 

229.  Many  men  up  to  the  time  of  their  enlistment  have  passed 
their  lives  entirely  in  big  cities  or  large  towns  and  have  rarely 
been  beyond  the  range  of  street  lights.  Such  men.  when  first 
taken  out  in  the  dark,  are  helpless ;  they  start  at  every  shadow, 
stumble  on  level  ground,  make  a  lot  of  noise,  and  are  generally 
in  such  a  state  of  nervous  excitement  tliat  they  are  hardly 
responsible  for  their  actions.  Yet  these  men.  by  a  short  course 
of  careful  training  and  individual  instruction,  can  soon  learn 
to  work  together  with  confidence  in  the  darkest  night 

182 


imSKETEY.  183 

If  in  daylight  the  moral  is  to  the  physical  as  three  is  to  oin'. 
there  can  he  no  doubt  but  that  at  night  the  proportion  is  many 
times  greater. 

230.  A  body  of  troops  on  the  defensive  may  arrange  to  sweep 
open  ground,  an  njtproach.  or  a  bridge  wliich  may  be  used  by 
the  enemy  by  having  their  rilles  in  rests,  so  that  they  sweep 
tlie  ground  without  any  aiming  by  flie  soldier.  These  rests 
are  put  in  place  in  daylight. 

The  ritle  should  n(»t  be  fastened  in  the  re.st.  as  that  would 
delay  taking  it  out  for  hand-to-hand  tighting. 

Illuminated  aiming  marks  giving  a  horizontal  line  of  sight 
may  also  be  used,  and  the  flashes  from  the  enemy's  rifles  may  be 
used  as  aiming  marlvs.  The  firing  should  be  at  very  short  ranges 
only. 

The  best  assistance  in  tiring  at  night  is  to  illuminate  the  fore- 
ground by  searchlights,  but  this  is  iisually  impossible  except  in 
trench  warfare. 

r>onfires  may  be  lighted.  These  must  be  prepartnl  in  advance 
and  lighted  when  the  lookout  gives  the  alarm. 

Star  shell  rockets  were  used  by  the  .Japanese  in  1904,  and  in 
the  present  war  all  sorts  of  appliance.s — flare.s,  searchlights,  and 
star  rockets — have  been  used  with  good  effect. 

231.  It  should  be  reiterated  that  every  infantryman  must  l)e 
imbued  witli  the  idea  that  at  night  the  only  weapon  he  can  trust 
is  the  bayonet,  and  that  the  more  promptly  he  uses  it  the  better 
his  chances  of  success. 

In  the  dark  every  advantage  is  on  the  side  that  takes  the  ini- 
tiative; numbers  are  of  little  account,  for  a  resolute  bayonet 
(•barge  delivertHl  by  even  a  single  picket  may.  if  it  comes  unex- 
pectedly, demoralize  an<l  throw  into  disorder  a  strong  attacking 
column. 

Sentries  should  be  taught  to  allow  persons  to  approach  fairly 
close  to  them  at  night  before  challenging  and  not  to  flre  except 
to  give  the  alarm,  unless  they  can  clearly  distinguish  and  be 
fairly  certain  of  hitting.  At  the  commencement  of  a  campaign 
sentries  are  continually  firing  at  nothing,  but  as  they  gain  expe- 
rience sliots  at  night  btn-ome  rare;  it  is  only  a  question  of  train- 
ing, and  this  should  be  given  during  pea<'e  time. 

It  is  reported  that  tluTe  is  a  rule  in  the  French  Army,  serving 
in  Algeria,  that  any  sentry  who  fires  at  night  must  produce  a 
corpse  or.  at  any  rate,  be  able  to  show  by  blood  marks  that  he 


184  MUSKETRY. 

has  liit  the  person  tired  at  ;  failing  in  this  the  sentry  is  dealt 
with  for  giving  a  false  ahirni. 

A  small  force  on  the  defensive  should,  if  it  gets  warning  of 
the  advance  against  it  at  night,  wait  until  the  enemy  gets  within 
30  yards ;  or  on  dark  nights  less,  then  every  rifle  should  be  fired 
once,  followed  immediately  with  a  bayonet  charge. 

For  night  firing  without  rests  the  men  must  be  taught  to 
hold  the  rifle  horizontally.  This  may  be  taught  by  having  the 
soldier  close  his  eyes  and  bring  his  rifle  to  the  position  of  aim, 
attempting  to  hold  it  horizontally.  Then  have  him  open  his 
eyes  and  look  at  the  position  in  which  he  is  holding  his  rifle. 

This  exercise  may  be  continuetl  by  squad  as  in  the  position 
and  aiming  drills. 

When  the  men  become  fairly  proficient  in  holding  the  rifle 
horizontally  they  should  fire  at  the  gallery  target  with  eyes 
closed. 


chaptp:r  XVI. 

AMMUNITION  SUPPLY. 

232.  The  soldier  carries  KM)  rounds  in  his  l)elt  and  there  is 
ll!0  niinuls  for  ea>-li  man  in  tlie  coniltal  wagons. 

Tlie  jjattalion  is  the  tactical  unit,  and  the  major,  as  its  com- 
mander, controls  the  supports,  hence  he  also  controls  the  de- 
livery and  distribution  of  ammunition  on  the  battle  field  to  the 
firing  line. 

When  the  battalion  is  deployed  on  the  major's  initiative,  he 
indicates  whetlier  extra  amnuinition  shall  be  issued ;  when  de- 
ployed pursuant  to  orders  from  hijrhcr  authority,  he  causoi*  the 
i.ssue  of  the  extra  anununition  unless  speciHcally  ordered  not 
to  do  so. 

This  accounts  for  the  120  rounds  in  the  combat  wajron. 

233.  In  rendering  a  decision  as  to  the  issue  of  this  extra  am- 
munition from  the  combat  wapon  a  commander  (the  major  o>- 
higher  connnauder )  must  consider : 

(1)  How  long  the  tight  will  prob.ibly  last.  A  short  advance 
or  rear-guard  action  might  not  require  the  issue  of  extra 
amnuinition. 

(2)  How  much  anununition  will  ha  used,  considering  rates  of 
fire,  etc. 

(3)  The  nature  of  the  terrain,  whether  or  not  it  will  permit 
of  communication  during  the  action.  Thus  it  will  be  easier  to 
deliver  anununition  to  the  firing  line  over  ground  broken  by 
ravines,  gullies,  etc.,  than  it  will  be  over  level  ground. 

(4)  The  extra  load  for  the  soldi?r ;  his  advance  will  l)e  slower 
and  more  fatiguing  carrying  extra  anununition  than  without  it. 

234.  Ammunition  is  supplied  during  the  action  by  collecting 
that  of  the  dead  and  wounded  and  by  sending  it  forward  bv 
reinforcements,  supports,  and  special  squads  detailed  for  th.it 
l)urpose. 

Full  advantage  should  be  taken  of  every  lull  in  the  action,  of 
cover,  and  other  favorable  conditions  to  distrilmtc  annnti- 
nition. 

The  ammunition  of  the  dead  and  wounded  is  best  collected 
by  the  supports  as  they  move  forward  to  join  the  firing  line. 

185 


186  MUSKETRY. 

Men  wounded  not  severely  enouj^h  to  prevent  movement  on  their 
part  should  pass  their  ammunition  to  the  men  on  their  rii?ht 
and  left. 

Reinforcements  going  forward  should  always  carry  amnmni- 
tion  for  the  men  in  the  firing  line.  It  is  to  be  remembered,  how- 
ever, that  these  men  are  carrying  220  rounds  each  of  their  own 
ammunition.  Hence  about  two  additional  bandoleers  each  will 
be  almost  the  limit  for  tliem. 

Special  squads  may  be  sent  forward  with  ammunition. 

All  men  carrying  ammunition  to  the  firing  line  first  deliver 
the  ammunition,  then  join  the  line  and  take  part  in  the  tiring. 

Men  are  not  sent  back  from  the  firing  line  for  ammunition. 

235.  There  are  two  methods  of  distributing  ammunition 
brought  forward  to  the  firing  line: 

(1)  The  men  that  bring  the  ammunition  forward  fall  into  the 
firing  line  and  pass  bandoleers  to  the  men  on  the  right  and  left 
of  them.  The  men  already  in  the  line  help  themselves  from  the 
bandoleers  and  pass  them  on  or  each  man  keeps  a  bandoleer. 

(2)  The  ammunition  carriers  halt  in  rear  of  the  firing  line 
and  under  the  direction  of  the  platoon  leaders  and  platoon  guides 
roll  along,  keeping  close  to  the  ground,  throwing  the  ammunition 
to  the  men  on  the  firing  line. 

There  is  very  little  difference  as  to  the  efficiency  of  either 
method,  providing  the  men  are  properly  trained.  The  men  must 
be  so  trained  that  there  will  be  no  decrease  in  the  rate  of  fire 
during  the  distribution. 

236.  Men  detailed  to  carry  ammunition  should,  before  starting 
forward,  be  deployed  on  a  front  equal  to  that  of  the  line  to  which 
they  are  carrying  ammimition,  thus  insuring  uniform  distribu- 
tion. 

EXERCISES. 

I. — Object:  To  train  the  battalion  in  the  supply  and  distribu- 
tion of  ammunition  to  the  firing  line. 

Method:  Assume  an  attack.  One  or  two  companies  are  desig- 
nated as  the  firing  line,  the  other  companies  as  the  support. 

The  firing  line  deploys  and  simulates  firing.  The  support 
carrying  empty  bandoleers  to  represent  the  extra  ammunition 
is  sent  in  as  reinforcement,  part  into  the  line  and  part  on  the 
flank.  These  bandoleers  are  distributed.  All  communication 
is  by  signal. 


MUSKETRY.  187 

This  exercise  may  be  varied  in  many  ways. 

One  variation.  Cause  the  firinfi  line  to  make  its  attack, 
certain  designated  men  drop  out  representing  wounded  and 
dead  men ;  tlieir  anununitioti  is  collected  and  distributed. 

237.  The  distril)Ution  of  extra  ammunition  from  the  combat 
wagons  is  very  siinpie.  One  nR'thud  is  to  form  the  companies 
in  double  colunm,  one  column  on  eadi  side  of  the  road.  The 
combat  wagt)ns  drive  between  the  colunui.s  and  suflicient  full 
boxes  are  thrown  off  for  each  company.  Tills  ammunition  is 
distributed  to  the  men  of  the  company  under  the  direction  of 
one  of  the  lieutenants  (the  captain  probably  receiving  orders 
from  the  major  at  this  time).  As  the  wagon  approaches  a 
company  the  senior  lieutenant  meets  it  and  calls  out  the 
number  of  boxes  required  for  his  company.  One  box  (1.2(M1 
rounds)  for  10  men. 

All  ofhcers  should  know  at  all  times  the  number  of  men 
present  in  ranks  in  their  company ;  hence  a  simple  division  of 
the  number  of  men  by  10  gives  the  number  of  boxes  required. 

The  distribution  to  a  war  strength  battalion  has  been  made 
in  this  manner  in  four  minutes. 

Extra  ammunition  is  not  issued  to  officers,  to  the  first  ser- 
geant, or  the  musicians.  These  men  have  other  more  impor- 
tant duties  to  perform  that  make  heavy  demands  upon  their 
powers  of  endurance,  aud  they  should  not  be  unnecessarily 
weighted  down. 

On  the  defense  extra  ammunition  is  stored  in  the  trenches 
in  convenient  locations.  Usually  boxes  are  placed  at  intervals 
in  recesses  dug  in  the  front  wall  of  the  trench  under  the 
parapet. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 
MUSKETRY    IN    TRENCH    WARFARE. 

238.  Nothing  in  the  present  war  (1917)  has  affected  the  gen- 
eral principles  of  war  as  known  and  accepted  by  military  men. 
Many  of  the  so-called  lessons  of  the  war  are  as  old  as  the  hills. 

The  situation  of  two  armies  facing  each  other  in  long  en- 
trenched lines  is  that  of  siege  warfare. 

The  same  methods  of  fighting  ( modified  by  the  employment  of 
the  increased  power  of  the  more  modern  weapons,  and  some  of 
the  weapons  of  the  ancients,  war  clubs,  etc.)  are  employed 
to-day  as  they  were  in  the  Crimea  and  at  Port  Arthur,  only  on 
a  scale  so  vast  as  to  be  almost  incomprehensible  to  the  average 
mind. 

The  world's  inventive  and  creative  genius  has  been  taxed  to 
the  utmost  to  develop  ways  and  means  of  using  and  combatting 
gas  attacks,  grenades  and  bombs,  snipers,  and  the  machine  gun, 
but  the  r51e  of  musketry  (the  use  of  the  rifle  and  its  bayonet) 
has  not  changed. 

All  authorities  insist  that  intelligent  fire  direction,  strict  fire 
control,  and  a  fire  discipline  foundetl  upon  careful  instruction 
and  implicit  obedience  to  orders  is  more  essential  to  success  than 
it  has  ever  been  before. 

239.  The  following  special  precautions  for  the  care  of  rifles  in 
the  trenches  have  been  found  necessary  : 

(1)  Rifles  must  be  kept  clean  and  well  oiled,  and  it  has  been 
found  necessary  to  make  an  inspection  daily,  or  even  oftener. 
Particular  care  must  be  taken  to  see  that  the  chamber  is  scrupu- 
lously clean.  If  it  is  permitted  to  become  dirty,  great  difficulty 
in  extraction  is  likely  to  be  experienced.  It  has  also  been 
found  that  cartridges  get  rusted  into  their  clips,  and  that  they 
should  be  moved  at  least  weekly.  The  bolt  and  magazine  must 
be  tested  daily  to  make  sure  that  they  are  working  freely. 
Many  accidents  will  be  avoided  if  men  are  never  allowed  to  keep 
a  cartridge  in  the  chamber. 

(2)  A  large  number  of  cases  have  occurred  of  rifles  becoming 
unserviceable  from  the  following  causes : 

188 


MUSKETRY.  189 

(a)  Mud  in  tlu'  lock,  owiii;,'  to  tlit'  rillc  Ikmiik  rested  on  a 
wet  parapet  or  dropped  on  wet  ground.  The  remedy  for  this 
is  to  cover  the  bolt  with  a  cloth  wrapper  or  an  old  sock  when- 
ever the  rifle  is  not  in  use  and  to  place  canvas  on  the  i)arapet. 
The  protectiiiir  niMterial  can  he  itulled  hack  wIhmi  it  is  refiuire<l 
to  use  the  ride. 

(b)  Mudd.v  annnunition.  resulting'  in  nuid  In  (he  chamber. 
The  renied.v  for  this  is  to  prohiliit  arnniunilion  being  put  on 
the  ground  and  to  i)r<)vide  boxes  or  tins  in  which  to  place  the 
ammunition.  It  is  a  good  plan  to  rub  the  annnunition  over  with 
an  oil.v  rag. 

(c)  Mud  in  the  muzzle,  owing  to  rifle  being  pushed  into  the 
sides  of  the  trenches.  The  only  remedy  is  to  see  that  rifles 
are  clear  before  tiring. 

(d)  Sticking  of  cartridges,  owing  to  dirt  in  the  chamber  or 
magazine.  If  tlie  chaml)er  is  not  kept  free  from  dirt,  the  car- 
tridge case  may  jam  and  extraction  become  difficult.  Similarly 
the  magazine  must  be  kept  clean  and  oiled,  otherwise  the  fol- 
lower will  not  work  freely. 

(e)  Rust  in  the  lock  and  Insufficient  oiling. 

It  is  well  to  remember  that  trench  warfare  can  not  last 
forever.  The  time  will  tome  when  one  side  must  make  a  huge 
effort  to  blow  a  hole  in  the  other  line.  The  attack  will  then 
take  the  form  of  one  of  great  depth  and  will  be  strongly  sup- 
ported by  artillery.  No  attempt  will  be  made  to  build  up 
firing  lines.  It  will  be  a  series  of  assaults  by  line  after  lino. 
One  must  therefore  be  prepared  to  dash  forward  across  the 
enemy's  trenches,  and  wlien  he  is  "nn  the  riin  "'  keep  liini  at  it. 

EXERCISES. 

240.  I. — Object:   To  teach  the  attack  in  trench  warfare. 

Method:  In  company  training  the  captain  may  assume  that 
his  connuand  has  reached  the  fire  trenches,  which  are  as  yet  too 
far  from  the  enemy's  defenses  to  enable  the  final  assault  to  be 
made  from  them.  The  company  should  construct  two  lines  of 
trenches  a  hundred  yards  or  so  apart  and  facing  toward  each 
other.  It  will  occupy  one  of  these  lines  and  sap  approach 
trenches,  branching  out  into  parallels,  toward  the  other,  until 
the  last  parallel  is  only  about  40  yards  from  it.  This  last 
parallel  must  be  extra  deep  and  strong.  Head  coyer  should  be 
provided  for  It  by  sandbags,  etc.,  overhead  cover  and  wire  net- 
ting raised  to  keep  out  bombs,  blinded  loopholes  made,  and 


190  MUSKETRY. 

periscopes  used  to  observe  the  supposed  hostile  trench.  The 
men  can  be  trained  to  hurl  dummy  bombs — tin  cans  filled  with 
earth  will  do — into  the  enemy's  defenses.  When  the  actual 
assault  is  to  be  made,  the  last  parallel  should  be  crowded  with 
as  many  men  as  it  will  hold;  while  the  rest  of  the  company  is 
massed  in  the  approach  and  original  fire  trenches.  The  watches 
of  all  the  officers  and  platoon  leaders  should  be  set  to  corre- 
spond, and  the  order  given  that  <it  a  fixed  time  the  firing  is  to 
cease  and  the  assault  made.  Bayonets  will  be  fixed  and  rapid 
fire  opened.  The  artillery  is  supposed  to  be  shelling  the  enemy's 
trench  and  wire  entanglements.  When  the  watches  show  the 
given  minute  the  rifie  fire  ceases,  the  signal  is  given,  and  the 
whole  company  should  climb  out  of  the  trenches  and  dash  at 
top  speed  for  the  hostile  trench.  Once  in  it,  everyone  should  go 
to  work  to  turn  its  defenses  round  to  face  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion. The  sandbags  and  earth  of  its  parapet  must  be  thrown  to 
the  other  side  and  piled  up  for  protection.  Empty  sandbags 
should  have  been  brought  up  by  some  of  the  men  and  now  must 
be  hurriedly  filled  and  placed  in  position.  Wire  entanglements 
will  be  put  up  on  the  enemy's  side  of  the  captured  trench,  com- 
munication trenches  dug  back  to  the  last  parallel,  ammunition 
and  water  brought  up  and  stored,  and  all  preparations  made 
against  counter  attack. 


CTTAPTKIJ  XVTTT. 
THE  SOLUTION  OF  FIRE  PROBLEMS. 

241.  Tlic  tronp  It'iult'i-  jic-quiri'S  I'licility  in  tlu-  sitlutinii  of  liri; 
])rol)leiii.s  by  nieniis  of: 

(o)  Slap  in'oblems, 

(b)  Terrain  exercises. 

(c)  Preliminary  exercises  witlioiit  liall   anununition. 

(d)  Prol)lenis  witli  ball  ainnninition. 

THE  SOLUTION. 

242.  The  solution  of  fire  problems  under  assumed  battle  condi- 
tions requires  a  trained  military  mind,  a  knowledge  of  minor 
tactics,  and  a  proficiency  in  musketry. 

243.  Estimate  of  the  situation. — "An  estimate  of  the  situation 
involves  a  careful  consideration,  from  the  corumanaer's  view- 
point, of  all  the  circumstances  affecting  the  particular  problem. 
In  making  this  estimate  he  considers  his  mission  as  set  forth 
in  the  orders  or  instructions  under  which  he  is  acting,  or  as 
deduced  by  him  from  his  knowledge  of  the  situation,  all  avail- 
able information  of  the  enemy  (strength,  position,  movements, 
probable  intentions,  etc.),  conditions  affecting  his  own  command 
(strength,  position,  supporting  troops,  etc.),  and  the  terrain  in 
so  far  as  it  affects  the  particular  military  situation.  He  then 
compares  the  various  plans  of  action  open  to  him  and  decides 
upon  the  one  that  will  best  enable  him  to  accomplish  his  mis- 
sion."    (I'iir.  SO.  F.  S.  U.) 

244.  Details  of  the  fire  estimate  and  order. 

(a)  The  Fike  Estimate. 

LOCATION,  STRENGTH,  AND  INTENTION  OF  THE  ENEMY. 

245.  Observation  of  targets. — The  target  and  adjacent  fore- 
ground should  be  given  as  thorough  a  study  prior  to  opening 
fire  as  the  time  element  and  accomplishment  of  the  mission  \\ill 

101 


192  MUSKETRY. 

permit,  and  it  sliould  he  lcei»t  under  constant  observation  during 
the  entire  action.  All  available  field  glasses  should  constantly 
sweep  the  front  for  observation  of  fire  effect  and  to  observe  the 
enemy's  change  of  position  so  that  the  leader  will  be  ready  to 
meet  the  enemy's  detachments  with  fire  from  whatever  quarter 
of  the  foreground  they  may  appear. 

246.  Determination  of  ranges. — Before  a  decision  can  be  ren- 
dered as  to  the  method  of  adjustment  to  be  employed  (sight 
setting  to  be  ordered,  or  the  use  of  battle  or  leaf  sight,  or  tlie 
employment  of  combined  sights),  consideration  must  be  giveu 
to  the  method  for  obtaining  the  range  or  ranges,  whether  they 
be  obtained  by  estimation  by  the  eye,  taken  from  «i  map,  deter- 
mined from  an  instrument  ov  by  ranging  fire,  or  actually  meas- 
ured. 

247.  Relative  importance  of  targets. — The  estimate  in  this  con- 
nection embodies  two  factors — the  selection  of  the  enemy  tar- 
gets that  should  be  fired  upon  and  the  determination  of  tlie 
size  of  the  units  that  will  be  ordered  to  fire  on  the  selected 
targets. 

248.  Strength  of  firing  line. — The  number  of  rifles  to  be  placed 
in  the  firing  line  must  be  sufficient  to  accomplish  the  mission. 
The  determination  of  this  strength  must  be  the  result  of  sound 
judgment  exercised  by  the  leader  on  the  ground  after  a  careful 
analysis  of  the  mission  and  the  means  to  be  employed  to  accom- 
plish it. 

249.  Location  of  fire  positions. — The  nature  of  the  problem 
and  the  character  of  the  terrain  are  tlie  governing  features 
in  selecting  fire  positions.  In  defensive,  outpost,  or  rear  guard 
actions  it  is  evident  that  great  attention  can  be  given  not  only 
to  the  selection  of  main  and  auxiliary  fire  positions,  but  to  the 
consideration  of  advance  positions  for  firing,  and  to  the  prepara- 
tion of  carefully  chosen  positions  in  rear  of  the  main  one.  lu 
the  attacli  it  may  or  may  not  be  possible  to  select  more  than  one 
firing  position  at  the  commencement  of  the  fire  figlit.  However, 
if  it  is  practicable,  it  should  be  done. 

250.  Classes  of  firing. — The  character  of  fire  (collective  or  in- 
dividual) and  one  of  the  various  classes  must  be  selected.  The 
object  to  be  attained  will  determine  the  use  of  volleys,  fire  at 
will,  or  clip  fire.  The  visibility  factor  of  the  target  may  require 
indirect  fire  by  use  of  an  auxiliary  aiming  point,  the  uncertainty 
of  the  correctness  of  the  range  may  demand  ranging  fire  (iadi-^ 
vidual,  collective,  and  selected  shots),  etc. 


MUSKETRY.  198 

251.  Rate  of  fire.--'J'lio  rato  of  firo  doponds  upon  tli<^  purpose 
of  the  action,  the  diaractor  of  the  target,  and  tlio  avaihd)le 
annaunitlon.  The  rate  is  afrect<Hl  l»y  many  factors,  as  trainin;:, 
ran^'e.  size  and  visibility  of  target,  position  of  lircr.  dcgroo  of 
surroinidlng  exciteinont,  etc. 

252.  Time  of  opening  fire. — The  time  of  oi^ening  tire  is  ii  factor 
of  prime  importance  aiul  may  or  may  not  be  left  to  the  discretion 
of  the  troop  leader  with  which  tlie  problem  deals.  In  any  cast\ 
fire  should  not  be  opened  until  the  director's  fire  estimate  has 
determined  upon  the  target,  sight  setting,  class  and  rate  of  (ire, 
and  mider  no  circumstancos  until  the  troops  are  ready  to  fire. 

253.  Formations  in  advancing  under  fire. — The  be.st  is  the  one 
that  will  best  aid  in  gaining  lire  superiority  an<l  defeating  the 
enemy   ^^■lth  tlie  least  loss  of  men,  time,  and  control. 

294.  Ammunition  supply. — This  detail  of  the  estimate  for  com- 
pany and  troop  ollicers  Is  usually  simply  a  consideration  and 
nn  appreciation  of  the  amount  issued  to  the  individual  and  how 
It  can  best  be  utilized  in  fulfilling  the  assigned  mission. 

For  tield  officers  it  embodies  the  question  of  maintaining  the 
supply  and  that  of  Issue  to  troops, 

{b)  Thic  Fiiac  Ohueb. 

255.  Announcement  of  the  sight  setting. — This  may  or  may 
not  coincide  with  the  range  estimate. 

256.  Designation  of  tf.rgets  (Chap.  V). — It  is  nece.ssary  here 
to  impres.s  tipon  one  that  the  degree  of  the  target'.s  visibility 
determines  the  extent  of  definition  necessary.  Having  this  in 
mind,  it  is  seen  that  the  two  extremes  will  be  when  the  target 
is  so  obvious  that  no  description  whatever  is  required,  and 
when  it  is  so  indistinct  that  one  may  be  taxed  to  use  a  refer- 
ence point  and  a  combination  of  the  two  clocks  and  finger  sys- 
tems. The  goal  to  be  reachetl  is  an  unmistalcable  designation 
esrpressed  in  the  simplest  and  most  direct  manner  in  terms 
common  to  all. 

ASSIGNMENT  OF  TROOPS  TO  TARGETS. 

For  the  details  of  the  systems  used  in  the  assignment  of 
targets  see  Chapter  VIII. 

257.  Directions  as  to  occupation  of  fire  positions. — These  di- 
rections may  not  be  necessary  at  all,  or  they  may  be  very  sim- 
ple and  covered  in  the  order  with  the  statement  that  the  unit 

3529°— 17 13 


194  MUSKETRY. 

will  (K-cupy  "this  position"  witli  its  rifiht  at  "that  point."  or 
several  positions  may  l>e  designated  for  the  various  units  to 
occupy  in  the  opening  lire  fight  against  their  particular  assigned 
target.  In  addition  to  tlie  position  from  which  the  fire  fight  is 
commenced,  the  order  may  announce  a  second  fire  position  in 
tlie  foi'eground  that  will  be  occupied  in  the  advance.  In  defen- 
sive rear-guai-d  and  outpost  actions  it  is  quite  evident  that  di- 
rections may  be  given  for  the  occupation  of  several  fire  po- 
sitions. There  are  times  when  these  directions  will  be  unnec- 
essary, and  there  are  occasions  when  such  directions  will  be  so 
clearly  related  to  the  firing  that  they  will  logically  form  pare 
of  the  fire  order. 

258.  Rate  of  fire. — The  rate  of  fire  may  or  may  not  be  an- 
nounced in  the  order.  With  well-trained  troops  the  rates  given 
in  S.  A.  F.  M.,  paragraph  209,  would  probably  be  employed 
without  caution.  However,  as  the  rate  of  fire  is  so  directly  re- 
lated to  the  vulnerable  area  of  the  target  as  well  as  to  the 
range,  it  may  be  better  to  announce  the  rate  desired  in  order  to 
insure  that  the  proper  volume  of  fire  is  attained  within  the  re- 
quired time.  The  rate  is  increased  or  decreased  by  the  com- 
mands "  Faster  "  and  "  Slower." 

259.  Class  of  fire. — The  selection  of  the  kind  of  fire  should 
result  from  the  estimate  and  be  announced  in  the  order  as 
"  Fire  at  will  "  or  "  Clip  fire." 

260.  Time  of  opening  fire. — Ordinarily  this  would  be  confined 
to  the  estimate  and  no  expression  given  to  it  in  the  order.  How- 
ever, so  diversified  are  the  factors  in  a  fire  order  that  some 
such  time  announcement  as  "  Open  fire  when  you  are  ready," 
etc.,  may  be  pertinent. 

261.  Position  of  leader  during  firing. — The  company  com- 
mander or  commander  of  a  small  firing  line  will  ordinarily  be 
opposite  the  center  of  the  rear  of  the  line  he  is  directing  or 
upon  that  flank  which  offers  the  best  opportunity  for  control 
of  the  line,  observation  of  the  enemy  targets,  and  the  fire  effect. 
His  position  must  be  such  that  control  is  dii'ect  or  where  his 
will  is  easily  and  promptly  transmitted.  He  must  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  control  the  ammunition  supply.  His  position  must  not 
be  fixed,  but  it  must  be  known  to  all  of  his  subordinates.  A 
leader,  who  has  decided  to  take  position  on  the  flank  of  his 
deployed  line,  to  observe  better  the  fire  fight,  and  who  feels 
that  his  subordinates  should  be  informed  as  to  his  location,  as 
communication  might  thus  better  be  facilitated,  should  include 
his  post  in  the  fire  order. 


MUSKETRY, 


195 


I'titil  facility  is  obtained  in  tlie  solution  of  fin'  prohleius,  the 
con  trolling  factors  sliould  1)0  talion  up  in  some  such  orderly 
manner  as  shown  in  the  forepoinfr.  It  is  almost  certjiin  that  a 
decision  reached  after  consideration  of  the  factors  noted  will 
be  of  more  value  and  more  nearly  correct  than  if  based  simply 
Oil  mental  impressions. 

There  will  be  few  occasions  in  which  all  of  the  factors  enumer- 
ated above  will  have  to  be  thought  out  In  (he  estimate  and  an- 
nounced iu  the  tire  orders.  In  fact,  the  simplicity  of  most 
problems,  particularly  those  conducted  on  "A"  ranges  will  make 
it  unnecessary  to  give  any  consideration  to  many  of  them. 
Again,  it  must  be  remembered  that  at  the  moment  wlien  the 
fire  orders  nmst  be  issued  many  of  the  factors  embraced  in  the 
estimate  will  liave  been  considered,  some  of  them  in  an  involun- 
tary manner.  On  some  occasions  the  fire  order  may  be  as  simple 
as  "  Fire  at  will." 

262.  An  example  of  a  map  problem  and  a  possible  solution. 
(See  Chap.  XXI  for  methods  in  the  construction  of  fire  prob- 
lems. ) 


Fig.  58. 


Capt.  X's  company  (eight  squads)  has  left  the  main  body  on 
a  special  mission,  "  To  marcli  south  to  reconnoiter  and  to  protect 
bridges  at  A."     (Fig.  58.) 

On  arrival  at  B  the  point  signals,  "  Halt.  Enemy  in  sight  in 
force."  Capt.  X  directs  rapid  assembling  near  B  and  joins  the 
second  lieutenant,  who  is  now  with  the  point. 

The  second  lieutenant  presents  Capt.  X  with  the  results  of  his 
observation,  as  follows :  About  50  led  horses  in  south  fringe  of 
woods  just  east  of  railroad  bridge,  about  10  mounted  men  halted 
about  300  yards  northeast  of  bridges  tearing  out  wire  fence, 
about  35  men  dismounted  moving  from  led  horses  toward  rail- 


196  MUSKETRY. 

road  bridge,  and  alioiit  IT)  iiKninted  men  at  C  movinR  north  alotifi 
road. 

Requirements:    (1)   Tlie  fire  estimate;    (2)    tlie  fire  orders. 

A  SOLUTION. 

263.  The  fire  estimate. — The  captain,  with  his  glasses,  studies 
tlie  front,  verifies  the  targets  pointed  out,  calls  the  lieutenant's 
attention  to  the  telegraph  poles  and  to  the  wire  fence  and 
directs  him  to  obtain  range  with  his  musketry  rule  and  to 
remain  in  observation  of  the  target.  The  captain  hastily  looks 
over  the  ground  for  fire  positions.  On  arrival  of  the  company 
the  platoon  leaders  and  range  estimators  are  assembled  and 
targets  pointed  out  with  direction  to  estimate  ranges.  The 
captain,  in  the  meantime  is  weighing  the  relative  importance 
of  the  targets.  He  determines  their  target  value  as  follows: 
(1)  The  men  moving  toward  bridges,  the  captain's  mission 
being  to  protect  the  bridges  and  the  appearance  being  that 
these  dismounted  men  are  on  a  mission  to  destroy  them.  The 
mounted  men  north  and  northeast  evidently  have  missions  as 
covering  patrols.  (2)  The  led  horses.  Good  target  and  oppor- 
tunity for  large  number  of  hits.  If  horses  are  routed,  the 
effectiveness  of  the  troop  as  a  mounted  organization  has  been 
destroyed,  and  besides  the  moral  effect  of  such  rout  would 
probably  materially  impair  the  troopers  dismounted  action. 
(3)  The  detachment  north  of  bridge.  Unless  they  are  fired 
upon  they  may  continue  on  their  mission.  It  seems  possible 
to  at  least  throw  them  into  confusion  and  defeat  the  accom- 
plishment of  their  task.  (4)  The  small  detachment  is  con- 
tinually presenting  a  better  target,  is  not  dangerous,  and  can 
well  be  covered  by  a  few  men.  The  captain  determines  the 
target  value  and  assigmuent  as  follows:  Target  I,  4  squads; 
Target  II,  2  squads ;  Target  III,  1  squad ;  Target  IV,  1  squad. 
The  captain  estimates  that  he  can  accomplish  something  more 
than  his  "  mission  "  ;  therefore  he  detei'mines  to  take  advantage 
of  the  vulnerable  targets  presented  to  him  and  endeavor  to 
completely  destroy  the  effectiveness  of  this  hostile  troop. 

The  captain  estimates  that,  as  the  ranges  obtained  by  the  lieu- 
tenant and  the  range  estimators  practically  agree,  there  is  no 
necessity  for  the  use  of  "  ranging  fire  "  or  "  combined  sights," 
and  that  "  fire  at  will "  is  the  proper  class  of  fire  to  be  used. 
He  estimates  the  situation  as  requiring  the  delivery  of  a  heavy 


MUSKETRY.  197 

volume  of  accurate  fire.  Tlie  increase<i  ^•ulnerability  of  llu' 
tarjrets  makes  it  possible  to  increase  the  standard  rates  without 
destroylnj;:  tire  effectiveness. 

The  captain  determines  to  put  all  rifles  in  the  fire  fight,  to 
open  fire  as  soon  as  the  various  leaders  are  ready,  and  to  use  his 
last  round  of  ammunition,  if  necessary,  to  carry  out  his  deci- 
sion. 

264.  The  fire  orders. — To  first  lieutenant:  First  platoon,  lir- 
inj,'  position  on  this  crest,  your  right  at  that  fence;  target.  l^~< 
dismounted  men  near  bridge;  "range  8<X)";  rate,  10  per 
minute.^ 

To  second  lieutenant:  Fifth  and  sixth  squads,  firing  position 
on  this  crest,  your  left  at  that  fence;  target,  led  horses;  "range 
750  "  ;  rate,  12  per  minute. 

To  Sergt.  A. :  Eighth  squad,  firing  position  on  tliis  crest,  your 
right  at  that  road ;  target,  iuounte<l  men  north  of  the  bridges ; 
"  range  l.(M)0  "  ;  rate.  8  i)er  minute. 

To  Sergt.  B. :  Seventh  squad,  firing  position  on  this  crest  to  the 
left  of  the  eighth  .squad ;  target,  mounted  men  east  of  railroad  ; 
"  range  600  "  ;  rate,  12  per  minute. 

The  captain  then  directed  all  as  follows:  "^Maintain  your  ratt- 
of  fire  if  observation  of  fire  determines  effectiveness  of  siglit 
setting.  Signal  when  you  are  ready  (raise  hand  with  palm 
toward  me).  I  will  signal  when  to  commence  firing  (arm  ex- 
tended moving  in  a  horizontal  plane).  All  will  use  fire  at  will 
and  expend  ammunition  necessary  to  accomplish  assigned  mis- 
sions. I  will  be  here  (about  halfway  between  road  and  wire 
fence)." 

265.  A  terrain  exercise. — The  class  is  taken  to  the  west  face 
of  the  hill  near  B  and  given  the  following  situation  : 

Our  (blue)  forces  from  the  south  are  engaged  with  the  enemy 
(i-(h1s)  who  is  occupying  the  general  line  Hill  A-east.  (Fig.  59.) 
A  blue  battalion  is  reconnoitering  the  iMght  flank  of  the  reds 
and  one  company,  covered  by  combat  and  flank  patrols,  has 
worked  its  way  under  screen  to  this  position.  Capt.  X,  com- 
manding a  blue  company,  of  two  platoons,  observes  from  this 
point  a  red  battery  going  into  ]»osition  on  the  northwest  slope 
of  Hill  A. 

Requirement :  The  fire  estimate,  the  fire  order. 

'  Note  that  the  range  is  not  given  first  In  this  case  because  It  is  given 
to  the  platoon  leaders  and  that  the  range  estimators  are  estimating  the 
range  while  the  captain  gives  the  orders.  The  platoon  leaders  will  give 
the  rangre  to  the  men  the  first  thingr. 


198  MUSKETRY. 

A    SOLUTION. 

266.  The  fire  estimate. — Capt.  X,  upon  arrival  at  the  hill, 
k'ariis  the  situation  from  Lieut.  V,  who  is  assumed  to  be  with 
tlie  point  and  in  observation  of  the  target.  Capt.  X  gives 
orders  for  the  company  to  deploy  on  ground  indicated  for  a 
living  position  just  east  of  the  road.  Platoon  leaders  and  range 
estimators  report  to  the  captain,  and  the  range  to  nearest  gun 
is  determined  to  be  1,100.  The  captain  states  that  he  can  see 
tlie  location  of  the  four  guns  and  caissons  in  the  "  firing  bat- 
tery." That  the  guns  are  moving  preparatory  to  unlimbering. 
The  targets  are  all  extremely  vulnerable,  and  are  of  equal  im- 
portance. The  moving  target  requires  a  rapid  delivery  of  fire 
and  this  can  best  be  attained  by  use  of  individual  fire.  The 
standard  rate,  at  this  range,  owing  to  great  vulnerability  of 
tr.rget,  can  be  greatly  increased. 

It  is  evident  that  as  the  target  is  about  100  yards  between 
flanks  it  must  be  subdivided  in  order  that  the  company  may  get 
the  best  firing  effect. 

Capt.  X  feels  that  the  correctness  of  the  estimate  at  this 
range  is  doubtful.  Furthermore,  the  extent  of  the  target  is 
longitudinal  in  direction,  and  the  increased  error  caused  by 
the  use  of  combined  sights  will  only  tend  to  increase  the  depth 
of  the  beaten  zone — a  consideration  not  so  objectionable  when 
the  longitudinal  is  greater  than  the  lateral  axis  of  the  target. 

Paragraph  217,  S.  A.  F.  M.,  states:  "When  means  of  exact 
determination  are  not  available  and  indications  of  impact  are 
lacking  or  insufficient,  and  the  range  can  not  be  learned  from 
the  artillery  or  neighboring  troops,  some  error  in  the  range 
must  be  expected.  In  such  case,  through  the  expedient  of  com- 
bined sights,  a  greater  depth  of  beaten  zone  may  be  created, 
giving  an  assurance  of  effect  wliich  might  not  be  otherwise 
obtained.     *     *     *  " 

He  realizes  that  the  vulnerability  of  the  target  will  be  mate- 
rially reduced  if  he  does  not  open  fire  before  the  guns  luilimber, 
so  he  determines  upon  opening  fire  immediately  upon  being  sig- 
naled by  the  platoon  leaders  that  they  are  ready.  He  will  use 
sufficient  ammunition  to  put  the  battery  out  of  action,  or  as 
nearly  so  as  possilile. 

267.  The  fixe  orders. — First  platoon,  target,  nearest  two  guns; 
range  3,150  and  1,050.  Second  platoon,  target,  furthest  two 
guns;  range  1,150  and  1,250.  Fire  at  will.  Rate,  eight  per 
minute.     It  is  desired  to  open  fire  as  soon  as  possible.     I  shall 


MUSKETRY.  199 

sifTiuil  Nvlirii  In  coimiii'iicc  tiriii^'.  I  sliall  be  on  tlio  ri;:li(  liaiiU 
of  the  coiiipany.  The  first  scrjioant,  in  roar  of  tlio  contcr  of  flio 
conipaiiy.  will  traiisinil  nil  si;,'iials. 

NOTK. — The  form  of  the  ordiT  Is  intt'udfd  as  a  jjulde.  In  the  case 
above  the  company  is  in  posit ioji  so  location  is  not  mentioned.  The 
situation  demamls  hasle  in  tlie  pr<'paration,  so  Capt.  X  announces  this 
fact,  and  to  be  sure  that  he  Is  not  misunderstood  he  adds  that,  "  I 
shall  sitrnal  when  to  commence  liring."  Nothing  Is  lost  by  a  statement 
of  the  necessity  for  hast«',  and  much  may  be  gained  in  communication 
by  statinj;  the  location  of  his  post. 

268.  A  problem  without  ball  ammunition. — Capt.  A  marches 
liis  company  to  woods  A,  causes  it  to  "fall  out,"  and  directs 
platoon  leaders,  ranjie  estimators,  and  buglers  to  accompany 
him.  Upon  arrival  at  the  ridge  I>  he  presents  the  following 
situation : 

"  f )ur  battalion  retn.-iiiis  jit  Y  (some  point  ti>  tlie  west).  Tins 
<'omp;iny  h;is  been  sent  forward  to  recomioiter  the  enemy's  out- 
post iHtsition  aloiif^  the  ridjie  B-C,  with  a  mission  to  devehtp 
tlie  enemy's  stren.^lh  ;it  B.  Our  reconnoiteriuK  patrols  have 
fraimxl  this  ridge  and  halted.  Corp.  Z  reports  that  he  saw  10 
or  15  men  in  the  lieavy  brush  north  of  the  road  at  B,  and  that 
one  of  the  members  of  his  patrol  saw  tit  least  that  number  near 
the  house  just  south  of  the  road." 

Capt.  X  directs  the  odicers  to  study  tlie  terrain  near  B  with 
their  field  glas.ses,  the  first  lieutenant  to  the  north  and  the  sec- 
ond lieutenant  to  the  south  of  the  road.  The  buglers  are  di- 
rected to  use  tlieir  held  ghis.ses  on  the  terrain  near  C. 

All  are  directed  to  take  the  prone  position  and  remain  in  con- 
cealment from  an  imaginary  enemy  on  ridge  B-C.  (A  few 
drab  targets  placed  north  and  south  of  the  road  at  B  and  near 
C  would  add  materially  to  the  exercise.) 

In  ab<mt  two  minutes  the  captain  rixiuires  a  report  from  each 
as  to  what  -tlettiils  have  been  observed  that  could  not  htive  been 
picked  up  with  the  naked  eye. 

269.  The  capluiu  then  assumes  ti  situation  retiuiring  fire  to 
l)e  opened,  that  trenches  have  been  lo<-ated,  describes  their  loca- 
tion, and  directs  the  estimators  to  obtain  the  range,  calling  their 
attention  to  the  telephone  posts  along  the  roadway.  He  makes 
his  fire  e.stimate  and  issues  his  fire  orders.  lie  directs  the  esti- 
mtitors  and  one  bugler  to  ol)serve  the  ttirget  :nid  the  jilat'Min 
leaders  to  join  their  platoons  and  to  explain  in  detail  to  the 
men  of  their  jilatoons  the  ntiture  of  the  exercise.  lie  then 
takes  command  or  turns  tlu!  comi)any  over  to  one  of  the  officers 
and  the  exercise  is  carried  to  a  completion. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

THE  UMPIRE. 

270.  In  order  to  derive  tlie  maximum  benefits  from  an  exer- 
cise, eitlier  witli  or  without  ball  ammunition,  it  should  be  fol- 
lowed by  a  critique  delivered  on  the  ground  innuediately  after 
the  conclusion  of  the  exercise. 

271.  The  critique. — The  umpire  must  know  all  of  the  details 
of  the  problem,  render  all  necessary  decisions,  and  deliver  the 
critique. 

It  is  evident  that  the  umpire,  who  delivers  the  critique,  must 
know  all  the  conditions  influencing  the  result  and  must  be 
able  not  only  to  diagnose  the  case  but  to  apply  remedial  sug- 
gestions whenever  necessary. 

The  umpire  has  general  charge  of  the  exercise,  sees  that  the 
data  required  on  the  form  is  properly  kept,  delivers  the  critique, 
and  renders  decisions  whenever  necessary.  The  umpire  should 
be  assisted  by  two  or  more  junior  officers  in  all  exercises  in- 
volving companies  or  larger  organizations.  These  assistants 
should  keep  the  record  of  the  details  of  the  leadership  and 
conduct  of  troops,  and  one,  accompanied  by  a  competent  sig- 
nalist,  should  be  charged  with  making  the  report  on  the  con- 
duct of  the  troops  as  observed  from  the  enemy's  viewpoint, 
use  being  made  of  a  periscope  when  ball  ammunition  is  used. 
An  officer  should  be  designated  to  note  the  statistics  required 
in  the  "  Umpire's  record  "  and  to  record  the  time  factor  men- 
tioned in  the  next  paragraph. 

272.  The  time  element  should  be  taken  cognizance  of — 

When  the  situation  is  given  out. 

When  the  first  firing  position  is  reached. 

When  the  fire  commenced   and  ceased  at  each  firing 
position. 

Length  of  time  in  advancing  from  one  position  to  en- 
other. 

When  any  important  order  is  given  or  when  any  inci- 
dent worthy  of  note  occurs. 
In  in.structional  firing  occasions  may  arise  when  it  might  be 
well  to  stop  the  fire  in  order  to  call  attention  to  poor  control, 

200 


MUSKETRY.  201 

poor  discipline,  or  to  give  any  otiier  instruction,  which  is  always 
more  readily  understood  and  best  absorbed  when  given  at  the 
time  of  occiuTi'nce. 

The  instructor  or  unii»ire  siiould  impress  upon  all  that  the 
tire  problems  during  tiie  period  of  instruction  are  not  to  be  con- 
sidered as  tests,  hut  that  the  i)r()l)!ems  are  constructed  and 
solved  for  instructional  purposes  only. 

On  some  occasions  in  the  early  stages  of  the  training,  and 
particularly  where  opportunities  for  combat  tiring  are  limited, 
it  may  be  better  for  the  umpire  to  correct  the  sight  setting  an- 
nounced, if  it  varies  more  than  10  per  cent  from  the  true  range, 
than  to  s])oil  the  problem  by  permitting  the  use  of  an  incorrect 
setting.  This  with  a  view  of  saving  ammunition  and  giving  the 
otlicers  and  noncommissioned  olhcers  an  opportunity  to  demon- 
strate their  ability  in  direction  and  control  and  the  men  their 
training  in  lire  discipline.  In  the  critique  it  could  be  stated 
what  would  have  been  the  effect  had  the  announced  sight  set- 
ting been  used.  There  is  no  use  of  having  the  object  of  the 
exercise  defeated  at  its  commencement  by  a  wild  estimate  of 
the  range. 

It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  after  the  instructional 
period  is  completed  the  fire  problem  with  ball  anununition  is 
the  test  of  an  otlicer  or  noncommissioned  ollicer  and  a  detach- 
ment in  fire  tactics  embodying  direction,  ccnitrol,  and  discipline, 
and  in  such  cases  the  umpire  should  interfere  as  little  as  pos- 
sible with  the  conduct  of  the  action.  However,  he  may  place  out 
of  action  at  any  time  individuals  or  groups  who  expose  them- 
selves unduly. 

In  order  that  the  results  in  any  complete  statistical  analysis 
of  the  firing  may  be  of  value  as  a  study  and  as  a  comparison, 
after  firing  at  a  target  the  amnumition  still  unfired  should  be 
cliecked  in  order  to  determine  the  number  of  rounds  firtnl  on  any 
given  target. 

When  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  firing  is  to  he  made  the 
number  of  rounds  fired  and  hits  made  at  the  firing  positions 
are  absolutely  essenti.il  in  proldems  where  the  test  is  to  deter- 
mine fire  accuracy,  inlluence  of  fatigue,  etc.  F(U"  examjile,  in 
a  number  of  German  tests  it  was  observed,  by  checking  the  hits 
made  at  each  halt,  that  the  fire  at  HOO  yards  where  rushes 
were  conunencetl  was  more  accurate  than  at  the  closer  ranges 
where  the  influence  of  fatigue  overcame  the  training  factor. 


202  MUSKETRY. 

The  rate  of  fire  in  the  second  cohiiun  of  Table  I,  statistical 
records  (par.  361),  represents  a  number  of  shots  per  niinuie 
(on  a  target  presenting  to  the  view  of  the  flrer  the  vulnerable 
area  of  prone  figures),  which,  if  increased  or  decreased,  will 
result  in  a  decrease  of  hits  per  minute.  The  table  rate  of 
fire  of  the  average  shot  is  therefoi^e  primarily  based  on  range 
and  tlie  vulnerable  area  of  the  prone  target.  In  combat  firing 
exercises  the  tactical  situation  requiring  the  maximum  num- 
ber of  hits  in  a  given  time  on  an  increased  vulnerable  target 
area  is  a  factor  which  the  umpire  must  consider  in  judging 
the  rate  of  fire. 

The  umpire  must  present  the  leader  of  the  troops  with  a 
statement  of  the  assumed  enemy-target's  fire  and  its  effect. 

273.  The  umpire  should  insist  that  in  the  "  setting  up  "  of 
the  exercise  it  include  the  targets  simulating  fire.  This  feature 
is  one  that  should  never  be  neglected,  and  its  omission  will  fre- 
quently destroy  the  good  points  of  the  best-prepared  fl\-ing 
problem. 

In  rendering  a  decision  on  the  assumed  effect  of  fire  of  the 
enemy  target,  the  basis  must  be  the  estimated  fire  eflicaey  of 
average  shots.  The  class,  rate,  and  effect  of  the  enemy-target's 
fire,  assumed  by  the  umpire,  is  based  on  the  character  of  the 
leadership  and  conduct  of  the  troops  and  their  own  apporent 
fire  effect. 

For  example,  at  the  commencement  of  an  exercise,  and  later 
during  its  progress,  the  troop  leader  may  be  informed  as  to  the 
enemy-target's  fire,  as  follows : 

(a)  He  is  using  "Ranging  "  platoon  volleys  on  your  position. 

( b )  He  is  opening  "  Fire  at  will "  on  you. 

(c)  He  is  using  "  Fire  faster  "  at  a  rate  of  about  10  shots  per 
minute. 

(d)  He  has  superiority  or  fire. 

(e)  His  fire  does  not  prevent  your  advancing,  etc. 

Whenever  the  troop  leader  is  informed  that  he  has  not  superi- 
ority of  fire,  he  should  make  an  estimate  at  once  as  to  the  cause 
or  causes  of  his  failure  and  give  action  immediately  to  his 
decision. 

274.  The  umpire's  ruling  may  have  been  based  on  one  or  more 
of  the  following  conditions  : 

(ffl)  Leader's  indifference  to  enemy's  fire. 
(6)  Error  too  great  in  estimation  of  range, 
(c)   Poor  defilade  or  concealment. 


MUSKETRY.  203 

(f/)   Hiito  not  siilliciontly  hi^rli  <»r  tf)0  great. 

(c)   Size  of  riishiiif;  iinits  too  great. 

(/)   Lack  of  leaniwork. 

(g)  Poor  designation  of  target. 

{h)  Apportionment  of  target  not  clear. 

(f)   Fire  not  wisely  (listril)ute(l  on  tlie  several  target  groups. 

(;■)   Ooncral  lack  of  lire  control  or  discipline,  etc. 

In  all  combat  firing  exercises  where  the  umpire  is  to  exprt^s 
an  opinion  on  the  ground  as  to  the  results  of  the  tiring,  (he  range 
and  the  time  of  firing  in  minutes  and  second.s  are  the  essential 
factors  in  determining  the  proper  distribution. 

Under  no  circumstances  should  the  umpire  permit  an  argu- 
ment as  to  the  result  of  his  decision.  This,  however,  does  not 
forbid  the  correction  of  any  apparent  error  in  the  record.  "  It 
must  be  rememltered  (hat  the  decision  of  an  innpire  is  rendered 
in  accordance  with  his  best  judgment,  and  though  the  decision 
may  appear  wrong,  the  outcome  in  actual  combat,  due  to  the 
element  of  chance  in  war.  might  have  been  as  he  decided." 

THE    UMPIRE'S   ASSISTANT. 

275.  In  order  that  the  umpire  may  draw  a  more  accurate  con- 
clusion of  the  "  Leadcrsliiit  and  conduct,"  an  assistant,  accom- 
panied by  a  competent  signal  ist,  should  observe  the  troops 
and  report  on  their  conduct  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  enemy. 
When  ball  ammunition  is  not  used,  the  assistant  should  take 
a  position  similar  to  and  among  the  targets.  When  ball  am- 
munition is  used,  the  assistant  should  be  provided  with  a  peri- 
.scope  (or  improvised  one)  and  take  a  position  in  the  pit  or 
on  one  flank  and  on  line  with  the  target.  In  order  to  aid  the 
assistant  who  observes  the  troops  from  the  position  of  the  enemy 
the  following  points  may  be  noted  or  a  memorandum  given 
him  by  the  umpire : 

Advance  of  troops  di.scerned  from  noticeable  efftx't  of  move- 
ment in  the  animal  and  plant  life,  from  noises,  or  from  sounds 
of  the  voice,  bugle,  or  whistle. 

Formations,  preparatory  to  deployment. 

Groups,  exposed  in  observation. 

Deployment,  under  tire. 

Movements  by  the  Hank  of  uiiKs  and  indiviilnals  while  mider 
fire. 

Concealment  of  (he  (ire  dire<(or  and  condollers  and  of  the 
various  parts  of  the  line. 


204  MUSKETRY. 

.  Cover  of  the  troops  while  udvaucing. 

Signals  (flag,  arm,  and  hand)  and  conclusions  drawn  from 
the  particular  signal  observed.     For  example,  SSS,  AM,  etc. 

Location  of  the  leader  by  observing  messengers  going  to  or 
from  liis  position  or  by  location  of  signal  flag  near  him,  etc. 

Individual  movements  in  rear  of  the  firing  line. 

All  umpires  and  observers  near  the  troops  will  remain  in 
rear  of  the  line  occupied  by  the  leader  and  will  attach  a  white 
pocket  handkerchief  over  the  ci'own  of  their  headdress,  in 
order  that  the  assistant  observing  the  troops  may  better  make 
his  report  of  the  exercise. 

THE   UMPIRE'S  RECORDS. 

276.  There  are  two  distinct  types  of  records — the  "umpire's 
record  "  and  the  "  statistical  record." 

Tivo  types. — The  "  Umpire's  Record  "  furnishes  the  basis  for 
the  critique  delivered  by  the  umpire,  on  the  ground,  at  the  com- 
pletion of  the  exercise,  and  consists  of  two  parts.  The  first 
part  covers  the  tactical  phase  of  the  exercise,  fire  direction, 
control,  and  discipline,  as  a  result  of  the  observation  of  the 
umpire.  The  second  part  is  statistical  in  character  and  covers 
essential  data  from  which  the  umpire  draws  conclusions  and 
expresses  an  opinion  upon  the  effectiveness  of  the  fire  as  affect- 
ing the  accomplishment  of  the  mission. 

Simplicity  of  form. — The  data  for  this  record  should  be  of 
such  a  character  that  it  can  be  obtained  quickly  without  refer- 
ence to  long  formulas,  numerous  tables  of  factors,  etc.  It  must 
be  as  simple  as  the  Umpire's  Record  in  a  maneuver  problem,  if 
not  simpler,  for  the  critique  based  upon  this  record  is  never 
carried  into  the  "  lecture  tent,"  but  delivered  on  the  ground. 

277.  The  umpire's  record  should  embody  sufficient  data  concern- 
ing the  troops  on  which  to  base  a  decision  as  to — 

1.  Leadership  and  conduct. 

A.  Judged  from  the  position  of  the  troops. 

B.  Judged  from  the  position  of  the  target. 

2.  Fire  effect. 

3.  The  accomplishment  of  the  mission. 

As  an  aid  in  delivering  the  critique  a  printed  form  covering 
the  principal  points  to  observe  in  the  leadership  and  conduct  of 
troops  should  be  provided. 

The  following  form  has  been  found  convenient  for  this  pur- 
pose.    Umpires  should  remember  that  this  form  is  simply  a 


MUSKETRY.  206 

reiuinder  in  pMicnil  tcniis  jiiid  that  all  tlic  (k'lailc(|  points  Kivon 
in  CliaptiT  1  licri'lii  aic  l<>  i>o  consiileroil. 

Umpikk's  llKcoiu)  ()!••  Combat  Fikinc;  kou  Ckitiquk. 

Organization eouiniandinK- 

Kxercise Order Date 

1.    LKADKKSIIIl'    AND    CONDUCT, 

278,  The  major: 
General — 

(«)   Effective    .snpervision    of   battalion, 
(h)   Ilarnionizinsr  ran?:es. 

(c)  Tactical   orders. 

(d)  Ilegulatinj?  ammunition   supply. 

(e)  Control   of   supports. 

(/)  Primary  apportionment  of  target. 

(g)  Provision   for  flank  protection. 

(h)  Observation  of  enemy  and  adjoining  troops. 

(i)    Deptb  of  deployment,  extent  and  density  of  firing 

line. 
(j)   Fixing  bayonets, 
(k)  The  charge. 
Jn  attack: 

(a)   Selection  of  formation  in  which  to  advance, 
(&)  Direction  of  advance. 

(c)  Objective  for  each  company. 

(d)  The  general   object   or  special   problem   for   e^ch 

company  of  the  order  and  front  of  each  com- 
pany. 

(e)  The  base  company. 

(/)  Time  or  place  for  opening  fire. 
In  defense: 

(a)  Assignment  of  sectors, 

(b)  Determination  of  ranges. 

(c)  Communication  to  company. 

279.  The  captain,  first  sergeant,  and  buglers: 

(a)  Leader's  knowledge  of  the  situation. 

(b)  Explanation  of  the  situation  to  the  company, 

(c)  Reconnaissance  of  the  target. 


206  MUSKETRY. 

((0    Use  of  iield   gUiJSses. 

(c)  Dangerous  ffrou])in.ii  of  platoon  leaders  and  range  esti- 
mators. 

(/)   Estimation  of  range. 

(g)   Designation  and  apportionment  of  target. 

(/()   Clearness  of  fire  orders  to  subordinates. 

(i)   Advance  of  the  unit  to  first  firing  position. 

(/)  Concealment. 

(A)  Time  of  preparation  from  receipt  of  situation  to  "  Com- 
mence firing." 

(l)   Observation  of  fire  effect. 

(m)  Correction  of  material  errors  in  sight  setting. 

(n)  Orders,  if  any,  for  distribution  of  ammunition.  Its 
economical  and  judicious  expenditure. 

(o)  The  position  of  first  sergeant  and  buglers  and  duties 
performed. 

(p)   Time  of  cease  firing. 

(q)   Signals. 

280.  The  platoon  leaders  and  guides: 

(a)  Execution  of  the  captain's  commands  and  directions. 

(b)  Announcement  of  correct  sight  setting. 

(c)  Clearness  in  designation  of  target  or  aiming  point. 
(fZ)   Additional    instructions   given   to   carry   out  captain's 

will, 
(e)  Correction  of  sight  setting. 
(/)   Designation  of  an  aiming  point. 
(g)   Observation  of  fire  effect. 
(7i)  Use  of  field  glasses. 
(i)   Orders  to  platoon  guides. 
ij)  Use  of  signals. 
(k)  Constant  communication  Ijetween  the  platoon  leaders 

and  captain. 
(?)   Observation  and  regulation  of  the  rate  of  fire, 
(m)   Their  positions. 

281.  The  corporals: 

(a)  Alertness  for  commands  and  signals.     Proper  trans- 
mission of  signals. 
( h )   Observation  of  the  conduct  of  the  squad. 

(c)  Assistance  in  enforcing  fire  discipline  and  abatement 

of  excitement. 

(d)  Participation  in  the  firing. 

(e)  Their  positions. 


MUSKETRY. 


207 


282.  The  privates: 
(d)   Fso  of  fovpr. 

(b)   Exf'itcinciit  or  nmfusion. 

(r)  Use  of  sisht  sotting  iiniioutu'ed  and  dianjies  dirofted. 

(d)  Firinp  on  desifrnatod  objootive  or  in  tlie  assigned  sec- 

tor and  fhanse  of  target  when  directed. 

(e)  Readily  responding  to  the  .signals,  particidarly  "Com- 

mence firiufr."  "Suspend  lirinfr,"  and  "Cease  flrinfr." 
(/)   I^nnecessary  cessation  of  fire,  partictdarly  when  bay- 
onets  were   Itein.c:   fixe<l,    sijxlit   sottinp;   chancrod,   or 
wlicn  supports  joined  tlie  firing  line. 

283.  Fire  effect.    (See  umpire's  reference  tables,  Chap.  XXVI.) 


Data. 

Targets. 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

ACCtmACY. 

True  range 

Estimated  range 

1 

Direct  hits  on  assigned  t;irKCt = 

Ricochet  hits  on  assigned  targets 



DLSTRinUTIOX. 

Figures  in  target 

■   ■   ■ 

- 

Figures  hit  (direct  hits) 

VOLUME. 

Number  of  men  firing 

Number  of  shots  fired 



Time 

1 

1 

Rate 

1 

COMPARISON-— AVERAGE  SHOTS. 

Figures  hit 

1 

J 

t 

1 

. 

GENERAL   COMMENT. 

2.  Was  the  mission  accomplished?  (This  decision  must  be 
based  on  a  consideration  of  leadership  and  conduct  and  fire 
effect.) 


(Umpire) 
It  will  be  noted  that  the  umpire's  record  as  explained  herein 
contains   all   of  the   data    (except   number   of   hits   expected) 
referred  to  in  "Records."  paragraph  2l2G,  S.  A.  F.  M.,  and  that 
the  excepted  data  is  contained  in  the  "  Statistical  record." 


CHAPTER  XX. 
PRELIMINARY  EXERCISES. 

(Without  boll  ammunition.) 

284.  Under  uo  circumstance  should  an  officer  or  man  be 
allowed  to  participate  in  a  fire  problem  wherein  ball  ammunition 
is  used  until  after  he  has  passed  through  and  been  found  pro- 
ficient in  a  thorough  preliminary  course  of  training. 

Ammunition  expended  in  fire  problems  by  organizations  that 
have  not  received  this  preliminary  training  Is  ammunition 
wasted. 

The  individual  known  distance  course  of  target  practice  Is  a 
demonstration  of  the  thorougluiess  and  correctness  of  the  man's 
preliminary  training.  In  a  like  manner  any  problem  should  be 
a  demonstration  of  the  perfection  attained  by  the  company  in 
the  preliminary  training  \vithout  ball  ammunition  as  a  whole 
in  all  that  relates  to  fire  direction,  fire  control,  and  fire  discipline. 

As  an  illustration,  the  case  may  be  cited  of  a  class  of  75 
recruits  at  the  school  of  musketry,  that  was  given  a  course 
of  preliminary  instruction  along  the  lines  indicated  herein,  after 
which  the  class  was  formetl  as  a  company  under  platoon  and 
squad  leaders  selected  from  the  class  and  given  a  firing  problem 
involving  the  securing  of  the  firing  data,  the  issuance  of  orders, 
and  the  execution  of  the  order  by  the  men.  There  was  abso- 
lutely no  criticism  to  be  made  of  the  methods  of  direction,  con- 
trol, and  discipline.  Therefore  lack  of  range  facilities  and  am- 
munition should  not  be  offered  as  an  excuse  for  insufficient 
training  in  combat  flirlng,  as  it  is  perfectly  practicable  to  have 
an  organization  well  trained  in  musketry  without  having  fired 
a  shot  In  a  fix'e  problem. 

However,  unless  such  a  course  is  supplemented  by  further 
exercises  with  ball  ammunition,  the  organization  will  not  know 
that  it  is  well  trained  and  hence  will  be  lacking  in  the  confidence 
that  such  knowledge  brings.  Exercises  with  ball  ammunition' 
are  essential  if  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  confirm  the  pre- 
liminary training. 

208 


MUSKETRY.  209 

The  following  exercises  and  those  given  heretofore  ar»»  offere*! 
as  suggested  methods  In  teaching: 

These  exercises  are  for  the  most  part  taken  from  tliose  used  al 
the  School  of  Musiietry,  and  have  consequently  all  been  tested. 
Their  use  should  suggest  otiier  similar  and  more  advanced  exer- 
cises. 

KXEUCISES. 

285.  The  construction  of  these  exercises  should  follow  the 
same  general  principles  as  for  fire  problems  with  hall  amniuni 
tion,  Chapter  XXI. 

286.  I.— Object:  Estimation  of  front  of  a  definite  extent  at 
various  ranges. 

Method:  Company  commanders  will  be  shown  a  line  and  in- 
formed :  "  Somewhere  on  the  line  a  squad  of  men  representing 
the  right  (left)  of  a  hostile  line  will  appear.  You  will  open 
fire  on  this  hostile  line  covering  a  front  of  50  (100)  yards." 

The  company  commander  will  determine  and  announce  the 
range  according  to  the  method  of  paragraph  240,  I.  D.  R.  lie 
will  then  determine  the  extent  of  front  he  is  directed  to  cover, 
and,  having  done  so,  will  sight  two  rifies,  resting  on  sandbag 
rests,  so  that  one  will  be  directed  at  the  right  and  the  other  at 
the  left  of  the  line  which  he  has  determined  as  the  extent  of 
front  he  is  to  cover.    The  aiming  tripod,  figure  33.  may  be  useil. 

In  estimating  fronts  the  musketry  rule,  rear  sight,  or  finger 
system  may  be  used. 

Standards  of  proficiency:  Estimation  of  i-anges,  90  per  cent; 
estimation  of  front,  90  per  cent. 

287.  II. — Object:  Exercise  in  harmonizing  ranges  used  through- 
out a  given  firing  line. 

Method:  The  company  commanders  with  their  "  range  esti- 
mators," all  in  the  prone  position,  will  be  assigned  to  an  out- 
lined position  where  the  fire  fight  is  to  start.  The  battalion 
commander  will  be  assigned  a  position  from  which  he  can  con- 
trol, through  his  company  commanders,  the  opening  of  fire. 
Ox\  the  ai)i)earance  of  the  target,  a  hostile  skirmisli  line,  rangrs 
will  be  estimated  as  prescribeil  in  paragrjiph  240,  I.  I).  II., 
"Time"  HO  seconds.  The  battalion  conuuandor  will  then  find 
out  the  determined  ranges  by  u.se  of  the  signal,  "  What  range 
are  you  using,"  and  amiounce  the  harmonizetl  range.  Ranges 
will  be  signaled  (par.  43,  I.  D.  R.).  When  the  last  company 
3529°— 17 14 


210  MUSKETRY. 

commander  has  repeated  the  battalion  couuiiiiuder's  signal  the 
exercise  will  be  closed. 

Time:  No  time  allowance.  The  exercise  will  be  completed 
as  soon  as  pr.-icticable. 

288.  III. — Object:   Designation  of  targets. 

Method*:  The  company  will  be  conducted  to  a  place  a  few 
yards  from  a  point  where  the  target  is  visible.  Its  captain 
%vill  be  shown  the  target.  He  deploys  the  company,  advances 
it  to  the  position  for  opening  fire,  and  gives  the  necessary  firing 
data,  including  description  of  target,  assignment  of  portions  of 
it  to  platoons,  etc. 

Platoon  leaders  will  give  the  necessary  firing  data  to  their 
platoons.  The  men  will  set  sights  and  aim  at  the  proper  target 
and  sector  as  understood  by  them. 

In  describing  Indistinct  targets  any  method,  mil  rule,  rear 
sight,  finger,  or  clock  systems  may  be  used. 

The  exercise  is  repeated  for  three  different  targets. 

289.  lY. — Object:   The  use  of  auxiliary  aiming  targets. 
Methods:  An  indistinct  target  will  be  selected,  the  flanks  of 

which  are  marked  by  signal  flags.  The  company  commander  is 
brought  to  a  position  from  which  he  can  observe  the  outlined 
target.  The  flags  will  then  be  ordered  down,  when  the  com- 
pany commander  points  out  to  his  range  estimators  and  platoon 
leaders  the  target  from  the  observing  station,  determines  the 
range  and  gives  the  command  for  opening  fire  on  the  objective, 
including,  for  the  purpose  of  instruction,  the  announcement  of 
an  auxiliary  aiming  target  and  the  consequent  sight  setting. 
Any  mechanical  device  may  be  used  as  an  aid  in  this  woi*k. 

290.  V. — Object:  Accurate  and  quick  sight  setting  and  the 
use  of  combined  sights. 

Method:  A  well-defined  target  will  be  used  at  a  range  of  over 
1,000  yards.  The  company  commander  will  be  shown  the  target. 
He  then  determines  the  range  in  the  usual  manner.  The  com- 
pany will  be  deployed  facing  the  target  and  the  usual  firing 
data  given  (in  this  case,  on  account  of  time  limit,  all  commands 
will  be  given  by  company  commander). 

The  company  commander  is  in  the  prone  position.  Time  is 
taken  from  the  last  word  of  command  announcing  the  sight 
setting.  Fifteen  seconds  later  the  command  "  time "  will  be 
given  by  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  exercise.  At  this  command, 
whether  sights  are  set  or  not,   all  rifles  will  be  laid  on  the 


MTJSKETR'X.  211 

frround  and  left  uiitoiiclKMl  until  oxaniincil.  This  concludes  the 
exercise. 

291.  VI. — Object:   Teaching  lire  direction. 

Elements  included:  Use  of  ground,  designation  of  target,  de- 
termination of  front  occupied  by  target,  asslginncnt  (tf  sc<t(U-s 
to  platoons,  deterininntion  of  the  range,  determination  of  kind 
of  fire  to  ho  used,  causing  fire  to  be  opened  at  proper  time. 

Method:  The  comi)any  is  marched  to  a  place  near  the  point 
selected  for  the  problem;  the  position  selected  is  under  cover. 
The  company  commander  is*  called  up  and  given  a  ])roblem 
similar  to  the  following  situation:  "The  enemy,  a  battalion 
acting  alone,  is  in  position  along  a  line  extending  east  from 
that  fence  corner.  You  will  deploy  your  company  here  and 
ilirect  its  fire  on  that  portion  of  the  Iiostile  line  which  is  occu- 
I)ied  by  a  10-squad  deployed  company  and  whose  right  rests 
at  that  fence  corner." 

The  captain  conducts  his  company  so  as  to  carry  out  the 
orders  or  directions  given  him,  using  suitable  tactical  forma- 
tions. 

The  exercise  is  ended  immediately  after  fire  is  opened.  For 
purposes  of  comparison  and  comment  the  following  will  be 
noted : 

(rt)  Time  elapsing  between  receipt  of  problem  and  opiMiing 
fire. 

(b)  Exposure  to  hostile  fire  while  securing  and  transmitting 
firing  data  and  while  deploying. 

(c)  Clearness  in  description  of  target  and  its  division  into 
fronts. 

(d)  Extent  to  which  the  captain's  will,  as  expressed  in  his 
firing  data,  is  carried  out  by  the  company. 

292.  VII.— Object:    Fire  control.     (I'ar.  250-253,  I.  D.  R.) 
Method:   The    company    will    be    marched    to    an    indicated 

point  where  a  tactical  situation  will  be  presented  involving  the 
principles  of  fire  control. 

For  the  pun^o.ses  of  comiiarison  and  connncnt  thr?  following 
will" be  noted : 

(a)  The  ciptain's  general  aiiplicalinu  of  tlic  ]>rinciples  of  fire 
dirtxition. 

(h)  The  detailed  elements  of  fire  control  as  given  in  (Miapter 
I,  herein. 

(r)   Time  «'lements. 

293.  VIII.— Object:    Fire  discipline. 


212  MUSKETRY. 

Method:  The  company  is  marched  to  an  indicated  point 
where  a  tactical  situation  will  be  presented. 

For  the  purposes  of  comparison  and  comment  the  following 
will  be  noted : 

(a)  Use  of  ground. 

(b)  Target  designation. 

(c)  Determination  of  front  of  target. 

(d)  Assignment  of  objectives  to  platoon. 

(e)  Determination  of  range. 
(/)  Kind  of  fire  used. 

(g)  Causing  fire  to  be  opened  at  proper  time. 

(/^)  Reinforcement  of  firing  line. 

(i)  Fire  discipline.  Ability  of  men  in  firing  line  to  transmit 
firing  data  (location  of  target,  what  the  target  is,  what  portion 
to  fire  at,  range  to  be  used,  rate  of  fire  to  be  employed)  to  re- 
inforcements when  they  arrive  on  the  firing  line,  and  to  do  this 
without  any  marked  cessation  in  the  rate  of  fire. 

For  this  exercise  two  platoons  will  be  on  the  firing  line, 
deployed  at  one-pace  intervals,  the  other  two  platoons  constitut- 
ing the  support ;  after  fire  has  been  opened,  the  firing  line  will 
be  reinforced  in  such  a  manner  that  the  men  of  the  support 
will  occupy  the  intervals  between  the  men  on  the  firing  line. 
Firing  data  will  be  transniitted  from  man  to  man.  Twenty 
seconds  later  the  original  firing  line  will  be  withdrawn  at  the 
command  of  the  director.  The  reinforcing  liue  will  then  set 
their  sight  at  the  range  given  them  and  10  seconds  later,  at  the 
command  of  "  Time,"  will  aim  their  rifles  ^t  what  they  believe  to 
be  their  portion  of  the  target. 

The  sight  setting  and  the  aiming  of  the  rifles  will  then  bo 
verified  and  the  probable  value  of  the  fire  determined. 

294.  IX. — Object:  To  apply  all  the  principles  of  fii-e  direction, 
fire  control,  and  fire  discipline  covered  in  previous  exercises, 
and  in  addition  the  use  of  suitable  means  to  maintain  fire  supe- 
riority during  advances  of  the  firing  line,  particularly  the 
proper  distribution  of  fire  cover  of  the  entire  target  during 
rushes. 

295.  Object:  The  application  of  all  the  principles  of  fire  direc- 
tion, fire  control,  fire  discipline  covered  in  previous  exercises 
and  in  addition  the  particular  application  of  the  various  pre- 
scribed methods  of  commimication. 

Method:  The  company  is  assigned  a  mission  requiring  it  to 
take  up  a  position  and  to  open  fire  on  an  advancing  column. 


MUSKETRY  213 

The  situiitioii  will  be  so  drawn  as  to  hriiij;  out  some  of  1 1n- 
authorized  methods  of  cominunication. 

Company  and  phitoon  commanders  will  not  use  tlie  voice 
when  any  part  of  their  unit  is  tiring,  nor  at  any  otlier  time 
when  their  will  can  be  expressed  by  a  signal. 

Pertinent  paragraphs  on  the  subject  of  comnnniication  are  as 
follows : 

Paragraphs  31,  3:{,  H'k  41,  4l!,  4:j,  47,  3S4-3.S.S,  1.  I ).  U.,  i,.iia- 
grai)h  32,  F.  S.  U. 

296.  XI. — Object:  Supply  of  ammunition  of  tiring  line  (prob- 
lem to  involve  in  its  solution  all  of  the  principles  covered  in 
previous  exercises). 

Method:  The  battalion  commander  will  be  handed  a  tactical 
situation  requiring  a  march  in  the  presence  of  an  active  enemy 
and  hiter  an  attack  on  this  enemy's  position.  It  will  be  con- 
ducted by  means  of  the  prescribed  commands  and  signals,  in 
accordance  with  the  rules  laid  down  in  I.  1>.  II.  under  the  head- 
ing "  Fire  "  and  "Attack,"  paragraphs  303  to  319. 

The  battalion  will  be  at  war  strength,  accompaniwl  by  its 
combat  train ;  machine  gun  company  and  five  mounted  orderlies 
attached. 

Combat  train  loaded  as  prescribed  in  Tables  of  Organization 
for  sui>plies  other  than  ammunition. 

Before  going  into  action  packs  will  be  dropi)e(l  and  left  under 
suitable  guard  (3G8,  I.  D.  K. ).  Other  pertinent  paragraphs  are 
294,  418,  and  419,  I.  D.  R. 


CHAPTER  XXL 
THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  FIRE  PROBLEMS. 

297.  A  fire  problem  is  an  iucident  or  phase  in  tlie  solution  of 
a  tactical  problem  and  should  always  be  so  treated. 

The  preparation  of  a  fire  problem  requires  not  only  a  sound 
knowledge  of  tactical  principles  and  the  requisite  experience  in 
constructing  tactical  problems,  but  also  a  detailed  knowledge 
of  the  theory  of  rifle  fire  and  of  targets  and  ranges.  In  the 
preparation  of  a  problem  the  following  points  should  be  con- 
sidered : 

PREPARATION. 

298.  («)  The  problem  should  be  so  constructed  as  to  impart 
a  lesson  in  fire  tactics. 

(b)  The  strength  of  the  fire  unit  should  be  determined  in 
connection  with  the  tactical  lesson  to  be  taught. 

(c)  A  tactical  situation  should  be  selected  that  will  best  illus- 
trate the  lesson  to  be  imparted.  It  is  believed  that  the  fire 
problems  in  general  should  present  one  phase  of  an  action.  For 
example,  firing  on  artillery,  on  moving  bodies,  opening  of  an 
attack,  carrying  the  exercise  to  the  second  firing  position.  On 
extended  well-equipped  B  ranges  it  will  be  possible  to  work  out 
a  shifting  scene  of  action,  presenting  a  number  of  new  targets 
to  an  advancing  line,  or  advancing  targets  to  a  stationary  line. 

{d)  An  estimate  should  be  made  of  the  sight  setting  that 
should  be  used  and  the  rate  of  fire  that  should  be  employed. 

(e)  The  ground  and  the  direction  in  which  the  firing  will 
occur  should  be  considered.  The  terrain,  whenever  possible, 
should  be  new  to  the  commander.  The  securing  of  a  great 
variety  of  terrain  will  usually  be  impracticable,  but  there  can 
be  pi-esented  to  the  connnander  new  situations  involving  the 
use  of  different  targets  at  different  points. 

(/)  Attention  should  be  given  to  the  targets  that  will  be  em- 
ployed, having  special  reference  to  those  that  may  be  available. 
The  target  should  generally  be  equal  to  approximately  the  num- 
214 


MUSKETRY.  216 

ber  of  men  or  to  the  front  of  the  detachment  tirinj^.  If  not,  it 
creates  a  false  inijirossion.  For  instance,  a  company  of  100 
rilles  tiring  on  a  target  of  20-30  yards  in  width,  but  targets 
greater  in  ninnl)er  tliau  tlie  tirers,  are  sometimes  used  in  order 
to  determine  wlietlier  or  not  tlie  tire  was  confined  to  a  particular 
sector  or  objective,  as  directed,  or  more  fre<iiiently  where  the 
troojis  are  on  the  defensive  and  tlu>  targets  are  simulating  an 
attack. 

Targets  should  be  placed  in  a  formation  corresponding  to  the 
phase  of  the  action.  Ordinarily  the  figures  should  be  placed  one 
to  every  yard  of  front.  The  enemy  will  take  care  to  expose 
himself  as  little  as  possible.  It  will  be  unusual  to  have  a  row  of 
kneeling  figures  to  fire  upon  at  the  close  ranges.  Close-order 
bodies  in  all  prcjbability  would  remain  a  target  for  a.  very  short 
period  of  time.  Artillery  targets  sliould  be  spaced  with  about 
20  yards  interval.  Cavalry  charges  might  be  represented  by 
targets  appearing  in  succession  at  800  yards,  at  700,  at  600.  at 
500,  etc.,  each  line  disappearing  from  view  a  few  moments  before 
tlie  next  appears. 

(ff)  The  amount  of  ammunition  necessary  to  bring  about  the 
result  desired  should  be  the  result  of  calculation.  The  number 
of  cartriilges  issued  should  be  enough  to  disable  theoretically  a 
selected  percentage  of  the  targets.  If  3.000  rounds  are  required 
to  disable  about  one-third  of  the  targets  and  1.500  rounds  are 
issued,  then  only  about  15  per  cent  of  the  figures  can  be  expectinl 
to  be  hit.  This  failure  would  rest  on  the  problem  maker  and 
not  on  the  troops.  For  determination  of  number  of  rounds  to 
be  carried  by  each  man  (see  paragraph  .373). 

(7()  Notation  should  be  made  of  the  time  element  for  the  par- 
ticular unit  involved  and  its  bearing  upon  a  time  schedule  for 
organization  which  may  follow  in  the  solution  of  the  same 
problem. 

(/)  The  time  element,  in  connection  with  the  tluration  of  fire, 
must  be  determined  by  first  deciding  on  the  rate  of  fire  to  be  used 
at  that  range,  consideration  being  given  to  the  tactical  require- 
ments and  to  the  vulnerable  area  of  the  target.  For  example, 
if  a  proper  rate  be  eight  per  minute,  then  the  number  of  car- 
tridges to  be  given  to  each  man,  divided  by  eight,  will  give  the 
number  of  minutes  firing.  This  calculation  forms  the  basis  for 
the  time  element  and  is  better  than  a  pure  guess,  even  though  a 
liberal  all(»wance  be  made  for  the  difference  between  practical 
and  theoretical  time. 


216  MUSKETRY. 

(j)  To  insure  fre.sh  situations  for  each  commander,  every 
effort  must  be  made  to  Iceep  those  next  to  fire  from  receiving 
information  about  the  problem. 

(A)  The  question  of  pits  to  be  constructed  and  the  necessary 
details  to  carry  out  successfully  the  plans  adopted  should  ])e 
uiven  weight  and  all  possible  economy  made  of  men  and  mate- 
rial. 

(/)  The  problem  should  be  tested  to  determine  if  it  can  be 
solved  in  a  manner  that  would  prevent  the  desired  lesson  from 
))eing  taught. 

FORM. 

299.  Tactical  situation. — The  situation  should  present  a  sim- 
ple logical  -sclieme.  This  gives  an  opportunity  to  judge  of  the 
tactics  employed  and  while  the  fire  feature  of  the  problem  must 
receive  proper  consideration  it  is  to  l)e  remembered  that  no 
effect  should  be  expected  with  an  organization  conducted  tacti- 
cally in  such  a  manner  that  it  could  not  reach  the  firing  position. 

MISSION. 

300.  It  should  be  definite,  and  logically  emanate  from  a 
simply-represented  situation. 

The  requirement  ordinarily  might  include:  (<i)  An  estimate 
of  the  situation;  (6)  an  order  based  on  this  estimate;  (c)  the 
execution  of  this  order. 

In  map  problems,  terrain  exercises,  etc.,  («)  and  (ft)  iisually 
will  be  oral  or  written,  while  (c)  may  include  such  features  of 
the  execution  as  do  not  include  firing. 

When  ammunition  is  used  (n)  would  be  mental,  (ft)  would  be 
given  by  word  of  mouth  or  by  signal,  and  (c)  would  be  carried 
out  in  its  entirety. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

AN  EXAMPLE  OF  THE  CONSTRUCTION,  SOLUTION, 
AND  CRITIQUE  OF  A  FIRE  PROBLEM  (BALL  AMMU- 
NITION). 

301.  Details  of  procedure. — Maj.  X  was  detailed  by  the  com- 
mandiii;;  i>tticer  to  prepare  a  foiiihat-liriiif,'  problem  with  l)all 
ammunition.  Upon  i-eceiving  this  order  Maj.  X  prepared  the 
followinj: : 

302.  Statement  of  the  problem  (see  fig.  oS). — Troops:  One 
company  of  infantry. 

Situation:  Two  hostile  units  are  engaged  in  a  fire  fight.  The 
hostile  unit  is  reinforced  on  one  flank. 

Object:  The  primary  object  is  to  give  practice  in  directing 
part  of  the  fire  of  the  company  to  cover  a  secondary  objective, 
at  the  same  time  keeping  the  main  objective  covered  with  a  well- 
distributed  and  proper  volume  of  fire.  Secondarily,  it  gives 
practice  in  quick  decisions,  target  designation,  quick  change  of 
objective,  requiring  rapid  estimate  of  tire  data,  and  i-apid  Lssuing 
and  transmi-ssion  of  orders  for  tiring,  use  of  signals,  use  of  the 
battle  sight,  and  the  principles  of  fire  direction,  control,  and  dis- 
cipline. 

Time:  '  The  umpire  causes  the  fire  to  cease  one  minute  after 
(lie  exposure  of  the  second  target  or  two  minutes  after  the  first 
shot  is  fired. 

Target:  Main  objective.  A  line  of  80  prone  figures  (target 
F)  range  about  GOO  yards.  Secondary  objective:  A  line  of  20 
prone  figures  range  about  ."lOO  yards.  Figures  in  both  objectives 
on  a  frontage  of  1  yard  per  figure. 

'  Percentage  of  flRures  desired  struck,  about  SO  for  the  first  minute  of 
firing  ou  each  target.  From  prone  table  (par.  HG5)  on  GOO-yard  line  48, 
the  nearest  to  50,  is  found  in  the  one-minute  column,  and  from  the  same 
table  on  500  B.  S.  line  50  is  found  in  the  nne-ininute  column,  so  two 
minute^s  Is  selected  as  the  firing  time 

217 


S18 


MUSKETRY. 


Ammunition:  ^  Twenty  I'ounds  of  bull  ammuuitiou,  per  man, 
carried  in  the  belt. 

Critique:   Principal  points. 

Note  assiKnnieiit  of  targets  to  platoon  leaders  in  order  to 
properly  distribute  tlie  fire  on  the  main  objective. 

Note  metliud  to  bring  tire  to  bear  on  secondary  objective. 

303.  Situation  for  leader. — Your  battalion  commander  has 
sent  your  company  forward  under  the  following  order :  "A 
civilian  reports  that  about  50  of  the  enemy  occupy  the  ridge  at 
'  B '  and  that  about  two  hostile  companies  are  halted  at  a  stream 
about  a  mile  east  of  '  B.'  Combat  patrols  now  cover  your  right 
and  left  flanks.  Attack  the  enemy  at  '  B '  and  drive  him  from 
his  position.  I  shall  move  the  remainder  of  the  battalion  south 
and  east  and  attack  the  enemy  reported  at  the  stream.  I  shall 
maintain  conuuunication  with  you." 

304.  Requirement — Execution  of  the  order. — Having  decided 
upon  the  character  of  the  problem,  Maj.  X  goes  over  the  ground 
where  from  memory  he  knows  his  problem  can  be  adapted  to 
the  terrain.  This  action  is  to  insure  himself  that  no  small  folds 
of  the  ground,  vegetation,  etc.,  will  interfere  with  the  conduct 
of  the  problem  as  planned. 


Target. 


Range. 


Time. 


Rate 

(from 

Table  1). 


Rounds. 


Main  objective 

Secondary  objective. 


COO 
500 


7.5 
8.3 


Upon  request  of  Maj.  X,  three  battalion  staff  officers  were 
directed  to  report  to  him  for  instruction.  Two  were  assigned, 
one  each  to  two  platoons,  to  observe  the  fire  control  of  the  cor- 
porals and  the  fire  discipline  of  the  privates,  and  the  third, 
accompanied  by  a  competent  signalist,  was  assigned  to  observe 
the  conduct  of  the  troops,  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  enemy,  by 
means  of  a  periscope  in  the  pit. 

305.  Maj.  X  prepared  the  following  memoranda  for  the  ad- 
jutant, to  be  delivered  to  the  range  officer  and  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  company  selected  for  the  fire  problem : 

(1)  The  maximum  number  of  rounds  per  man  required  wll  be  the  amount  needed 
by  those  men  who  fire  for  one  minute  on  the  main  objective  and  then  switch  to  the 
secondary  objective  for  one  minute,  or  7.5  plus  8.3,  a  total  of  15.8.  Adding  10  per  cent 
and  issuing  full  clips,  the  estimate  would  be  20  rounds,  which  would  be  a  sufficient 
number  of  rounds  for  each  man.    (Par.  372-373.) 


MUSKETRY.  219 

Confidential  memorandum  liom  the  adjutant  to  First  Lieut.  Y, 
ranpe  and  statistical  otlicer :  "You  will  jtrepare  the  ran^*'  l'<>i" 
a  combat  i)rol)lem.  Copy  of  the  situation  and  niemorandiini  to 
Capt.  A  inclosed  herewith.  Tarjrets:  80  F  targets  on  ridjie  at 
B.  Target  '  I '  three  beams  20  F  targets,  concealed  at  G  ready 
to  appear  on  signal  '  up  '  from  Maj.  X.     Firing  position  at  '  A.'  " 

The  points,  A,  B,  C,  E,  and  X  are  indicatotl  on  rang*'  map 
and  well  known  to  Lieut.  Y. 

306.  Memorandum  from  the  adjutant  to  Capt.  A:  "The  com- 
manding otlicer  directs  that  you  report  with  your  company  in 
the  field  equipment,  20  rounds  ball  ammunition  per  man,  to 
Maj.  X,  at  E,  at  7  a.  m.,  February  21,  1910." 

Upon  arrival  at  E  Capt.  A  presents  Maj.  X  with  a  statement 
of  his  company's  strength  and  organization  which  was  as  fol- 
lows : 

1  company  commander  and  2  buglers. 
4  platoon  leaders   (2  officers). 
6  platoon  guides. 
10  squad  leaders. 
70  rifles  in  the  firing  line. 
Total,  officers  3,  enlisted  men  90. 
Organized  into  four  platoons — first  and  fourth  platoon  three 
squads  each,  second  and  third  platoon  two  squads  each. 

Maj.  X  informs  Capt.  A  that  he  will  have  five  minutes  in 
which  to  explain  the  situation  to  his  company.  He  directs  the 
captain  "  to  load  "  in  the  present  position  of  the  company. 

A    SOLUTION. 

307.  The  fire  estimate. — Capt.  A  calls  his  company  to  ".Vt 
ease,"  then  reads  his  problem  carefully  and  explains  the  situa- 
tion to  all.  The  captain  directs  Scrgt.  R  to  take  charge  of  the 
company  and  the  platoon  leaders  and  range  estimators  to  join 
the  captain.  Upon  arrival  near  the  crest  the  target  is  located, 
and  all  who  have  glas.ses  sweep  the  front  for  further  details. 
The  range  estimators  announce  the  range.  The  captain  selects 
the  firing  position  for  the  company  and  directs  Sergt.  R  (the 
platoon  leaders  are  with  the  captain)  to  deploy  the  company, 
indicating  where  the  right  shall  rest.  He  determines  upon  the 
sight  setting  and  upon  the  assignment  of  targets,  using  the  lone 
tree  on  the  ridge  B  as  a  reference  point  in  the  apportionment  of 
the  target.  He  decides  that  the  class  of  fire  shall  be  "  Fire  at 
will  "  and  the  rate  to  be  the  ordinary  rate  at  this  range,  at  least 


220 


MUSKETRY. 


until  he  is  convinced  by  tlie  observation  of  the  fire  effect  that 
the  sight  setting  is  correct  and  that  the  vulnerability  of  the 
target  permits  a  higher  rate. 

He  notes  the  woods  to  his  left  front  and  decides  to  caution 
the  fourth  pltitoon  leader  for  particular  observation  in  that 
direction  for  conceiiled  targets.  He  determines  to  open  fire  as 
soon  as  platoon  leaders  signal  "  Ready." 

He  decides  to  take  station  on  the  left  of  the  line  to  observe 
the  fire  and  study  its  effect. 

The  fire  orders. — Target:  That  line  of  prone  figures  on  that 
ridge,  width  134  mils. 

Reference  point:  That  tree  ("D"  pointing  out  same). 

First  and  second  platoons,  target  70  mils  wide,  35  mils  each 
side  of  the  tree. 

Third  and  fourth  platoons,  target  70  mils  wide,  commencing 
30  mils  toward  9  o'clock  from  the  tree. 

Each  platoon  will  cover  the  entire  target  assigned  to  the  two 
platoons. 

The  fourth  platoon  will  observe  the  woods  to  our  left  front. 

Fire  at  will. 

Sergt.  M  will  be  in  rear  of  the  center  of  the  company  to  re- 
ceive and  transmit  signals. 

I  shall  be  on  the  left  of  the  line. 

Capt.  A  later  signals  "  Commence  firing."  At  the  end  of  one 
minute's  firing  Maj.  X  signals  "  up,"  or  telephones  to  the  pit, 
and  the  secondary  target  at  "  C  "  comes  up.  Capt,  A  signals  the 
leader  of  the  fourth  platoon  "  Battle  sight "  and  "  Swing  cone 
of  fire  one  finger  (one  sight  leaf  or  50  mils)  to  the  left"  and 
signals  the  third  platoon  "  Fire  faster." 

308.  At  the  end  of  the  second  minute  Maj.  X  causes  "  Cease 
firing  "  to  be  sounded. 

The  pit  record  was  as  follows: 


Target  1. 
Target  2. 


Figures 

hit 
(direct 

hits). 


Direct 
liits. 


Rico- 
chets. 


MUSKETRY.  221 

Two  battalion  stalT  oflicers  who  were  assigned  each  to  two 
platoons  to  observe  the  fire  control  of  the  corporals  and  the 
fire  discipline  of  tlie  privates  make  their  report  to  MaJ.  X. 

Maj.  X.  preparatory  to  delivering  the  critique,  directed  Capt. 
A  to  briefly  outline  his  observation  of  tiie  exercise,  particu- 
larly with  respect  to  causes,  if  any,  for  factors  which  may  have 
reduced  the  elTectiveness  of  the  lire. 

309.  Capt.  A  stated  as  follows:  I  feel  assured  now  that  my 
announced  sight  setting  was  too  great.  I  believe  that  It  should 
have  been  decreased  at  least  50  yards.  However,  I  think  that 
the  number  of  hits  on  the  main  target  was  about  average. 
The  fire  seemed  well  distributed,  although  I  believe  that  the 
first  platodu's  target  received  the  greater  number  of  hits.  The 
rates  seemed  ai)out  correct.  The  lack  of  control  in  the  third 
platoon  was  due  to  Sergt.  E's  lack  of  musketry  training. 

Referring  to  the  letteretl  subheads  of  the  umpire's  record 
(par.  378),  Maj.  X  delivered  the  following  critique: 

810.  (1)  Leadership  and  conduct. — The  captain,  first  sergeant, 
and  buglers: 

(a)  The  situation  was  thoroughly  understood  by  the  captain. 
{b)  His  explanation  to  the  company  was  not  clear.  Prob- 
ably the  result  of  not  talking  sulliciently  loud  to  be  heard  l>y 
all.  At  least  10  men  stated  that  they  did  not  hear  the  capain. 
{(■)  The  target  was  well  reconnoitered. 

(d)  Field  glasses  were  properly  used. 

(e)  E)uring  the  time  that  the  estimators  were  obtaining  the 
range  and  the  captain  was  making  his  fire  estimate,  the  captain, 
platoctn  leaders,  and  estimators  were  dangerously  grouped. 

{/)  The  sight  setting  announceil  was  50  yards  over  the  true 
elevation.  This  was  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  the  target 
was  in  a  ckmded  light,  and  that  it  was  not  clearly  defined  against 
a  favorable  background.     (Par.  81,  S.  A.  F.  M.) 

(g)  The  designation  of  the  target  seemed  clear. 

(h)  The  fire  orders  were  clearly  stated,  but  the  captain  failril 
to  announce  the  rate,  which  is  a  function  of  fire  direction.  The 
rates  used  seemed  ai)out  correct. 

(t)  The  advance  of  the  third  platoon  crawling  to  the  crest 
was  poorly  carried  out ;  more  concealment  should  have  been  ob- 
tained. The  advance  of  the  first  platoon  was  excellent.  There 
was  too  much  talking  going  on  in  the  third  platoon.  This  caused 
some  confusion.  The  seventh  and  eighth  squads  deployed  too 
slowly.  I'aragraph  124,  I.  D.  11.,  states  that  the  men  deploy 
"  moving  at  a  run." 


222  MUSKETRY. 

(i)  The  second  and  third  platoons  moved  too  far  to  the  front, 
sacrificinj;  bettor  conceahnent  and  paining  nothing  in  the  fire 
position. 

(k)  The  preparation  consumed  10  minutes.  Considering  the 
situation,  this  is  too  long  and  is  mainly  due  to  lack  of  proper 
utilization  of  time,  and  the  slowness  in  making  the  fire  esti- 
mate. The  time  would  have  been  reduced  had  the  captain  issued 
his  orders  to  the  platoon  leaders  while  the  estimators  were  ob- 
taining the  range.  The  deployment  of  the  company  could  have 
been  ordered  as  soon  as  it  was  apparent  where  would  be  the 
filling  position. 

(l)  The  captain  did  not  utilize  the  buglers  in  obsterving  the 
enemy,  the  target,  and  fire  effect.     (Par.  235,  I.  D.  K. ) 

(m)  On  account  of  the  dust  near  the  enemy's  right  and  rear 
of  the  target  the  shot  strikes  should  have  been  visible  to  the 
captain  or  buglers  and  the  error  in  sight  setting  corrected. 

(n)  It  is  thought  that  the  ammunition  distribution  between 
the  two  targets  was  excellent. 

It  is  thought  that  the  deflection  of  but  one  platoon's  fire 
on  the  new  target  was  excellent  and  that  ammunition  was 
wisely  expended. 

(o)  See  (Z)  above.  The  first  sergeant  led  the  second  platoon. 
Sergeant  M  did  not  receive  and  transmit  signals  as  promptly 
as  should  have  been  done. 

(p)  Firing  ceased  two  minutes  after  first  shot  was  fired 
and  one  minute  after  second  target  appeared. 

(q)  The  signal  "  Swing  cone  of  fire  to  the  left"  should  have 
been  made  with  the  palm  of  the  hand  to  the  left,  pointing  in 
the  direction  of  the  new  target. 

311.  Platoon  leaders  and  guides: 

(a)  Commands  and  directions  were  carried  out. 

(&)  Correct  sight  setting  was  announced. 

(c)  The  designations  of  the  target  given  by  second  and  third 
platoon  leaders  were  not  clear ;  it  is  evident  that  the  third 
platoon  leader  has  no  idea  of  the  "  Finger  system." 

(d)  No  additional  instructions  to  carry  out  the  captain's 
will  seemed  necessary  except  as  noted  in  (e)  below. 

(c)  The  first  platoon  leader  "lowered"  50  yards.  The  other 
platoon  leaders  made  no  correction. 

(/)  No  aiming  point  was  necessary. 

(g)  The  observation  of  fire  effect  by  the  third  platoon  leader 
was  very  poor.     In  the  fourth  platoon  there  was  too  much 


MUSKETRY.  228 

observation  for  a  probable  new  target  and  not  enough  for  fire 
effect.  The  observation  of  the  fifst  platoon  leader  was  ex- 
cellent 

(h)  Glasses  were  used  with  good  effect. 

(f )  With  th(!  exrcption  of  the  order  jriven  by  the  first  platoon 
leader,  to  his  platoon  guide,  viz,  •'  In  addition  to  your  regular 
duties  you  will  iioep  in  constant  comnmiiicatitin  with  the  cap- 
tain," there  seems  to  have  been  no  particuhir  use  made  of  the 
phitooii  miiilc's.  None  of  tlioin  iiroperly  performed  their  duties 
except  the  guide  of  the  first  platoon. 

(j)  The  arm-and-hand  signals,  as  a  general  rule,  were  made 
too  quickly,  accuracy  giving  way  to  si)eed.  This  caused  some 
confusion  and  delay.  Exactness  of  execution  must  be  demaudcil 
In  all  arm-and-hand  signaling.  One  has  no  time  to  solve  arm 
puzzles. 

{Ic)  The  second,  third,  and  fourth  positions  at  time  were  out 
of  constant  communication  with  the  captain. 

(/)  See  (h)  under  heading  "Captain"  above.  The  first  and 
fourth  platoon  leaders  announced  a  rate,  but  no  attempt  seemeil 
to  have  been  made  to  regulate  it. 

(/»)  The  positions  of  the  platoon  leaders  were  such  that  they 
could  easily  control  their  platoons. 

312.  Corporals: 

((/)  Tlic  corporals  of  the  sixth  and  seventh  squads  were  not 
on  the  alert  for  commands  and  signals.  The  corporal  of  the 
eighth  squad  transmitted  the  signal  "Commence  firing"  im- 
properly. 

(?>)  The  corporals  of  the  first,  second,  and  third  squads 
showed  a  high  state  of  training  in  the  conduct  of  their  squads. 
The  corporals  of  the  sixth,  seventh,  and  eighth  squads  need  spe- 
cial nmsketry  instruction. 

{<•)  As  a  rule,  the  corporals  did  not  enforce  fire  discipline, 
due  principally  to  the  lack  of  instruction  in  how  to  carry  out 
this  duty. 

(d)  The  corporals  did  not  participate  in  the  firing.  It  is 
thought  that  by  not  doing  so  they  were  better  able  to  perform 
the  duties  with  which  they  were  charged. 

(c)  Eight  of  tlie  corporals  were  sliglitly  in  rear  of  the  center 
of  their  squads,  their  heads  being  near  the  feet  of  the  men  to 
the  front.  Two  were  cm  the  line.  The  former  position  seems 
better  from  which  to  control  the  conduct  of  their  squads. 


224  MUSKETRY. 

313.  The  privates: 

(a)  A  number  of  men  in  the  third  platoon  did  not  take  the 
best  cover  obtainable.    They  were  too  far  to  the  front. 

{b)  There  was  too  much  confuision  in  the  third  platoon,  due 
to  unnecessary  tallving.  Tlie  inefficiency  of  some  of  the  squad 
leaders  had  the  natural  result  of  causing  some  of  the  squads  to 
develop  self-appointed  leaders,  creating  the  usual  confusion 
apparent  in  bodies  tliat  are  weakly  led. 

(c)  Eight  men  were  checked  as  not  taking  the  announced 
sight  setting. 

(d)  About  five  men  of  the  third  platoon  were  checked  firing 
on  the  target  assigned  to  the  first  and  second  platoons.  The  left 
of  the  third  platoon  changed  targets  without  command  when 
the  second  target  appeared. 

(e)  About  five  men  fired  after  "Cease  firing"  had  been 
ordered. 

(/)  Tliere  was  practically  a  cessation  of  fire  in  the  first  pla- 
toon when  the  leader  signaled  "  Lower  50  yards." 

314.  Maj.  X  then  directed  Lieut.  Z,  who  had  observed  the 
conduct  of  the  troops  from  the  pit,  to  read  his  notes,  which  were 
as  follows: 

7.06  a.  m. :  Several  head  of  cattle  were  seen  to  run  from  under 
cover  of  ridge  A,  as  if  they  had  been  driven  out.  Later  I  heard 
two  blasts  from  whistles  of  different  tones. 

7.07 :  A  group  of  about  seven  men  could  be  seen  near  the 
clump  of  bushes  on  ridge  A.  Two  were  observing  with  field 
glasses. 

7.08 :  The  arm  signal  "As  skirmishers  "  was  observed  made  by 
one  of  the  above  group. 

7.09 :  The  line  appeared  crawling  to  the  ridge  crest.  The  right 
seemed  to  be  as  well  concealed  as  the  ground  would  permit,  the 
left  center  was  badly  exposed,  and  made  an  excellent  target. 
The  whole  line  seemed  too  far  advanced. 

7.10 :  Observed  on  three  or  four  occasions  what  I  thought  to 
be  platoon  guides  or  squad  leaders,  in  crouching  positions,  move 
in  rear  of  the  line. 

7.11 :  Firing  opened  ;  range  seemed  over  at  first,  but  decreased 
later  with  apparent  good  effect. 

7.12:  I  located  the  company  commander  by  observing  a  mes- 
senger leave  him  and  go  to  the  rear.  I  was  later  convinced  of 
his  position  by  the  man  near  him,  presumably  a  bugler,  dis- 
playing a  signal  fiag.  From  the  white  square  on  the  red  field, 
I  assumed  the  organization  to  be  Company  A. 


MUSKETRY. 


225 


I  read  a  message  signaled  with  a  liandkonhit'l'  liom  the  left  of 
the  line:  "  Kuciiiy  in  woods  to  our  front." 

There  w.is  a  iiotieeable  cessation  of  liri!  at  one  time  in  tlie 
right  of  the  line. 

The  eonnnand  "  I'^irc   faster"  was  lic.inl  distinctly. 

7.13:  I  read  a  signal  AM  wigwagged  with  the  hat  by  some 
one  in  rear  of  the  left  of  the  line — i»roliahly  the  jtlatoon  guide 
of  Ihe  left  platiMdi.  This  information  was  unusually  inijxtrtant. 
as  It  showed  an  annuuiution  seareity  after  about  two  minute.s' 
firing. 

The  estimated  strength  of  the  tiring  line  was  00  ritles — deter- 
nilned  witii  musketry  rule,  knowing  the  range  000,  and  reading 
(he  width  of  the  line  in  n)ils,  110.  (Width  of  the  line  In  yards 
e<iuals  (he  range  in  yards  multiplied  by  the  width  of  the  line 
iu  mils  divldetl  by  1.000.) 

Maj.  X  then  announced  the  statistical  part  of  the  umpire's 
record,  as  shown  below,  and  commented  thereon  as  noted : 

815.  Fire  effect. — 


Targets. 

Data. 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

ACCURACY. 

600 

650 

.   75 

8 

600 

n.s. 

Direct  hits  on  assigTied  target. . . 
Kicochet  hits  on  assigned  target . 

DISTRIBUTION. 

13 
2 

1                  1 

::::;::::: 

80  F. 
40 

20  F. 
9 

Figures  hit  ( direct  liits) 

VOLUME. 

:::::::::: 

i 

«00 

900 

2 

7  J 

121 

ICS 

1 

8 

1 

jiate                             

1 

COMPARISON— AVERAGE  SHOTS. 

142 

»  10 

>  See  par.  317. 


316.  General  comment. — .Tudgment  of  the  result; 
Target  1. — Estimated  visibility  700. 
3529°— 17 15 


226  MUSKETRY. 

Average  shots,  at  tlie  true  range,  would  have  struck  50  figures, 
and  with  a  visibility  of  "  700  yards  "  42  figures. 

You  struck  40  figures. 

Taryet  2. — Estimated  visibility  normal.     (Pai's.  317  and  340.) 

Average  shots,  at  the  true  range,  would  have  struck  10  figures. 
You  struck  9  figures. 

Your  performance  seemed  about  equal  to  average  shots  and 
is  considered  satisfactory. 

3.  Was  the  mission  accomplished?    Yes. 

A —  B 

Captain  Oath  Jnfantnj, 

Umpire, 

317,  Memorandums-Explanatory  of  the  eemparison: 

Company  strength,  10  squads,  first  and  fouith  platoons,  3 
squads  each. 

Corporals  in  i-ear  of  line. 

TO  rifiee  In  the  firing  line, 

Target  1.     80  F,  range  600,     TisiUUty  700, 

70  men  firing  1  minute, 

70  men  less  21  (fourth  platoon)  firing  1  minute. 

70  plus  49  equal  119. 

^^  equal  59j,  say  60  men  firing  2  minutes. 

There  are  60  men  firing  2  minutes  on  80  targets ;  reducing 
the  men  and  the  targets  to  the  same  number  in  order  to  get 
the  time  factor  for  reference  to  table,  we  have  80  men  firing 
on  80  prone  targets  for  1^  minutes  and  from  the  table,  700-yard 
line,  the  percentage  of  figures  hit  shows  53,  or  42  targets. 

Target  2.    20  F,  range  B.  S.   (500).     VisiUUty  normal. 

Target  was  exposed  for  1  minute.     Twenty  men    (21)   firing 
1  minute  on  20  prone  figures  at  range  500  with  the  battle  gig^it. 
From  the  table  50  per  cent,  or  10  targets. 


CHAPTER  XXTTT. 


SITUATIONS    FOR    FIRE    PROBLEMS. 


318.  The  examples  given  here  are  for  the  purpose  of  instruc- 
tion, but  it  is  only  by  actual  construction  and  solution  of  prob- 
lems that  the  subject  is  mastered. 

The  following  siluatioiis  arc  oircrcd  as  an  aid  in  (lir  iircpara- 
tion  of  prohk'ins  : 

319.  A  blue  company  on  coiiihat  reconnaissance  lias  worked 
its  way  around  the  rijrht  Hank  of  tlie  red  position,  and  on  arrival 
at  B  observes  a  red  battery  about  to  unliinber  at  ^1.     (Fig.  09.) 

N 


,Rd''t^^ifio<>Y$rcli 


Fig.  50. 

320.  A  company  of  infantry  is  reconnoitering  the  enemy's 
outpost  position  with  a  mission  to  develop  the  enemy's  strength 
at  B.     (Fig.  60.) 

N 

^     "A  o\Tln\  IT  T-  ^^ — 5—1 — 


Fio.  60. 


oor 


228 


MUSKETRY. 


321.  Two  hostile  units  are  engaged  in  a  tire  fight.    The  hostile 
unit  is  reenforceil  on  one  Hank.     (Fig.  61.) 


N 


;^[-'' 


^R^^^ 


-5^f^* 


f^^ntfC  (fOO  yc^$ 


FiQ,  61. 


322.  A  red  unorganized  force  occupies  windows  and  tops  of 
buildings  on  north  side  of  plaza.  A  blue  company  from  A  has 
deployed  at  B-C.     (Fig.  62.) 


\jmwmmmmmmA 


n- 


~|r~ 


no.  62. 


MUSKETRY. 


229 


323.  A  rear-fj:ii;ir(l  l).i(liilioii  is  (U'ployed  at  C     Tlie  pursiiiiij^ 
enemy  has  app^'ari'd   at    .1.      (V'lii.   U.'5. ) 


Pio.  63. 

324.  A  hattalidd  is  sent  from  V,  to  cover  the  left  of  the  blue 
position.  Un  arrival  at  A  two  red  companies  are  .seen  advanc- 
inj:  through  the  brush  in  .squad  columns.     (Fig.  64.) 


loM  M  I   t   M  I  H  <  J 

i     f      C  » 


^^^^ 


i 


Fio.  64. 


325.  A  blue  advance  guard  battalion,  ui)on  arrival  at  .1.  is 
directed  to  halt,  cover  bridges,  and  prevent  enemy  crossing. 
Enemy  about  J  mile  west  of  bridges,  now  ai»i>roacliiiig.  (Fig. 
(;"). ) 

326.  Tlic  reds  have  taken  up  a  concealed  position  t)n  the 
west  of  hill  A,  whose  face  is  covered  with  a  uniform  brush.  The 
blue  leader  from  B,  with  his  fieUl  gla.sses,  has  located  the  reds 
along  the  30-foot  contour,     (Fig.  (jG. ) 


MUSKETRY. 


f 


Fig.  65. 


M 


etut 


t 


^n^ciooo  yy^ 


Fig.  66. 


MUSKETRY. 


Sdl 


327.  A  l)luo  Itattalidii  is  inlreiiclaHl  at  .l-.l  to  prevent  hos- 
tile landiiij;.  Shells  are  falliii;;  on  and  near  intrenclnuents  from 
a  ship  east  of  E.     (Fiy.  07.) 


,,4^V 


\ 


^•^'S 


>^, 


\ 


Fig.  67. 


328.  A  blue  rcKinicnt  has  reached  1),  a<lvancing  toward  an 
cneiiiy  intrenched  at  .1.  with  mission  to  first  conduct  a  holding 
attack  until  the  rest  of  the  hrijiade  has  launcluMl  the  main  at- 
tack from  a  Hank.     (Fiy.  (W. ) 


Fig.  68. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

PROBLEMS  SUITABLE  FOR  A  CLASS  A  RANGE. 

329.  The  following  are  illustrative  of  the  kind  of  prohleuis 
that  may  be  fired  on  a  class  A  range: 

FOR  THE   SQUAD. 

Object:  To  illustrate  the  leadership  of  the  squad. 

Situation:  One  squad  is  sent  from  an  outpost  in  enemy 
country  into  an  open  field  to  round  up  and  drive  in  a  herd 
of  cattle  grazing  near  a  small  hill  (the  parapet)  about  1,000 
yards  in  front  of  the  outpost  line.  A  small  hostile  patrol 
(three  men)  was  seen  in  the  vicinity  of  the  hill  yesterday. 

Action:  The  squad  advances  in  the  indicated  direction  in  the 
formation  directed  by  the  corporal.  When  it  has  advanced 
about  200  yards  firing  is  heard  in  the  direction  of  the  hill 
and  the  umpire  informs  the  corporal  that  one  of  his  men  has 
been  hit.  The  umpire  directs  one  man  to  fall  out  and  remain 
prone.  Simultaneously  with  the  firing  a  small  patrol  appears 
(three  men)  near  one  side  of  the  range,  and  remains  in  view 
30  seconds.  Forty  seconds  later  the  patrol  appears  again  for 
30  seconds  and  more  firing  is  heard.  If  the  corporal  oi)ens  fire  and 
advances,  the  enemy  patrol  retreats,  appearing  three  times,  each 
time  for  30  seconds  at  intervals  of  40  seconds.  If  the  corporal 
does  not  open  fire  and  advance,  the  enemy  patrol  remains  in 
its  first  position  and  at  intervals  of  40  seconds  appears  and 
fires.    No  shots  will  be  fired  except  as  ordered  by  the  corporal. 

Targets:  Four  lines  of  silhouettes  in  echelon,  mounted  on 
disappearing  apparatus.  First  line,  3  prone  silhouettes  2 
yards  apart;  second  line,  3  prone  silhouettes  4  yards  apart; 
third  line.  3  prone  silhouettes  6  yards  apart ;  fourth  line,  3 
silhouettes  8  yards  apart,  all  of  the  silhouettes  measured  from 
center  to  center.  Distance  between  lines,  front  to  rear,  50,  75, 
and  90  yards.    Distance  to  first  line  about  700  yards. 

Ammunition:  Five  rounds  per  man. 


MUSKETRY.  238 

FOR    THE    PLATOON. 

330.  Object:   To  illustrate  the  leadership  of  a  platoon. 

Situation:  One  platoon  of  four  stpiatls  is  sent  from  an  out- 
post in  enemy  eountry  to  cut  down  some  trees  from  which  an 
onemy  i)atrol  fir»'d  on  one  of  our  outj^uards  yesterday.  There 
is  no  cover  for  700  yards  in  front  of  our  line. 

Action:  The  platoon  advances  in  the  indicated  direction  in 
the  formation  directed  by  the  platoon  leader.  AVhen  it  has  ail- 
vanced  ahout  200  yards  tiring  is  heard  and  at  the  same  time  a 
hostile  patrol  appears  near  one  side  of  the  range.  The  umpin; 
directs  two  men  to  fall  out,  and  informs  the  platoon  leader 
that  they  have  been  hit.  If  the  plato(»n  oi)ens  fire  a  second 
hostile  patrol  appears  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  range,  and  if 
the  platoon  continues  firing  both  patrols  retreat. 

Targets:  First  patrol — 4  lines  in  column,  each  line  consist- 
ing of  8  prone  silhouettes  on  disappearing  apparatus,  1  yard 
apart  between  centers  at  distances  from  front  to  rear  of  60, 
80,  and  100  yards.  Distance  to  front  line  about  700  yards. 
The  first  appearance  of  the  first  line  is  for  30  seconds.  At 
intervals  of  about  80  seconds  it  continues  to  appear  and  fire  initil 
fire  is  opened  by  the  platoon.  After  fire  has  been  ojiened  by 
the  platoon  the  first  line  remains  in  view  for  30  seconds.  The 
second,  third,  and  fourth  lines  of  targets  then  appear  at  intervals 
of  30  seconds,  each  line  remaining  in  view  about  30  seconds. 
Second  patrol — same  as  for  first  patrol,  except  the  silhouettes 
will  be  kneeling  and  the  distance  to  the  first  line  will  be  about 
775  yards.  The  second  patrol  does  not  apjiear  until  fire  has 
been  opened  on  the  first  patrol.  The  appearance  of  the  second 
l»atn)l  is  acconiiKinied  with  firing  from  its  direction. 

Ammunition:   1'>  rounds  i)er  man. 

FOR  THE   COMPANY    (OFFENSIVE). 

331.  Object:  To  illustrale  lire  directioii,  control,  and  disci- 
pline. 

Situation:  A  company  is  ordered  to  attack  an  enemy  whose 
pfisition  is  indicated  to  the  company  connnander. 

Action:  The  company  will  be  dejtloyed  in  line  of  skirmishers 
abont  l.L'OO  yards  from  the  jiits  under  connnand  of  the  cai)tain. 
The  umpire  will  indicate  the  first  firing  position  and  direct  the 
captain  to  move  his  company  forward  and  open  fire.    One  min- 


234  MUSKETRY. 

ute  and  a  half  after  the  company  opens  fire  it  will  cease  firing 
and  the  targets  will  be  marked.  Tlie  iiumber  of  targets  struck 
will  be  signaled  to  the  umpire,  who  will  determine  whether 
fire  superiority  has  been  gained.  Should  the  company  have 
failed  in  this  respect  it  will  remain  in  position  and  fire  for 
another  minute  and  a  half,  continuing  in  this  position  and 
firing  for  periods  of  a  minute  and  a  half  until  the  ammunition 
is  expended  or  fire  superiority  gained.  In  case  fire  superiority 
is  gained,  three  minutes  will  be  given  for  the  next  period  of 
lire,  during  which  the  company  will  be  required  to  advance  not 
less  than  .50  yards,  the  details  of  the  advance  being  left  to  the 
captain.  Following  the  advance  the  umpire  will  determine 
whether  fire  superiority  has  been  retained.  If  not,  the  company 
will  remain  in  position  as  at  the  beginning.  This  procedure 
will  continue  luitil  the  ammunition  has  been  expended. 

Target:  A  line  of  prone  silhouettes,  equal  in  number  lo  the 
nuH!l)er  of  men  in  the  tiring  line,  1  yard  apart,  center  to  center, 
resting  on  the  ground,  and  placed  about  900  yards  from  first 
firing  position. 

Ammunition:  30  rounds  per  man. 

The  distance  gained  and  the  number  of  figures  hit  during 
liiis  exercise  might  be  used  as  a  basis  for  judging  the  relative 
proficiency  of  the  companies  of  a  regiment.  This  would  furnish 
a  stimulus  that  would  add  to  the  interest  of  combat  firing. 

When  favorable  soil  exists  for  a  trench  of  proper  dimensions 
to  be  constructed  the  targets  for  the  exercise  outlined  above 
could  be  so  arranged  and  manipulated  that  it  would  be  imnec- 
essary  for  the  company  to  cease  firing  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether  or  not  fire  superiority  had  been  gained. 

The  beam-disappearing  target  would  be  arranged  in  this  pit 
by  resting  the  beams  on  pieces  of  timber  placed  crosswise  in  the 
])it  and  sunk  sufficiently  deep  to  allow  only  the  visil)le  part  of 
the  target  to  be  seen  flush  with  the  ground.  Four  beams  should 
be  fastened  together  so  that  one  man  from  a  central  position 
could  operate  32  targets.  Two  lines  of  figures  pointing  in  oppo- 
site directions  would  be  fastened  to  each  beam  so  that  a  turn 
of  ISO  degrees  would  expose  first  one  line  and  then  the  other. 

After  firing  was  begun,  each  line  of  targets  would  alternately 
be  exposed  one  minute.  From  the  number  of  targets  hit  each 
minute,  an  oflicer  in  the  pit  would  deternfine  when  fire  supe- 
riority had  been  gained  and  whether  it  was  being  kept.  By  a 
system  of  flag  signals  this  information  would  be  read  at  the 


MUSKETRY.  286 

Hrinjr  point.  Aftor  opciiiii;,'  lire  the  citiiipany  would  remain  .sta- 
tionary until  tire  suiieriority  had  heon  j;aine<l.  when  it  would  be 
allowed  to  advance  in  any  formation  desired  liy  the  captain.  If 
fire  superiority  were  lo.st,  all  elements  would  lialt  in  place  until 
they  were  able  ajrain  to  gain  tlie  advantaj:*'. 

FOR   THE   COMPANY    (DEFENSIVE). 

332.  Object:  To  teach  (inick  estimation  of  distances,  (piicli 
sight  setting,  study  of  the  foreground,  and  apportionment  of 
target. 

Situation:  A  company  in  an  entrenched  position  is  ordered 
to  fire  on  an  advancing  enemy. 

Action:  The  company  beiug  in  position,  tlie  umpire  calls  up 
the  first  target,  which  is  the  signal  for  the  company  to  commence 
firing. 

Targets:  Four  linos  f>f  i)rone  silliouettes  on  disappearing  ap- 
paratus— number  of  silhouettes  equal  to  the  number  of  men  fir- 
ing, 1  yard  apart  between  centers.  The  four  lines  placed  in 
column  at  distances  of  90,  75,  and  60  yards  from  rear  to  front. 
Distance  to  first  target  about  900  yards.  The  first  target  re- 
mains in  view  one  and  one-half  minutes  after  fire  has  been 
opened,  when  it  disappears.  At  intervals  of  30  seconds  the  sec- 
ond, third,  and  fourth  targets  appear  and  remain  in  view  one 
and  one-half  minutes  each. 

Ammunition:   30  I'ounds  per  man. 

Time:  The  time  for  preparing  for  the  first  opening  of  fire 
will  be  taken  from  the  appearance  of  the  first  target. 

The  average  distance  of  the  targets,  the  total  number  of 
figures  hit,  and  the  total  time  of  actual  firing  will  form  a  basis 
for  the  umpire  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  company  gained 
fire  superiority. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 
THE   STATISTICAL   OFFICER. 

THE    STATISTICAL   RECORDS. 

333.  The  statistical  recoi'd  of  combat  firing  is  kept  by  the 
statistical  officer  under  the  direction  of  the  umpire. 

Disposition. — The  statistical  ofiicer  makes  such  disposition  of 
the  records  as  the  umpire  may  direct. 

334.  The  form. — The  form  shown  below  is  a  convenient  one, 
though  no  particular  form  is  prescribed.  It  is  believed,  however, 
that  the  data  included  on  this  form  is  essential  to  a  thorough 
analysis  of  any  firing. 

The  columns  headed  "  Target  1,"  "  Target  2,"  etc.,  may  be 
used  to  record  the  results  on  several  targets,  on  a  single  target 
from  several  firing  points,  on  several  fractions  of  a  single  line, 
or,  when  the  firing  is  at  a  single  target  from  a  single  firing 
point,  to  record  the  results  obtained  by  successive  "  orders,"  thus 
keeping,  on  a  single  sheet,  the  results  of  as  many  repetitions  of 
the  same  exercise  as  there  are  columns  in  which  to  record  them. 

In  case  certain  items  of  the  record  are  found  to  be  not  perti- 
nent to  certain  exercises,  they  may  be  omitted  at  the  discretion 
of  the  umpire. 
236 


MUSKETRY. 
St.\ti.stic.\l  Kkcokd  of  Comh.vt  Fiking. 


287 


Orpanizat  ion Commandln);. 

KxiTciso Onior School  ol  Miiskolry,  Fort  SiJI,  Oklu 10 

DATA. 


Hits. 

Target  1. 

TargiH  2. 

Target  3. 

Target  4. 

Target  .5. 

Hits: 

Direct,  in  sector  or  on  as- 
sit;nc(l  objective 

Ricliwhet,  in  sector  or  on 
lussigned  objective 

Ontside  sector 

True  range 

VLsibilily 

" 

Estimated  ranRC 

Firing  data  used: 

Elevation     

Deflection 

.\imiiig  point 

Figures  m  target: 

Number  and  kind  m  sector 
or  objective 

Number  per  yard  of  front. . 

Struck  by  richochetsonly. . 

Struck  outside  sector  or  ob- 
jective   

Cfinter  of  impact 

The  Critique — Remarks  on  Statistical  Record — Result  Com- 
pared WITH  Standard. 


[Same  time  and  strength.] 

1 

Rcsult. 
Standard. 

3 

o 

i 

1 

"3 

-2 

1 

■6 

c3 

1 
to 

"a 

Accuracy 

Hits 

Distribution 

Figures  stnick 



Volume 

Kate 

Time 

Shots 

1 

Men 

:::::::: 

1 

;  •  Y--!--- 

1 

1    ■ 

Richochcts  included  (yes  or  no) 

COMPARISONS  ON  OTHER  BASES. 


(a)  Comparat  i ve  st  rengths 

1 

(6)  Comparative  time 

(c)  Hiisc\]i(Mtc(l  for  shots  fired 

' 

(d)  Distribution  e.xpected  for  hits  made 

....|.... 

1 

' 

1 

1        1               1        ,        1  ■■■ 

..Statistical  Officer. 


238  MUSKETRY. 

STATISTICAL  OFFICERS'  SOURCES   OF  INFORMATION. 

336.  The  information  required  by  the  statistical  officer  for  the 
completion  of  his  record  is  obtained,  in  general,  by  observation: 
From  the  umpire,  from  the  range  officer,  from  the  commander  of 
the  firing  unit,  by  computation. 

By  observation: 

Estiuiuted  range. 

Firins  data  used. 

Time. 
From  the  umpire: 

Visibility. 

Ilifocliets  includerl,  yes  or  no. 
From  the  range  officer: 

True  range. 

Number  of  figures  in  target  per  yard  of  front. 

Number  and  kind  of  figures  within  the  sector  or  assigned 
objective. 

Hits,  direct  and  ricochet,  obtained  within  and  without 
the  sector  or  assigned  objective. 

Figures  struck  within  and  without  the  sector  or  assigned 
objective. 

Figures  struck  by  ricocliets  only. 

Center  of  impact. 
From  the  commander  of  the  unit  firing: 

Number  of  men  firing. 

Number  of  shots  fired. 
By  computation: 

Such  further  entries  as  are  required  in  the  record  he 
obtains  by  computation. 

ENTRIES   IN    THE   RECORD. 

337.  Entries  in  the  record  should  include  hits,  true  range,  visi- 
bility, estimated  range,  firing  data  used,  figures  in  the  target, 
center  of  impact. 

338.  Hits. — After  the  firing  is  completed  and  the  targets  have 
been  marked  the  statistical  officer  secures  a  record  of  the  hits 
obtained,  direct  and  ricochet,  within  and  without  the  sector 
or  assigned  objective,  from  the  range  officer  or  from  the  signal 
squad,  as  is  most  convenient.  In  case  the  statistical  oSicer's 
post  is  some  distance  from  the  signal  station,  then  arrange- 
ments should  be  made  to  have  this  information  sent  to  him 
promptly  by  messenger. 


MUSKETRY.  289 

In  cnse  all  the  flfruras  In  (lie  t;ir;,'t't  lie  wlfhln  the  limits  of 
the  objective  or  sector,  then  ohvlously  there  wuuUl  be  no  entry 
on  the  line  "  o\itsi(ie  sector." 

Whether  or  not  ricochets  are  to  be  scored  and  recorded  sejv 
arately  will  depend  ui)on  the  natnro  of  the  exercise  and  will 
be  decided  in  each  case  by  the  uniiiire.  However,  it  must  be 
noted  tiiat  the  tal)les  are  based  on  direct  hits  only, 

339.  True  range. — This  is  obtained  from  the  range  officer,  and 
should  be  the  result  of  an  exact  measurement,  not  an  estimate. 

340.  Visibility. — The  tables  from  which  the  standard  of  com- 
parison is  ot)tained,  as  explained  hereafter,  are  based  ui)()n 
the  hypothesis  that  the  target  (tr  aiming  point  Is  clearly  visible, 
thus  expressing  the  ja-obabie  maximum  of  expectancy. 

When  this  condition  does  not  exist— and  it  seldom  does  in 
field  tiring — It  becomes  necessary  to  modify  the  standard  by 
reducing  It  to  meet  existing  conditions.  The  amount  of  this 
reduction  is  termed  the  "visibility,"  and  is  the  opinion  of  tho 
umpU'e  expressed  in  terras  of  range.  For  example,  the  true 
range  to  a  target  being  600  yards,  the  umpire  may  estimate  the 
visibility  as  "G50."  That  Is  to  say,  It  is  his  belief  that  the 
conditions  are  such  that  the  probable  maximum  result  to  be 
expected  Is  the  same  as  when  tiring  at  a  clearly  visible  target 
at  650  yards  and  that  the  standard  Is  to  be  computed  on  that 
basis. 

341.  Estimated  range. — The  estimated  range  may  or  may  not 
agree  with  the  siglit  setting  announced. 

During  the  progress  of  the  exercise,  the  statistical  officer 
remains  In  the  vicinity  of  the  commander  of  the  unit  engaged 
in  the  practice  and,  by  close  observation,  learns  the  estimated 
ranges.  Should  the  result  of  his  observation  leave  him  doubtful 
as  to  the  correct  figures,  he  may  inquire  of  the  unit  commander 
after  the  firing  is  completed  or  at  such  other  time  as  not  to  in- 
terrupt the  progress  of  the  exercise. 

342.  Firing  data  used. — 

lOh^vation, 
DetkH'tion, 
Ainalng  point. 
The  statistical  officer  obtains  this  Information  In  the  same 
manner  In  which  he  obtains  the  estimated  range,  i.  e.,  by  obser" 
vatlon  and  Inquiry. 

When  an  auxiliary  aiming  point  is  used,  it  is  recorded  briefly 
fxs   "tj-ee,"   "  bush,"   "  rock,"   "house,"   "hedge,"   etc,   and   it 


240  MUSKETRY. 

sometimes  may  be  of  advantage  also  to  note  its  distance  and 
direction  from  the  target.  Tliis  may  i)e  done  by  recording  tlie 
distance  (in  mils)  in  Arabic  numerals,  followed  by  the  direction 
(clock  notation — target  at  center  of  vertical  clock)  recorded  in 
Roman  numerals.  Thus  "Tree-50-IV"  would  mean  that  the 
aiming  point  was  a  troe  50  mils  from  the  target  in  the  direction 
of  4  o'clock. 

343.  Figures  in  target. — 

Numiier  and  kind  in  sector,  or  assigned  objective. 

Number  per  yard  of  front. 

Struck  by  richochets  only. 

Struck  outside  sector,  or  assigned  objective, 
This  information  i.s  obtained  by  the  statistical  officer  froni 
the  range  officer.    The  first  two  items  may  be  obtained  from 
the  statement  of  the  exercise. 

344.  Center  of  impact. — This  information  is  obtained  from  the 
range  officer  or  from  the  signal  squad,  as  Is  most  convenient, 
The  statistical  officer  is  informed  as  to  whether  the  fire  was 
equally  distributed  throughout  the  entire  front  of  the  target  or 
was  concentrated  in  one  or  more  well-defined  shot  groups.  The 
record  should  be  brief,  and,  merely  for  the  sake  of  uniformity, 
the  following  abbreviations  are  suggested.  With  reference  to 
the  target,  R,  L,  and  C  refer  to  its  right,  left,  and  center : 

Right R 

Left : _.  L 

Center ^^ : C 

Right  center  quarter s RC/4 

Left  center  fifth LC/5 

Center  third C/3 

Right  half : .  R/2 

Distributed Dist. 

Should  there  be  any  apparent  necessity  for  more  precise  in- 
formation than  can  be  given  in  this  manner,  it  is  better  to  divide 
the  front  of  the  objective  into  several  parts  and  to  obtain  a 
separate  record  of  the  hits  and  distribution  in  each  part.  Cer- 
tain exercises  might  require  that  a  record  be  kept  of  the  num- 
ber of  hits  on  each  figure  in  the  target.  In  such  cases  this  in- 
formation would  be  recorded  on  a  separate  sheet  and  attached 
to  the  record,  when  entries  in  the  body  of  the  record  might 
lead  to  confusion  or  misunderstanding.  .    -  - 

345.  Result  compared  with  standard. — There  are  several  stand- 
ards by  whicli  the  material  results  of  combat  fi.ring  may  be 


MUSKETRY.  241 

judged,  but  the  one  here  used  is  an  expression  of  the  probable 
result  to  be  expected  from  an  equal  number  of  average  shots 
firing  at  the  correct  range  and  with  the  correct  elevation  and 
for  the  same  length  of  time. 

Entries  under  standard  should  include  hits,  figures  struck,  rate, 
time,  shots,  men,  ricochets  included,  yes  or  no. 

To  coiupute  the  standard  the  statistical  olflcer  must  have  at 
baud  the  following  data: 
Visibility. 

Time,  or  duration  of  the  fire,  in  minutes. 
Number  of  men  firing. 
Numi)er  and  kind  of  figures  in  the  target. 
An  example  will  serve  best  to  show  the  method  of  arriving 
at  the  standard. 

Assume  the  following  data:  Range.  500;  visibility,  650;  time, 
2  minutes;  men,  100;  figures  in  target.  100,  kneeling, 

346.  Hits,— Consult  Table  I  (par.  361).  In  the  left-band  col- 
xinin,  beaded  "Range  yards,"  find  the  figure  "650"  (visibility). 
Follow  tliis  6.50  line  to  the  right  until  entering  the  subcolnnm 
"Kneel  "  (kinds  of  figures  in  the  target)  in  the  column  "  Num- 
ber of  hits."  Here  is  foijnd  the  amount  "1.074,"  which  is  the 
number  of  bits  to  be  expected  from  one  average  shot  in  one  min- 
ute. This  amount  nuiltiplied  by  2  (time)  gives  2,148,  or  the 
number  of  bits  to  be  expected  from  one  average  shot  in  two 
minutes.  This  product  nmltiplied  by  100  (men)  gives  214.8, 
which  is  the  number  of  hits  to  be  expected  from  100  men  firing 
for  2  minutes  and  is  the  standard  sought.  Fractions  less  than 
one-half  ordinarily  are  disregarded,  and  so  this  would  be 
recorded  as  215. 

347.  Figures  struck. — Taking  the  probable  number  of  bits 
(215)  as  the  basis,  first  find  the  number  of  times  each  figure 
in  the  target  would  be  struck  on  the  average.  As  there  are 
100  figures  in  the  target  and  there  are  215  hits,  then  215  divided 
by  100  would  give  the  average  number  of  hits  per  figure,  or 
2.15.  Consult  Table  II,  In  the  column  "H"  find  the  amount 
2,15.  Then  the  amount  on  the  same  line  in  the  adjacent  col- 
umn "D"  to  the  right  expresses  the  percentage  of  figures  in 
the  target  that  should  be  struck  with  a  fire  equally  distributed 
throughout  the  entire  front  of  the  objective.  In  the  present 
instance  the  amount  2.15  is  found  in  colunm  H.  Disregarding 
fractions  less  than  one-h:ilf,  the  amount  taken  from  column  D 
is  88.     As  this  amount  expresses  percentage  only,  and  as  it  is 

3529°— 17 16 


242  MUSKETRY. 

number  that  is  souRlit,  then  88  nuiltipliod  by  the  number  of 
figures  in  the  target  (100)  and  this  product  divided  by  100 
will  give  the  number  of  figures  that  should  have  been  struck. 
In'this  case,  as  the  number  of  figures  in  the  target  is  an  even 
100,  the  number  and  percentage  are  the  same,  88.  Using  the 
umpire's  reference  table,  kneeling  figures,  and  interpolating  for 
range  650  in  the  2-minute  column,  the  percentage  is  found  to 
be  88. 

348.  Rate. — The  expected  rate  of  fire,  expressed  in  shots  per 
man  per  minute,  is  found  in  Table  I  at  the  intersection  of  the 
line  corresponding  to  the  visibility  650  with  the  column  headed 
"  Rate  of  fire."     In  this  example  it  is  7.0. 

349.  Time. — The  time  recorded  under  "  Standard  "  and  imder 
"  Result "  are  identical — i.  e.,  it  is  the  actual  duration  of  the 
fire  in  minutes. 

The  statistical  officer  often  will  find  his  computations  sim- 
plified if  in  recording  the  time  he  will  express  fractional  parts 
of  a  minute  decimally  instead  of  as  seconds. 

350.  Shots. — This  is  the  number  of  shots  that  would  have  been 
fired  had  the  correct  rate  been  used.  Multiply  the  rate  by  the 
time  and  this  product  by  the  number  of  men. 

In  this  example  7  (the  rate  as  found  in  the  table)  times  2 
(the  time  in  minutes)  times  100  (the  number  of  men  firing) 
equals  1,400,  which  is  the  number  of  shots  that  should  have 
been  fired. 

351.  Men. — This  is  the  number  of  men  in  the  firing  line  who 
did  or  should  have  used  their  rifles  in  the  exercise  in  question. 
The  men  recorded  under  "  St;uidard  "  and  "  Result "  are  the 
same. 

352.  Ricochets  included,  yes  or  no. — Under  certain  conditions 
it  might  be  expected  that  a  given  number  of  ricochets  would 
occur  in  addition  to  the  direct  hits  found  from  Table  I.  In 
such  a  case  the  umpire  would  decide  upon  whether  or  not  he 
desired  to  consider  the  ricochets  separately,  and  if  so,  he  would 
notify  the  statistical  officer  as  to  the  percentage  to  be  expected.^ 
The  recording  of  this  amount  as  "  20  per  cent,"  for  examp'.e, 
under  "  Standard "  would  indicate  that  ricochets  were  to  be 
included  and  that  20  per  cent  were  to  be  expected  in  addition 
to  the  direct  hits.  If  the  umpire- decides  that  ricochets  are  not 
to  be  considered,  then  the  word  "  No  "  appears  in  place  of  the 
percentage. 


MUSKETRY.  243 

In  case  ricoclit'ts  arc  <i>nsi(lt'n'<l,  tlu'  statistical  olliccr  in- 
creases the  expected  hits  as  fi>viii»l  in  the  tahle  l)y  the  perccnt- 
a^o  of  ricochets  as  announced  hy  tlie  umpire.  He  tluMi  uses 
this  increased  nuniher  of  hits  in  his  further  computations. 

The  entries  under  result  should  include  hits,  figures  struck, 
rate,  time,  shots,  men,  ricochets  included,  yes  or  no. 

353.  Hits  and  figures  struck. — Tiiese  ainoinits  are  tiie  ones 
oI)tained  from  the  ran;re  ollicer,  as  explained  above,  and  induih* 
ricochets  or  not  as  directed  by  the  umpire. 

354.  Rate. — Tliis  is  the  rate  of  fire  actually  obtained,  and  is 
found  by  dividing  the  total  number  of  cartridj,'es  fired  l)y  tlie 
product  of  the  men  and  time. 

355.  Time,  shots,  men. — This  is  merely  a  record  of  fact  as  to 
tlie  duration  of  tlie  fire,  tlit>  total  number  of  shots  fired,  and  tlie 
number  of  men  in  the  firing  line  who  did  or  should  have  used 
tliiMr  rillcs  (lui'ing  tlu>  exercise. 

356.  Ricochets  included,  yes  or  no. — This  i.s  a  statement  as  to 
wliether  or  not  the  results  recorded  under  hits  and  figures  struclc 
include  ricochets.  It  would  be  unu.sual  to  include  ricochets  in 
the  standard  and  not  in  the  result,  or  vice  versa. 

357.  Comparisons  on  other  basis  should  include  comparative 
strengths,  comparative  time,  hits  expected  for  shots  fired,  dis- 
tribution expected  for  hits  made. 

Comparative  strengths. — A  given  firing  line  produces  si  given 
numlier  of  casualties  in  tlie  enemy's  ranks  (.strikes  a  given 
number  of  figures  in  the  target)  in  a  given  time.  What  is 
sought  then  is  how  many  riflemen  of  average  ability,  using  the 
correct  elevation  and  rate  and  distributing  their  fire  equally 
throughout  the  entire  front  of  the  target,  will  be  required  to 
produce  the  same  number  of  casualties  in  the  same  time.   . 

This  may  be  found  from  the  "  Umpire's  reference  tallies  "  as 
explained  in  Cliai)ter  XXVI,  or,  if  more  preci.se  results  are 
desired,  by  the  .solution  of  the  following  equation  : 

n^   N 

''B  T F' 

Mg   is  the  number    of   men   (.ftandard   conditions)   producing 

equal  results. 
H  is  an  amount  found  from  the  distribution  table.  Table  11, 

as  liereinafter  sliown. 
N  is  the  number  of  figures  in  the  target — within  tlie  sector, 

or  assigned  objective. 


244  MUSKETRY. 

B  is  an  amount  found  from  Table  I,  as  hereinafter  shown. 
T  is  the  time  or  duration  of  the  fire  in  minutes. 
F  is  the  number  of  figures  in  the  target  per  yard  of  front. 
To  find  the  value  of  H,  multiply  the  number  of  figures  struck 
by  100  and  then  divide  this  product  by  the  number  of  figures  in 
the  target.     Consult  Table  II  and  find" an  equal  amount  to  this 
quotient  in  column  D.    The  amount  on  the  same  line,  in  colunui 
II  to  the  left,  is  the  value  of  H  sought. 
Example: 

Number  of  figures  in  target,  50. 
Number  of  figures  struck,  26. 
Then  26X100-^50=52,  and  in  the  column  D  of  Table  II 
(fourth  column  from  the  left)  is  found  the  amount  51.8,  which 
is  the  closest  approximation  of  52.  In  the  column  H,  to  the 
left  and  on  the  same  line,  is  found  the  amount  0.73,  wliich  is 
the  value  of  H  sought. 

To  find  the  value  of  B,  consult  Table  I.  In  the  column  "  Num- 
ber of  hits,"  select  the  appropriate  subcolumn  depending  upon 
the  kind  of  figures  (kneeling  or  prone)  in  the  target.  The  value 
of  B  sought  will  be  found  at  the  intersection  of  this  subcolumn 
with  the  line  corresponding  to  the  visibility. 
Example: 

Prone  figures. 
Visil)ility,  800. 
Follow  the  8(X)  line  to  the  right  until  entering  the  colunm 
"  Number  of  hits,  prone,"   there   is  found  the  amount,  0.384, 
which  is  the  value  of  B  sought. 
Example  of  use  of  equation: 

Number  of  figures  struck,  48. 

Number  of  figures  in  target,  65  kneeling. 

Visibility,  950. 

Figures  in  target  per  yard  of  front,  J. 

Time,  2  minutes. 

Substituting  in  the  equation. 

1.08(H)XG5{N)        ^70.20_ 
^^«    0A7i{B)X2{T)X}4iF)      .474      ^^^ 

That  is,  it  would  take  148  average  shots  to  strike  43  out  of  65 
kneeling  figures  in  two  minutes. 

358.  Comparative  time.^ — How  much  time  should  be  used  by 
average  shots  of  a  given  number  to  strike  a  given  number  of 
figures. 


MUSKETRY. 


246 


Thl.s  can  be  found  in  tlu>  same  manner  ns  the  comparative 
stri'nf,'th  from  the  iniiph-e's  reference  table  or  with  Kreat«>r  i>re- 
cision  l)y  a  transposition  of  the  above  eiiuation  to  read — 

_  Ji>L 

^'      BMF 
Tlie  values  are  the  same  as  in  the  original  e(|uation  except  that 
Tb  Is  the  time  or  duration  of  the  lire  in  minutes  (standard  cdu- 
ditions)   producing  ecjual  residts. 

359.  Hits  expected  for  shots  fired. — Consult  Table  I.  Multiply 
(he  pert'ceutage  of  hits,  as  found  on  the  line  corresponding  to  the 
visibility,  by  the  number  of  shots  fired.  The  product  is  the 
numlier  of  lilts  expected  for  shots  fired. 

360.  Distribution  expected  for  hits  made. — Solve  as  "  fijrures 
struck"  under  "Standard." 

361.  Statistical  officer's  tables.^The  rate  of  fire  and  the  per- 
centage and  number  of  hits  on  the  prone  and  kneeling  figures 
expected  at  each  range  are  shown  in  Table  I.  The  percentage 
of  figures  in  a  linear  target  that  should  be  struck  by  an  evenly 
distributed  fire,  based  on  the  average  number  of  hits  per  figure, 
is  shown  in  Table  II. 

Talilc  I. 
[Black  tifiures  indicate  "  l)attlp  sight."] 


Per  cent  of  hits. 

Number  of  hits. 

lianpe, 
yards. 

Kate  of 
fire. 

Prone. 

Kneel. 

Prone. 

Kneel. 

200 

10.833 

20.  05 

.^3.41 

2.172 

3. 619 

18.52 

33.05 

2.006 

3.580 

250 

10.41(1 

16.  78 

29.19 

1.  748 

3.  (Ml 

16.01 

28.61 

1.668 

2.980 

300 

10.  000 

14.49 

25.  87 

1.  4 19 

2.  587 

14.08 

25.59 

1.408 

2.559 

350 

9.  5Si 

12.91 

2:5.40 

1.2:57 

2.242 

12.89 

22.41 

1.235 

2.148 

400 

9.  lOti 

11.67 

21.40 

1. 070 

1.962 

11.62 

19.72 

1.065 

1.808 

450 

8.7.50 

10.  79 

19.  88 

.  944 

1.740 

10.05 

16.13 

.980 

1.411 

.500 

8.  .333 

10.  00 

18.  57 

.s:« 

1.547 

8.30 

12.86 

.692 

1.072 

550 

7.9ir. 

9.  30 

17.35 

.  73(i 

1. 374 

600 

7.500 

K6ij 

16.22 

.6-19 

1.217 

a50 

7. 0S.3 

K05 

15.16 

.570 

1.074 

700 

6.  fi(>fi 

7.  54 

14.17 

.5a3 

.  9 15 

750 

(!.  2.50 

7.  Oi 

13.  27 

.  4:{9 

.829 

800 

5.  8.33 

6.  59 

12.45 

.  3.8-1 

.726 

S50 

.5.411) 

6.  IS 

11.71 

.:{:t5 

.  6.34 

900 

.5.000 

.5.  7S 

11.00 

.  289 

.5.50 

950 

4.  .583 

5.  42 

10. 34 

.  218 

.474 

1,000 

4.  106 

,5.  12 

9.77 

.213 

.407 

246  MUSKETRY. 

362.  The  degree  of  precision  desirable  in  the  iise  of  this  table 
is  dependent  upon  the  duration  of  the  tire  and  upon  the  amount 
of  anuuunition  expended.  In  "  Rate  of  fire "  and  "  Number 
of  hits "  use  one  place  of  decimals  when  firing  less  than  5 
minutes,  two  places  when  firing  less  than  10  minutes,  and  three 
places  when  firing  more  than  10  minutes.  In  "  Per  ceiit  of 
hits  "  use  no  fraction  when  less  than  100  shots  are  fired,  one 
place  of  decimals  when  less  than  1,000  are  fired,  and  two  places 
when  more  than  1,000  are  fired. 

The  amounts  in  the  body  of  the  table  under  "  Rate  of  fire  " 
indicate  shots  per  man  per  minute  when  firing  at  the  correct 
rate. 

The  amounts  under  "  Per  cent  of  hits "  indicate  the  per- 
centages of  hits  to  be  expected  from  average  shots  on  lines  of 
prone  or  kneeling  figures  occupying  a  frontage  of  1  yard  per 
figure.  For  different  spacing  of  the  targets  multiply  the  amount 
in  the  table  by  the  number  of  figures  per  yard  of  front. 

The  amounts  under  "  Number  of  hits  "  indicate  the  number 
of  hits  to  be  expected  fi'om  one  average  shot  in  one  minute  (cor- 
rect rate  and  elevation  being  used)  on  lines  of  prone  or  kneeling 
figures  occupying  a  frontage  of  1  yard  per  figure.  For  different 
spacing  of  targets  multiply  the  amount  given  in  the  table  by 
the  number  of  figures  per  yard  of  front. 

The  amounts  in  the  body  of  the  table  are  based  upon  the  fur- 
ther supposition  that  the  targets  are  clearly  visible. 


MUSKETRY. 
Tit  hi,'  II. 


247 


H. 

D. 

H. 

D. 

H. 

0.61 

D. 

H. 

D. 

0.01 

1.0 

0.31 

26.7 

45.7 

0.91 

59.8 

0.  02 

2.0 

0.32 

27.4 

0. 62 

46.2 

0.92 

60.2 

0.  03 

3.0 

0..33 

28.1 

0.63 

46.7 

0.93 

60.6 

0.  04 

3.9 

0.34 

28.8 

0.64 

47.2 

0.94 

60.9 

0.  0.') 

4.9 

0.35 

29.  5 

0.  m 

47.8 

0. 95 

61.3 

0.  ()(> 

5.8 

0.36 

30.2 

0.66 

48.3 

0.96 

61.7 

0.07 

6.8 

0.37 

30.9 

0.67 

48.9 

0.97 

62.1 

0.  OS 

7.7 

0.38 

31.6 

0.68 

49.4 

0.98 

62. 5 

0.  Oil 

8. 6 

0.39 

32.3 

0.69 

49.8 

0.99 

62.8 

0.10 

9.5 

0.40 

32.9 

0.70 

50.3 

1.00 

ta.2 

0.11 

10.6 

0.41 

33.6 

0.71 

50.8 

1.02 

63,  9 

0.12 

11.3 

0.42 

34.3 

0.72 

51.3 

1.04 

64.7 

0.13 

12.2 

0.43 

34.9 

0.73 

51.8 

1.06 

65.  4 

0.14 

13.1 

0.44 

35.6 

0.74 

52.3 

1.08 

66.0 

0.15 

13.9 

0.45 

36.2 

0.75 

52.8 

1.10 

66.7 

0.16 

14.8 

0.46 

36.9 

0.76 

.5;}.  2 

1.12 

67.  4 

0.17 

15.6 

0.47 

37.  5 

0.77 

53.7 

1.14 

6N.  0 

0.18 

16.5 

0.48 

38.1 

0.78 

54.2 

1.16 

68.6 

0.19 

17.3 

0.49 

38.7 

0.79 

54.  6 

1.18 

()9. 3 

0.20 

18.1 

0.50 

39.4 

0.80 

55.0 

1.20 

69.9 

0.21 

18.9 

0..51 

40.0 

0.81 

55.5 

1.22 

70.5 

0.22 

19.7 

0.52 

40.5 

0.82 

56.0 

1.24 

71.1 

0.2:5 

20.  5 

0.53 

41.1 

0.83 

56.4 

1.26 

71.6 

0.24 

21.3 

0.54 

41.7 

0.84 

56.8 

1.28 

72.2 

0.25 

22.1 

0.  55 

42.3 

0.85 

57.  3 

1.30 

72.7 

0.26 

22.9 

0.  56 

42.9 

0.86 

57.7 

1.32 

73.3 

0.27 

23.  7 

0.57 

43.4 

0.87 

58.1 

1.34 

73.8 

0.28 

24.4 

0.58 

44.0 

0.88 

58.5 

1.36 

71.3 

0.29 

25.2 

0..59 

44.6 

0.89 

.W.  9 

1.38 

74.8 

0.30 

26.0 

0.60 

45.1 

0.90 

59.3 

1.40 

75.3 

248 


MUSKETRY. 
Tabic  II — Continued. 


n. 

D. 

H. 

1). 

II. 

D. 

1.42 

1.44 
1.46 
l.-!8 
1.50 
1.52 
1.54 
1.56 
1.58 
1.60 

1.62 
1.64 
1.66 
1.68 
1.70 
1.72 
1.74 
1.76 
1.78 
1.80 

1.82 
1.84 
1.86 
1.88 
1.90 
1.92 
1.94 
1.96 
1.98 
2.00 

75.8 
76.3 

76.8 
77.2 
77.7 
7S.  1 
7S.  6 
79.0 
79.4 
79.8 

80.2 
80.6 
81.0 
81.4 
81.7 
82.1 
82.4 
82.8 
83.1 
83.5 

83.8 
84.1 
84.4 
84.7 
So.O 
85.3 
85.6 
85.9 
86.2 
86.5 

2.05 
2.10 
2.15 
2.20 
2.25 
2.30 
2.35 
2.40 
2.45 
2.50 

2.55 
2.60 

87.1 
87.7 
88.4 
88.9 
89.5 
90.0 
90.4 
90.9 
91.4 
91.8 

92.2 
92.6 

4.50 
5.00 

99.0 
99.3 

5.50 
6.00 

99.5 
99.8 

1 

1 

1 

1        ■      . 

2.65 
2.70 

92.9 
93.3 

1 

2.75 
2.80 

93.6 
93.9 

i       .   ... 

1 

1 

2.85 
2.90 

94.2 
94.5 

1 

I 

' 

2.95 
3.00 

94.8 
95.0 

3.25 
3.50 

96.4 
97.8 

3.75 
4.00 

98.3 
98.7 

"l 

If  every  figure  in  the  target  is  hit  H  times  on  the  average,  then  frcm  the  table, 
D  per  cent  of  the  figures  will  be  hit. 


CHAPTER  XXVT. 
THE  UMPIRE'S  REFERENCE  TABLES. 

364.  Distribution  factor. — Tlic  coiisidcration.s  influencing  tlio 
effect  of  fire  are  numerous,  and  while  some  of  them  can  he 
clearly  sh()\^^l  in  terms  of  hits  made  or  figures  struck,  there  are 
many  which  must  he  hased  entii-ely  on  ohservation  and  opinion. 
However,  .so  soon  as  the  principal  factors  are  ivnown,  from  a 
consideration  of  the  record  of  any  firinj;,  a  trained  lunpire  can 
at  once  express  an  intelligent  decision  as  to  the  prohahle  result 
of  the  action.  What  is  wanted  is  a  prompt  decision  from  the 
best  obtainahle  judgment  as  to  the  efficacy  of  the  fire  and  the 
solution  of  the  fire  problem. 

lu  order  to  add  force  to  tlie  decision,  it  is  sometimes  advisahle 
to  make  a  comparison  with  average  shots.  In  order  that  this 
comparison  may  not  involve  "complicated  calcuhitions  "  various 
tables  have  been  compiled  in  order  that  the  percentage  of  figures 
struck  may  be  taken  fi-om  the  table  at  a  glance  and  without  com- 
putation. The  compiled  table  represents  the  result  expected 
from  average  shots  firing  at  a  correct  maximum  rate  and  dis- 
tributing their  fire  perfectly  while  using  the  correct  sight  set- 
ting. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  accomplishment  of  the  mission 
in  a  fire  problem  is  based  usually  on  the  number  of  targets  dis- 
abled.    The  "  comparison,"  therefore,  is  based  on  this  factor. 

365.  The  two  tables  which  follow,  if  printed  on  both  sides  of  a 
card  of  convenient  size  are  of  value  to  umpires,  not  only  as  a 
ready  reference  in  judging  of  the  results  of  fire,  but  also  in  for- 
nuilating  problems  with  ball  cartridges. 

Tlicre  are  problems  in  which  the  \ise  of  these  tables  would 
be  neither  feasible  nor  necessary,  and  others  in  which  the  de- 
cision of  the  umpire  is  amply  supporte<l  by  his  own  judgment. 
Hence  it  is  not  to  be  understood  that  the  use  of  these  tables  is 
in  any  sense  mandatory,  but  rather  that  when  the  umpire  be- 
lieves their  use  possible  and  desirable  they  may  serve  him  as  a 
guide  in  arriving  at  a  decision  or  as  a  standard  whereby  he  may 
fortify  or  confirm  a  decision  already  made. 

249 


250 


MUSKETRY. 


Umpire's  reference  table. 

[Note. — Amounts  in  body  of  table  indicate  the  percentages  of  figures  that  should 
be  struck.    Those  in  black  indicate  "  battle  sight."] 

PRONE   FIGURES. 


Range, 
yards. 

Time,  minutes. 

i 

i 

3 

1 

1* 

2 

2i 

3 

3i 

4 

5 

G 

10 

15 

23 

2J 

30 

200 

.300 

400 

500 

600 
700 
800 
900 
1,000 

42 

39 

30 

30 

2i 

23 

19 

16 

15 

12 

9 

7 

5 

&\ 
63 
52 
51 
41 
41 
34 
29 
2S 
22 
17 
13 
10 

SO 
78 
or, 
65 
55 
55 
46 
40 
3,S 
31 
25 
19 
15 

89 
87 

76 
(itl 
66 
57 
50 
48 
40 
32 
25 
19 

96 
95 
89 
88 
so 
80 
71 
65 
62 
53 
44 
35 
27 

99 
99 

94 
94 

ss 
88 
81 
75 
73 
63 
54 
44 
35 

99 
99 

98 
98 
93 
93 
8S 
82 
80 
72 
62 
51 
41 

100 

iOO 

99 

99 

99 
99 
99 
99 
97 
94 
92 
87 
79 
68 
57 

100 
100 
99 
99 

99 
98 
95 
92 
85 
76 
66 

■  1  ■ 

99 

9<) 
96 

92 
87 

86 
7S 
68 
58 
47 

99 

lis 

98 

95 
91 
90 
S3 
74 
64 
54 



100 
100 
99 
99 
9S 
95 
90 
82 
72 



10(1 
100 
100 
99 
98 
94 
88 

100 
99 
99 
96 

100 
99 
99 

100 
99 

ioo' 

KNEELING   FIGURES. 


Range, 
yards. 

Time,  minutes. 

1 

4 

3 

1 

li 

2 

2V 

3 

3  J 

4 

5 

0 

10 

15 

200 

300 

400 

500 

600 
700 

800 

900 

1,000 

60 
59 
4S 
47 
39 
36 
32 
24 
26 
21 
17 
13 
10 

84 
83 
73 
72 
63 
59 
54 
41 
46 
38 
30 
24 
18 

93 
93 

S(i 

85 

74 
69 
55 
60 
51 
42 
34 
26 

9S 
98 
93 
92 
86 
84 
79 
66 
70 
61 
52 
42 
33 

99 
99 
99 
98 
95 
93 
90 
80 
84 
76 
60 
56 
46 

100 
100 
99 
99 
99 
98 
96 
88 
91 
85 
77 
67 
56 

100 
100 
99 
99 
98 
93 

"91" 
84 
75 
64 

99 
99 
99 
96 

99 
94 
89 
81 
71 

100 
100 

99 
98 

99 
97 
92 
85 
70 

100 
99 

99 
98 
95 
89 
80 

99 

100 
99 
98 
94 

87 

100 

99 
99 
97 
91 

100 
100 
99 
99 

166' 
100 

USE  OF  TABLES  LN   JUDGING  RESULTS   OF   FIRE. 


368.  General  use  in  judging  results. — .\.ll  tables  of  expected 
results  are  liased  on  the  theory  of  prohaliility.  Tlie  tabulated  re- 
sults are  therefore  "  probable  "  results.  Any  concrete  case  is  as 
likely  to  result  in  a  higher  as  in  a  lo^ver  figure,  and  in  a  great 
number  of  cases  there  will  be  as  many  on  one  side  of  the 
"  probable  "  as  on  the  other. 


MUSKETRY.  251 

This  I'iMt  applied  to  tai)les  of  expccteil  hits  from  iivcra^c 
shots  ineuns  that  average  shots  firing  an  indefinite  nunil)er  of 
identical  problems  will  have  an  average  result  in  direct  hits 
'equal  to  that  shown  in  the  table,  but  with  as  many  results  below  as 
above  the  "probable."  When  it  is  sought  to  compare  the  result 
attained  by  a  tiring  group  in  a  concrete  case  with  the  tabuhitcd 
probable  result  of  average  shots,  it  should  be  remeniliered  tliat 
the  average  shots  themselves  in  the  firing  would  often  attain  a 
number  of  hits  higher  (or  lower)  than  the  prol)able,  and  that  the 
purpose  of  the  comparison  with  the  probable  is  merely  that 
there  may  be  some  standard  of  comparison.  One  would  not 
expect  average  shots  to  hit  upon  this  same  standard  every 
time  they  fired,  Bor  would  one  expect  the  tiring  group  in  any 
concrete  case  to  do  so.  Judgment  is  needed  to  determine 
whether  the  departure  in  the  concrete  case  is  normal  or  abnor- 
mal in  amount.  The  fact  that  it  is  above  or  below  is  absoluti'ly 
immaterial,  it  is  only  the  amount  of  the  departure  that  is  of 
value  in  forming  a  judgment  from  the  comparison. 

369.  Description. — The  amounts  in  the  body  of  the  table  indi- 
cate the  percentages  of  figures  that  should  be  struck  by  any 
number  of  average  shots  firing  at  an  equal  number  of  figiu'es  ar- 
ranged to  represent  a  linear  target  occupying  a  front  of  1  yard 
jxT  figure.  These  results  are  based,  too,  on  the  further  assump- 
tion that  the  correct  elevation  and  rate  of  fire  is  used,  that  the 
fire  is  distributed  equally  throughout  the  entire  front  occupii^l 
by  the  target,  and  that  the  visibility  is  normal. 

Of  these  seven  factors  the  following  four  are  dependent  upon 
the  skill  and  leadership  of  the  firers,  i.  e.,  the  use  of  correct 
elevation  and  rate  of  fire,  the  equal  distribution  of  the  fire,  and 
the  marksmanship  of  the  individual  rilleman  (whether  he  is 
good,  average,  or  poor  shot).  As  these  factors  are,  in  a  sense, 
within  the  control  of  the  firers,  they  may  be  considered  as  con- 
stant in  so  far  as  the  use  of  the  table  is  concerned,  or,  rather, 
varialjle  only  in  that  they  would  serve  to  indicate  whether  the 
performance  had  been  good,  bad,  or  indifferent. 

The  other  three  factors — number  of  figures  in  the  target,  num- 
ber of  figures  in  tho  target  per  yard  of  front,  and  the  degree  of 
visibility  of  the  target — may  vary  with  every  target  and  exer- 
cise, and  visibility  may  vary  even  for  the  same  target  at  dilTer- 
ent  hours  of  the  day. 

The  object  of  these  tables  is  to  give  to  the  umpire  a  means, 
with  the  minimum  computation,  of  finding  a  standard  with  which 


252  MUSKETRY. 

to  compare  the  results  of  any  firing.  The  standard  adopted  is 
the  single  amount  representing  the  percentage  of  casualties 
that  should  have  been  obtained  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy  (num- 
ber of  figures  in  the  target  that  should  have  been  strucli)  in  a 
given  time. 

In  order  that  the  percentage  of  figures  hit  can  be  read  directly 
from  the  table  and  thus  avoid  any  unnecessary  computations  in 
the  field,  it  is  suggested,  when  the  character  of  the  problem  per- 
mits, that  the  target  contain  as  many  figures  as  there  are  rifles 
firing  and  that  the  figures  be  spaced  on  a  frontage  of  one  per 
yard. 

370.  Normal  conditions. — 

Example  1. — At  a  range  of  900  yards  100  men  fire  for  two 
minutes  at  a  line  of  100  kneeling  figures  on  a  front  of  100  yards. 
Visibility  perfect.     In  this  firing  they  strike  24  figures, 

AVhat  is  the  judgment  of  this  result? 

Consult  the  table  headed  '*  Kneeling  figures." 

In  the  column  headed  "  Range,  yards,"  find  the  amount  900. 
Follow  this  line  to  the  right  until  entering  the  column  headed 
"2"  (this  corresponds  to  the  time,  2  minutes,  during  which 
the  fire  continued),  where  is  found  the  amount  67,  which  is  the 
1  ercentage  of  figures  that  should  have  been  struck.  How  does 
this  compare  with  the  result  that  was  obtained? 

First  reduce  the  percentage  of  figures  that  should  have  been 
struck,  67,  to  number  of  figures,  in  this  case  67. 

Then  at  a  glance  the  umpire  can  see  that,  in  the  allotted  time, 
the  firing  resulted  in  a  little  more  than  one  third  the  casulties 
it  should  have  produced. 

371.  Variable  conditions. — 

E. ram  pie  2. — Reduced  visibility. — Fifty  men  fire  at  50  prone 
figures — normal  front — for  2  minutes  at  a  range  of  600 
yards.  The  figures  are  not  well  defined.  It  is  manifest  that  the 
same  results  can  not  be  expected  on  a  target  of  this  character 
as  in  one  that  is  clearly  visible,  hence  it  would  seem  advisable 
to  lower  the  standard.  It  is  only  a  question  of  how  and  how 
much.  This  is  a  matter  resting  entirely  upon  the  judgment  of 
the  umpire  who  makes  an  estimate  of  the  increased  difficulties 
presented  to  the  firers  and  arrives  at  a  decision  which  he  ex- 
presses simply  as  an  opinion,  "  The  visibility  of  the  target  is 
such  in  this  problem  that  a  reduction  of  efficiency  is  to  be 
expected.  In  my  judgment  the  firing  of  this  organization  is 
satisfactory  (deficient,  etc.)." 


MUSKETRY.  268 

Should  the  umpire  wisli  to  l)!ise  this  oiiinioii  iiiion  a  cnmiiu- 
tation  he  may  do  so  in  the  manner  shown  bolow. 

The  umpire,  knowing  the  range  to  be  GOO  yards,  for  example, 
says  to  himself,  "  While  this  actual  range  is  600  yards,  the  tar- 
gets appear  to  me  to  present  all  the  didiculties  of  a  dearly  visi- 
ble target  at  800  yards  and,  as  there  is  no  aiming  point  that 
can  be  used  which  is  as  clearly  outlined  as  the  targets  them- 
selves, I  will  judge  of  this  firing  by  the  800-yard  standard." 

Assume  that  the  fire  resulted  in  20  figures  being  struck. 
Then  in  the  table  at  the  intersection  of  the  800-yard  line  and 
the  2-minute  column  is  found  the  amount  54.  which  is  the  per- 
centage that  should  have  been  struck — in  this  case  27  figures. 

Example  3. — Number  of  firers  differing  from  number  of  figures 
in  the  target. 

lOiglity  men  fire  at  40  prone  figures  for  one  miiuite  at  a  range 
of  700  yards. 

In  this  case  it  becomes  simply  a  question  of  determining  in 
tvhat  time  it  would  take  a  number  of  rifiemen  ecpial  to  the 
number  of  figures  in  the  target  to  deliver  an  amount  of  fire 
equal  to  that  actually  delivered. 

In  this  case  40  men  firing  for  2  minutes  would  give  the  same 
amount  of  fire  as  80  men  for  1  minute,  and  therefore  should 
strike  63  per  cent  or  25  of  the  figures. 

Example  .). — Targets  on  front  other  than  1  figure  per  yard. 

Sixty  men  fire  at  60  prone  figures  on  a  front  of  120  yards  for 
2  minutes  at  a  range  of  600  yards.  As  the  vulnerability  of  this 
thin  line  is  only  half  that  of  a  line  of  normal  density,  then  the 
standard  is  .sought  in  the  column  indicating  half  the  time 
actually  consumed.  In  this  case  the  amount  sought  is  at  the 
intersection  of  the  600-yard  line  and  the  1-minute  colunm  and 
is  found  to  be  48  per  cent,  or  29  figures,  which  is  the  number 
of  figures  tiiat  should  have  been  struck. 

These  tables  may  be  used  also  in  determining  comparison, 
factors  of  time  and  men.  and  in  formulating  problems  with  ball 
cartridges  as  to  duration  of  fire  and  number  of  rounds  to  be 
issued. 

372.  Time  and  men  comparison. —  (o)   Wiiat  time  should  have 

been  re<iuire(l  by  tiie  firers  to  have  gotten  the  result  obtaint^l? 

{!))   How    many    men    with    j)roper    sight    setting,    rate,    and 

distribution  could  have  produced  the  same  number  of  casualties 

in  the  actual  time  consumed  by  the  firers? 


264  MUSKETRY. 

Cousidei'ing  the  lirst  question  («)  and  referring  to  the 
example  where  100  men  fired  for  two  minutes  at  a  range  of  900 
yards  on  100  lineeling  figures  on  a  front  of  100  yards  with  a 
result  of  24  figures,  ov  24  per  cent,  struck,  visibility  perfect : 

Follow  the  range  line  (900)  to  the  right  until  encountering 
an  amount  approximately  equal  to  the  percentage  of  figures 
actually  struck.  The  heading  of  the  time  column  in  which  this 
amount  is  found  will  be  the  answer  sought.  In  this  example, 
the  percentage  24  is  found  on  the  900-yard  line.  As  this 
amount,  2^,  is  found  in  the  %-minute  column,  the  umpire  ar- 
rives at  the  conclusion  that  the  firers  should  have  accomplished 
what  they  did  in  one-half  minute. 

Considering  the  second  question  (b)  and  referring  to  the 
same  example : 

This  is  answered  by  solving  this  simple  proportion : 

The  time  actually  consumed :  The  time  that  should  have  been 
consumed  : :  Number  of  men  actually  firing :  The  number  of  men 
required. 

In  this  example  it  would  be  2 :  %  : :  100 :  x,  or  a?— 25.  That 
is,  25  men  should  have  been  able  to  strike  24  out  of  100  targets 
in  two  minutes'  firing. 

Just  how  many  of  these  bases  of  comparison  are  used  by  the 
umpire  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  problem  and  whether,  in 
his  .iudgment,  the  tactical  situation  calls  for  additional  emphasis 
of  the  need  for  economy  of  time  or  economy  of  men. 

373.  Duration  of  fire  and  number  of  rounds, —  ( a )  How  long  to 
continue  the  fire  at  any  particular  target? 

(6)  How  much  ammunition  to  issue  for  any  particular  prob- 
lem? 

(a)  It  is  obvious  that  if  the  fii'e  is  continued  too  long  at  a 
target  the  percentage  of  figures  struck  ceases  to  be  an  indi- 
cation of  the  efficacy  of  the  fire.  Thus,  for  example,  no  conclu- 
sions of  value  could  be  drawn  from  the  results  of  fire  continued 
for  more  than  one  minute  on  kneeling  figures  at  200  yards,  or 
for  more  than  3^2  minutes  at  prone  figures  at  400  yards. 

Hence  in  drawing  up  tbe  problem  the  umpire  may  decide  on 
what  percentage  of  figures  he    :...-,.res  to  -  in  any 

target,  and  then  (from  the  table)  he  can  determine  for  what 
period  he  can  allow  the  fire  to  continue. 

For  example :  How  long  shall  fire  continue  in  order  to  strike 
30  out  of  100  prone  figures — normal  front — at  800  yards?    From 


MUSKETRY. 


255 


flio  talilc,  (iiiitosito  r-AUiic  S(»()  in  the  l-iiiimitc  cnldinii,  is  I'ouinl 
32,  tlie  nearest  porcentii^e  to  30. 

For  an  iniual  uiunlu'r  of  ritles  this  would  ln'  :il)>>ui  one  iiiimilf. 

For  200  rilles.  half  the  time. 

For  fiO  rilles,  double  the  time. 

For  half  the  density  of  tarfjet  (1  lij.'ure  jier  2  yards  of  front ). 
double  the  time. 

(6)  To  estimate  the  aiiiounl  of  aimiiunilioii  (o  issue  for  any 
partieular  exercise,  imiltiply  the  duration  of  lire  by  the  correct 
rate  for  that  ranj^e  (see  Table  I,  under  "Statistical  record") 
or  by  the  umpire's  e.stimated  rate.  It  is  advisable  to  add  10 
I)er  cent  to  this  estimate  in  order  to  provide  ammunition  to 
men  whose  rate  of  fire  is  greater  than  that  ordered.  This  to 
equalize  the  amnninition  unexpended  by  men  who  are  using  a 
slower  rate  than  onleivd,  due  to  either  lack  of  training,  ground, 
or  vegetation  preventing  view  of  assigned  targets,  to  jams,  etc. 

Assume  an  exercise  in  which  four  targets  of  prone  figures 
were  to  be  used  and  fire  to  be  continued  until  30  to  40  per  cent 
of  the  figures  have  been  struck.  The  range  to  target  No.  1  is 
about  800  yards,  to  No.  2  is  700  yards,  to  No.  3  is  600  yards,  and 
to  No.  4  is  500  yards. 

The  issue  of  ammunition  would  be  computed  as  follows : 


Target. 

Range. 

Time. 

Rate. 

Rounds. 

1                           

800 

700 

600 

500(B.S.) 

1 
1 

5.8 
6.6 
7.5 
8.3 

5.8 

2         

6.6 

3 

5.6 

4 

6.2 

Add  10  per  cent. 

24.2 
2.4 

26.6 

That  is,  in  this  exerci.se,  30  rounds  per  man  would  be  issued- 
30  instead  of  27  merely  to  save  time  by  issuing  only  full  clips. 


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